User:LawrenceJayM/sandbox

Leonard Hearns II outline

I Fight in 1981 repercussions for both in fight 2 A. Leonard's eye B. Hearns being best known for loss II Leadup to 1989 fight. A. Leonard's views on hearns' chin, legs B. Hearns weight, purse repercussions/Clancy questions, & this is last fight Hearns ever fought at such a low weight, lending weight to Clancy's observation. C round 12 leonard given questionable 10 to 8 rd to induce draw.

Prior to round 7, Dundee beseeched his charge to stay in the center of the ring. Ali managed to do so effectively for about a round and a half, and was able to best Frazier in heavy toe to toe exchanges during the opening minute of round 8, which was described by Dunphy on the telecast as "A big rally by Ali." During the latter part of the eighth, as well as the ninth and tenth rounds, Ali didn't have the energy to stay off of the ropes, and absorbed a great deal of punishment from his shorter opponent in multiple close-in exchanges. This was a result not only of the tireless labors of a fearsome challenger, but the deplorable conditions under which the fight was held.

The majority of the fighting during rounds 5-11 was done with Ali's back to the ropes, and Frazier enjoyed commensurate advantages. It is important to note, however, that Ali was able to land his share of punches during this period (especially at the beginning of round 8) and that as a result of an accumulation of blows and the oppressive heat the fight was contested in, Frazier's left eye swelled up, and began to close.

.              A.

The fight took place at 10 AM local time in order to accommodate an international viewing audience. Though it served the business interests of the fight, it was detrimental to the fighters. Ali's ring physician Ferdie Pacheco explains: "'At 10am the stickiness of the night was still there, but cooked by the sun. So what you got is boiling water for atmosphere."Denise Menz, who was part of Frazier's contingent, said of the conditions inside Araneta Coliseum; "It was so intensely hot, I've never before felt heat like that in my life. Not a breath of air--nothing.  And that was sitting there.  Can you imagine being in the ring? I don't know how they did it." Frazier estimated the ring temperature at more than 120 degrees Fahrenheit, taking into account the effect of additional lights used for purposes of televising the fight. Ali would later say that he had lost lost 5 lbs that morning due to severe dehydration caused by the conditions.

When the fighters and their cornermen met at the center of the ring for the referee's instructions, Ali continued his verbal assault on Frazier, finishing with the taunt; "'You don't have it Joe, you don't have it! I'm going to put you away! In response, Frazier smiled and said 'We'll see." And so began what many consider to be the greatest boxing match ever held.

The Champion was sharp early, as the notoriously slow starter, Frazier, could not bob and weave his way inside of Ali's jab. Ali won the first two rounds decisively. His jab was effective, he kept his man turning, and landed more than a few straight right hands behind the jab. Commenting for the U.S. television audience, Don Dunphy summed up the early action stating; "Ali with his fast hands and sharp shooting keeps it his way." Viewing the fight for the first time some 31 years later, Frazier said simply; "too far away, needed to get closer."

The 3rd round was an inflection point in the contest. Ali began his rope-a-dope, which was a strategy for him to get needed rest for his legs along the ropes while his opponent expended energy throwing punches. When it was effective, Muhammad would eventually spin off the ropes and unleash a volley of punches in rapid succession against an arm-weary opponent. In Manila, it did not work out that way. Frazier landed his first good body punches of the fight in the 3rd round with Ali pinned in the corner. Due to his general lack of reach and arthritic right elbow, Frazier needed to be right on top of Ali to land with frequency, and the rope-a-dope enabled him to do that. About two minutes into the round, a frustrated Ali came out winging, throwing a succession of hard punches in anger, many of which missed their mark. Seeing this, BBC commentator, Harry Gibbs told his audience "I don't know when I've seen Ali in as aggressive a mood as this, he really looks as if he wants to nail Frazier to the canvas for one and all." Ali also carried his campaign of verbal abuse into the bout--most noticeably so in round 3, when he was riding high, and had plenty left in the tank. Carlos Padilla recounted Ali's recital of pugilistic nursery rhymes to Frazier thusly; "during the fight he would say 'Ah one ah two and a three... Jack be nimble and Jack be quick, Jack jump over the candlestick.  Is that all you can give? Come on, you ugly gorilla, hit me!'"

The fifth round was a signal round for Frazier, as the timing and rhythm of his bobbing and weaving action improved, and he was able to avoid the oncoming fists of the champion and for the first time in the fight, land solid left hooks to Ali's head. The champion spent much of the round along the ropes, which according to his outstanding trainer, Angelo Dundee, "was the worst thing he could do because he's making Joe pick up momentum where he could drive those shots to the body."

The fifth was also the round where Ali's method of self defense changed for the worse. Jerry Izenberg, a journalist who was ringside that day noted that "Somewhere about the 4th or 5th round Joe hit him with a right hand--I didn't think Joe could tie his shoes with his right hand--and Ali pulls back and says 'You don't have no right hand, you can't do that.' and Bing! he hits him with another right hand. Suddenly Ali had to think 'Well there are two hands in this fight on the other side'-that was very important." His guard also visibly lowered in this round as a result of the vicious body attack he was absorbing. The net effect was that Ali became much more exposed to Frazier's most lethal punch, the left hook.

Shortly after the bell rang to start the 6th round, Joe Frazier landed a thunderous left hook which thudded against the right side of Muhammad Ali's face. Ali was knocked back by the force of the blow, and landed in the ropes behind him. He did not appear dazed or groggy, but was visibly stiff in his body movements while backing away from the oncoming Frazier, and continuing to throw punches of his own. Seconds later, Frazier landed a tremendous, whipping left hook to Ali's head. Again Ali landed in the ropes behind him, but he only gave appearance of being slightly dazed, and stiff legged. Though he had taken blows that would have felled a lesser or less committed fighter, Ali remained standing and was able to finish the round without being knocked down, and ultimately went on to win the fight. Years later, watching the event on video, Joe Frazier could only shake his head in disbelief at the sight of Ali withstanding these powerful blows. Izerberg observed "They were tremendous hooks, and you have to understand, normal fighters would not have continued--it would have been over."

Aftermath

Neither fighter was ever the same again. Neither was remotely effective, and their fitness to fight at all was at the very least in question.

best place ali stays on the ropes hes going to get picked to death by Joe's punching power so ali has to keep him in the center of the ring or he has to throw quick flurries on the ropes or he has to get off the ropes quick if he stays on the ropes he's going to fall behind. Joe's best position is to have Ali on the ropes he cant match ali for speed in the middle of the ring, he can't do much in the middle of the ring he's too short so his best place is along the ropes, and he's walking him (Ali) straight ot the ropes every time.

As the bout wore on, a clear trend emerged: when Ali had his back against the ropes, Frazier had a sizable advantage. He was able to wear down his opponent with body punches, left hooks to the head, and occasionally, short, chopping right hands. Meanwhile, the long-armed champion had a difficult time getting much power into his punches while fighting on the inside. Alternatively, when the fighting took place in the center of the ring, Ali was able to take advantage of his superior reach and hand speed, and deliver good, clean jabs and one-twos to his opponent's head (Ali did not throw a single body punch in this fight). Ken Norton, who was ringside doing color commentary for the fight, thought that the ropes were Frazier's "best place. If Ali stays on the ropes, he's going to get picked to death by Joe's punching power. Ali has to keep him in the center of the ring or he has to throw quick flurries on the ropes and he has to get off the ropes quick - if he stays on the ropes he's going to fall behind.   Joe's best position is to have Ali on the ropes - he can't match Ali for speed in the middle of the ring - he can't do much in the middle of the ring, he's too short so his best place is along the ropes, and he's walking him straight to the ropes every time."

Ali was also able to slow Frazier at times by grabbing the back of his head or neck and pulling it down, but was unable to nullify Frazier's body punching as he had in their second encounter. Referee, Carlos Padilla, made a point of being more assertive than his predecessor, and warned Ali on multiple occasions for use of this extra-legal tactic. He also broke the fighters very quickly, and in the later rounds when Ali was in a weakened state, did not break the fighters, but instead just removed Ali's gloved hand from the back of Frazier's neck, and had the fighters continue without breaking them.

And so it went: with the unbearable conditions taking a severe toll on both fighters, Frazier was able to carry the fight to Ali throughout the middle rounds with the majority of the action taking place along the ropes.

Ali, in response to the pleadings of his corner, was able to summon the energy to stand and fight in the center of the ring for most of the 7th round, and in patches during rounds 8-10, and in so doing, landed enough punches to cause severe swelling to Frazier, which eventually impaired his vision and impacted the outcome of the fight.

Thriller in Manila Fight outline:
I. Fight strategy for Frazier II Strategy for Ali A. Futch's counter, getting the right referee III In the ring: pre fight Ali taunts frazier, tells him "you don't have it Joe, you don't have it, I'm going to put you away." Frazier smiled and said, "we'll see". IV Ali's controlled agression dominates 1st 2 rounds V. Round 3 inflection point. The reasoning behind, and failure of rope a dope, and an overanxious Ali misses a lot of punches, tires himself. VI Frazier wins round 5, is very effective, and follows blueprint set for next 7-8 rounds VII round 6 a huge round for Frazier VIII Eighth round an epic battle IIX

Frazier's blindness in one eye Intense heat's effects on fighters. After 6th round, Frazier glares out at Ali on way back to corner.

Eddie Futch (August 9, 1911 – October 10, 2001) was a boxing trainer. Among the fighters he trained are Joe Frazier, Ken Norton, Larry Holmes, and Trevor Berbick, four of the five men to defeat Muhammad Ali.

Eddie Futch was the trainer of record for Joe Frazier, Riddick Bowe, and Montell Griffin when they defeated and handed future Hall of Fame fighters Muhammed Ali, Evander Holyfield, and Roy Jones, Jr., their first professional defeats.

Youth and Amateur Career
Futch was born in Hillsboro, Mississippi, but moved with his family to Detroit, Michigan when he was five years old. They lived in the Black Bottom section of the town. When Futch was a teenager, he played semi-professional basketball with the Moreland YMCA Flashes. He planned to attended the YMCA College School at the University of Chicago, but when the Great Depression happened, he was forced to continue his job at the Wolverine Hotel to support his family. Here is where he trained promoter and trainer Don Arnott

In 1932, Futch won the Detroit Athletic Association Lightweight Championship, and in 1933, he won the Detroit Golden Gloves Championship. He trained at the same gym as Joe Louis, the Brewster Recreation Center Gym, and often sparred with the future champion. A heart murmur prevented Futch from turning professional, and he began training boxers.

Hall of Fame Trainer
Eddie Futch was an outstanding trainer, perhaps the greatest who ever lived. He prepared fighters to perform their best at the highest levels of the sport for several decades. Champions who worked under Futch's tutelage include Joe Frazier, Larry Holmes, Riddick Bowe, Michael Spinks, Alexis Arguello, Marlon Starling, Wayne McCullough, Montell Griffin, and his first world champion fighter, Don Jordan, who was crowned world welterweight champion in 1958.

Training Joe Frazier
Eddie Futch was first hired by Frazier, and his chief cornerman and manager Yank Durham to help him prepare for a fight with Scrapiron Johnson in 1967. Shortly thereafter, he was informed by the duo that Joe Frazier had been legally blind in his left eye since a training accident in 1964. Throughout Frazier's entire career, the three men were the only ones who knew about this severe malady. Because of this, and Joe's lack of height and reach, Futch deemed it to be of the utmost importance for Frazier to develop an effective defensive style. He trained Frazier to constantly bob and weave, and create a sense of persistent motion and pressure, which also took advantage of Frazier's lack of size to make him an elusive target. This unique fighting style enabled him to get inside where his punches could reach his opponents without taking as much punishment as boxing with a more conventional fighting style would.

The tactic proved to be highly effective, and Frazier remained undefeated, winning the New York title from Buster Mathis, and WBA crown from Jimmy Ellis with devastating knockouts. All of which led to the inevitable showdown with Muhammad Ali in the bout promoters deemed "The Fight of the Century" which took place in March 1971 at New York's Madison Square Garden.

Fight of the Century
In developing Frazier's strategy for the Ali fight, Futch thought it important for him to land body punches on Ali consistently throughout the course of the fight in order to wear him down. He felt that Frazier's constant bobbing and weaving would make Ali uncomfortable because he would often have to punch down at Joe's head (Ali almost never threw body punches) and he'd never had to do that before. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in watching films of Ali, Futch noticed that his uppercuts were thrown sloppily, and incorrectly from a technical standpoint (Futch said Ali threw what he thought were uppercuts.) He instructed Frazier to throw a left hook over the top of Ali's right uppercuts, and told his fighter to expect to beat Ali to the punch when doing so. In the 15th round, when an exhausted Ali opened the round by throwing a half-hearted uppercut, Joe Frazier feinted a left hook, and then unleashed a huge leaping left hook at Ali's head, which floored him, creating an iconic moment in boxing history.

Frazier won the fight by a unanimous decision, and was recognized as the undefeated, undisputed champion of the world.

Manila
Four and a half years after the Fight of the Century, Frazier and Ali met for a third and final time in the fight that will forever be known as the "Thrilla in Manila" in September 1975. Eddie Futch served as Frazier's manager and chief second for this fight, having inherited those duties from Durham who had passed away from a stroke shortly after Frazier's defeat by George Foreman in 1973.

Fight Strategy and Referee Selection
(Frazier cornerman) Eddie Futch's main preoccupation heading into the Manila bout lay in preventing Ali from repeating the illegal tactic of holding Frazier behind the neck to create extended clinches. Ali used this tactic to effectively keep Frazier from getting inside, and enable him to get needed rest during his victory in their second meeting. By Futch's count Ali had done this 142 times in that fight without being penalized. He also did it while facing the much taller Foreman in his defeat of him in Zaire, leaving little doubt as to his intentions for the upcoming bout in Manila. Sensing trouble, Futch moved to block (Ali-Foreman ref) Zach Clayton as referee by enlisting the aid of Philadelphia Mayor Frank Rizzo who refused to let Clayton out of his duties as a Philadelphia civil service employee to go referee the fight. Futch also warned Filipino authorities that Ali was going to mar what was to be a great event for their nation by constantly tying up Frazier illegally. He advised them to assign one of their countrymen to referee the bout, stressing that this would reflect well on the Philippines, and be a source of pride for its people. Futch and Filipino officials (who bought in heavily to the idea) brushed aside complaints from Don King that Filipino refs were too physically small to handle a heavyweight fight. This resulted in the appointment of Filipino Carlos Padilla.

As for the fight strategy, Futch and his assistant, George Benton thought the key to the fight would be Frazier's persistent attack on Ali's body, including punches to the hips when Ali effectively covered up his torso along the ropes." Benton related; "my expression to Joe was what you've got to do is stay on top of him, and hit the son of a bitch anywhere, hit him on the hips, hit him on the legs. You hit him anywhere!"

Indeed, Frazier's strategy was the epitome of the old boxing axiom "if you kill the body, the head will die." As he described it;"Once I've stopped your organs--when those kidneys and liver stop functioning, he can't move so fast... The organs in his body have to be functioning. If you slow them down, he cannot do what he wants to do."

The Ali camp used the championship as leverage in negotiations, and won out on two key points. The ring size which was 21' by 21' allowed Muhammad the ability to move and circle the ring if he so chose, which would enable him to use his superior boxing skills to his advantage. He also got his preference for 8 oz. gloves which were smaller and less padded than those used in most heavyweight bouts. According to Ali's ring Dr., Ferdie Pacheco, Ali planned to take advantage of Frazier's well-earned reputation as a slow starter, and use his superior reach and hand speed to attack Joe exclusively with punches to the head in the early rounds in the hopes of scoring a knockout, or at least doing enough damage to Frazier to prevent him from fighting effectively as the bout wore on.

Fight Strategy and Referee Selection
(Frazier cornerman) Eddie Futch's main preoccupation heading into the Manila bout lay in preventing Ali from repeating the illegal tactic of holding Frazier behind the neck to create extended clinches. Ali used this tactic to effectively keep Frazier from getting inside, and enable him to get needed rest during his victory in their second meeting. By Futch's count Ali had done this 142 times in that fight without being penalized. He even did it while facing the much taller Foreman in his defeat of him in Zaire, leaving little doubt as to his intentions for the upcoming bout in Manila. Sensing trouble, Futch moved to block (Ali-Foreman ref) Zach Clayton as referee by enlisting the aid of Philadelphia Mayor Frank Rizzo who refused to let Clayton out of his duties as a Philadelphia civil service employee to go referee the fight. Futch also warned Filipino authorities that Ali was going to mar what was to be a great event for their nation by constantly tying up Frazier illegally. He advised them to assign one of their countrymen to referee the bout, stressing that this would reflect well on the Philippines, and be a source of pride for its people. Futch and Filipino officials (who bought in heavily to the idea) brushed aside complaints from Don King that Filipino refs were too physically small to handle a heavyweight fight. This resulted in the appointment of Filipino Carlos Padilla.

As for the fight strategy, Futch and his assistant, George Benton thought the key to the fight would be Frazier's persistent attack on Ali's body, including punches to the hips when Ali effectively covered up his torso along the ropes." Benton related; "my expression to Joe was what you've got to do is stay on top of him, and hit the son of a bitch anywhere, hit him on the hips, hit him on the legs. You hit him anywhere!"

Indeed, Frazier's strategy was the epitome of the old boxing axiom "if you kill the body, the head will die." As he described it;"Once I've stopped your organs--when those kidneys and liver stop functioning, he can't move so fast... The organs in his body have to be functioning. If you slow them down, he cannot do what he wants to do."

his was brutally effective. It resulted in an exhausted, stationary Ali with hematomas on both hips, who informed his corner that he could not continue following the 14th round. Tragically for Frazier, Ali had landed enough punches to close his one sighted eye, rendering him nearly blind in the ring.

At the conclusion of the 14th, which was a terrible round for Frazier, fearing that Joe might lose his vision in his one sighted eye (his right), Futch stopped the fight over Frazier's objections. After finding out that Ali would not have continued, and seeing him pass out in the ring after briefly attempting to stand and acknowledge the crowd in victory, Frazier became deeply bitter at Futch for his decision. Futch, however to his dying day never expressed any regret over what may well have been the most consequential decision ever made by a trainer.