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Why Holodomor is a genocide of Ukrainian people
The Holodomor (Ukrainian: Голодомо́р, romanized: Holodomor, IPA: [ɦolodoˈmɔr];[2] derived from морити голодом, moryty holodom, 'to kill by starvation'),[a][3][4][5] also known as the Terror-Famine[6][7][8] or the Great Famine,[9] was a famine in Soviet Ukraine from 1932 to 1933 that killed from 3.9 — 10,5 million of Ukrainians.

1. FOOD WITHDRAWAL
Forced and total seizure of food is the first sign of genocide. On June 21, 1932, Stalin and Molotov sent a telegram to the Central Committee of the CP(B)U and the Council of people's commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, which demanded the implementation of the grain procurement plan under any conditions. "Non-givers" of bread were called to the village council and inflicted severe beatings on them, forced to kneel, pasted posters with offensive inscriptions on their chests and led around the village, stripped naked women, taken out undressed in the cold to the steppe, kept for several days in cold pits, did not allow them to eat and sleep, beat them with revolvers, destroyed buildings, houses, stoves, embroidered roofs of houses, organized drafts and other inhuman tortures. The Russian Bolsheviks surrounded entire settlements included in the system of Blacklisting, and took out all food products from there, the recalcitrant ones were arrested. Stalin delivered the final blow on January 1, 1933, with a telegram to the Central Committee of the CP(B)U regarding the "voluntary surrender of hidden bread."

2. PROHIBITION OF TRAVEL FOR BREAD
The second sign of genocide is severe restrictions on freedom of movement. The Soviet government not only forcibly deprived Ukrainian peasants of food but also severely restricted their freedom of movement so that they could not find salvation in other regions of the Ukrainian SSR. Departure was prohibited by the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) and the Council of people's commissars of the Ukrainian SSR of January 22, 1933, signed by Stalin and Molotov. The restrictions applied specifically to the peasants of Ukraine, as well as to the Kuban, where, according to the 1926 census, there were 915,450 Ukrainians – more than two-thirds of the total population. All peasants of Ukraine and the North Caucasus who made their way north were to be arrested. After the selection of "counter-revolutionary elements", all others were ordered to be returned to their places of residence. As of February 14, 1933, 31,783 people were detained, of which 28,351 were returned to their places of residence, 3,434 were brought to justice, and 579 were selected for sending to the Kazakh ASRR. At the same time, Kazakhstan also suffered from hunger. However, the archives do not contain any decisions on the forced return of Kazakhs fleeing from starvation to the regions of Western Siberia. By the end of 1932, there were 150 thousand of them.

3. SILENCING THE TRUTH ABOUT THE HOLODOMOR
This is the third sign of genocide. The world community could provide food aid to the starving population. But the Soviet authorities made an effort to ensure that no one knew about the famine. The Bolshevik leaders resorted to large-scale disinformation, involving even prominent figures in world culture - Romain Rolland, Bernard Shaw, French Prime Minister Édouard Herriot. Foreigners inspected specially prepared facilities and then convinced the world that there is no famine in Ukraine. Stalin bribed American journalist Walter Duranty, who told the world from the New York Times that the famine in Ukraine was a fabrication.

4. REFUSAL OF WESTERN AID FACILITIES
The fourth sign of genocide is the blocking of foreign aid attempts. Ukrainian emigrants made efforts to provide material assistance to the hungry people of Ukraine, but the organizers of the Holodomor did their best to ensure that not a crumb reached the affected villages. They took financial aid for themselves, dooming those to whom the money was addressed to die. The "smart" Bolsheviks invented a way to warm their hands on the tragedy, creating a system of so-called "tradesmen". They were visited by hungry people who, out of desperation, sold gold, silver, and other jewelry for nothing. The total amount delivered was 33 tons of gold and 1,420 tons of silver.

5. PRE-SETTLEMENT IN EXTINCT UKRAINIAN VILLAGES
Another sign of genocide is the forced change in the demographic situation in Ukraine. The organizers of the Holodomor deliberately resettled residents of Russia and Belarus to the place of extinct Ukrainians. So they tried to blur the continuity of the Ukrainian ethnic territory, especially in the southeastern regions of Ukraine. For the first time such a policy was tested in the Kuban village of Poltava. Its population was taken to Kazakhstan, and in its place at the beginning of 1933, retired Red Army soldiers and OGPU veterans began to arrive. 350 people each from Leningrad, Belorussian and Moscow, 250 people from the Ukrainian, 200 people from the Volga military districts. As the Russian researcher [|V. Churkin] testifies, this operation was planned in advance and developed to the smallest detail. One of the organizers of the Holodomor, Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR Mikhail Tukhachevsky signed a secret directive a week before the resettlement of the village of Poltava. He demanded until January 10, 1933 to recruit "especially politically reliable" from the army ranks to populate empty houses. "Natives of the North Caucasus and Ukraine are not subject to recruitment," he noted. There were not enough empty houses on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. Since the spring of 1933, Ukraine has been a terrible void. By autumn, the situation had worsened, especially in the steppe part, where there were entire villages in which not a single living person remained.

6. TERMINATION OF UKRAINIZATION
Finally, the anti-Ukrainian policy that accompanied it is a clear sign of genocide. Moscow unequivocally outlined its attitude to Ukrainization in the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated December 14, 1932 "On grain procurements in Ukraine, the North Caucasus and the Western region": "... instead of the correct Bolshevik implementation of national policy in a number of regions of Ukraine, Ukrainization was carried out mechanically, without taking into account the specific characteristics of each district, without careful selection of Bolshevik Ukrainian cadres, which made it easier for bourgeois-nationalist elements, Petliurists and others to create their legal covers, their counter-revolutionary cells and organizations... Propose to the Central Committee of the CP(b)To pay serious attention to the proper conduct of Ukrainization, eliminate its mechanical conduct, expel Petliura and other bourgeois-nationalist elements from party and Soviet organizations, carefully select and educate Ukrainian Bolshevik cadres, ensure systematic party leadership and control over the conduct of Ukrainization." This also applied to territories outside the USSR: "... the frivolous, non-Bolshevik "Ukrainization" of almost half of the districts of Sevkavkaz, not arising from the cultural interests of the population, with the complete absence of control over the Ukrainization of schools and the press by the regional authorities, gave a legal form to the enemies of Soviet power from the Kulaks, officers, emigrant Cossacks, participants of the Kuban Glad, etc." Based precisely on this logic, the party leadership set as its goal "the defeat of the grain procurement resistance of the Kulak elements and their party and non-party servants." To achieve it, a number of brutal repressions were introduced. Among them are the forced relocation, in particular, of the village of Poltava, which has already been discussed, and the settlement of the vacated places by "conscientious Red Army collective farmers." Forced translation of all office work, newspapers and magazines, school education in Ukrainian districts into Russian. On December 15, 1932, Stalin and Molotov signed a decree on the termination of Ukrainization in the Far East, Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Volga region, the Central Chernozem region - wherever Ukrainians lived. Moscow has not applied such a complex of repressive measures as against Ukrainians during the Holodomor of 1932-1933 and after it to any other nation. Although, in general, the repressions concerned others, in particular Germans and Poles, whom the Bolsheviks "took up" at the end of 1934.

Losses of the Ukrainian nation during the Holodomor in 1932 - 1933
In 1926, almost 31.2 million Ukrainians lived in the Ukrainian SSR, and in 1937, only 26.4 million. The number of Russians during this time increased from 77.8 million to almost 94 million people, Belarusians - from 4.74 million to 4.87 million people. Personal impressions of contemporaries of famine. They arose under the influence of what they saw with their own eyes and heard from direct witnesses. The voiced figures differed markedly. It could have been "10 or 15 million souls", as Italian Consul Sergio Gradenigo wrote in a letter dated May 31, 1933. And 18 million, which in private conversations in August 1934 spoke the head of the choir "Dumka" Nestor Gorodovenko. It was also called the figure of 7 million, which was written in a letter to Maxim Gorky by an employee of the Kharkiv Electromechanical Plant Jacob Sapsai. Impressions expressed publicly. They were typical for Western countries in chronologically close to the Holodomor years. Such assessments were usually made on the basis of reports received from the USSR. Although notes about the famine began to appear in the Foreign Press as early as February 1933, the first concrete public assessment of the losses was made in early July 1933 and belonged to Richard Sallet, a Harvard graduate and lecturer in political science at Northwestern University. In a short note in the New York World Telegram newspaper, he announced the figure of 10 million. Following the fresh trail of events, there were other, smaller estimates of losses – from 1 to 5 million rubles. Moreover, there were even some figures who denied losses at all. As an example of this approach, we can recall the position of New York Times correspondent Walter Duranti and former French Prime Minister Edouard Herriot. In fact, because of this kind of public denial of mortality from hunger, which was made by authoritative persons, and because of sympathies for communist ideas in western society. The above-mentioned diversity of estimates of demographic losses also played a negative role in this.