User:Lingzhi/causesBengal

Verification moved

 * moved to User:Lingzhi/verifyBengal
 * elected Indian appointed British p. 98
 * borrow for seed etc. p. 66

underlying

 * 1) inefficient agricultural practices, [Das underlying #7 &  #8;]
 * 2) over-population, [Greenough blames almost everything ultimately on population increase; though some on shift to British-style self-centered market practices]
 * 3) de-peasantisation through debt bondage and land grabbing [Das proximate #9??;]

proximate

 * 1) local natural disasters—a cyclone, storm surges and flooding, and rice crop disease [Das proximate #2;]
 * 2) various consequences arising from the war.
 * 3) war-time inflation [Das proximate #8;]
 * 4) loss of rice imports due to the Japanese occupation of Burma (modern Myanmar) [Das proximate #1;]
 * 5) disruption of Bengal's market supplies and transport systems by the British "scorched earth" response to the occupation (the "denial policies" for rice and boats) [Das proximate #5 &  #6;]
 * 6) massive inflation brought on by repeated policy failures, war profiteering, speculation, and perhaps hoarding. [Das proximate #8??;]
 * 7) The British government prioritised military and defense needs, allocating medical care and food disproportionately to the military, civil servants and other "priority classes".  [Das proximate  #6;]
 * 8) These factors were compounded by restricted access to grain:
 * 9) domestic sources were constrained by emergency inter-provincial trade barriers,
 * 10) access to international sources was largely denied by Churchill's War Cabinet.

underlying

 * 1) The staple food-grains produced in the province insufficient for its population.
 * 2) Majority of the Bengalees are connected with land and have a very small margin between subsistence and starvation
 * 3) Smallness and scatteredness of agricultural holdings
 * 4) Absence of mechanised industries in the rural areas and gradual decay of rural handicrafts
 * 5) Extension of the cutivation of jute at the cost of food-grains.
 * 6) Physical degeneration of the people pioduced by malnutrition and malaria
 * 7) Absence of propor and sufficient irrigation and drainage facilities leading to dependence of agriculture on the caprices of climate.
 * 8) Absence of scientific methods in agriculture.
 * 9)  Lack of education.

proximate

 * 1) Failure of supply of rice from Burma, Thailand and Indochina
 * 2) Natural calamities like flood and cyclone in some parts of the province
 * 3) Hoarding of rice by farmers, merchants and well to-do consumers.
 * 4) Half hearted attempts at price-control and ineffective food drive by the Government of Bengal
 * 5) Removal of boats in pursuance of Denial Policy
 * 6) War requirements i.e. hoarding of rice for Industrial workers and soldiers. Denial Policy
 * 7) General dislocation of transportation
 * 8) Inflation of currency
 * 9) Destruction of rural credit brought about by the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act
 * 10) Official corruption
 * 11) Moral degeneration of the people

underlying

 * see p. 138
 * 1) population growth (pp. 61–5) [Greenough blames almost everything ultimately on population increase; though some on shift to British-style self-centered market practices]
 * 2) inefficient grain marketing system (p. )
 * 3) landless wage-workers appeared on a large scale, from 1870s onward (pp. 61–5)
 * 4) small land-holdings "consequence of an increasing rural population and an essentially unchanging [total size of]  land base" (at the conclusion of the "Sharecropping and risky settlement" section, pp. 69–70).
 * 5) scarcity of rice (production falling slowly but long-term; population increasing rapidly, p. 83)
 * see also p. 84, "semi-starved for many years"

proximate

 * 1) war, rebellion and cyclone in the districts
 * 2) bad morale, panic 87-8
 * 3) refugees, disease 88-9
 * 4) defense spending threw peasants out of work "boat denial" 89-90
 * 5) appropriation of farmlands 90
 * 6) Quit India, unrest, 90-2
 * 7) cyclone 92-94 p. 96 "first stage famine when local rice supplies destroyed by cyclone"
 * 8) rice denial 94-5 with corruption; rice denial scheme origin never explained footnote 26
 * 9) aberrant rice market, 1942–43
 * 10) rise in prices put it out of reach of the poor p. 98
 * 11) cultivators and traders failed to bring rice to market p. 98
 * 12) "the Bengal rice market... with the knowledge and sometimes consent of govt, had become a veritable engine of distress" p. 99
 * 13) "derangement of the market rather than a deficiency of food that precipitated the famine" p. 99
 * 14) freezing of the market 99-100
 * 15) ordinary wartime inflation 102-3 with good table
 * 16) Burma deranged 103
 * 17) Bengal govt halted all but officially sanctioned exports June 1942, p. 103
 * 18) Foodgrains Control order scarcely operated in Bengal; speculators and novies played a major role as a result p. 104
 * 19) July 1942 Bengal govt price control (failed) 104; supplies disappeared, refused to bring to market
 * 20) price controls 'created the black market, and their failure caused it to expand tremendously "less amenable to supervision... govt and est. traders watched with dismay" p. 105 Pinnell, formerly Commerce Dept. but now Civil Supplies, ICS so... Indian govt?
 * 21) Pinnell's dept successful for 4 months or so but then cyclone, mid-Nov prices soar speculation peak Dec p. 107
 * 22) the govt tried to start a "buy coercively, dump on market" strategy (weigold/law-smith mentioned this) December 22 but the bombing of Calcutta made govt abruptly halt efforts to feed mofussil and instead focus only on supplying Calcutta [ so the people escaping Calcutta after bombing raids may have been factor?] p. 108 very good quote Pinnell ...yes refugees p. 109 good quote "Hitherto"
 * 23) discussion
 * 24) big firms in the Priority Classes scheme were probably the ones who were doing all the bidding up of black market prices. pp 112-13
 * 25) lower-level market frozen fear of appropriation; Pinnel said no coercion try free trade 113
 * 26) march 11th govt Bengal decontrol 113
 * 27) may 18 govt India remove trade barriers; famine prices on rest of India esp. orissa & bihar 116-7
 * 28) Pinnell gone Suhrawardy new ideas 117
 * 29) rice remained in the villages 118
 * 30) rising wages meant rich refused to employ (real wages)
 * 31) "Cultivators knew that without imported supplies and a functioning marketing system, there would be no substantial replenishing of village rice supplies until the winter-rice harvest beginning the following November. As prices moved up and marketing slowed down, there was a gradual collapse of patronage and benevolence throughout Bengal. Chapter 5 discusses these developments in some detail. Notice that cultivators were willing, even eager, to sell their rice....They were willing to sell but not forgo expected profits." p. 119
 * 32) failure of relief p. 99

underlying

 * 1) (p. 51)a gradual decline in rice production which left Bengal a net importer of rice in the decade prior to the famine

proximate

 * [Law-Smith basically blames the Government of India for everything]
 * 1) (p. 51)exacerbated by war priorities, rice shortage and inflationary financing,
 * 2) absence of a cooperative relationship between the Governments of India and Bengal.
 * The Famine Report :
 * 1) an absolute shortage of rice together with the loss of imports from Burma, and rice exports from Bengal (which officially stopped in July 1942).
 * 2) the 'material and psychological' consequences of war.
 * 3) the failure of the Government of Bengal to control the supply and distribution of foodgrains
 * 4) the Government of India's tardiness in putting into operation an India-wide system of moving supplies from surplus to deficit areas.
 * but Law-Smith says more:
 * 1) the Government of India's failure to use Constitutional provisions or Defence of India powers to suspend inter-provincial trade barriers which isolated Bengal (as did the loss of Burma) from normal sources of rice imports.
 * 2) (p. 52)  the effect of Government of India policy directives on Bengal, especially the Denial policy
 * 3) the failure of the Basic and Rescue plans to get grain to Bengal before September 1943
 * 4) the Government of India's refusal to take responsibility for supplying Calcutta, of crucial importance as a producer of war-related material
 * 5) its refusal to accept that there was a shortage of rice in Bengal.
 * 6) The method of war financing which fueled an inflationary spiral, also severely affected prices and supply in Bengal.
 * Major proximate cause(s):
 * 1) The Central Government's refusal to infringe provincial autonomy when this would have benefitted Bengal, and its persual of policies that adversely affected the province were the major causes of the 1943 famine:
 * 2) the [boat] Denial Policy,
 * 3)  the Central Government [did not agree] to open up Greater Bengal as a single trading area
 * 4) even further  proximate causes:
 * 5)  rail transport priorities
 * 6) land resumption by the military for air fields and installations,
 * 7) high wages paid to their workforce,
 * 8) the Army's continued food purchasing in Bengal,  pressure on supply.
 * 9) Even further underlying causes:
 * 10)  famine was the inflationary method of war financing
 * 11) failed price control schemes
 * But over all and above all:
 * 1) the Government of India's ... failure to move cooperatively or to accept responsibility for the outcomes of its policies.