User:Lingzhi/verifyBengal


 * The method of credit financing was also tailored to UK wartime needs. The UK agreed to pay for defence expenditures over and above the amount that India had paid in peacetime (adjusted for inflation). However, their purchases were made entirely on credit accumulated in the Bank of England and not redeemable until after the war. At the same time, the Bank of India was permitted to treat those credits as assets against which it could print currency up to two and a half times more than the total debt incurred. India's money printing presses then began running overtime, printing the currency that paid for all these massive defence expenditures. The tremendous rise in nominal money supply coupled with a scarcity of consumption goods spurred monetary inflation, reaching its peak in 1944–45. The accompanying rise in incomes and purchasing power fell disproportionately into the hands of industries in Calcutta (in particular, munitions industries).
 * 1) |1a1=S. Bose|1y=1990|1p=715 :
 * "Massive public expenditure expansion played an extremely important role in stoking wartime inflation in both India and China. Between 1939 and 1945 nearly Rs 3500 million were spent on defence purposes in India.47 The inflationary pressures resulting from this were far more acute in Bengal where construction works related to the war effort were carried out on a much bigger scale than elsewhere. About half of the total war expenditure was said to be 'recoverable' as sterling credits accumulated in the Bank of England. But for the moment it could be financed mostly by making the printing presses work overtime. The nomimal money-supply in India multiplied from Rs 3170 million in 1939 to Rs 21,900 million in I945.48 Since the sterling balances were treated as assets against which the Reserve Bank of India was 'entitled to print notes about two and a half times their total value', the 'recoverable' war expenditure had quite a disproportionate inflationary effect.49 Meanwhile, imports dropped and government purchases of war materials diverted some goods from home consumption at a time when the cash-crop economy, especially Bengal jute, found many of its markets closed off. The relative price of jute remained weak, despite a government regulation limiting its acreage while prices of foodgrains and essential non-producibles rose uncontrollably. ... The fall of Burma did cut off Burmese supplies and diverted the demand from its rice markets in southern India and Ceylon on to Bengal, but the scale of these shifts was puny by comparison to the price-hike set off by speculative tendencies in the rice market after March 1942. An attempt"


 * 2) 2a1=Rothermund|2y=2002|2pp=115–122
 * "pp. 115-16 Great Britain claimed a much greater share of Indian production in this war [i.e., WWII] than in the previous one...it may suffice to stress the importance of this fact for wartime inflation:purchasing power was created in terms of industrial wages and profits, but at the same time goods that could have absorbed it were exported in order to aid the war effort. The British government bought goods produced in India on credit and subjected India to a regime of forced saving. This amounted to a kind of compulsory investment in government bonds, but it was not necessary to issue such bonds as the government could freely print money. As more and more money was printed, the sterling currency reserves of the Reserve Bank of India deposited with the Bank of ...The peculiar effects of wartime stagflation also made themselves felt in the agrarian sector.Prices rose steeply, but this did not lead to increased production, as the mode of production of innumerable small peasants could not be changed all of a sudden. In the subsequent sections of this chapter we shall first examine the wartime claims on industrial production and then the severe crisis of the food supply."


 * 3) 3a1=A. Sen |3y=1977 |3p=50
 * "First, the increase in the rice price in Phase I was essentially related to demand factors; supply was exceptionally high in 1942 (see Table 2). The price increase in the Phase I period, while not confined to Bengal, was much more acute in Bengal than elsewhere (see Singh, 1965, pp. 95-99; Palekar, 1962). This was, to a great extent, a result of general inflationary pressure in a war economy. The fall of Burma had brought Bengal close to the war front and Bengal saw military and civil construction at a totally unprecedented scale. The war expenditures were financed to a great extent by printing notes. While a substantial part—indeed more than half from 1941-42—of the total war expenditure incurred by India was 'recoverable' as sterling balances owed by Britain, this did not reduce the immediate inflationary pressure, since the 'recovery' took place much later. Indeed, given the Indian monetary system, these sterling balances were treated as assets against which the Reserve Bank of India was 'entitled to print notes worth about two and a half times their total value', so that the recoverable war expenditure tended to have a stronger inflationary impact than expenditure on India's own account (see Gadgil and Sovani, 1944, pp. 12-14)."


 * 4)|4a1=Mukherji|4y=1986|4p=PE-25
 * "The famine of 1943 was not an isolated nor an unexpected crisis. The impact of the war had not only triggered off very high and continuously mounting defence expenditure, resulting in deficit financing at an un- precedented scale, it had also diverted essen- tial consumer goods from the civilian market and for the first time made the black market or a parallel economy take a firmly entren- ched position in the national scene. Defence expenditure in India rose from Rs 49.54 crore in 1939/40 to Rs 869 crore in 1944/45, of which India's share rose from Rs 49.54 crore to Rs 458.32 crore.85 The rest was chargeable to Britain. The peculiar method of repayment adopted at this time by Britian did not increase Indian revenues because India was paid back in sterling which was credited in favour of the Reserve Bank. Against this reserve, the Reserve Bank issued paper currency and made it available to government for necessary paymants.86 As a result, total money supply rose from Rs 317 crore in 1939 to Rs 2,190 crore in 1945.87 In effect, therefore, the sterling balances were blocked and could not be used for purchases abroad. This expansion in monetary circulation accompanied by scarcity of civilian goods as a result of diver- sion to war effort and speculative hoarding of essential goods naturally resulted in enor- mous increases in the price level. The general price index rose to Rs 236.5 in 1943/44 with August 1939 as 100,88 the rise in the price index of rice alone rising to 951 in December 1943,89 for obvious reasons. Apart from starvation and death in Bengal, there was a marked fall in the consumption of essential goods all over the country; civilian con- sumption of cotton goods fell by more than 23 per cent from the peace time level by 1943/44 and home production of kerosene had halved during the same time.90 There was no breakthrough in industrial production either, and indeed industry was to fall into a deep recession once the war was over."


 * 1) |Brennan |Heathcote |Lucas|1984|p=12
 * "Most of the deficit was used on munitions and war supplies (Sinha and Khera 1962: 349-50) and much of these were produced in Calcutta and its environs. Calcutta was, therefore, not only the most important military production base in India, but also the recipient, through war-contracts, of a vast flow of money into its industrial sector. In these circumstances the manufacturers were well placed to buy food at prices above the controlled rate and to provide it to their workers at reasonable prices (FIC 1945:63-4). The government was happy to agree to this arrangement as it would keep up war-production and reduce the likelihood of strikes, which had troubled Calcutta in 1943 (ECO 1943: 91). It was also the mechanism which would drain Bengal to feed Calcutta."


 * A "denial of rice" policy was carried out in three southern districts along the coast of the Bay of Bengal—Bakarganj (or Barisal), Midnapore and Khulna—that were expected to have surpluses of rice. John Herbert, the governor of Bengal, acting under orders from London, issued a directive in late March 1942 requiring stocks of paddy (unmilled rice) deemed surplus, as well as other food items, to be removed or destroyed in these districts.
 * 1) 1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission|1y=1945a|1pp=25–26
 * 2) 2a1=Iqbal|2y=2011
 * 3) 3a1=De|3y=2006|3p=
 * 4) 4a1=Ó Gráda |4y=2009|4p=154
 * "In addition, on military advice officials removed rice and paddy deemed surplus to local requirements from coastal districts such as Midnapur, Bakerganj, and Khulna."


 * 5) 5a1=Mukerjee|5y=2010|5pp=98–100


 * Implemented on 1 May after an initial registration period, the policy authorised the Army to confiscate, relocate or destroy any boats large enough to carry more than ten persons, and allowed them to requisition other means of transport such as bicycles, bullock carts, and elephants.
 * 1) 1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission|1y=1945a |1pp=26–27
 * 2) 2a1=A. Sen |2y=1977 |2p=45
 * 3) 3a1=Bayly |3a2=Harper |3y=2005 |3pp=284–285
 * 4) 4a1=Iqbal |4y=2011 |4p=274
 * "p. 274 ('ten persons' also mentioned footnote 3 p. 271) While the railways proved inadequate for various reasons at the initial stage of the famine, other available substitutes for boats, such as tikka gharies (carts drawn by horses and oxes), motor cars and bicycles, lost their utility as they also came within the purview of the "denial policy".11 MM Stuart, an official, observed that one part of the denial policy which always made him smile was the insistence of some authority on including the tikka gharies. He remarked that no one who had not seen these "little match-boxes drawn by mice", which serve in Bengal as horse cabs, could "perhaps be expected to see the funny side of the Japanese arriving in them."12 Even the elephants were brought under the jurisdiction of the policy. The Forest Officers called this the "scorched elephant policy". The boat denial, therefore, came into force at a time when boats could not have been needed more desperately, given the restriction on other available means of transport."


 * 5) 5a1=J. Mukherjee |5y=2015 |5p=66


 * Second, the social disruption and dismal conditions caused by a cascading breakdown of social systems brought mass migration, overcrowding, poor sanitation, poor water quality and waste disposal, increased vermin, and unburied dead. All of these factors are closely associated with the increased spread of infectious disease.
 * 1) |1a1=Greenough|1y=1982|1pp=141 & 163
 * 2) 2a1=Shears|2y=1991|2pp=245–246
 * 3) 3a1=Dirks|3y=1980|3p=24, ''note9'
 * 4) 4a1=de Waal |4y= 1990|4p= 481
 * 5) 5a1=Watkins |5a2=Menken |5y=1985|5p=650


 * It provided the livelihoods of fishermen and transport workers, and was indispensable for the movement of the supplies and finished goods of various artisan trades, such as potters, weavers, and basket makers. Roads were scarce and generally in poor condition, and Bengal's extensive railway system was employed largely for military purposes until the very late stages of the crisis.
 * 1) 1a1= Famine Inquiry Commission |1y=1945a |1p=8
 * "The out-standing features of the transport system are the important country boat traffic on its water-ways and the meagreness of road communicatious. The nature ofthe terrain is such that the making and maintenance of roads are extremely difficult. Throughout the greater part of the province roads have to be raisedabove dood level, frequently to the height of sevenl foot, and have to be provided with a large number of bridges over the smaller rivenand khal. Moreover, the larger rivers present an insurmountable obstacleto any system of through communication by road; the largest of them aretoo wide to be bridged and others are unbridgeable except at a prohibitive cost. In many districts, therefore, the chief means of communications are by country boat supplemented by a limited number of river steamer services."


 * 2) 2a1=Natarajan|2y=1946|2pp=10–11
 * "pp. 10-11 The transporting of the inland trade has had to be done by rail, road and coastal shipping. The railways do not reach many places in the country and what is more they have been dependent on foreign countries for locomotives. The total route mileage on 31st March 1939 was 41,134 and 40,477 in 1942. In 1942 the mileage in India works out to 104 miles per million. The figures that are available show that the railway mileage per million in Canada works out to 4,318, in U.S.A. 2,132 and in ILK. to 406. The road development in India was not only ill planned but far from adequate to meet the requirements of this huge country. The total roadways in India (including States) on 31st March 1938 was 347,132. ...It has been calculated that, if India is to be as well developed as even the United Kingdom, the existing roadways must be increased more than tenfold. The number of motor vehicles of all descriptions in operation in India (including States but excluding Burma) on 31st March 1940 was 174,077. While there are said to be one car for every 5 persons in the U.S.A, one for every 20 persons in the U.K., in India there is one car for every 2,234 persons. The Road transport, too has had always to look to imports of automobiles."


 * 3) 3a1=Mukerjee|3y=2014 |3p=73
 * 4a1=Brennan |4y=1988 |4p=542 & 548, note12 (+Outriggr: weak support for roads in general:)
 * "Contai (population 753,152) and Tamluk (756,085), ill-served by roads, were particularly dependent on boats for transport (Census 1941:58)."


 * Hundreds of thousands of troops also poured into the province from the United States, the UK, India, and China, placing further strains on domestic supplies, and causing local scarcities in a wide range of daily necessities.
 * 1) 1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission |1y=1945a |1pp=170–71
 * 2) 2a1=Greenough |2y=1980 |2p=222
 * 3) 3a1=J. Mukherjee |3y=2015 |3pp=40–41, 110 & 191
 * 4) 4a1=De|4y=2006|4p=2


 * There was also rampant corruption and nepotism in the distribution of government aid; often as much as half of the goods disappeared into the black market or into the hands of friends or relatives.
 * 1) 1a1=Brennan|1y=1988|1pp=552, 555 & 557
 * 2) 2a1=Greenough|2y=1982|2p=169
 * 3) 3a1= J. Mukherjee|3y=2015|3pp=174–75
 * 4) 4a1=Famine Inquiry Commission|4y=1945a|4p=75


 * Deaths from starvation began to decline, but over half the famine-related deaths occurred in 1944, after the food security crisis had abated, as a result of disease.
 * 1) |1a1=A. Sen|1y=1977|1p=36
 * 2) |2a1=A. Sen |2y=1981a |2pp=55 & 215|
 * "p. 55The economic experience of Bengal leading to and during the famine can be split into three phases: Phase I : from the beginning of 1942 to March 1943 ; Phase II: from March 1943 to November 1943; Phase III: from November 1943 through most of 1944. The death rate reached its peak only in Phase III, but the most acute period of starvation had by then passed; epidemics were raging in a famine-devastated country. Phase II is when starvation death reached its peak."


 * "p. 125 Very substantially more than half of the deaths attributable to the famine of 1943 took place after 1943...the epidemics of malaria and other fevers, cholera, smallpox, dysentery, and diarrhoea that sprang up during and immediately after the famine went on raging for a long time (see tables D1 and D3 and Figure D1)."


 * 3) |3a1=S. Bose|3y=1990|3p=701"In Bengal the most critical period of deaths from starvation lasted from March I943 to November 1943. Although Bengal produced a record rice harvest in December 1943, continuing problems of distribution and epidemics stalking a famine-ravaged land ensured that the death rate was even higher through most of the year 1944 than it had been in the phase of acute starvation.5 Sen, Poverty and Famines, p. 55... redundant DELETE&nsp;"


 * Bengal's inability to keep pace with rapid population growth changed it from a net exporter of foodgrains to a net importer.
 * 1) 1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission |1y=1945a|1p=181
 * 2) 2a1=Mahalanobis |2a2=Mukherjea |2a3=Ghosh |2y=1946 |2p=339|3a1=Islam
 * 3) 3a1=Islam|3y=2007b|3p=56


 * Particularly in eastern Bengal, jotedars began to make substantial profits and gained power through their roles as grain or jute traders and, more importantly, by making loans to sharecroppers, agricultural labourers and ryots. They gained power over their tenants using a combination of debt bondage through the transfer of debts and mortgages, and parcel-by-parcel land-grabbing.
 * 1) 1a1=Ray|1a2=Ray|1y=1975|1p=84
 * 2) 2a1=Brennan|2a2=Heathcote|2a3=Lucas|2y=1984|2p=9 (+Outriggr)
 * "Real power in the villages  of  Bengal  resided,  however,  in  the  non-cultivating  tenants,  the  jotedars, who  rented  large  areas  from  the  zamindars,  cultivated  part  with  agricultural  labourers, and  used  sharecroppers  to  work  the  rest.  They  also  traded  in  grain and  made  substantial profits  through   lending  money  and  grain to  their  labourers  and  sharecroppers."


 * 1) 1a1=Mukherji|1y=1986
 * 2) |2a1=S. Bose |2y=1982 |2pp=472–73


 * In this way, the jotedars effectively dominated and impoverished the lowest tier of economic classes in several districts of Bengal.
 * 1) 1a1=S. Bose|1y=1982|1pp=472–73
 * 2) a1=Das|3y=2008|3p=60


 * The end result of this process of exploitation, exacerbated by Muslim inheritance practices that divided up land among multiple siblings, was growing inequalities in land ownership.
 * 1) 1a1=Ali|1y=2012|1p=128|
 * 2) 2a1=Roy |2y=2006 |2p=5393
 * 3) 3a1=S. Bose |3y=1982 |3p=469


 * By December 1942 the total number of prioritised individuals, with their families, was approximately 1,000,000; this high number forced the government to seize rice by force from mills and warehouses in Greater Calcutta.
 * 1) 1a1=Ó Gráda|1y= 2010 |1p =36
 * 2) 2a1=Brennan |2a2=Heathcote |2a3=Lucas |2y=1984|2p=12
 * "More importantly this  action  and  the  appropriation  of  rice  stocks  in  late December  1942  to  meet  the  crisis  in  Calcutta  caused  by  Japanese  bombing,  broke  the confidence  of  the  rice  traders  in  the  government  and  in  the  predictability  of  its actions."


 * 3) 3a1=J. Mukherjee|3y=2015|3p=86


 * May was the month of the first reports of death by starvation in Bengal.
 * 1) 1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission |1y=1945a|1p=112
 * 2) 2a1=Aykroyd |2y=1975|2p=74
 * 3) 3a1=Iqbal|3y=2011|3p=282


 * The question as to whether the famine arose primarily from a crop shortfall or from distribution failure has been the subject of later debate.
 * 1) 1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission|1y=1945a|1pp=2–3
 * 2) 2a1=Ó Gráda |2y=2015 |2p=12
 * 3) 3a1=Mahalanobis |3y=1944 |3p=71


 * The explanation generally offered for these repeated refusals was insufficient shipping,
 * 1) 1a1=Mansergh|1a2=Lumby|1y=1973|1pp=133–41 & 155–58
 * 2) 2a1=A. Sen |2y=1977|2p=52
 * 3) 3a1=J. Mukherjee|3y=2015|3pp=128, 142, 185–88


 * Chittagong and Noakhali, both "boat denial" districts in the Ganges Delta (or Sundarbans Delta) area, were the hardest hit.
 * 1) 1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission |1y=1945a|1p=112
 * 2) 2a1=Aykroyd |2y=1975|2p=74
 * 3) 3a1=Iqbal|3y=2011|3p=282


 * Eventually, families disintegrated; men sold their small farms and left home to look for work or to join the army, and women and children became homeless migrants, often travelling to Calcutta or another large city in search of organised relief:
 * 1) 1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission|1y=1945a
 * 2) 2a1=Greenough |2y=1980 |2pp=227–28


 * Estimates of the number of the sick who flocked to Calcutta ranged between 100,000 and 150,000.
 * 1) 1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission|1y=1945a|1p=2
 * 2) 2a1=J. Mukherjee|2y=2015|2p=135, citing The Statesman "Policy of Repatriation of Destitutes," November 6, 1943
 * 3) 3a1=Schofield |3y=2010 |3p=304


 * the gruel, which often provided barely a survival-level caloric intake, was sometimes unfit for consumption – moldy or contaminated with dirt, sand, and gravel.
 * 1) |1a1=J. Mukherjee |1y=2015 |1p=29 & 174
 * 2) 2a1=De |2y=2006 |2p=40
 * 3) 3a1=Brennan |3y=1988 |3p=557 note18


 * Amartya Sen attributes the most devastating periods of inflation to heavy speculative buying.
 * 1) 1a1=A. Sen|1y=1976|1p= 1280
 * 2) 2a1=A. Sen |2y=1977|2p= 50
 * 3) 3a1= A. Sen|3y=1981a|3p=76


 * This is attributed to British anger over widespread Bengali nationalist sentiment and the perceived treachery of the violent Quit India uprising.
 * 1) 1a1=Mukerjee|1y=2010|1p=273
 * 2) 2a1=Bayly|2a2=Harper|2y=2005|2p=286
 * 3) 3a1=Collingham|3y=2012|3pp=144–45

sorted

 * 110
 * 155–58
 * 191
 * A. Sen 1976, p. 1280
 * A. Sen 1977, p. 36
 * A. Sen 1977, p. 45
 * A. Sen 1977, p. 50
 * A. Sen 1977, p. 50
 * A. Sen 1977, p. 52
 * A. Sen 1981a, p. 76.
 * A. Sen 1981a, pp. 55 & 215
 * Ali 2012, p. 128
 * Aykroyd 1975, p. 74
 * Bayly & Harper 2005, p. 286
 * Bayly & Harper 2005, pp. 284–285
 * Bhattacharya & Zachariah 1999, pp. 79–80
 * Brennan 1988, p. 542 & 548, note 12.
 * Brennan 1988, p. 552.
 * Brennan 1988, p. 557 note 18.
 * Brennan 1988, pp. 552, 555 & 557
 * Brennan, Heathcote & Lucas 1984, p. 12
 * Brennan, Heathcote & Lucas 1984, p. 9
 * Brennan, Heathcote & Lucas 1984, p. 9. Harv error: link from CITEREFS._Bose1990 doesn't point to any citation.
 * Collingham 2012, pp. 144–45.
 * Das 2008, p. 60.
 * De 2006
 * De 2006, p. 13.
 * De 2006, p. 13.
 * De 2006, p. 2.
 * De 2006, p. 40
 * de Waal 1990, p. 481
 * Dirks 1980, p. 24, note 9
 * Famine Inquiry Commission 1945a, p. 112
 * Famine Inquiry Commission 1945a, p. 181
 * Famine Inquiry Commission 1945a, p. 2
 * Famine Inquiry Commission 1945a, p. 30
 * Famine Inquiry Commission 1945a, p. 67
 * Famine Inquiry Commission 1945a, p. 75.
 * Famine Inquiry Commission 1945a, pp. 170–71
 * Famine Inquiry Commission 1945a, pp. 2–3
 * Famine Inquiry Commission 1945a, pp. 25–26
 * Famine Inquiry Commission 1945a, pp. 26–27
 * Ghosh 1944, p. 52.
 * Greenough 1980, p. 222
 * Greenough 1980, pp. 227–28
 * Greenough 1982, p. 169
 * Greenough 1982, pp. 141 & 163
 * Hunt 1987, p. 42.
 * Iqbal 2011
 * Iqbal 2011, p. 274
 * Iqbal 2011, p. 281.
 * Iqbal 2011, p. 282.
 * Iqbal 2011, pp. 273–4.
 * Iqbal 2011, pp. 273–74
 * Islam 2007b, p. 56.
 * J. Mukherjee 2015, p. 13
 * J. Mukherjee 2015, p. 132.
 * J. Mukherjee 2015, p. 135, citing The Statesman "Policy of Repatriation of Destitutes," November 6, 1943
 * J. Mukherjee 2015, p. 29 & 174
 * J. Mukherjee 2015, p. 66
 * J. Mukherjee 2015, p. 86.
 * J. Mukherjee 2015, p. 90.
 * J. Mukherjee 2015, pp. 128, 142, 185–88.
 * J. Mukherjee 2015, pp. 174–75
 * J. Mukherjee 2015, pp. 40–41
 * J. Mukherjee 2015, pp. 61–63
 * Mahalanobis 1944, p. 71.
 * Mahalanobis, Mukherjea & Ghosh 1946, p. 339
 * Mansergh & Lumby 1973, pp. 133–41
 * Mukerjee 2010, p. 273
 * Mukerjee 2010, pp. 98–100.
 * Mukerjee 2014, p. 73
 * Mukerjee 2014, p. 73
 * Mukherji 1986
 * Natarajan 1946, p. iii
 * Natarajan 1946, pp. 10–11
 * Ó Gráda 2009, p. 154
 * Ó Gráda 2010, p. 36
 * Ó Gráda 2015, p. 12
 * Ó Gráda 2015, p. 40.
 * Ray & Ray 1975, p. 84
 * Rothermund 2002, pp. 115–122
 * Roy 2006, p. 5393
 * S. Bose 1982, p. 469.
 * S. Bose 1982, pp. 472–73
 * S. Bose 1982, pp. 472–73
 * S. Bose 1990, p. 701.
 * S. Bose 1990, p. 715
 * Schofield 2010, p. 304.
 * Shears 1991, pp. 245–246
 * Watkins & Menken 1985, p. 650.

Brennan, Heathcote, Lucas, 1984 (added by 'riggr)

 * To ensure that workers in the prioritised industries in Calcutta would be fed, the authorities seized rice stocks from wholesale dealers, shattering any trust the rice traders had in the government.{sfn|Brennan|Heathcote|Lucas|1984|p=12}
 * "More importantly this  action  and  the  appropriation  of  rice  stocks  in  late December  1942  to  meet  the  crisis  in  Calcutta  caused  by  Japanese  bombing,  broke  the confidence  of  the  rice  traders  in  the  government  and  in  the  predictability  of  its actions."


 * Regional differences in mortality rates were influenced by the effects of migration,{sfn|Maharatna|1992|p=279} and of natural disasters.{sfn|Brennan|Heathcote |Lucas|1984|p=13}
 * "The second set  of  districts  to  be  affected  was  that which had  suffered  a natural calamity.  One of  these  was  Rangpur. ... The  famine  in  Rangpur  district  demonstrated  that  there were  differentials  between the  impact  of  the  famine  within  districts."


 * These [Eastern] districts also were subject to the boat denial policy, and had relatively high jute production.{sfn|Brennan|Heathcote|Lucas|1984|p=13}
 * "There appears to have  been  two  sets  of  districts  in  which  the  famine  was  more  severe (FIC  1945:  112-15).  First,  those  where  a  deficit  in  the  production  of  rice  was normally met  by  sales  of jute.  But  in  1943  the  wholesale  price  of jute  was  low  at  an  average  (on index  terms)  of  130  on  a  base  of  100 -1914,  against  cereals, 397 (Chattopadhyay  1981:141),  and  the  boat  'denial'  policies  of  the  government  in  1942  had  destroyed  the  usual transport  facilities  of  these  districts.  The  second  set  of  districts  to  be  affected  was  that which had  suffered  a natural calamity."


 * When prices rose sharply, their wages failed to follow suit; this drop in real wages left them less able to purchase food.{sfn|Brennan|Heathcote |Lucas|1984|p=13}
 * "Not finding it."