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The Battle of Mount Belvedere also known as the Battle of Riva Ridge (18-25 February 1945) was a battle of the Second World War between the 10th Mountain Division and the German Wehrmacht. The first part of Operation Encore, this battle was a limited offensive, with the goal of controlling a string of summits of the Northern Apennines that controlled Strada statale 64 Porrettana, the all-weather link between Pistoia and Bologna. Once held, control of these summits would provide the Allies an advantageous position from which the western portion of the Allied spring offensive could start.

The primary height along Highway 64 was Mount Belvedere, which had been the goal of several earlier Allied attacks November 1944 by the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (BEF). However, heavy German artillery barrages prevented the BEF from holding Belvedere; these barrages had been aided by spotters on Riva Ridge. So to hold Mount Belvedere, this chain of mountains would also need to be captured. To accomplish this, however, the attackers would need to climb up a series of steep slopes, at times cliffs, without any cover; one tactical study estimated that over 70% of any attackers would become casualties if attempted in daylight. Therefore General Hays chose to send the 86th Infantry Regiment to climb those slopes at night. Once Riva Ridge was in friendly hands, the other two regiments of the 10th Mountain -- the 85th and 87th -- would begin their frontal assault on Mount Belvedere.

German counterattacks focused on the American regiments holding Mount Belvedere. Once these were overcome, the Division proceeded along the mountain crests to Mount della Torraccia, which was seized 24 February. German counterattacks ceased after that.

Background
Following the capture of Rome 4 June 1944, the Allied forces proceeded north in two groups: the British Eighth Army (Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese) advancing along the coastal plain of the Adriatic, and the U.S. Fifth Army (Lieutenant General Mark Clark) to the west through the central Apennine Mountains. Before them stood the carefully prepared German defenses of the Gothic Line. General Clark's plan had initially been to drive through the Apennines at two points: the main body of II Corps would advance north along the Strada statale 65 della Futa, the highway that connects Florence to Bologna by way of the Futa Pass. When these troops encountered the expected enemy resistance, the 34th Division would launch a strong diversionary attack west of the Futa Pass, while the rest of II Corps would bypass the Futa Pass to the east and attack the lightly defended Il Giogo Pass on Route 6524 near the boundary of the German Fourteenth and Tenth Armies. This attack began 10 September 1944.

However, the Apennines were a formidable terrain and the Germans proved to be stubborn foes in well-prepared defensive positions. Although the American divisions managed to advance past both the Futa and Il Giogo passes, it was at a high cost. Between 10 September and 26 October, II Corps' four divisions had suffered over 15,000 casualties. On 27 October General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, ordered a halt to these offensives.

The Allies made one last attempt to break through the Apennines, using the recently arrived Brazilian Expeditionary Force, which was about a division in size. To the west of Futa Pass Highway 64 passed Mount Belvedere on its route to Bologna; the BEF was tasked with capturing this prominence, which would allow a breakthrough into the Po Valley. From 24 November through 12 December the Brazilians made three unsuccessful assaults to capture the mountain, but despite their bravery every time they secured the peak of the mountain, German artillery drove them off the heights. It was at this point the US 10th Mountain Division, the only American mountain infantry unit, which had been impatiently idling stateside, arrived in Italy.

"Because of specialized mountain training and comparatively light organic artillery -- there were only three battalions of 75-mm. pack howitzers as contrasted with the three battalions of 105-mm. howitzers and one of 155-mm. howitzers in the standard infantry division -- commanders in other theaters had declined the division's services, but the specialized training enhanced the division's attractiveness to an army engaged in mountain warfare."

The first members of the 10th arrived in Italy when the 86th Regiment landed at Naples late December 1944. On Christmas Day the men of the first battalion of the 86th were transported by rail in forty-and-eights to Livorno while the rest of the regiment arrived in the freighter Sestriere; from Livorno they rode in trucks to Pisa. (Need citation here)

It was at Pisa that the men of the division discovered their specialized mountaineering equipment had not followed them to Italy; their skis, mountain boots, parkas and the rest of their equipment got no closer to them than a warehouse in Boston. Once in the mountains, the men would most miss their sleeping bags that had kept them warm through the winter nights in the Rocky Mountains; in response to their complaints, the standard issue of two blankets was supplemented with another two. The officers would miss the mountain boots the division spent years developing. (Link to note about appropriating German mountain boots) One wrote, "We have spent three years developing this clothing and equipment. We may now be denied the use of it at a time when we really need it." The men improvised, borrowing skis from local Italian alpine clubs for their patrols in the snow; they could not obtain crampons from the local clubs, so they fixed knotted ropes to the soles of their leather and rubber shoepacs to improve their footing on icy slopes.

From Pisa the regiment proceeded to the front, arriving at Vidiciantico. By 20 January, the rest of the division joined them on the front lines in the Apennines.

Isserman, p. 137: "Lieutenant Colonel Hampton likened the 1st Battalion's position in and around Vidiciatico to sitting 'in the bottom of a bowl with the enemy sitting on two-thirds of the rim looking down upon you. There was about as much concealment as a goldfish would have in a bowl.'"

Task Force 45, originally at milhist.net

Disposition of forces
On the Allied side:
 * US 10th Mountain Division
 * Attached to the division:
 * US 175th Field Artillery Battalion (Had been part of Task Force 45)
 * US 1125th Armored Field Artillery
 * US 84th Chemical Mortar Battalion (Had been part of Task Force 45)
 * US 751st Tank Destroyer Battalion (Had been part of Task Force 45)
 * US 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion (Had been part of Task Force 45)


 * Brazilian Expeditionary Force (BEF)

On the German side:
 * 232nd Infantry Division
 * 232nd Fusilier Battalion
 * 1043rd Infantry Regiment
 * 1044th Infantry Regiment
 * 1045th Infantry Regiment
 * 114th Jäger Division (sent as reinforcements, Fisher pp. 430f)
 * 29th Panzer Grenadier Division (Fisher, p. 433)
 * 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment

Prelude
"To the west of the town of Vidiciatico and running generally southwest was a very precipitous and rugged escarpment called the Mancinello-C[a]mpiano Ridge. This chain of summits rose from the very steep canyon of the Dardagna River to various heights. Rising abruptly from the fortified town of Rocca Corneta, it extended to M. Spigolino, a distance of about seven miles. The summits from north to south were Pizzo di C[a]mpiano (3175 ft.), M. Cappel Buso (3800 ft.), M. Serrasiccia (4600 ft.), M. Riva (4672 ft.), Le Piagge (4900 ft.), Serra [d]ei Barchetti (4350 ft.), Cingular Sermidiano (5400 ft.), and M. Spigolino (6030 ft.). The elevation of the Dardagna canyon varied from 1600 feet at the north end to some 2500 feet at the south end.There were no sharp breaks of passes. On the east side it is generally very steep, broken, with cliffs, steep ravines and shoulders. The west side is by comparison very mild, ranging from broken and steep through rolling to nearly a plateau west of M. Riva. The watershed on the east side is abrupt, characterized by fast flowing waterfalls. They empty into a stream which flows parallel to the base of the ridge, whose banks range from steep to a gorge, One of the important factors to be considered was the gradient of the east side of the escarpment which would have to be scaled to take this ridge held by the enemy. At the shortest place, the average gradient to M. Cappel Buso is about 40 degrees. (The average gradient of the Hornlike ridge of Hira Herborn is 45 degrees). The average gradient to M. Serrasiccia was 30 degrees. [Dusenberry believes that the gradients to Cappel Buso & Serrasiccia are reversed.] -- Lt. Col. Henry Hampton, cited in Dusenberry p. 179"

Initial encounters revealed the naïveté of the American troops. (Isserman, pp. 141f)
 * 86th reg. replaced 900th AA Battalion night of 8/9 January (Lt. Col. Hampton's report)
 * Men of the 86th regiment were the only ones to conduct patrols with skis. (Isserman, pp. 142-144; Shelton, p. 125; Jenkins, p. 150)
 * Skirmish with German infiltrators at Querciola with company L (Isserman, pp. 141f)
 * Importance of Riva Ridge to holding Mt. Belvedere "This ridgeline offered German artillery observers a clear line of sight on anyone approaching the treeless flanks of Belvedere, and since the face of Riva Ridge was so steep, there was nothing the Fifth Army could do to knock the observers off." (Jenkins, p. 136)
 * Gen. Hays ordered commander of 86th regiment Col. Tommy Tomlinson, to have his men scout out possible routes up the face of Riva Ridge. Tomlinson, a regular army soldier w/o rock climbing experience, said it couldn't be done. Hays: "This is a mountain division. Surely they can find how to climb up that ridge. It will be a lot cheaper to capture the ridge in the first place than to suffer the casualties from hostile fire directed from there." (Isserman, p. 148f; Jenkins, p. 152 (full quotation); Shelton, p. 127 (slightly different quotation))
 * Over the following weeks, patrols went out. "Early patrols noticed, at first, very little activity along the ridge." "Early on, American patrols were restricted to nighttime. But with the Germans on top of the ridge apparently oblivious to -- or unconcerned about -- the increasing activity, patrols were slowly allowed to pick up, like water slowly beginning to boil around lobsters in a pot." (Jenkins, p. 154)
 * Discarded plans: attack north from Mt Spigolino, due to supply problems; one ascent from the middle, too unwieldy & too attractive to an artillery barrage (Jenkins, pp. 153f)
 * Five routes -- called trails -- were identified up the face of Riva Ridge. (cite Lt. Col. Henry Hampton's report)
 * End of January, most of the 86th withdrawn from the line to Bagni di Lucca. There they underwent rigorous training in rock climbing at a local marble quarry. Nearly a third of the men had joined the division after its departure from Camp Hale, & lacked the specialized training. (Isserman, p. 149)
 * The vanguard included some of the elite skiers & climbers of the 10th, including Cpn Percy Rideout of the Dartmouth ski team, & Cpn Bill Neidner, a ski racer & jumper from the University of Wisconsin. (Isserman, p. 149)

"Continue to move forward. Never stop. Always forward. Always forward. Always forward. If your buddy is wounded, don't stop to help him. Continue to move forward. Always forward. Don't get pinned down. Never stop. When the assault comes, you must get into the enemy's position as quickly as possible. You must move fast. Don't give the enemy time to recover. Shoot him. You must take his position."
 * By 12 February the snow had mostly melted away or packed down by patrols. Skis were no longer needed. (Jenkins, p. 161)
 * General Hays' "always forward" speech to the troops, 16 February (Shelton, p. 129; Jenkins, pp. 164f -- has the most extensive quotation)

The attack
The plan: 86th would climb & secure Riva ridge; 3rd bn 85th reg wd assault the summit of Mt Belvedere; 1st bn 85th reg Mount Gorgoresco east of Belvedere on right; 3rd bn 87th reg move along the lower slopes in support of the 85th reg; 1st bn 87th reg capture Valpiana Ridge to NW on left; 2nd bn the area between Corona & Florio. (Jenkins, p. 165) The B.E.F. wd capture Mt Castello
 * Enemy strength had been estimated at 40-50 men on Riva Ridge, with several hundred in close reserve on the gentler reverse slope, supported by artillery & mortars. (Isserman, p. 150) These were from 4th (Edelweiss) Mountain battalion & a battalion of the 232d Infantry division (Shelton, p. 126; Isserman, p. 151)
 * Enemy strength on Mt Belvedere 1045 reg, 232d Division (Isserman, p. 165); 114th Jaeger Division, & 4th Mountain bn (Jenkins, p. 180)
 * At the time men of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment on Riva Ridge were being relieved by the 232nd Fusilier Battalion (Isserman, p. 154)
 * German Gen. Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin was concerned about the complacency of his own troops. (Jenkins, pp. 154f)

Riva Ridge

 * Started climb 7:30p 18 February
 * Men heavily loaded (Jenkins p. 163 for details)
 * Although 5 "trails" had been identified, only 4 were used
 * B Co. assigned Mt Cappel Buso
 * Co. C Trail 3 Mt Serrasiccia
 * Co. F Mt Cingio del Bure
 * Co. A (less 1 platoon) Mt Mancinello (these 4, Jenkins, p. 162)
 * platoon from Co. A under Lt. James Loose, performed a technical climb up Pizzo di Campano (Jenkins, pp. 162f)
 * Italian mules under Italian Alpini brought the heavy weapons up Trail 2. "One mule carried a howitzer tube to the top and immediately dropped dead from exhaustion." (Jenkins, p. 168; Hampton's report said the animal died a few hours later)
 * Command expected if the Germans knew of the climb, casualties were expected to be as high as 90% (Isserman, p. 152; Jenkins, p. 161)
 * Lt Loose's platoon found excellent prepared position, which they appropriated for their use. (Lt. Col. Hampton report)
 * Lt. Col. Hampton reports groups reached targets at these times:
 * B co. 0117 19 February
 * A co. 0258
 * C co. 0305
 * F co made contact with HQ 0407
 * The Germans had neglected to place lateral communications along the ridge (Jenkins, p. 167)
 * In the event, Germans were surprised, & except for a few individual encounters no resistance was encountered. The 5 companies reached their intended goals & "dug in"
 * Co. B encountered German machine gun fire as they summitted; they held their fire; probably thinking they encountered a lone patrol, the Germans withdrew (Isserman, p. 154)
 * Men of Co. A also encountered Germans; they exchanged gunfire; the Germans again probably thought they encountered a "wayward" patrol, withdrew. Same group found more Germans asleep in their foxholes, killed or drove them off (Isserman, p. 155)
 * When the Germans became aware of the American presence morning 19 February, their responses varied:
 * A company, led by Sgt. Torger Tokle, seized a bunker, killed 4 captured 8
 * While determining why the phone wire between Pizzo di Campiano & B co. was down, a group under Lt. Boudoures was attacked by a group of Germans who had infiltrated. (Hampton's report)
 * While securing Ridge X (a knife-edge running W of Mt Cappel Buso & perpendicular to the ridgeline), Co. C encountered a group of Germans pretending to surrender (Jenkins, p. 175)
 * Platoon of A co. were assigned to hold Pizzo di Campiano under 2nd Lt. James Loose. Came under attack by 2 German companies for a day & ahalf. Ran out of food & water, & came close to running out of ammunition. "Do you realize that you are asking for fire exactly on your position?" -- "I do, but if we don't get artillery support, you'll have nothing to support." Reinforcements led by Lt. Col. Hampton arrived 4pm 20 February. Lt. Col. Hampton, Lt. Loose, Pvts. Frank Gorham, & Frank Fairweather were awarded Silver Stars for their heroism. (Jenkins, pp. 176f)
 * 126th Mountain Engineer bn. constructed an aerial tramway up the slopes of Mt. Cappel Buso (Isserman, p. 161; Jenkins, pp. 177f)
 * Battalion on Riva Ridge was relieved by 10th Mt. AT Battalion 23 February (Lt. Col. Hampton's report)

Mount Belvedere

 * Started 11:00p 19 February (Isserman, p. 165)
 * Fixed bayonets, rifles unloaded (Shelton, p. 144, Jenkins, p. 181)
 * Add speculation why
 * "Man alive. We are to make an assault with five battalions against the strongest German positions in Italy and not a goddam loaded gun in the entire outfit. That's a large order, Sarge. I hope the general knows what he's doing." (Dan Kennerly, cited Jenkins p. 181)
 * Amongst those advancing 2nd Lt. George J. Hays (B Co. 87th Reg.), son of the commanding general (Isserman, p. 165)
 * Fields of landmines on the slopes of Belvedere & Gorgolesco (Shelton, p. 148)
 * Weight of the 81-mm mortars (Isserman, p. 165)
 * 3rd bn 87th reg met resistance below summit of Belvedere 1:00a; 1st bn 85th reg engaged the Germans on Mt Gorgolesco 3:00a (Isserman, p. 169)
 * Summit of Belvedere was taken between 3:30 & 5:30 am 20 February (Isserman, p. 169)
 * Sgt. Hugh Evan's charge to the top of Mt. Gorgolesco (Shelton, p. 152; Isserman, pp. 170f; Jenkins, pp. 186f) Awarded the Silver Star for his heroism (Isserman, p. 172)
 * Daylight hours of 20 February P-47 fighter-bombers & British Spitfires (both RAF & South A.) strafed German positions in support (Isserman, p. 173; Jenkins, p. 191)
 * Battlefield covered with corpses of American & German dead
 * Americans found the remains of almost 70 civilians in the village of Ronchidoso, killed by SS the previous September in retaliation for local partisan activity (Isserman, p. 176)

B.E.F.

 * Assigned to capture Mt. Castello (Isserman, p. 151)
 * 1st battalion attacked from NE just beyond Mazzancana (Brooks, in Baumgardner p. 31)
 * 3rd battalion struck north (Brooks, in Baumgardner p. 31)
 * East of Mt Castello 11th Infantry captured Abetaia (Brooks, in Baumgardner p. 31)
 * Mt Castello captured 21 February (Isserman, p. 176)

Mount della Torraccia

 * 85th Regiment, 2nd bn under Lt. Colonel John Stone to cross the saddle linking Monte della Torraccia & capture that height (Shelton, p. 153)
 * Germans reinforced by men from 741st Infantry Regiment, attacking night 21-22 February (Isserman, p. 177) <-- Is this the Jäger Regiment 741, part of the 114th Jäger Division?
 * 2nd bn unable to advance due to artillery fire from the enemy 88s (Shelton, p. 153)
 * By evening of 22 February, 2nd bn was down to 400 men (Isserman, p. 178)
 * 2nd battalion suffered heavy casualties & was unable to capture the objective. Lt Colonel Stone was relieved (Isserman, p. 178; Shelton, p. 153) Suffered half the total casualties the division had in this battle (Isserman, p. 180)
 * Despite their failure to advance, five men of the battalion were awarded Silver Stars, one posthumously (Isserman, p. 178)
 * 3rd bn 86th Regiment replaced them night 23-24 February, under the command of Major John Hay Jr. Attack started 6:50am 24 February, seized the summit shortly before 9:00am (Isserman, p. 179)
 * For neutralizing a machine gun nest that was blocking the advance of the battalion, Bob Foster was awarded the Silver Star (John W. Dewey, reprinted in Feuer, p. 38)
 * German counterattacks by Mittenwald Mountain Battalion late afternoon & into the night (Isserman, p. 179)
 * Morning of 25 February the 40 surviving men of one German company surrendered (Isserman p. 179)

Reaction to the victory

 * News of the battle initially did not mention the 10th Mountain because its presence in Italy was still a secret. (Isserman, p. 180) But when their presence could be revealed, their credit was given wide circulation. "This kind of news was seldom heard from the 'forgotten front' in Italy, where there had been no significant Allied progress over the past four months." (Isserman, p. 181)
 * "The fall of Monte Belvedere -- indeed the capture of all the hills from Riva on the left to della Torraccia on the right -- had surprised not only the Germans but the Allied command as well. The untested 10th had exceeded even General Hays's expectations, and a critical salient, or wedge, had been driven into the Nazi defenses." (Shelton, p. 158)
 * "Original plans for the offensive, perhaps influenced by grim memories of the prolonged campaign to capture Cassino, had envisioned it could take as long as two weeks to drive the Germans off Belvedere and adjoining peaks; instead it took the 10th five days." (Isserman, p. 180; cf. Jenkins, p. 196)
 * "Neither the 10th's espirit de corps nor its ability to attract favorable publicity exactly endeared the division to other American soldiers in Italy who had been fighting there far longer." (Isserman, p. 182) Incident in the army theater (Shelton, pp. 171f)

Operation Encore

 * Operation Encore had a second part.
 * Five days of relative peace followed the capture of Mt della Torraccia (Isserman, p. 185)
 * Action to kick off from Mts della Torraccia & della Casellina started 3 March (Isserman, p. 185)
 * High ground NE of these summits for 5 miles to Castel d'Aiano. "those heights, overlooking another important road junction at Vergato on the far side, would cut the German line of supply and communication to the Po Valley and provide an ideal jump-off for a breakout from the North Apennines." (Isserman, p. 185)
 * Kesselring sent in his reserve, 29th Panzer Grenadier Division to aid in the defense. (Isserman, p. 191) Over the March fighting Kesselring admitted that (quote from his memoir) the division has "suffered such serious losses that they lost their value as a strategic reserve." (Isserman, p. 194)

Notes (not references)

 * Lt Col. Hampton's report was completed 15 June 1945, after hostilities in Italy had concluded. Harris Dusenbery, company clerk for Co C 1st battalion included it as an appendix in his The North Apennines and Beyond (Portland, 1998)
 * A number of soldiers reported they replaced their issued combat boots with mountain boots taken from the Germans. (Bob Frauson from a dead German -- Jenkins, p. 169) (Bob Parker from a POW -- Shelton p. 157)
 * Diary of a German Officer. First printed in the 18 March 1945 issue of Stars and Stripes; this has been reprinted several times. According to John Dewey who recovered the diary, "This German officer was captured during our recent attack northeast of Mount della Torracia. Filled with bitterness and despair, the diary is typical of the mood that prevailed at this time among German soldiers fighting on the Italian front." (Feuer, Packs On!, p. 141)