User:Louis P. Boog/lead-1953-coup

Proposed Lead for 1953 Iranian coup d'état article
The 1953 Iranian coup d’état (refered to as Operation Ajax by the CIA) deposed the democratically-elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq. The coup has been called "a critical event in post-war world history" and is thought to have contributed to the 1979 overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi and his replacement with the anti-Western Islamic Republic.

Several years earlier, Mosaddeq, backed by his nationalist supporters in the Iranian parliament, nationalized the British government-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), so that Iran could profit from its vast oil reserves previously controlled exclusively by the AIOC,  Britain accused Mosaddeq of violating the legal rights of the (AIOC) and mobilized a worldwide boycott of Iran's oil, plunging Iran into financial crisis. The British government successfully enlisted the support of the United States in planning and executing the coup, the American Eisenhower administration fearing that Iran was in danger of falling under the influence of the expansionist Soviet Communist "empire". The coup was the first covert operation by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) against a foreign government.

In the wake of the coup Zahedi became prime minister and the Shah returned to Iran where he ruled as an autocrat for the next 26 years until being overthrown in 1979. the Iranian-controled national oil company was replaced by a consortium of international oil companies which shared profits 50-50 with Iran but did not to open their "books to Iranian auditors or to allow Iranians onto its board of directors."

In America, the coup was originally considered a triumph of covert action but now is considered by many to have left "a haunting and terrible legacy." In 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, called it a "setback for democratic government" in Iran.

proposed section on coldwar for 1953 Iranian coup d'état article
There is disagreement over the importance and/or legitimacy of American and British fears of Communist influence in Iran in regard to the coup.

In the decades following the October Revolution, Iran's huge neighbor, the Soviet Union, had expanded its domain to rule over tens of millions of Muslim in Central Asia, and following World War II over much of Eastern Europe. On June 26, 1950, as the movement for oil nationalization was gathering steam in Iran, soldiers of the North Korean Communist regime with the backing of the Soviets, crossed the 38th parallel to invade South Korea, beginning the Korean War. Three years later, just before the coup in Iran, Soviet tanks crushed an anti-Communist uprising of strikes and protests in East Germany. In Iran itself, the well-organized, pro-Soviet Tudeh (Communist) Party, greatly exceeded the National Front in the sized of its rallies as the crisis became worse.

In the view of American mainstream public and elite opinion, the crisis in Iran became just part of the conflict between Communism and "the Free world." Consequently,

"the United States, challenged by what most Americans saw as a relentless communist advance, slowly ceased to view Iran as a country with a unique history that faced a unique political challenge."

According to Sam Falle, a young British diplomat at the time of the coup, ''1952 was a very dangerous time. The Cold War was hot in Korea. The Soviet Union had tried to take all Berlin in 1948. Stalin was still alive. On no account could the Western powers risk a Soviet takeover of Iran, which would almost certainly have led to World War III''

In addition to fear of the Soviet influence in Iran, the Cold War influenced American support for, or at least lack of opposition to, Britain's policies there. Hardline British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used Britain's support for the U.S. in the Cold War to insist the United States not undermine his campaign to isolate Mosaddeq. "Britain was supporting the Americans in Korea, he reminded Truman, and had a right to expect `Anglo-American unity` on Iran."

But according to Prof. Ervand Abrahamian, "the `communist danger` was more of a rhetorical device than a real issue." The coup d'état was "a classic case of nationalism clashing with imperialism in the Third World". Secretary of State Dean Acheson admitted the “`Communist threat` was a smokescreen” in responding to Pres. Eisenhower's claim that the Tudeh party was about to assume power.

"Despite 20,000 members and 110,000 sympathizers, the Tudeh was no match for the armed tribes and the 129,000-man military. What is more, the British and Americans had enough inside information to be confident that the party had no plans to initiate armed insurrection. At the beginning of the crisis, when the Truman administration was under the impression a compromise was possible, Acheson had stressed the communist danger, and warned if Mossadeq was not helped, the Tudeh would take over. The (British) Foreign Office had retorted that the Tudeh was no real threat. But, in August 1953, when the Foreign Office echoed the Eisenhower administration’s claim that the Tudeh was about to take over, Acheson now retorted that there was no such communist danger. Acheson was honest enough to admit that the issue of the Tudeh was a smokescreen."

As part of the post–coup d'état political repression of the Tudeh, the imposed imperial government revealed that the party had 477 members in the Iranian armed forces: "22 colonels, 69 majors, 100 captains, 193 lieutenants, 19 noncommissioned officers, and 63 military cadets", however, none was member of the tank divisions, stationed around Tehran, that might have participated in (or prevented) the 1953 coup d'état; the Shah had carefully screened these commanders.

Comments
This suggested new lede does not begin to explain the reasons for the 1951-53 crisis. There is nothing in this account explaining that the Brits led a world-wide boycott of Iranian oil, blocking Iran's ports in the Persian Gulf, causing real economic crises in Iran, with widespread unemployment and unrest between 1951 and 1953, or that the reason for the boycott was specifically over British anger (greed) over the nationalization of Iranian oil which Britain had controlled since 1913. This account does not mention that, after the coup, and, for the first time in half a century, Britain shared Iranian oil with the United States as a reward for overthrowing the Iranian government. Britain shared the profits of Iranian oil, 40 percent for US oil companies, 40 percent for British oil companies and 20 percent divided among French and other oil companies. These inconvenient facts were deleted in last week's orgy of reverts by snowfire, et al. and that's why any account leaving out the role oil played in this coup is unacceptable. (Skywriter pasted from 1953 coup article talk page)

reply: the lead reads "Britain accused Mosaddeq of violating the legal rights of the (AIOC) and mobilized a worldwide boycott of Iran's oil, plunging Iran into financial crisis." Is there any source with any evidence that the coup was connected with with whateveer percentage US oil companies had in the consortium? --BoogaLouie (talk) 19:00, 25 July 2009 (UTC)