User:Louis P. Boog/sandbox/Other arguments over Absolute Guardianship

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Other arguments over Absolute Guardianship
A number of clerics connected to the Islamic Republic have defended Khomeini's theory of government by the Faqih.

Ayatollah, Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi (1935-2021) -- “perhaps the most prominent and vocal proponent of absolute velayat-e faghih [faqih]" -- asserted that “neither the laws nor the officials of the state have any legitimacy unless and until they meet with the vali-e faghih’s [Guardian Faqih/Supreme Leader’s] approval”, and that the vali-e faghi ruler possesses "all the prerogatives" of the infallible Imam (‘a) "as the holder of authority of the Islamic society".

Also writing in defense of the principle of the universal and absolute guardianship of the Guardian Faqih ruler, is Ahmad Vaezi (b. 1963), an Iranian Shi'i cleric and academic.

At least as of the early 21st century, their defenses of Khomeini's concept tended to be replies to criticisms. Misbah Yazdi (in his work, A Cursory Glance at the Theory of Wilayat al-Faqih), emphasizes the many dangers to defend against, warning the faithful of: "intellectual and ideological threats", “satanic hands" and "propaganda" spreading "incorrect" and "groundless" thoughts",  the "untenable claims and inconsistent features", the "calumnies and lies", the "sinister and nefarious propaganda", of "the enemies" of Wilayat al-Faqih. In addition, there is the danger of the influence of "the prevailing intellectual atmosphere", the danger of those "fascinated by or deluded by the Western culture", and the concepts of "freedom and democracy", the "goddesses" and "sacred idols ... of the 20th and 21st centuries", etc.

Some of the criticism of Wilayat al-Faqih that they reply to, include:


 * that there is no straightforward statement in scripture that faqih clerics should rule over the people.

Those concerned over whether Islam supports the concept of wilayat al-faqih, should note that (according to Mesbah Yazdi), the "overwhelmingly dominant opinion" of Shi'ah jurisprudents, (based on "the available views and opinions") is that "a duly competent jurist" (who is "appointed according to the general descriptions ... that the Imam has set") should rule over the people during the occultation of the Imam. Unfortunately, preventing a consensus among jurisprudents on this point are "one or two" contemporary Shi'ah jurists, who insist that for a government to be legitimate, it must be "decided by the people". Those concerned should also look to several hadith (listed above in "scriptural basis"), which when properly understood, make "it is crystal clear that obedience to the ... decree of the [ruler] faqih" is just as obligatory and mandatory," as obedience to the  infallible Imam (‘a).

In addition there are two "Intellectual proofs" (using reason rather than scripture) substantiating wilayat al-faqih:

Proof #1
 * 1) Everyone needs a government for order and welfare;
 * 2) the best government is that run by the infallible imam;
 * 3) since we can't have that, we need one resembling it as much as possible;
 * 4) rule by the Islamic jurist provides that, with his "absolute immunity from any kind of corruption, error, sin, selfishness", and "comprehensive and perfect insight and competence in social conditions".

Proof #2
 * 1) God possesses the exclusive "right to exercise authority over the properties, honor and lives of the people";
 * 2) a right he bestowed first on "the Holy Prophet (S)" Muhammad and then on the infallibles;
 * 3) these are now gone, but God couldn't have "abandoned His purpose", namely, "man’s attainment of bliss and perfection", the reason sharia was created;
 * 4) so he must have "given permission to the most appropriate person to implement them",
 * 5) that person is a "competent jurist" who possesses fear of God and "expertise in governing society and ensuring its welfare".

Ahmed Vaez gives a similar argument, maintaining that a ruling wali (guardian) is a natural progression from God (who several verses in the Quran -- Q.3:68, Q.2:257, Q.4:45 -- describe as a wali over the believers), to the Prophet Muhammad (who is also described as such Q.5:55, Q.33:6), to the Imams (who are described as wali in numerous Shi'i hadith). So it is natural that the next religious figure after them also have the "universal" powers that Muhammad and the Imams had. This also explains why giving a Faqih general powers over the public does not put sane adults in the same category as minors and mentally ill. The powers of God, Muhammad and the Imams were total, despite the fact their subjects were sane adults.


 * that the concept of wilayat al-faqih ought to be something Shi'a Muslims are able to understand/accept/believe based on their own religious study [i.e. tahqiq] (as they do with the basic principles of belief -- "proving the existence of God or the prophethood of the Prophet (S)"), and not something accepted without question from a religious scholar.

Despite providing hadith and intellectual proofs for absolute wilayat al-faqih, Mesbah Yazdi also argues that the idea of rule of the jurist is a principle of religion that believers must accept on faith [taqlid] -- because of its "special character".


 * that in Shi'a Islam, all believers already have a religious scholar to provide them with guidance -- the "source of emulation (maraji‘ at-taqlid)" that each Shi'i chooses.

Mesbah Yazdi and Ahmed Vaezi claim that the maraji‘ at-taqlid and wilayat al-faqih have two different roles. One ('maraji‘) gives opinions on "general issues and Islamic precepts", answering  religious questions on practical matters in Islam by making deductions from their religious knowledge; and the other (wilayat) enacts and implements laws and regulations,'' decrees intended to "effectively organize and resolve difficulties within Muslim society". One gives fatwa; the other decrees (hukm).

Ahmed Vaezi also explains that while a fatwa may sometimes conflict with a hukm, the Muslim must obey the  Wali's hukm over their  marja' fatwa because the order/hukm "is binding upon all Muslims"—including other faqih and including Muslims outside of the political jurisdiction of the Wali (i.e. outside Iran). (as explained in the hadith above).


 * that giving the guardian jurist "absolute" status so that he "may issue orders that disregard the commands of the Shari’ah" (Ahmed Vaezi), not only contradicts "Khomeini's previous promises but also the norms of the sacred law" (Freedom Movement of Iran of Mehdi Bazargan).
 * About nine years after its founding, a "stalemate" developed within the Islamic Government between Islamic radicals trying to push through "controversial items of social and economic legislation" (labor laws, income tax), and conservatives "Guardian" mullahs vetoing their bills.  Both groups  were  supporters  of Khomeini and he attempted to find a compromise with "milder" legislation. In the process of trying to  solve this  impasse he made a statement in January 1988 elevating "the  preservation of the Islamic state to a primary central injunction (al-ahkam  al-awwaliyya) and downgraded rituals (e.g., the obligatory salat prayers and fasting during Ramadan) to secondary injunctions (al-ahkam al-thanawiyya)". (This of course also elevated the jurist ruler of the Islamic state, and concept is called velayat-e motlaqaye faqih -- "the absolute authority of the jurist".)
 * "'I should state that the government, which is part of the absolute deputyship of the Prophet, is one of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all secondary injunctions, even prayers fasting and hajj'."
 * Extending the power of the guardian jurist "to the temporary suspension of such essential rites of Islam as the hajj",  was seemingly in contradiction for the rationale Khomeini gave for the need for an Islamic government in his 1970 manifesto:
 * "... in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty. The Sacred Legislator of Islam is the sole legislative power. No one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the Divine Legislator. ... The law of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government. Everyone, including the Most Noble Messenger (s) and his successors, is subject to law and will remain so for all eternity—the law that has been revealed by God, Almighty and Exalted,..."

Concerning this controversy, Mesbah Yazdi maintains that the ruling jurist's priority over things like prayer and hajj involves only things like delaying the offering of salat prayer when "the enemies’ attack is due", not serious changes in Islam.

Similarly, Ahmed Vaezi states that commands to reverse sacred law are only temporary commands applicable when some "significant damage, distress and constriction or disorder" occurs; ‘first order’ laws (al-ahkam al-awaly) remain intact. (However, he then goes on to explain that under the "revolutionary view" of Ayatollah Khomeini, "Shari’ah … is not the ultimate goal". Islamic laws are only "a means" to an end. The end is "the protection of Islam and the extension of Justice". For Khomeini "the Islamic State is not merely one part of Islam amongst others, but it is Islam itself".)


 * That unless the ruler is one of the most learned faqih (a Grand Ayatollah), the "intellectual foundations" of the concept of wilayat al-faqih are "undermined" (according to Ervand Abrahamian), and the "logic" of the Islamic revolution comes to an "end"  (according to Olivier Roy).


 * As mentioned above in the History section, in March 1989 Khomeini made a "major pronouncement" declaring that clerics could be categorized "into two distinct groups" -- those clerics knowledgeable about "religious scholarship", and those knowledgeable about "the problems of the day", i.e. the contemporary world and economic, social and political matters.  It was the second group  should rule, not "religious" clerics, despite the fact that he had spent decades denouncing  secularism and the idea that the affairs of this world "were separate from the understanding of the sacred law".


 * Also in that month, Hussein-Ali Montazeri, was ousted as Khomeini's officially designated successor, after he called for "an open assessment of failures" of the Revolution and an end to the export of revolution.  Montazeri was the only marjaʿ al-taqlid beside Khomeini who had been part of Khomeini's movement, and the only senior cleric trusted by Khomeini's network.  Since the constitution called for the Supreme Leader/Wali al-Faqih to be a marja', after Khomeini died the Assembly of Experts amended the constitution to remove scholarly seniority from the qualifications of the leader, accommodating the appointment of a "mid-ranking" but loyal cleric (Ali Khamenei), to be Leader.

Mesbah Yazdi doesn't talk about this event or the controversy. He agrees that "the basic and fundamental raison d’être of wilayat al-faqih is the implementation of Islamic laws and ordinances", and that the guardian jurist "must first and foremost be knowledgeable, familiar with the laws of Islam and is able to identify them very well". But if the leading jurist lacks fear of God and "efficiency in managing the society", he is disqualified from that position.


 * that the people deserve to choose who rules over them;

Mesbah Yazdi argues that it is a common misconception to hold that in order to have legitimacy, government must represent the people. Since "the entire universe and whatever is in it belongs to God", humans have no more right to choose/elect someone to rule themselves, than they would have to take someone else's property ("house, car, shoes, clothes, etc.") and use it without that person's permission. This, however, does not mean the people do not have a "vital role" to play in the system of wilayat al-faqih. By their "acceptance" of Islamic government, the people secure the "actual establishment and stability" of divine government.


 * that Absolute Guardianship of the jurist may or will lead, or has led to despotic government or dictatorship;

Mesbah-Yazdi raises this doubt, but assures readers that it would be impossible because while a dictator rules according to "his personal whims and caprice", the Guardian Jurist "rules according to the will and choice of God, the Exalted, following the divine laws". What would happen if the Wali drifted "away" from Islam and its laws? He would "spontaneously" lose credibility, and "not be obeyed".

Ahmed Vaezi also reassures readers that absolute guardianship is "totally different" from "totalitarian and dictatorial government" and absolutism found in Western states, because the Wali possesses the qualities of "justice, piety and the necessary socio-political perspicacity" and will be "dismissed" if he fails to demonstrate them.


 * that throughout history, integrating religion and politics has not ended well; Because of the corruption of power, if you "want your religion to remain safe and the Qur’an and Islam be respected" you must keep "religion away from the political scene.
 * instead, the management of social (and economic, political) affairs should be based on the domain of fact, not religion, planning based on what people see and experience.

The idea that rule by religious dignitaries is a mistake because government should be kept separate from religion, (according to Mesbah Yazdi), comes from medieval Europe where "monarchs had to submit to and obey" the Catholic Pope. Eventually, "all the misfortunes, deprivations, and backwardness" of Europe came to be blamed on religion, and now, because of modern technology, these ideas have spread to "Muslim countries and Muslim thinkers" but they are alien to Islam. The idea that "whatever we feel and see real and we must think about it and set a plan for it", is also based on an erroneous European idea -- the philosophy of Positivism


 * that if we are to have a government by Jurist, he should be chosen by popular vote. After all, didn't Muhammad asked the people in Ghadir Khumm to pay allegiance to ‘Ali (‘a) (the first Imam and fourth Caliph)? why would "the Prophet (S) ask the people to give their allegiance to the Imam (‘a) ... if the legitimacy of the government of ‘Ali (‘a) had indeed nothing to do with the vote of the people"?

Just as you would use professors of mathematics to select the best professor of mathematics, so you use experts on the subject of fiqh -- and not public opinion -- to pick the best expert on fiqh.

The misconception that the people’s opinion and choice is relevant comes (according to Mesbah Yazdi) from arguments such as the one above alluding to Ghadir Khumm. However, that bay'ah (oath of allegiance)  is only "a means of expressing readiness to assist and cooperate" with the ruler/ commander, and "has nothing to do with giving legitimacy and granting the right" to rule over them.


 * Currently there is a "problem of circularity" in selecting a Guardian Jurist/Supreme Leader in the Islamic Republic, preventing the people of Iran from having input in choosing Iran's most powerful official -- i.e. The Assembly of Experts picks the Guardian Jurist/Supreme Leader who then can appoint half of the members of the Guardian Council (and may dismiss them at will), the Guardians approve any candidate wishing to run for the office of the Assembly of Experts. This creates a self-perpetuating cycle whereby if the people of Iran don't like/disagree with the Leader, or the people who select him, they can do little about it.

Misbah Yazdi defends the allegedly circular selection process of the Guardian Council, Assembly of Experts, Supreme Leader by noting it is "stipulated in the Constitution" or Iran, that the approval of candidates for the Council of Guardians is the "prerogative" of wali al-faqih’s (who as previously demonstrated is God's ruler). He further points out that in all modern so-called democracies there is always a first election to vote members of some body of representatives (such as a constitutional assembly to write a constitution) and that body comes "into existence as a result of an election based on a certain set of rules and regulations which had not been enacted and approved by any popularly-elected cabinet and parliament" (such as who gets to vote -- how old do they must be, whether only men can vote, etc.; who gets to be elected to the body, voting system -- first past the post, ranked choice, proportional representation, etc..) because it's the first election! But this "is nothing but the circular relationship to which we have referred at the beginning". So we see that (according to Mesbah Yazdi) just because there is "circularity" in the wilayat al-faqih system should not disqualify it; otherwise, we would "have to reject all the past, present and future democratic governments and systems in the world."


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