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TOP TRANSLATORS TALK ON TAPE  Pavel Palazchenko

Correspondent: in this series of conversations we've been giving an intimate glimpse of the communication problems of the world's leaders when they don't share a common language. the role of the interpreter in our century has become evermore crucial, though that's only imperfectly understood outside those tiny groups at the summit.

Pavel Palazchenko was always one of the most unobtrusive figures, even when he was pictured standing at the shoulders of President Gorbachev and President Reagan <ссылка из книги Patty Davis>. last Sunday night viewers of the Clive Anderson show saw him slip quietly onto the set, while the ex-president acknowledged the applause. he has been beside him now ever since Gorbachev blew into the Kremlin like a blast of fresh air.

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: my impression was that this is a kind of surprisingly normal person, a surprisingly reasonable individual. certainly, the previous soviet leaders were quite different. i've never actually worked with any of them, but we had a certain impression about the kind of person that the soviet leader was supposed to be. they were quite old, they looked rather dogmatic and they looked like people on a kind of pedestal. Gorbachev never looked like that. and that was my first impression which i still think was correct.

Correspondent: what was your first big experience in interpreting?

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: oh, i don't know what you call a "big experience". i started working for the UN in 1974 in the interpretation service of the united nations' secretariat, worked there for five years, so that was probably what you would call the big experience and certainly a major learning experience for me. i would say that professionally i owe everything to, first of all, my school, the institute of foreign languages in moscow, and secondly, my five years of working at the un.

Correspondent: what was your first meeting and acquaintance with mr. Gorbachev?

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: right after he became general secretary in april 1985. he was interviewed by a reporter from india because the visit of Radjiv Gandhi, the indian prime minister, was being prepared and so he granted an interview to an indian reporter, and i interpreted that interview.

Correspondent: whithin hours of the chernenko funeral President Reagan proposed a summit with the new leader, with mister Gorbachev at Geneva. when did you know you would be going to geneva with him? PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: actually during the preparations for the geneva summit i was in new york working at the soviet delegation. and i was not at all prepared for the kind of news that i received. it was totally a surprise. it came, i think, less than a week before the summit.

Correspondent: there had been more than a 6 year hiatus, a gap between the last meeting between the soviet and american leaders and this one in geneva. what was the atmosphere like when President Reagan met mr.Gorbachev?

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: well, their first meeting certainly was not marked by an atmosphere of trust and cooperation that developed a lot later. but i think they both made a good effort, even though they both regarded themselves as representing countries who are adversaries and even potential enemies. they both made a good effort.

Correspondent: before their meeting President Reagan had been talking about "the evil empire" and using phrases like that. presumably, he didn't do that at the summit?

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: well, he certainly didn't use the phrase 'the evil empire' at the summit. in some of his subsequent public speeches he did use some similar phrases. but so far as i know, as the relationship between Gorbachev and himself, and the relationship between the soviet union and the united states improved, he really in most cases tried to avoid that kind of language. and of course, during his visit to moscow in may 1988 he was asked specifically by an american reporter whether he still considered the soviet union an 'evil empire'. and he said, "No". He said, "i no longer consider it 'the evil empire', because the country is changing in the direction that we welcome." this happened during mr.Reagan's tour of the kremlin, and i was present there, and i heard that response to a very pointed question. and I think it really marked the evolution of the relationship.

Correspondent: were those one-on-one meetings very intense in terms of concentration from your point of view?

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: well, any meeting when you interpret at the highest levels of government, any summit meeting work requires a lot of concentration and you do feel, you know, more than kind of average responsibility. on the other hand any interpreter, when he or she do any kind of work, have to concentrate. this is a must whether you interpret at a summit or you interpret at some conference on tax policy.

Correspondent: Reagan kept quoting the russian proverb which meant "trust, but verify". was this his only russian phrase?

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: well, yes, he actually liked to quote that proverb, but he also quoted a number of others, and some of them many russians did not even know. and those were good proverbs. i understand that some people specifically did research for him in order to find the proverbs that would sound good.

Correspondent: that first meeting in geneva was very much a sort of getting-to-know-each-other meeting. the meeting in Reykjavik in 1986 was a much more important meeting in terms of the discussions. how did you find that meeting? what kind of pressure were you under for that?

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: i would disagree that the geneva meeting was just a get-to-know-each-other-meeting, just the first-handshake kind of meeting. you remember, it was at that meeting that they included in the joint statement the phrase that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. and before that there was a lot of talk on the american side and probably some talk on the soviet side at least, you know, within government that nuclear war is just another kind of war. there are things more important than peace etc, etc. and it was very important that the two leaders made that statement. and i believe that really the beginning of the process of nuclear disarmament can be traced back to the geneva summit. but, of course, the Reykjavik summit was very-very substantive discussions of the nuts and bolts of arms control, of the bean counting of missiles, submarines, Strategic Defence Initiative (sdi). all of these things were at that time very important. i think they still are. and that, of course, PLACED ON THE INTERPRETERS WHO WORKED ON BOTH SIDES A GREAT BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY.

Correspondent: when Gorbachev proposed a mutual elimination of all strategic offensive arms over the period of ten years and said he was prepared to accept any form of verification. This surprised the Americans. Did it surprise you?

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: no, it didn’t surprise me. I, of course, knew in advance of that meeting that Gorbachev will be making a rather dramatic proposal, and the first very dramatic proposal was about cutting in half, about a 50%-cut of all types of nuclear weapons, both land-based, sea launched and bombers. And that was a very important proposal because he agreed that within that cut the soviet heavy missiles which the Americans regarded as the most dangerous ones would also be cut in half.

And that was the first time that a soviet leader agreed to that kind of cut in that particular category of weapons. And in the process also, when President Reagan started to talk about his fears of nuclear war, and that the strategic defence initiative is aimed at preventing nuclear war, Gorbachev did say that the best way to prevent nuclear war would be to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons over a period of ten years. It was quite dramatic, but it was quite consistent with Gorbachev’s general policy and with his statement calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons within ten years. That statement was made long before the Reykjavik summit on January 15, 1986. the fact that they went on to discuss this idea was to me, of course, it was very welcome. I believe that it was a kind of psychological breakthrough that both leaders were thinking about this.

Correspondent: Can you give me some idea of the flavour of these meetings, which were clearly so very important?

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: well, the very first meeting in Reykjavik was just a one-on-one meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan. And there was an interpreter on each side and also a note taker on each side. So there were six individuals in the room. Then after about half an hour, I forget whether it was Reagan or Gorbachev who said, “Let us invite our foreign ministers”. And therefore Shevardnadze and Shultz were invited. And the rest of the Reykjavik summit was two-on-two rather than one-on-one. And it was a rather small room actually and eight people in that one room. It was I think more than enough. You know, at some point it got a little bit stuffy in the room because of the presence of eight people in the room. Actually the Heitje House in which the Reykjavik summit was held is a very small place and it would have been a good place to hold a really small and informal summit that was initially envisioned. But in real life whenever the two leaders agreed that a summit would be small, informal, without protocol formalities etc., etc., it never really works out that way and there were dozens of officials present on both sides. But of course, in the room itself there were just those eight individuals, and most of the talking was done by Reagan and Gorbachev. But particularly the presence of George Shultz was very important President Reagan never really paid much attention to details. He was not a detail kind of political leader. And Shultz was very knowledgeable about those details.

Correspondent: There were quite a number of observers of President Reagan who felt that he didn’t have too much of a grasp of foreign affairs and that kind of detail. Was that mr. Gorbachev’s feeling either before or after they’d met?

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: All I would say, it’s common knowledge that President Reagan did not have much interest in the details. When he wanted to get into some detailed matter, he was quite able to understand. But the fact is that he was a kind of instinctive, intuitive politician and statesman. And therefore for him more general things were important and he could hold his ground on those things quite well. And I think Gorbachev understood that and, to my knowledge, he really never tried to take advantage of Reagan’s style. Reagan was the elected leader of the United States. Gorbachev HAD A LOT OF REALLY HEALTHY RESPECT for that from the start. He really understood who he was dealing with.

Correspondent: There was an outside perception at that time the President Reagan was initially inclined to accept Mr. Gorbachev’s proposals in Reykjavik and very nearly agreed, and was then TALKED OUT of it by his own foreign minister and foreign staff. Was that your impression?

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: Well, that really was not just an impression. I think that is the way it was. And the records of the Reykjavik summit, which have been published, I think they confirm that that was indeed the fact. Obviously, at that time if Reagan even had accepted that proposal, the Americans would have found the way to BACK OUT of that agreement. So I would say that however the fact that Reagan, the President of the United States, discussed in very serious terms the possibility of the elimination or the abolition of nuclear weapons was of great POLITICAL AND PSYCOLOGICAL importance.

Correspondent: But was Gorbachev really disappointed when the Americans finally wouldn’t agree?

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: I think he was, yes, but his disappointment was not OF A BITTER kind. And if you recall, right after the Reykjavik summit there was that famous press conference where he spoke about the outcome of the Reykjavik summit. And he used the phrase that REYKJAVIK WAS NOT A FAILURE BUT RATHER a breakthrough. He really went beyond any initial disappointment in that comment. Correspondent: When they met in Washington in December 1987, they did in fact reach the first arms elimination agreement of the nuclear age in that INF treaty. But was much more modest than mr. Gorbachev’s original proposals in Reykjavik. Was it however, do you think, important psychologically?

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: Oh, absolutely. And he wanted to take that first step. He believed that eliminating at least two categories of nuclear weapons was a very important beginning on a road to the abolition of nuclear weapons. And that’s why he agreed to taking that step, even though it fell short of his goals for the first phase of nuclear disarmament. He would have liked to add a 50% cut in strategic nuclear weapons. He wanted to regard that as a package. But when he saw that pragmatically, realistically that was not possible, and that the next step would have to be somewhat postponed, he agreed with that. And he agreed that the first step would be modest, but remember this was and still is the only agreement in history THAT TOTALLY ELIMINATES a certain class of nuclear weapons, held by the two great powers.

Correspondent: Reagan had this very relaxed style, Mr. Gorbachev’s was a very forceful style. Did you and your American opposite number TRY TO ECHO THAT in your interpretations?

PAVEL PALAZCHENKO: Normally my interpretation style is that you try to be A LITTLE MORE NEUTRAL than the speaker, because the principal speaker has other ways of expressing whatever he wants to express, whether it is warmth or strength, or cordiality, or relaxed manner. The body language also works. And it is good to leave it to the principal to use the body language and to use all of other resources.

So my interpretation style is always somewhat more neutral than what the speaker is saying. I believe that that’s the right approach. to be continued..