User:Luka Ghantous/sandbox

Interactionism also known as interactionist dualism, is the theory where the philosophical mind, and the physical mind, are both uniquely distinct and independent substances that exert causal effects on one another.[1] It is one form of dualism, that can be categorized in substance dualism, and more recently has been seen as a form of property dualism. Proponents Interactionism was propounded by the French rationalist philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650), it is something he is still remembered for to this day. Descartes posited that the body, being physical matter, was characterized by spatial extension and not by thought and feeling, while the mind, was a separate substance, that had no spatial extension but could think and feel regardless.[2] Nevertheless, the mind and body “form a unit” and are “intermingled” with each other. We don’t merely perceive events that happen to our bodies, the way sailors perceive events that happen to their ship, but we directly experience such events. (p.34, Amy Kind, Philosophy of Mind). In the 20th century, its most significant defenders have been the noted philosopher of science Karl Popper and the neurophysiologist John Carew Eccles.[4] Popper in fact divided reality into three "worlds"—the physical, the mental, and objective knowledge (outside the mind)—all of which interact,[5] Eccles also adopted this same "trialist" form of interactionism.[6] Other notable recent philosophers to take an interactionist stance have been Richard Swinburne, John Foster, David Hodgson, and Wilfrid Sellars, in addition to the physicist Henry Stapp.[7] In his 1996 book The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers questioned interactionism. In 2002 he listed it along with epiphenomenalism and what he calls "Type-F Monism" as a position worth examining. Rather than invoking two distinct substances, he defines interactionism as the view that "microphysics is not causally closed, and that phenomenal properties play a causal role in affecting the physical world." (See property dualism.) He argues the most plausible place for consciousness to impact physics is the collapse of the wave function in quantum mechanics.[7] The New Catholic Encyclopedia argues that a non-physical mind and mind-body interaction follow necessarily from the Catholic doctrines of the soul and free will.[8] Objections[edit] Problem of causal interaction[edit] Main article: Mind–body dualism § Arguments against dualism Causation is a very complicated subject within the mind and body, this led to Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia being the first person to object to this theory. She argued that in ordinary situations things must touch to react, for example a billiard ball won't move unless being with the cue, therefore how can a non physical mind interact with the physical one. In his response to Princess Elizabeth, Descartes was very elusive and didn’t give a clear answer. (p.35, Amy Kind, Philosophy of mind). This is what led to the main objection often posed to interactionism is the problem of causal interaction – how the two different substances the theory posits, the mental and the physical, can exert an impact on one another. Descartes' theory that interaction between the mind and the physical world being intermingled was seen as inadequate by a number of philosophers in his era, who offered alternate views: Nicholas Malebranche suggested occasionalism, according to which mind and body appear to interact but are in fact moved separately by God, while Gottfried Leibniz argued in The Monadology that mind and body are in a pre-established harmony.[3] On the other hand, Baruch Spinoza rejected Descartes' dualism and proposed that mind and matter were in fact properties of a single substance,[3] thereby prefiguring the modern perspective of neutral monism. The first person to argue against Descaartes was still Princess Elizabeth. Another example of her making a great argument against Interactionism is when she said a rock cannot break a pane of glass without being thrown into it first therefore, the mind must be physical. (p.35, Amy Kind, Philosophy of Mind). Today the problem of causal interaction is frequently viewed as a conclusive argument against interactionism.[9] On the other hand, it has been suggested that given many disciplines deal with things they do not entirely understand, dualists not entirely understanding the mechanism of mind-body interaction need not be seen as definitive refutation.[9] The idea that causation necessarily depends on push-pull mechanisms (which would not be possible for a substance that did not occupy space) is also arguably based on obsolete conceptions of physics.[2] “The nature of mind-body causation is oftenly raised as a main objection to Descartes’ interactionism” (p.35, Amy Kind, Philosophy of Mind), and due to this idea being originally brought up by Princess Elisabeth, this is known as, ‘Princess Elisabeth’s objection’. The problem of mental causation is also discussed in the context of other positions on the mind-body problem, such as property dualism and anomalous monism.[2] Compatibility with the conservation of energy[edit] See also: Mind-body dualism § Argument from physics A more recent related objection is the argument from physics, which argues that a mental substance impacting the physical world would contradict principles of physics.[1] In particular, if some external source of energy is responsible for the interactions, it would violate the law of conservation of energy.[10] Two main responses to this have been to suggest the mind influences the distribution but not the quantity of energy in the brain and to deny that the brain is a causally closed system in which conservation of energy would apply.[1][8] Causal closure[edit] See also: Mind-body dualism § Argument from physics Taking the argument a step further, it has been argued that because physics fully accounts for the causes of all physical movements, there can be no place for a non-physical mind to play a role.[2] All physical movements (things) can only have physical outcomes, and therefore the mind, being immaterial, can only produce mental outcomes. There is no connection for the non-physical mind to complete a task. The principle, in slightly different iterations, has variously been called causal closure, completeness of the physical, physical closure, and physical comprehensiveness.[2] This has been the foremost argument against interactionism in contemporary philosophy.[7] Some philosophers have suggested the influence of the mind on the body could be reconciled with deterministic physical laws by proposing the mind's impacts instead take place at points of quantum indeterminacy.[9] Karl Popper and John Eccles, as well as the physicist Henry Stapp, have theorized that such indeterminacy may apply at the macroscopic scale.[4] (See quantum mind.) However, Max Tegmark has argued that classical and quantum calculations show that quantum decoherence effects do not play a role in brain activity.[11] David Chalmers has noted (without necessarily endorsing) a second possibility within quantum mechanics, that consciousness' causal role is to collapse the wave function as per the Von Neumann-Wigner interpretation of quantum mechanics.[12] He acknowledges this is at odds with the interpretations of quantum mechanics held by most physicists, but notes, "There is some irony in the fact that philosophers reject interactionism on largely physical grounds (it is incompatible with physical theory), while physicists reject an interactionist interpretation of quantum mechanics on largely philosophical grounds (it is dualistic). Taken conjointly, these reasons carry little force...".[7] There remains a literature in philosophy and science, albeit a much-contested one, that asserts evidence for emergence in various domains, which would undermine the principle of causal closure.[2] (See emergentism.) Another option that has been suggested is that the interaction may involve dark energy, dark matter or some other currently unknown scientific process.[13] Another possible resolution is akin to parallelism—Eugene Mills holds that behavioral events are causally overdetermined, and can be explained by either physical or mental causes alone.[14] An overdetermined event is fully accounted for by multiple causes at once.[15] However, J. J. C. Smart and Paul Churchland have argued that if physical phenomena fully determine behavioral events, then by Occam's razor a non-physical mind is unnecessary.[16] Andrew Melnyk argues that overdetermination would require an "intolerable coincidence."[2] While causal closure remains a key obstacle for interactionism, it is not relevant to all forms of dualism; epiphenomenalism and parallelism are unaffected as they do not posit that the mind affects the body.[2] Relationship to other positions[edit]

Four varieties of dualist causal interaction. The arrows indicate the direction of causations. Mental and physical states are shown in red and blue, respectively. Interactionism can be distinguished from competing dualist theories of causation, including epiphenomenalism, and parallelism. Epiphenomenalism is a theory that admits causation, but views causation as unidirectional rather than bidirectional. While parallelism denies causation, while seeking to explain the semblance of causation by other means such as pre-established harmony or occasionalism).[1] The epiphenomenalist position is recognized when “the dualist simply concedes that the mind lacks causal efficacy. The mind exists, and it is distinct from the body, but it does not obtain any causal power whatsoever”(p.38, Amy Kind, Philosophy of Mind). The Conscious Mind, is a book where David Chalmers argues that regardless of the mechanism by which the mental might impact the physical, if interactionism were true, there would be a deeper conceptual issue. The chosen mechanism could always be separated from its phenomenal component, leading to simply a new form of epiphenomenalism.[12] Later, he suggested that while the causal component could be separated, interactionism was like "type-F monism" (Russellian monism, panpsychism, and panprotopsychism) in that it gave entities externally characterized by physical relationships the additional intrinsic feature of conscious properties.[7]

See also Qualia Hard problem of consciousness Philosophical zombie Explanatory gap Knowledge argument Chinese room Phenomenal consciousness Dual aspect theory Idealism Biological naturalism Identity theory of mind Functionalism (philosophy of mind) Behaviorism Eliminative materialism Neuroscience of free will Neurophilosophy Integrated information theory (IIT) Philosophy of science Scientism Artificial consciousness Animal consciousness References Robinson, Howard (2016). "Dualism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2 January 2018. Robb, David and John Heil (2014). "Mental Causation". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 15 January 2018. The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. "Interactionism – philosophy". Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. Retrieved 2 January 2018. : |last= has generic name (help) Popper, Karl & Eccles, John (2002). The Self and Its Brain. Springer Verlag. ISBN 3-492-21096-1. Three Worlds by Karl Popper - The Tanner Lecture on Human Values - Delivered by Karl Popper at The University of Michigan on April 7, 1978. Eccles, John (1973). "6 'Brain, Speech, and Consciousness'". The Understanding of the Brain. McGraw-Hill Book Company. p. 189. ISBN 0-07-018863-7. Chalmers, David J. (2003). "Consciousness and its Place in Nature" (PDF). In Stich, Stephen P.; Warfield, Ted A. (eds.). The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind (1st ed.). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. ISBN 978-0631217756. Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 October 2017. Retrieved 21 January 2018. Maher, Michael (1909) "The Law of Conservation of Energy", Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 5, pp. 422 ff, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05422a.htm. Calef, Scott (2014). "Dualism and Mind". In Fieser, James and Bradley Dowden (ed.). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 15 January 2018. Lycan, William (1996) "Philosophy of Mind" in The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, ed. Nicholas Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Tegmark, Max (April 2000). "Importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes". Phys. Rev. E. 61 (4): 4194–4206. arXiv:quant-ph/9907009. Bibcode:2000PhRvE..61.4194T. doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.61.4194. PMID 11088215. S2CID 17140058. Retrieved 18 November 2012. Chalmers, David (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Philosophy of Mind Series. Oxford University Press, USA. pp. 156–157. ISBN 978-0-19-983935-3. Robinson, H. (2003) "Dualism", in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, ed. S. Stich and T. Warfield, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 85-101. Mills, E. (1996). "Interactionism and Overdetermination". American Philosophical Quarterly. 33: 105–117. Althusser, Louis (1985). "Contradiction and Overdetermination," in For Marx. ISBN 0-902308-79-3. Churchland, Paul (1984). Matter and Consciousness, Revised Edition. MIT Press. ISBN 9780262530743. External links Interactionism Philosophy Index. Varieties of Dualism: Interaction Stanford University. vte Philosophy of mind Philosophers AnscombeAustinAquinasBainBergsonBhattacharyaBlockBrentanoBroadBurgeChalmersChurchlandDennettDharmakirtiDavidsonDescartesGoldmanHeideggerHusserlFeyerabendFodorJamesKierkegaardLeibnizLewisMcDowellMerleau-PontyMinskyMooreNagelParfitPutnamPopperRortyRyleSearleSpinozaTuringVasubandhuWittgensteinZhuangzimore... Theories BehaviorismBiological naturalismDualismEliminative materialismEmergent materialismEpiphenomenalismFunctionalismIdealismInteractionismMaterialismMonismNaïve realism NeurophenomenologyNeutral monismOccasionalismParallelismPhenomenalismPhenomenologyPhysicalism identity theoryProperty dualismRepresentationalSolipsismSubstance dualism Concepts Abstract objectArtificial intelligenceChinese roomCognitionCognitive closureConceptConcept and objectConsciousnessHard problem of consciousnessHypostatic abstractionIdeaIdentityIngenuityIntelligenceIntentionalityIntrospectionIntuitionLanguage of thoughtMaterialismMental eventMental imageMental processMental propertyMental representationMindMind–body problemNew mysterianismPainProblem of other mindsPropositional attitudeQualiaTabula rasaUnderstandingZombiemore... Related MetaphysicsPhilosophy of artificial intelligence / information / perception / self CategoryPhilosophers categoryProjectTask Force Categories: Dualism (philosophy of mind)Philosophy of mind Navigation menu Luka Ghantous Alerts (0) Notices (2) Talk Sandbox Preferences Beta Watchlist Contributions Log out ArticleTalk ReadEdit sourceView historyWatch Search Search Wikipedia Main page Contents Current events Random article About Wikipedia Contact us Donate Contribute Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file Tools What links here Related changes Special pages Permanent link Page information Cite this page Wikidata item Print/export Download as PDF Printable version

Languages Azərbaycanca Eesti فارسی Italiano Norsk bokmål Português Русский Edit links This page was last edited on 7 March 2022, at 02:39. Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0; additional terms may apply. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.