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The Role of Chinese and American Leaders in Building Relations Between the Two Countries in the 1970s

Majed Kiasat

Abstract

After the victory of the communist forces in China and establishment of the government of the People’s Republic of China led by Mao Zedong, the United States severed all ties with mainland China. For 25 years, dark relations dominated the political sky of the two countries. Disputes between the two sides over Taiwan, the Vietnam War, and many other issues, including ideological differences, had left leaders reluctant to re-establish political and economical ties between the two countries. During these years, efforts were made to pave the way for the establishment of bilateral relations. But because the leaders of the two countries, especially Mao Zedong, were not convinced that building relations was in the best interest of their countries, they prevented it. It was not until the early 1970s that Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon decided to find a way to break through the wall of mistrust and build political relations.

Introduction

Communist China and the United States experienced strained relations for years, so that even American travel to china have had restricted by US government. Trade, shipping, payment and any kind of economic connection had restricted. China accused the United States of ignoring Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. The two countries were facing each other in the Vietnam War, and thus the two countries were enemies, although they were not directly at war with each other. However, there were occasional attempts by individuals on both sides to find ways to normalize relations and reduce tensions. Mean while, the role of Prime Minister Chou En Lay on the Chinese side was significant. Such people were from both sides trying to remove obstacles and eliminate conflicts. But fears of being accused of Westernization by the Chinese and accusations of communist tendencies on the part of the Americans, made their work difficult. On the other hand, the lake of support and even explicit opposition of the leaders of Chain and the United States to the establishment of diplomatic relations had left no possibility to take this step.

Will is higher than ideology?

Richard Nixon, the president of the United States in the early 1970s, made the final decision to the confrontation. At the same time, Chou En Lay’s efforts to persuade Mao Zedong were fruitful. According to professor Sari al_Qalam:” Chou En Lay’s walked slowly and step by step patiently inside Mao’s worldview system without getting involved with Mao and losing his trust” and “ Chou En Lay was able to create a kind of persuasion when the leadership and body of the Chinese Communist Party were generally chanting all anti American slogan.”

But while these efforts continued and lasted about fifteen years from 1955 to 1970 vertically no progress in these efforts until Mao himself was convinced to try another way to confront the Western world. It was nothing but diplomacy. The idea of changing the relationship between the two countries was first suggested by Nixon. Nixon’s diary mention this: “ the first time I mentioned the important idea of the relationship between the United States and communist China was in an article in Foreign Affairs in 1967. In the introduction, the article indirectly refer to China: We seek an open world. . . a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.”

The first serious public step was taken by Richard Nixon in February 1970 during the Annual Foreign Policy Report to Congress. The section on China began: “ The Chinese are a great and viral people who should not remain isolated from the international community .The principal underlying our relations with Communist China are similar to those governing our policies toward the U.S.S.R. United States Policy is not likely soon to have much impact on China’s behavior, let alone its ideological outlook. But it is certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking.”

The Chinese leaders understood the message of the report and immediately offered to move the bilateral talks from the Warsaw to Beijing. This displacement was expected to bring about a positive change in the progress of the negotiations. Here we clearly see the effect of sending a message from the highest official of a country. Certainly, the expression of will at this level of decision_ making has tangible result.

To show his goodwill and willingness to improve relation with China, Nixon ordered that travel restrictions on China as well as trade control on Chinese merchant ships be significantly reduced. Mean while, giving the positive signals from the United States, there was a need to make decisions at the highest level of Chinese leadership, especially Mao Zedong. However, as Prime Minister, Chou En Lay was responsible for regulating the delicacy of the work in such a way that, while formalizing the actions, it also showed the will of China’s highest policymaker in this regard as a sign of approval. So in a message sent to the United States through Pakistani President Yahya Khan on December 9 of that year. Whit characteristic subtlety, Chou concluded with a Play on words. “ we have had messages from the United States from different sources in the past,” he said, “ but this is the first time that the proposal had come from a Head ( Mao), through a Head (Yahya Khan), to a Head ( Nixon).”

December 18 the same year, American Writer Edgar Snow had an interview with Mao Zedong. Mao told him that the Foreign Ministry was considering the question of allowing Americans of all political coloration to visit China.

It is important to note that given Mao’s positions as China’s most powerful figure, how to articulate these consideration could chart the future course of Sino_US relations. In the of opposition, it was not possible to advance Chou En Lay’s goals. Because of his unique personality, Mao rarely consulted with others, even the Prime Minister. If he was not sure of something, it would not be possible to do it. Especially if it was a foreign policy decision, he made that decision personally. If a suggestion was made by others, it was still Mao how had to endorse it.

In an interview with Time Magazine in October 1970, Nixon said: “ if there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China. If I don’t, I want my children to”.

In interview with Mao Zedong. Snow asked whether a rightist like Nixon, how represented the “ monopoly capitalists,” would be permitted to come. Mao replied that: “ he would be welcomed. Because as President, he is the one with whom the problems between China and the United States would have to be solved.” Mao said that he would be happy to talk to the President, whether he came as a tourist or as President."

These few short sentences by them and the manner in which they were uttered and the timing utterances were the green light for Chinese Prime Minister Chou En Lay to establish diplomatic relations and resolve the problems between China and the United States. The condition of China and the United States at that time should also be considered. In fact, the two countries were facing each other in Vietnam and Cambodia, the United States had made a military pact with Taiwan, which China considered a violation of Chinese sovereignty by the United States. On the other hand, the US negotiations with North Vietnam had not yet yielded the desired results. With his great intelligence, Chou En Lay the opportunities and, without wasting time, sent a message to the United States through the Romanian channel: “ If the U.S. has a desire to settle the issue and a proposal for its solution, the P.R.C. will be prepared to receive a U.S. special envoy in Peking. This message has been reviewed by Chairman Mao and by Lin Pia o.”

Two points are clearly seen in this message:

On is the acceptance of the US representative in Beijing, which was associated with Mao’s interview with Edgar Snow.

The second is Mao’s approval as a final decision.

The interesting thing about this message is that it was implicitly free of ironic issues, Beijing did not see the US position on Taiwan and the Vietnam War as an unacceptable to bilateral relations between China and the United States.

During this period, many attempts were made by Chinese extremists to create a barrier, as in response to the United States mediation in the Laos affair, which was considered by China as a threat to China, People’s Daily, the official government newspaper wrote sharply against the US and Nixon himself: “ By spreading the flames of war to the door of China, U.S. imperialism is on a course posing a grave menace to China. . . . Nixon has indeed fully laid bare his ferocious features, and reached the zenith in arrogance.”

Accepting China’s invitation and coordinating Nixon’s visit to the United States raised the voices of both Democrats and Republicans. Much of criticism in the United States came from conservatives. Congressman John Schmidt accused Nixon of being “ besieged by Communists.” George Wallace warned Nixon about “ becoming powerless against the Chinese.”. Nixon was forced to hold a secret meeting with both parties and eventually managed to make them understand the importance of relationship with China. But in China, criticism of Chou En Lay had rise. He was accused of being a Westerner. Until Mao strongly and transparently supported Chou En Lay and expressed his opinion on the need to establish diplomatic relations with the United States in view of the Soviet threat. Even after Nixon arrived in China and before any negotiations began, Mao personally held the first meeting with Nixon and his entourage, with Chou En Lay in attendance. To show in practice that this action has his full support.

Summary

The leaders of both countries especially Mao Zedong and Richard Nixon knew full well that their principles could not be negotiated or ignored. Accordingly, they saw relationship as just a bridge to achieve something for both sides that would bring security and prosperity to their people.

References

Nixon Richard, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 1979 New York. Warner.

Hong Chi, Memoirs shed light on Nixon’s Beijing visit, China Daily, updated 2019-08-08