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The German army or Heer maintained its position as “The institution on which the Reich really rested,” through the emergence of the Weimar Republic, and therefore continued a significant role in German politics spanning 1919 to 1939. It exerted its influence through direct military intervention in political putsches, coups and uprisings as well as marked refusal to do so when it didn’t suit their own political agenda. The majority of the body of the Heer continued their timeless allegiance to the Reich rather than rather than the new democratic system. The officer class as well as the very highest ranking officers despised the new regime, which also manifested in their political influence. The Heer also played a role in representative government through official representatives like the defence minister Kurt von Schleicher and the president and former prominent army leader, Paul von Hindenburg. Junior officers also often fraternised with right wing political parties and figures, exerting their influence on a more local level. In the years of NSDAP regime the Heer acted as a restraining influence in the political environment, discouraging conflict on the basis that it was not equipped for war.

Conflict in Early Years
The Heer had the most tangible role in the Republic during the year of, and the preceding years following its formation. The Republic’s early years were dominated by politically motivated putsches, secessions and uprisings. With the government lacking any force of its own the army was left “As the foundation of state power” as General Lüdwitz confirmed. The government called the Heer to intervene in various left wing incidents including the Spartacist Uprising of January 1919 and the Bavarian secession. The army accepted the Government’s orders and in both cases engaged and brutally defeated the Bolshevik insurrectionists. However in 1920 when the Heer was called to intervene against the Erdhart brigade in the Kapp Putsch, a right wing insurrection, the government was met with blatant refusal. In 1923 when the Munich Putsch broke out the Heer again refused to involve itself. This demonstrates the Heer’s political leaning through direct prejudice to the left and at least, non-belligerence, of not support for the right wing cause, leaning weight to the assertion of Evans that “the army was far from being a neutral organisation.”

Allegiance to Reich
The Heer also demonstrated its political role through its allegiance, not to the Republic, but to “the abstract ideal of the Reich.” (Evans) Constant attempts were made by the government to convert the Heer’s colours to the black, gold and red of the Republic. However the response of the Heer was generally unenthusiastic and can be typified by General Ritter von Möhl’s rebuttal “The Reichswehr inwardly adheres to black, white and red; that cannot be changed.” Although purely symbolic it is indicative of the Heer’s refusal to give any ground to the new Republic, regardless of the scale of the issue, in fact Quigly and Clark point out that “The whole army was honeycombed with anti-Government propaganda.” The seniors of the elite German officer corps also thought little of the new republic and its Commander in Chief of the Heer, Hans von Seeckt, saw it as a “Temporary Aberration,” and went so far as to say that the Reichstag was the “Cancer of our time.” Lack of faith of the Heer “The institution on which the Reich really rested,” in the Republican regime must have had a fundamentally de-stabilising influence on the political environment of the Reichstag, which had to operate under the shadow of a disobedient and unreliable military force.

Influence in Legislative Progress
The Heer also directed its role in politics through a more direct and legalistic means. Although originally the Heer sought to extend its influence through direct military intervention in political uprisings. However after 1923 and the end of predominant civil unrest the Heer leant towards a more democratic, representative approach including having candidates stand for the Reichstag and the Presidential election. One of the most prominent of these was the standing of Paul von Hindenburg, the Prussian military figure and national hero of the First World War. It would be naïve to see this development as insignificant to the political cause of the Heer, Evans points out that “For many Hindenburg’s election was a step away from Weimar democracy, in the direction of establishing the old monarchical order,” and represented an “Unmitigated disaster for Weimar Democracy.” Such a prominent military figure of the elite Prussian officer corps was of course promoting the course of the Heer at least at an unconscious level. Kurt von Schleicher was also active in pursuing the Heer’s policy. Acting as defence minister he was in the words of Hillgruber the “military-political head of the Reichswehr.” Through careful backroom deals, negotiation with parties and factions he was able to champion the cause of the Heer through promoting causes such as re-armament which were deemed beneficial to the institution. Schleicher, ascended to the role of Chancellor for a brief two month period which is indicative of the extreme levels and therefore influence reached by individuals who pushed the policy of the Heer.

Fraternisation of Officers with Right Wing
One of the most dominant signs of the Heer’s role German politics was the increasing association between the junior officers and political parties, predominantly those on the right. Particularly in the later stages of the Republic, in the wake of both the economic crises of 1923 and 1929 younger officers became increasingly involved in the political environment of the Reich. This resulted in a dangerous coalition of interest between the Heer and right wing organisations such as the NSDAP and the Steel Helmets. Evans points out that “Already in 1929 a number of junior officers were already engaging with the Nazis and debating the prospects of a ‘national revolution’.” These talks, no doubt accelerated by the fact that “younger officers were more susceptible to Nazi propaganda,” assured the right wing leaders of the belligerent approach of the Heer towards their objectives, and at least confirmed they would not be seriously opposed. This was but another of the influences of the Heer in Reich politics.

NSDAP Regime
In the period of the NSDAP regime spanning 1933-39 the Heer had a restraining role, particularly on the foreign policy of the Reich. Although enlarged in size and restored in prestige, the High Command had severe doubts about its ability to fight a war with any formidable European power, particularly seeing as its only ally, Italy “could never hope to join the exalted club of great powers.” (Overy) The Heer leadership advised against the re-occupation of the Ruhr, assuming that they would lose if it came to a war with France. Indeed Albert Speer exposes that Hitler was more nervous at this time that any other of his military endeavours. The Heer rigorously opposed any prospects of a general war in Europe. Taylor points out that the “Italians… wished to insist they could not be ready for war until 1942 in the earliest; and the German representatives agreed with them,” and when it came to fighting France many generals were deeply sceptical. Without the restraining influence of the Heer on the policies of the time a general European war may have in fact broken out earlier, however, this can only ever be conjecture.

Conclusion
The Heer had an overwhelming influence on the politics of the Reich through 1919-1939. Though originally protecting the Republic from leftist insurrectionism the organisation became quickly staunchly anti-republican, and increasingly right wing. The negative attitude of the elite of the Heer as well as the failure to intervene in right with insurrections such as the Kapp Putsch is indicative of this. The Heer also fraternised with the political system through both elected officials following their agenda, including Schleicher and Hindenburg, as well as talks between the junior officers and the right wing political parties severely influencing the politics of the time. Following the collapse of the republic to 1939 it acted as primarily a restraining force, particularly in the realm of foreign policy. Overall the Heer and Kurt von Schleicher were instrumental in the Reich’s politics from 1919-1939.