User:Marcd30319/Operation Formation Star

Operation Formation Star was the code name for the emergency re-deployment of U.S. Seventh Fleet warships to the Sea of Japan off the eastern coast of North Korea following that country's seizure of the USS Pueblo (AGER-2) in international waters on 23 January 1968.

The centerpiece of this operation was Task Force 71, a 28-ship flotilla led by six aircraft carriers. Nine nuclear and non-nuclear submarines were also re-deployed, and a partial activation of the United States Navy Reserve took place, the first such call-up since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Operation Formation Star was the largest build-up of U.S. naval forces around the Korean Peninsula since the Korean War, being comparable to a similar naval build-up following the 1969 shoot-down of a EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace by the North Korean Air Force.

Operation Formation Star placed a considerable strain on the United States Seventh Fleet's support for the Vietnam War, particularly aircraft carrier operations at Yankee Station. Additionally, the presence of such a large U.S. naval force in the Sea of Japan prompted the Soviet Union to deploy its own warships and naval aircraft to the area in response.

Although a wide range of military options were considered, the Johnson Administration elected to resolve the Pueblo crisis diplomatically. However, the periodic rotation of U.S. aircraft carrier task forces to off the North Korean coast in the Sea of Japan provided additional leverage to American negotiators in talks to repatriate the crew of the Pueblo.

Initial response
On the day of the Pueblo's seizure, 23 January 1968, the closest U.S. naval force was Task Group 77.5 under the command of Rear Admiral Horace H. Epes, Jr. The task group consisted of the nuclear-powered attack aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CVAN-65), the nuclear-powered guided-missile frigate USS Truxtun (DLGN-35), and the guided-missile frigate USS Halsey (DLG-23). Task Group 77.5 was steaming in the East China Sea en route to Yankee Station off North Vietnam. At the time of the initial alert, TG-77.5 was approximately 550 nmi from the last reported position of the Pueblo or 470 nmi from Wonsan, the nearest North Korean seaport to Pueblo. Now re-designated Task Group 70.6, the Enterprise task group was ordered to proceed "at best speed" to the southern entrance of the Tsushima Strait, and the destroyer USS Higbee (DD-806) was ordered to Wonsan. Also, the Pueblo's sister-ship, the USS Banner (AGER-1), was ordered to suspend its intelligence-gathering mission and return to Yokosuka, Japan, immediately. A number of factors prevented an immediate response from the Enterprise's embarked Carrier Air Wing Nine of 85 aircraft. The air wing's aircraft had sustained damage from a recent typhoon and those remaining operational strike aircraft had to be re-spotted on the flight deck and armed with air-to-surface ordnance. Additionally, the ship could not stage replacement aircraft through Japan due to the status of forces agreement that prohibited the combat use of U.S. military aircraft re-deployed from a neutral nation. In any case, Seventh Fleet commander Vice Admiral William F. Bringle ordered Task Group 70.6 to take "no overt action until further informed." The Higbee was also recalled from Wonsan.

On the evening of 25 January 1968, a high-altitude A-12 reconnaissance aircraft overflew Wonsan harbor and confirmed that the Pueblo was anchored there and surrounded by North Korean naval vessels. Effective that date, in conjunction with Operation Combat Fox, Operation Formation Star was initiated. Taken together, both operations represented a major surge deployment of U.S. naval and air forces into the Sea of Japan region off the eastern coast of North Korea.

Naval build-up
Operation Formation Star was the largest build-up of U.S. naval forces around the Korean Peninsula since the Korean War, being comparable to a similar naval build-up following the 1969 shoot-down of a EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace by the North Korean Air Force.

On 25 January 1968, the Enterprise-led Task Group 70.6 sailed through Tsushima Strait and into the Sea of Japan. The task group would operate below 36th parallel North. Also, between 24–26 January 1968, the destroyers Higbee, USS Ozbourn (DD-846), USS Collett (DD-730), and USS O'Bannon (DD-450) joined Task Group 70.6. Also on that date, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Executive Order 11392 ordering certain units of the Ready Reserve of the Naval Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard of the United States to active duty. For the U.S. Naval Reserve, this call-up involved six naval air squadrons and two Seabee construction battalions for a total of 1621 naval reservists activated.

On 27 January 1968, the attack aircraft carrier USS Ranger (CVA-61) was detached from Task Force 77 at Yankee Station off North Vietnam and ordered to the Sea of Japan as part of Operation Formation Star. Likewise, the support aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (CVS-10) was ordered to forego its scheduled port-call in Japan and divert to the Sea of Japan.

By 1 February 1968, Yorktown, Ranger and Enterprise were operating in the Sea of Japan as Task Force 71 under the command of Rear Admiral H.H. Epes, Jr., with the Enterprise as his flagship. TF-71 was organized into a two-carrier strike group, a surface action group, and an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) unit centered around the Yorktown and her escorts.

Additional ASW assets for Operation Formation Star included land-based Lockheed SP-2H Neptune and Lockheed P-3A/B Orion maritime patrol aircraft from patrol squadrons VP-2, VP-17, VP-19, and VP-48. Between 24-31 January 1968, Neptune and Orion patrol aircraft flew over 50 ASW barrier patrols over the Sea of Japan and subsequently flew an additional 238 mission in February. This operational tempo placed such a burden on patrol aircraft based in Japan that additional aircraft from Okinawa and the Philippines were used to augment the barrier patrols.

Also, on 27 January 1968, of the seventeen U.S. submarine then deployed in the Far East, nine nuclear and non-nuclear submarines were order to the Korean Peninsula for up to three months of operations in the Sea of Japan. The return of two submarines deployed in the Far East was delayed because of the Pueblo crisis while three additional submarines were dispatched to the U.S. Seventh Fleet in response to the crisis. The GUPPY IIA Diesel-electric submarine USS Ronquil (SS-396) was specifically tasked for cover and search-and rescue operations during the Pueblo crisis.

On 28 January 1968, the area air defense for Task Force 71 was greatly enhanced when the guided-missile cruiser USS Chicago (CG-11) was detached from PIRAZ duty off Vietnam for operations in the Sea of Japan. Equipped with modernized electronic systems, an improved combat information center using the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS), and long-range RIM-8 Talos anti-aircraft missile, Chicago coordinated air activities for the TF-71 aircraft carriers. The USS Canberra (CAG-2) and USS Providence (CLG-6) were the other two guided-missile cruisers assigned to Task Force 71, joining the guided-missile frigates Bainbridge and Halsey.

To support Task Force 71, Task Force 73 created an underway replenishment group that included the fast combat support ship USS Sacramento (AOE-1); the fleet oilers USS Platte (AO-24) and USS Tolovana (AO-64)' the combat stores ship USS Mars (AFS-1); and the ammunition ship USS Vesuvius (AE-15). To service TF-71's flotilla of destroyers, the destroyer tender USS Samuel Gompers (AD-37) was deployed to Sasebo, Japan, to service TF-71's flotilla of destroyers.

Finally, although not directly unrelated to Operation Formation Star or Task Force 71, the Republic of Korea Navy dispatched nineteen ships and two fast patrol boats to sixteen patrol zones around South Korea.

Soviet reaction
Beginning in mid-1950s, The United States Navy took note of the use of Soviet fishing trawlers as intelligence-gathering vessels operating near the United States. Often such trawlers interfered with the navigation of U.S. naval vessels, particularly surfaced submarines. Starting in early 1963, long-range land-based Soviet bombers began overflying U.S. aircraft carriers, often resulting in the disruption of flight operations. At the time of the Pueblo Incident, the negotiations for the 1972 U.S.–Soviet Incidents at Sea agreement had not even been suggested, and U.S.-Soviet interaction on the high seas often were contentious and dangerous.

Prior to the Pueblo Incident, on 15 January 1968, the aircraft carrier Enterprise and its escorts were underway for its third Western Pacific deployment when task group's long-range radar detected two approaching Soviet Tupolev Tu-95 maritime patrol bombers. Jet fighters from the carrier's combat air patrol intercepted and escorted the two bombers during their time in the general vicinity of the task group. Later, on the day of the Pueblo' s seizure, 23 January 1968, Enterprise had departed from the U.S. support base in Sasebo, Japan, when the Soviet intelligence-gathering trawler Gidrofon passed very closely in front of the carrier's bow, nearly causing a collision.

As the Pueblo crisis unfolded, the presence of such a large U.S. naval force in the Sea of Japan prompted the Soviet Union to deploy its own warships and naval aircraft to the area in response. The Soviet Pacific Fleet initially deployed a Kildin-class destroyer, a Kotlin-class destroyer, a Riga-class frigate, two intelligence-gathering trawlers, four fleet tankers, and a water tender in response to the U.S. naval force in the Sea of Japan. On 25 January 1968, the Enterprise-led Task Group 70.6 sailed past the Riga-class frigate and Uda-class oiler patrolling the entrance of Tsushima Strait. Later that same day, a Kashin-class destroyer began trailing TG-70.6 in the Sea of Japan. The Kotlin-class destroyer subsequently joined in shadowing the now-activated Task Force 71.

By 5 February 1968, a picket line of Soviet warships formed along the 38th parallel North that included two Kynda-class cruisers and three Kashin-class destroyers. Also, on that date, another six Soviet destroyers steamed into the Sea of Japan, as well as at least two Soviet submarines were also operating in Sea of Japan. Ultimately, the Soviet fleet commander, Admiral Nikolay N. Amelko, committed fully half of his cruiser-destroyer forces based in Vladivostok to monitor U.S. naval forces during the Pueblo crisis.

Pacific-based Soviet Naval Aviation maritime patrol bombers were also flying multiple daily missions to monitor Task Force 71. On 7 February 1968 alone, ten Tupolev Tu-16 Badger bombers approached U.S. naval forces at altitudes between 500 ft and 30000 ft. Between 23 January and 21 February 1968, the U.S. Seventh Fleet reported 14 cases of harassment by Soviet naval vessels, with the most damaging on 1 February 1968 when the U.S. destroyer USS Rowan (DD-782) and the 10,000-dwt Soviet freighter Kapitan Vislobokov punched above-the-waterline holes in their hulls during a collision.

Task Force 71

 * Task Force 71, 1968