User:Mauricio.sih/Corruption

Quality of Government (QoG)
The Quality of Government (QoG) is a school of thought born in the University of Gothenburg, which includes thinkers such as Bo Rothstein, Soren Holmberg, Andreas Bagenholm, and Marcia Grimes, among others, was greatly influenced by the political thought of John Rawls, and the “Institutional Turn” of Social Sciences, which focus on the understanding, analysis, and study of institutions that conform the government through which we ought to exercise power in an impartial way to promote the well-being of citizens—opening important avenues of study of institutions, corruption, redistribution, and power.

Based on the University of Gothenburg in Sweden, this school of thought, is intrinsically linked with the Quality of Government Institute, founded in 2004  by Bo Rothstein and Soren Holmberg. It is still actively promoting dialogue, research, and publishing. It’s latest and essential work, collaborating to create “The Oxford Handbook on the Quality of Government” published in 2021. Dr. Rothstein defines the QoG as “The Quality of Government as the extent to which government power is exercised in a manner consistent with the norm of impartiality.”

Influences
Many political scientists of the 20th century influenced this project, mainly the works on Justice and Institutions. Firstly, as many social scientists at the core of this movement, we can find traces of the “Theory of Justice" of John Rawls and the “Justice as Impartiality” of Brian Barry. Both books shaped how impartiality, institutions, and justice became fundamental for this school of thought. Another significant influence was the “Institutional Turn” of social sciences in the 1990s, which pursued the idea of bringing back the focus on institutions and the way they influence society, with publications such as James B. March and Johan P. Olsen’s "Rediscovering Institutions", Douglass C. North "Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance" , and Elinor Ostrom’s "Governing the Commons" . One of the main characteristics of their work is the focus set on the “rules of the game,” or how the ethos, composition, and framework of institutions change the rules by which all actors in society act.

Framework
The QoG sees the institutional framework as essential to understanding the foundation of social evils such as poverty, corruption, inequality, and redistribution. As explored by Holmberg and Rothstein, “Without a reasonably high level of institutional quality, representative democracy is not likely to deliver increased human well-being.” In other words, even though a state can have free and fair elections and access to a representation of citizens through different democratic tools, it does not necessarily translate into fulfilling well-being and good life for citizens. The strength or weaknesses and “set-up” of institutions can significantly impact the provision of well-being.

Social trust and people's satisfaction with their lives are some of the most apparent ways of recognizing how institutions provide well-being to citizens. Firstly, social trust is closely linked with the idea of impartiality, a fundamental part of the QoG, in which when the exercise of public power is used in a way that does not discriminate, gives preference, and is maintained based on the rules set by institutions, this influence the level of in which citizens trust and engage in the system. Secondly, satisfaction can be seen in the way QoG increases democratic quality and performance in the defense of citizens' rights, safety, and economic performance.

So, by turning to “normative standards on the exercise of government power...” the QoG has opened the door to new avenues for studying institutions, corruption, and power. Focusing on the institutions that exercise power and resources and try to understand key mechanisms and considerations that are fundamental for providing social good and well-being to the citizens. The approach brings to the surface synergies and conflicts between “democracy and the qualities of the state apparatuses that are responsible for the implementation of public policies.”

Normative Institutionalist
The dilemma of the Principal-Agent Problem in the study of corruption created a branch of thinkers attempting to explain the development of the so-called normative institutionalism inside institutions. This is represented by four explanatory theories from the “Corruption of the Democratic Process” by Dennis Thompson, the “Corruption of Equality” by Mark E. Warren, the “Corruption of Autonomy” by Seamus Miller, and the “Corruption of the Constitution” by Lawrence Lessig. All of them trying to understand the relation of benefits and undermining results of corruption to broaden the possibilities of legal and ethical regulations which allow “ rules and procedures of the institution and the incentives for individuals who may not be corrupt.”

Dennis Thompson started this development by conceptualizing institutional corruption in contrast with institutions' pillars and the short-circuits' cost. Thompson (1995) considers  “Corruption is institutional insofar as the gain a legislator receives is political rather than personal.” this idea was centered on the damage that was imposed in the institution by the promotion of improper procedures in three main areas, which help to analyze institutions: “independence (deciding on the merits), fairness (playing by the rules), and accountability (sustaining public confidence). Institutional corruption short-circuits the democratic process by enabling private interests to gain influence in government without being subjected to procedures that respect these principles.” By this; we understand that the corruption in this vision is one of the benefits of the agent, which by benefiting out of the post “short-circuit” the institution by failing to follow the three pillars. To this, another contesting idea emerged: the failure of the core concepts of the institution was not always unjustified.

Based on the work of Thompson, Mark Warren developed the “duplicitous exclusion” in which he creates a more philosophical argument based on intentionality and undermines the institution's goal. Based on Warren's work, it is said that “agents of corruption claim to accept the norm of inclusion but at the same time violate it.” In other words, the basic concepts of Thompson (independence, fairness, accountability) are a priori accepted when one takes office but later are intentionally broken. With this, Warren moves away from consequences, placing the problem on the intention of the corrupt act by the agent. This opens up a further and more philosophical discussion. Miller (2010) developed this idea of intentionality and consequences in which “In act or practice counts as institutional corruption if and only if (a) it tends to undermine this collective purpose or the shared processes of the institution, or despoils the character of an occupant of a role in the institution, or both, and (b) the occupant either intended or foresaw these effects, or could have avoided contributing to them” By this, the intention of the act and the knowledge of the possible consequences that can undermine the institution are as important. There is no clear hierarchy between them, but duality must be attended to.

Finally, the most prominent theory of institutional corruption in many cases is its simplicity, which allows it to be expanded in various institutions. Lessig (2013) conceptualizes institutional corruption as “... manifest when there is a systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical, that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose” here the use of means that are usually not conceived as illegal but acceptable. In here the issue that emerges for the agent is due to external influences “ corruption occurs when officials have to depend on support from persons other than those to whom they owe exclusive allegiance” By this the conceptualization and organization of the institution by itself is flooded in such a way that allows for the agents to be influenced and have gains and advantages facilitated by others that they don't owe allegiance to, in this case not its constituents by external actors that want to pursue their agenda.

All these developments leave two apparent aspects that make the difficulty of understanding institutional corruption in the state clear. Firstly, the Institutional gains are “...goods that are useable primarily in an institutional role and are necessary for, or essential by-products of, performing the role.” This is the possibility of obtaining something out of the role performed in the institution, granting access to other things. This creates the possibility of seeking an Institutional Advantage in which “...individual and institutional corruption involves providing an advantage to a private citizen or organization typically outside the institution.” These goods, for the most part, create the possibility of creating advantages for the individual in their private sphere or for other institutions, in which the process of these two phenomena establishes a self-inflicted system of unwritten rules.