User:Mccapra/1971 Turkish coup attempt

The coup attempt of March 9 1971 was an unsuccessful military coup attempt developed outside the chain of command.

Background
Justice Party Chairman and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, after overcoming the issue of amnesty of Celâl Bayar and his friends, which brought him face to face with the military coup attempt in 1969, went to the general election and gained great success in the 1969 general elections and came to power alone again.

But the 'right' wing of his party could not forgive Demirel for letting Bayar and his friends down. A while after the election, the Democratic Party was founded by Ferruh Bozbeyli, who resigned from the Parliament Speakership on October 19, 1970, and from the Justice Party in November 1970, and 69 founders.

" National Democratic Revolutionaries ", who gathered around the Devrim newspaper published by Doğan Avcıoğlu and including Retired Lieutenant General Cemal Madanoğlu [ 1], the real leader of the National Unity Committee that carried out the May 27 Coup, claimed that the understanding of democracy of the political parties of that period was a distraction. [2] They advocated extra-parliamentary opposition in line with the principles expressed as the nationalist-revolutionary method. [3] There were very serious attempts in Turkey, allegedly led by Doğan Avcıoğlu and İlhan Selçuk [ 6] , to provoke the Army [4] and establish a left-socialist, kind of Baathist government [5]. The reflection of these studies within the army influenced especially the young Air Force Commander, General Muhsin Batur, and various elements at the land forces headquarters. Although it was thought that the Commander of the Land Forces, General Faruk Gürler, was also likely to act with this team, he would not be in favor of this and it would lead to the preparation of the March 12 coup. [7]

Extended Command Council
However, the entire army was not in favor of a left-wing coup. In particular, the Chief of General Staff, General Memduh Tağmaç, and the Commander of the 1st Army in Istanbul, General Faik Türün , were openly opposing the left-wing coup and were pressuring the Commander of the Land Forces, Gürler, to leave the front in which he was said to have joined. [8] General Faik Türün said that if the National Democratic Revolutionaries staged a coup in Ankara, he would immediately convene the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Istanbul and take action with the 1st Army against the coup plotters in Ankara, based on the decision taken by the Parliament.

When it became clear that Faruk Gürler had left the left-wing coup plotters and that Muhsin Batur, who used the code-name "Yavuz Bey", could not attempt this job alone, the junta members wanted to stage a coup on March 9, 1971. The leader they chose was Celil Gürkan, a Major General at the Land Forces headquarters. But Gürkan, in his own words, did not press the 'button'; The attempt did not materialize, but the arrow was out of the bow. On March 10, a previously unheard of 'Extended Command Council' meeting was held in Ankara, and all generals in the army and lieutenant generals serving in Ankara were invited to the meeting.

Before going to Ankara, the 1st Army Commander, General Faik Türün, sent his wife and children to his hometown to a relative to protect them from the left-wing coup plotter young officers, and then, before the meeting, he called his brother, Major General Tevfik Türün , the Ankara Garrison Commander, and asked him to take precautions. Thereupon, soldiers from the Ankara garrison surrounded and 'secured' the General Staff headquarters throughout the day-long meeting, or more precisely until General Faik Türün came out safely. At this meeting, it was decided to submit a memorandum to the government on March 12. [9]

Message to Washington
According to the documents of the American State Department, on the evening of March 10, the Central Intelligence Agency CIA officer in Ankara sent the following message to Washington:

“	An unexpected "Armed Forces Command Council" meeting was held under the chairmanship of the 1st Turkish Chief of General Staff, General Memduh Tağmaç. The meeting started at 10.00 in the morning and lasted until 18.00. Land, Air and Navy commanders, 1st, 2nd and 3rd army commanders, all corps commanders, all Air Force Regional commanders and some other general officers attended the meeting.

2. This meeting was held at the insistence of several high-ranking officers to decide how the military would respond to the accelerating deterioration of the political situation in the country due to the kidnapping of four American airmen, the police-student clash at METU, and unrest elsewhere.

3rd Land Forces Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Hayati Savaşçı, said that the meeting was held to adopt one of two options. Either it would be decided to overthrow the regime and take over the government, as suggested by many young generals, or the request to take some specific and urgent control measures by giving a memorandum to President Sunay and Prime Minister Demirel, as suggested by General Tağmaç and others, would be accepted. Savaşçı added that they had no other alternative.

4. The warrior also said that the issue of military intervention in the political situation is no longer debatable. The army was intervening, the form of which was to be decided. He said that it was important for a clear consensus to emerge from the meeting and explained the importance of this as follows: If there was no consensus, the parties who were disappointed by the decision could have used force to force the acceptance of their views. Savaşçı also said that whatever decision is taken will be quickly communicated to all units.

5. Especially the airman generals are in favor of a full military intervention and are strongly against the Tağmaç solution.

6. As of 24:00 on March 10, Ankara is calm and there is no apparent military alert. „

As a matter of fact, the coup planned on March 9, 1971, the situation of the members of the National Intelligence Organization, including Mahir Kaynak [10] and Mehmet Eymür, and the tape recordings taken by Lieutenant General Atıf Erçıkan, who had infiltrated the relevant meetings at that time, [11] included Chief of General Staff Memduh Tağmaç and It was foiled when he informed 1st Army Commander Faik Türün. Memduh Tağmaç, who gave the March 12 Memorandum , ex officio retired all the officers involved in the March 9, 1971 National Democratic Revolution, especially Major General Celil Gürkan , except those in the rank of General. 1st Army Commander Faik Türün also interrogated all the Revolution writers and other National Democratic Revolution junta members involved in this coup through the National Intelligence Organization at the Ziverbey Mansion. During these interrogations, it was revealed that Land Forces Commander Faruk Gürler and Air Force Commander Muhsin Batur, who used the code-name "Yavuz Bey", first supported the March 9 coup attempt, but then withdrew their support when intelligence information reached Chief of General Staff Memduh Tağmaç. . [12]