User:MinorProphet/Draft subpages/WW2 German Army workshop companies and tank maintenance

Organisation of maintenance and repair workshops
In 1941, 2,469 tractors of all types broke down.

Hettler, Nuts & Bolts 16, 12-ton halftrack, pp. 10-11, talks about Maintenance Companies, and KStN 1145, 1189 & 1052a. The 12-tonner was often found in these companies as well as the standard 18-ton Sd.Kfz. 9.

The army complained that Goering's enormous Reichswerke took over all the industrial sites on the Eastern front, including those that were suitable as maintenance and repair depots.



June 1941
Most Panzer Regiments (one per Panzer Division) had two tank battalions, with one Werkstatt Kompanie per regiment. 6, 7, 8, & 17th Divisions had a Werkstatt platoon attached to their 3. Abteilung (Battalion). Pz Regiments of the 12, 18 and 19th Divisions had three Werkstatt Zug, probably 1 for each Company. Panzer Divisions: Eastern Front 1941–43 PP Battistelli. 2008 Osprey Battle Orders 35. pp. 14–16

History
In November 1941, the 653rd anti-tank Abteilung (StuG IIIs, later Ferdinands, Jagdtigers), was transferred from the 6th Army (AG Centre I fink) to the 11th Army Corps in the Crimea. They marched (ie drove) 900 kilometres. 75% of the wheeled vehicles broke down. The maintenance section followed behind, fixing apparently all the vehicles which had fallen out on the way. The maintenance section didn't reach the Crimea until January 1942.

Spare parts
Grab stuff from WW2 Maybach engines

Göring was exactly the same with provisioning parts for the Luftwaffe. Instead of allowing for 20 to 30% of production for spares he preferred to allocate as much as possible for frontline aircraft. The Luftwaffe was thus chronically short of parts during the entire war, leading to cannibalising aircraft just to keep the rest flying.


 * "Another problem area was the enormous need for replacement parts by the army in the east. This was caused not only by the expected wear and tear on motor-vehicles, but also by the use of over 2,000 different types of vehicles as a result of the use of captured material. More than a million different spare parts were required in the area covered by Army Group Centre alone. Owing first to the multiplicity of types, and second to the inadequate production of replacement parts in Germany, it proved impossible to provide sufficient supplies to compensate for breakdowns and the poor state of many vehicles. The inevitable result was a steady decline in combat-readiness and levels of motorization."


 * "It is probable that in the last year of the war, the German government made the mistake of concentrating upon production of finished vehicles, with the result that the number of vehicles deadlined on account of scarcity of parts was very large. This opinion was expressed by many German Generals and Speer officials and was due to the destruction of large quantities of spare parts both at motor vehicle plants and at repair and parts depots behind the fronts. The spare parts storage facilities at motor vehicle plants were especially vulnerable to air attacks because of the presence of large amounts of combustible packing material in the same buildings, and the fact that in most factories the spare parts departments were housed in the old type of buildings. This resulted in the destruction of the greater portion of the spare parts in storage at the plants, and in the case of Adam Opel, Henschel and Sohn and Daimler-Benz, the almost complete destruction of these departments. In spite of the disastrous effect this loss was bound to have on repair of trucks in the field, no effort was expended afterwards to replace these parts. Factories preferred to neglect production of substitute parts in favor of new production because the substitute parts did not show up in their production figures of vehicles.

Panther problems
Spielberger, Panther Tank and Variants, English version, p. 96: At Kursk, 5–13 July 1943, 25 engines failed within 9 days (these would have been HL210 P30s) - piston rod bearing damage, broken con rods, damaged pistons, tears (cracks) in the cylinder sleeves, burnt cylinder head gaskets, and water in the exhaust. High oil consumption, spark plugs oiling up. Fuel lines not sealed properly, leading to fires in the engine compartment. Final drives were too weak and had a high failure rate. Running gear was fine. Main clutch was fine except when used for towing, and the gearbox also functioned without problems - always seems to have worked well, very few problems ever reported.

The design of the AK 7-200 gearbox started in February 1943, and the first two test transmissions were ready for delivery in August that year. First batch was of 5,000 transmissions.(Spielberger, p. 53) Two new factories were built to manufacture them, de:Waldwerke GmbH Passau in mid 1943, and Schlettstadt, Alsace.(Spielberger, pp 55–56) Approximately 350 slave labourers from the Mauthausen concentration camp were employed in Passau from 1944.

Production figures for all types of artillery tractors etc.
Figures for half-tracks etc. in Russia. NB Koch is probably using different sources although he doesn't cite them specifically. Various figures don't quite agree.

Hmm, German armored fighting vehicle production during World War II - check with J&D, Pz. Tr. 23...

In 1942 the German Department of Army Weapons (or Weapons Agency) (Heereswaffenamt) counted
 * 3,764 wheeled, caterpillar and tracked vehicles (eg Kettenkraftrad), of which 1,452 RSO.
 * 5,486 half-track tractors on hand, of which:
 * 2,960 Sd.Kfz. 10 1-tonners
 * 1,326 Sd.Kfz. 11 3-ton
 * 448 Sd.Kfz. 6 5-ton
 * 209 Sd.Kfz. 7 8-ton
 * 343 Sd.Kfz. 8 12-ton
 * 200 Sd.Kfz. 9 18-ton (approx)

Half-track production figures:
 * Sd.Kfz. 10 (1-ton): 2,868 made (enstanden) in 1942, 2,724 in 1943, and 873 in 1944. Total of 14,700 produced.
 * Sd.Kfz. 11 (3-ton): 1,572 made (Fertigung) in 1942, 2,133 in 1943, and 1,308 in 1944. Total production around 9,000.
 * Sd.Kfz. 6 (5-ton): 2,061 existing in the entire Wehrmacht (armed forces) in December 1942, 563 made in 1943 and 729 in 1944. Total production was around 3,500 up to 1944.
 * Sd.Kfz. 7 (8-ton): 3,262 on hand in the Wehrmacht in December 1942. 1,320 made in 1941, 1,392 in 1942, 3,251 in 1943, and 3,298 in 1944. Between 1937 and 1942 almost 12,000 were produced. Adding in the 1943 and 1944 figures, that makes a total of around 18,550 Sd.Kfz. 7 manufactured.
 * Sd.Kfz. 8 (12-ton): Up to December 1942 1,615 had been made. 828 made in 1941, 840 in 1942, 507 in 1943, and 602 left the assembly line in 1944. Total production was around 4,000 vehicles. Hettler gives exactly 4070 units, with figures for each year.
 * Sd.Kfz. 9 (18-ton):855 on hand in December 1942. 240 produced in 1941, 384 in 1942, 643 in 1943 and 834 in 1944. The Wehrmacht received nearly 2,500 from 1937 to 1945.


 * LKW 2t Maultier: 635 made in 1942. 13,000 examples made in 1943, 7,310 in 1944.
 * LKW 4.5t Maultier: 594 made in 1943, and 886 in 1944.
 * Schwere Wehrmachtschlepper: around 1,000 were produced. These were upgraded 5-ton Sd.Kfz. 6s, capable of towing 6 tons. Some had an armoured cab. Bigger drive sprocket, fewer holes in the hoad wheels.
 * Einheits-(Diesel ?) trucks: Ford made 14,000, Opel made 4,000 and Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz made c.2,500.

Further production figures:
 * From 1942-1944 the following vehicles were produced:
 * 279,828 wheeled trucks
 * 3,850 wheeled tractors (eg Krupp Protze), eg for 3.7cm PaK
 * 33,400 caterpillar and tracked tractors (of which 27,385 RSO) Total 27,663 RSO produced up to March 1945. RSO also towed 7.5 cm Pak 40 & 41, 10.5 leFH 18 and 15 cm sIG 33, 12 cm Granatwerfer 42 as well as captured Soviet artillery.
 * 25,085 half-track tractors/prime movers
 * 10,150 Kettenkraftrad (Sd.Kfz. 2) during the war period (production continued until 1948)

Most wheeled tractors (Radschlepper) were used on Luftwaffe airfields and in Navy yards, while half- and full-tracked tractors (Halb- und Voll-kettenzugmaschinen) and a majority of wheeled trucks (Lastkraftwagen) were used to haul artillery weapons. Total production figures for trucks and tractors (Kraftwagen und Zugmitteln): 62,400 in 1941, 81,276 in 1942, 109,483 in 1943, and 89,069 in 1944.

Porsche Radschlepper Ost... Oh no, another Porsche total design failure, towing a 17 cm Kanone 18.

A 10.5 cm leFH 18 cost 32,000 RM in 1936, and the 3-ton Sd.Kfz. 11 to tow it was 22,000 RM. The 15 cm sFH 18 cost 50,000 (in 1936 presumably) and the 8-ton Sd.Kfz. 7 cost 36,000 RM.

More sources...
"A Re-assessment of the German Armaments Production during World War II" by Ioannis-Dionysios Salavrakos (Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 44, No. 2, 2016, pp. 113–145. doi : 10.5787/44-2-1178) has lots of figures re relative costs of various weapons, armaments etc.

See also German Arms Production but sadly un-reffed...

Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Reichswehr, Wehrmacht und Bundeswehr: ab 1900, von Werner Oswald and Jürgen Plate.

The World War II databook : the essential facts and figures for all the combatants by John Ellis (Archive.org, free reg, borrow for 1 hour at a time) This is a vast collection of statistics, but its usefulness is limited because there are no specific refs to anything. There is a long bibliography, but all the figures are necessarily subject to question because the author doesn't cite any particular work at all in the entire body of the text. Obviously this would have made the job much harder/longer, but in the end it's only a load of unsubstantiated opinions: I'm not sure if it would even qualify as a WP:RS.