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Article: Canada-Israel Committee
Formational History

Jewish immigration of the late 19th and early 20th centuries brought to Canada the diversity of Zionist thought, which led to the creation of several Zionist parties. Uniting these parties was difficult because each had considerable vertical integration, from international support to national and local activity. Only by way of World War II and the British Mandate of Palestine, was lasting cooperation achieved. A common solidarity to Israel united Canadian Jewry past its divisions, establishing a precedent that would lead to the beginning of the CIC.

The decades following the British Mandate saw a consolidation of Zionism in Canada. By the 1960s, several pan-Zionist organizations had been created, including the Zionist Public Affairs Committee, the Committee for Emergency Aid to Israel, and the Joint Public Relations Committee. Most of these groups were maintained on an ad hoc basis, often emerging in response to significant events in Israel.

In 1967, the Joint Public Relations Committee evolved into the Canada-Israel Committee. The new committee was authorized by public mandate to represent Israeli interests before the Canadian Parliament, public, and media. But most importantly, the CIC was designed to link Canadian Jews to the halls of power in Ottawa.

Early Years

The CIC underwent difficulties in its first years of operation. It was briefly disbanded in 1971 when its funding partners could not reconcile differing visions. Later in 1971, the CIC was restored. Under the leadership of Myer Bick, the CIC secured funding from B’nai Brith and hired personnel at its Montreal location. The Canadian Jewish Congress and the Canadian Zionist Federation later became funding partners to the CIC.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War compelled the CIC to magnify its reach to better service Israel in its time of need. It added a French-speaking division at its Montreal office and launched new offices in Toronto and Ottawa. The CIC was thrust to the forefront of policy making by Canada’s desire to support Israel in the conflict. Because the war placed the CIC at the epicenter of Canadian decision making, the committee used its newfound influence to advance an Israel-centric foreign policy within Canada. The CIC’s Toronto office performed Middle East research and published pertinent information to the news media, and the Ottawa branch focused lobbying efforts on the Canadian Parliament.

Organizational Structure

The Canada-Israel Committee’s operations were steered primarily by its board of directors, which composed of sponsoring organizations, representatives from various Jewish communities, and a compilation of other nationally influential Zionist groups. The board met quarterly to set, plan, and implement its agenda. Additionally, the CIC was governed by its executive committee, which consisted of nine to twelve members. In times of fast-moving developments or emergencies, the executive committee would take over the helm of the CIC and functioned under a flexible response regime.

The head of the CIC was the national executive director. This person was tasked with administering budgetary priorities and being the chief spokesman on behalf of the Committee. In the end, the national executive director remained beholden to the board of directors for implementing prerogatives and reporting process.

Functionally, the CIC was a predominately a centralized organization, with the focal point being the Ottawa office. This arrangement was naturally advantageous for the CIC because foreign policy itself was, and remains today, consolidated in Ottawa by the Canadian federal government. Yet the need to include all Jewish communities at the table, especially smaller ones, was an institutionally binding feature of the CIC. Thus, the committee decentralized some power to better incorporate Jewish representatives countrywide into the organization.

Overall, the CIC’s structure was distinctly similar to the corporate model of governance. Much of its membership came from the wealthy and upper-classes of Canadian Jewry, who often had familiarity with corporate procedures, organization, and operation. Uniquely, the CIC had no due-paying membership base. This is in contrast to other Canadian Jewish organizations, such as B’nai Brith, which relied on dues. Without a membership base, the CIC could exercise independence in a manner membership-based organization could not; however, the CIC could not self-sufficiently procure revenue without members. Thus, the CIC was principally reliant on donor organizations for money, and therefore, was answerable to them.

Activity

CIC lobbying efforts directed toward the Canadian federal government came in a variety of arrangements. Most popular among these were mailed letters, petitions, and phone calls to members of parliament. The CIC further employed “advertisements, demonstrations, and whisper campaigns…” With the intent to brief government officials, the CIC published a biweekly communiqué entitled The Middle East Digest to members of Parliament and senior staff. Widely regarded as reputable, the brief examined Middle Eastern current events, ongoing Canadian policy, and suggested recommendations moving forward. The brief, tailored for busy members of Parliament (MPs), was professionally designed with analysis both on Israel and the larger Middle East. The CIC hoped to garner additional support for Israel amongst MPs with the convenience of its briefs. Moreover, the CIC invited select MPs and members of the media to attend annual trips to Israel. CIC outreach to back-benchers and new MPs was personalized to parallel the values of Canadian parties with which it interacted. Reaching out to new MPs was seen as a generational investment in support for Israel. Doing this allowed the CIC to build and sustain ties across political persuasions. The CIC firmly believed that the backbenchers of today could become the Prime Ministers of tomorrow. Regardless of which party held power, the CIC sought enduring positive Canada-Israel relations.

The CIC made great strides to cultivate an image of reliability and expertise with the Department of External Affairs. On policy relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the CIC used its relations with the Department to steer policy decisions. Former Department officials attested to the CIC’s ability to shape policy, especially when Israel faced external conflict. The CIC met several times per year with cabinet officials and occasionally with the prime minister. Lobbies were sent out most consistently to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and depending on developments in the Middle East, would meet through more informal channels.

To produce a government more receptive to its lobbying, the CIC issued soft warnings to MPs who voted counter to their positions. These warnings included reminding MPs the strength of individual Jewish voters in crucial swing districts and the financial power held by Jewish elites. The CIC was a reluctant actor in electoral politics. Local organization was predominantly in charge of informing Jewish voters who were allies to their cause and who were not. The national organization largely avoided political campaigns, leaving donations to private individuals and businesses. Instead, the CIC sought positive working relationships regardless of the party in power.

Beyond lobbying, the CIC was active in the Jewish community with its circulation of research, policy memorandums, and handbooks. Every year, the CIC hosted a large conference highlighting their work. All Jews were invited, and they could connect with both politicians and organizational leadership to advance CIC’s mission and scope. Lastly, the CIC constructed a networking platform for Jewish industrial leaders, academia, and activists. Leadership workshops were sporadically made available for these individuals.

Canadian Jews were, and remain, very active political participants. The CIC channeled this activism into influence through its platform off speaking for Canadian Jewry writ large. Because the CIC’s scope amalgamated the whole of Canadian Jewry into one, the diversity within the organization was immense, and consequently, the necessity to maintain a public face of unity was paramount. While disagreements were inevitable, they generally arose from differences of opinion on tactics, such as lobbying efforts, and not actual policy. CIC largely internalized these discrepancies and avoided commenting on topics that would divide the organization’s cohesion, for example, counseling or rebuking Israel. Conversely, when policy was the point of division within the Jewish community, the CIC attempted to soothe disagreements by charting a middle course. One such incident arose from the first Palestinian Intifada, beginning in 1987. The event markedly split the ideological ends of Canadian Jewry into polarized camps comprising of the political right and left. Their respective passions for supporting Israel and maintaining peace overwhelmed conciliatory efforts by the CIC to bridge the divide. The CIC wanted a compromise between both sides, but this led to each side roundly criticizing the CIC. Both the left and right perceived the CIC favoring the other side, and simultaneously, mainstream Jewry resented the CIC’s incapacity to forge consensus. Preserving intra-communal harmony was a consistent challenge the CIC faced throughout its existence.

Satisfying sponsoring partners was difficult because beliefs about responses or policy varied even within the CIC’s donor base. Resolving these contradictions diverted time and effort from lobbying efforts. A notable example of this occurred in 1979. Canada’s embassy in Israel was located in Tel Aviv, but there were calls to relocate it to Jerusalem. Joe Clark, a past leader of the Progressive Conservative party, was particularly in favor of the move. Intra-communal Jewish tensions swelled over this issue. While the embassy remained in Tel Aviv, the strains over the embassy location threatened to upend the CIC. Yet, the CIC persisted out of an innate obligation to unity, to both Canadian Jewry and the plight of Israel.

Yom Kippur War -- October, 1973
The Arab-Israeli War and lobbying by the CIC did not sway the Canadian government or populace drastically in favor of Israel. The CIC sought for Canada to directly condemn the Arabs states for attacking Israel, but for a number of reasons, this goal was never realized. First, the CIC was still very young, underfunded, and unknown. Structurally, the CIC had little organization and unclear prioritization of goals. Constituent organizations of the CIC, among them the Canadian Zionist Federation, were far more established politically and opted to circumvent the CIC by lobbying the government directly. This fractured coordination, weakening the CIC’s effectiveness vis-á-vis the Canadian federal government. Second, Canadian politics was resistant to favoring sides in ethnic divisions. The mold of supporting Israel was historically unfounded in Canada’s foreign policy for fear of alienating other groups. And finally, Canada did not feel the same fervor for Israel as did its Jewish citizens. For Israel supporters, the war was perceived as an existential crisis for Israel; however, Canadian government officials could not be swayed to feel the same. A 1973 Gallup poll found approximately 73 percent of respondents to have no inclination toward either the Israelis or Arabs. Canada’s indifference on the matter permeated through both society and politics, and the CIC’s inexperience could not reverse this fact.

Arab Economic Boycott of Israel in Canada
Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Arab nations launched a joint economic boycott of Israel. In response, the CIC employed its energies in a manner becoming of a mature ethnic interest group. The CIC lobbied department officials, members of Parliament, and cabinet heads. Further, the CIC was able to bend the political debate in its favor by highlighting the larger inequities of Arab trade practices on Canadians. Support for Israel, the CIC argued, went hand-in-hand with improving civil and human rights of Canadians. In doing so, the CIC “gain[ed] the sympathy and support of wide segments of the public” by underscoring its significance to Canada. Garnering this level of support bolstered the likelihood with which the Canadian federal government would respond to public will and address the Arab boycott.

Internal restructuring and a larger budget enhanced the CIC's prominence within Canada’s Jewish community. The CIC was “the unchallenged voice of Canadian Jews in matters concerning Israel,” which licensed the CIC to be the premier representative for Canadian Jews regarding the boycott. Determined lobbying influenced the framing of a government response toward the best interest of Canadians. Public opinion leaned in favor of ending the boycott, and additionally, media reporting was sympathetic to the CIC’s position. This projected the CIC’s messaging far beyond its own reach and was widely attributed to the degree of success achieved by Canadian Jewry.

Because of concerns that opposing the boycott would endanger Canadian relations with Arab states, the government under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau employed delay tactics on proposed legislation. Corporate lobbies warned against economic retaliation from Arab states that would harm business. These factors negated the CIC’s momentum on the issue and ultimately prevented anti-boycott legislation from becoming law. The CIC’s influence, despite its impetus, only marginally affected the final outcome.

The Lebanon War of 1982
Israel’s invasion into southern Lebanon caused disillusionment within Canada over its disposition toward Israel. Prime Minister Trudeau became quite critical of Israeli actions. He penned a letter to Menachem Begin calling for the removal of Israeli forces while issuing support for the Lebanese government. Initially, the CIC stepped into the fold to argue that Israel was justified in its invasion and Canada should, at the very least, take a hands-off approach to the matter. Even though the CIC was heavily engaged with lobbying, the offensive nature of Israel’s actions negated the CIC’s capacity to make headway on its agenda. In several interviews post-war, top CIC officials admitted they were effectively left to defend unjustifiable military operations. When it became apparent PM Trudeau would not budge, the CIC implemented a damage control strategy over Canadian policy in the Middle East. This mainly comprised of lobbying at the highest levels of the Department of External Affairs. While its efforts could not turn Canada back against the prevailing tide of separation from Israel, it served to delay stronger Canadian-Arab relations from forming until 1989, when Canada would expand diplomatic ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization. In sum, the CIC was hamstrung by events beyond its control that made operability within Canada’s political system difficult.

Mission Statement

The stated missions of the Canada-Israel Committee are:

·“To advance a strong and dynamic relationship between the peoples of Canada and Israel

·To make the Canadian public sensitive to Israel's perspective on Arab-Israel relations

·To help facilitate increased collaboration between Canada and Israel in the pursuit of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East

·To articulate to the Canadian government and the media our concern regarding unfair treatment of Israel in all fora and to communicate the Jewish community's perspective on developments affecting Israel

·To work in concert with all fair-minded and tolerant individuals and groups in Canada and abroad to counter the myths, inaccuracies and oversimplifications concerning Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict

· To support all efforts within the Jewish community to celebrate Israel, the Jewish people and the realization of their timeless aspirations of Zionism: the return of the Jewish people to their aboriginal homeland as a free and democratic nation.”