User:Mnystrand/Dialogically organized instruction

Dialogically Organized Instruction

Any discussion of “dialogic” properly begins with the work of Mikhail Bahktin and his colleagues, especially Valentin Vološinov, in what is now known as the Bakhtin Circle starting in 1918. This work was largely unknown even in Russia until past the mid-twentieth century and not in the West and in English until the 1970s. Bakhtin himself is unknown to have ever used the term “dialogism,” which emerged with his canonization and widespread use (over 100,000 citations in Google Scholar and counting) as his ideas on the dialogic have been adopted in history, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and education. Needless to say, his ideas have been “refracted,” as he would say, well beyond his original work. Some cited scholars precede the publication of his work in the West and may be said to have anticipated him, e.g., Friere, 1970; T. S. Eliot ("the past should be altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the past": "Tradition and the Individual Talent," 1922), George Herbert Mead, and Ragnar Rommetveit (“We read on the premises of the writer and write on the premises of the reader,” 1974, p. 64).

Others are often included as interpreting the dialogic in his wake, e.g., Alexander, 2008; Applebee, Langer, Nystrand, & Gamoran, 2003; Aukerman, 2007; Aukerman, Belfatti, & Santori, 2008; Dyson, 1993; Dysthe, 2006; Flecha (2000); Habermas (1984); Hargrave (2000); Hess, 2009; Hillocks, 1995; Juzwik, 2009; Kelly, 2008; Mercer, 1995, 2000; Mezirow (1990, 1991, 2000); Murphy, Wilkinson, Soter, Hennessy, & Alexander, 2009; Nystrand, 1986, 1997; Nystrand & Gamoran, 1991; Searle (2004), Soler (2004); and Wells (1999). This enormous range of work, both anticipating and succeeding Bakhtin's own, is prima facie evidence of the refraction of discourse at the center of Bakhtin’s ideas. The inclusion of Vygotsky in this ensemble is misleading: though both were sociocultural, Bakhtin was a literary theorist examining the social-interactive properties of discourse (especially at the level of words) whereas Vygotsky, who expressed no concept of the dialogic, was a psychologist concerned with macro cognitive development and noted especially for his “zone of proximal development.”

Utterances were interesting to Bakhtin because he saw that they respond to previous utterances at the same time that they anticipate future responses. In this view, discourse is continuously woven into a “chain of speech communication” by one speaker’s “responsive position” relative to another. For Bakhtin, even long texts such as books are ultimately parts of extended dialogues involving perhaps other texts but always other voices of all kinds. In other words, Bakhtin’s utterance was akin to what we now call a conversation turn (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Goodwin, 1981):


 * Any utterance—from a short (single-word) rejoinder in everyday dialogue to the large novel or scientific treatise—has, so to speak, an absolute beginning and an absolute end: its beginning is preceded by the utterances of others, and its end is followed by the responsive utterances of others (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 72).

Yet dialogue is dialogic in these cases not because the speakers take turns. Discourse is dialogic, rather, because it is continually structured by tension—indeed even conflict—between the conversants, between self and other as one voice “refracts” another. It is precisely this tension—this relationship between self and other, this juxtaposition of relative perspectives and struggle among competing voices—which for Bakhtin gives shape to all discourse and hence lies at the heart of understanding as a dynamic, sociocognitive event.

A dialogic perspective on discourse and learning starts with the premise, then, that discourse is essentially structured by the interaction of the conversants with each playing a particular social role. Instructional discourse is shaped by classroom participation structures and authority relationships (Gutierrez, 1992, 1993; Schultz, Erickson, & Florio, 1982) and by the extent of reciprocity between teachers and students (Nystrand & Gamoran, 1991).

The roles teachers establish and the interactions they undertake with questions, responses, and assignments, inexorably set out the possibilities for meaning in their classes and, in this way, the context of learning. Whether as teachers or students engaged in instruction, parents reading to our children, children teaching games to each other, motorists stopped by police, lovers sharing intimaties, etc.—whatever is said and thought in these roles is significantly shaped by the social organization of the discourse and the respective roles of the conversants. A given utterance cannot be understood, Bakhtin writes:


 * outside the organized interrelationships of the [conversants] . . . . The crux of the matter is not in the subjective consciousness of the speakers . . . or what [the :::speakers] think, experience, or want, but in what the objective social logic of their interrelationships demands of them . . . .  In the final account, this logic defines the :::very experiences of people (their ‘inner speech’) (Bakhtin, 1985, p. 153).

That is to say, individual’s relations with the significant others in their lives shapes their consciousness— how they understand themselves, others, and the world around them. Even their most private thoughts—stream of consciousness, cryptic dialogues with themselves, the ones that keep them awake at night—are ultimately reviews of and rehearsals for conversations with others.

Dialogism, then, is more than a theory of interaction. Because it offers insights into human interaction as a foundation of comprehension, meaning, and interpretation, it is of special interest to educators. What’s special about Bakhtin and Vološinov is the way they derive an epistemology from a conception of social interaction, relating how people make sense of things to how they interact with each other. Bakhtin believed that the meaning individuals give to an individual utterances always emerges in their response to and anticipation of other utterances; utterances relate to each other much the way questions and answers reciprocally reflect each other. A dialogic perspective on instruction highlights the role that intersecting multiple voices play in the individuals’ learning and the development of their understandings.

At the heart of Bakhtin’s social logic is a reciprocity of roles: the roles of teacher and learner each respectively and mutually entail those of the other, the one in effect defining the parameters of meaning and communication of the other. Social phenomenologist Alfred Schutz regards this reciprocity as a transcendent social fact, explaining it by saying, it is “assumed that the sector of the world taken for granted by me is also taken for granted by you, and even more, that it is taken for granted by ‘Us’” (Schutz, 1967, p. 12). This is why ostensibly individual acts such as mailing a letter (Schutz, 1967), writing (Nystrand, 1986), reading (e.g., Tierney, 1983; Tierney & LaZansky, 1980), and learning and cognitive development (Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 1979, 1985) are nonetheless social; each is premised on appropriate and respective acts by reciprocal others (postal workers for letter writers, readers for writers, writers for readers, teachers for learners). As Brandt (1990) puts it, “Literacy is not a matter of learning to go it alone with language but learning to go it alone with each other” (p. 6).

In these terms, what we think and how we understand our experience always depends on how we respond to others at the same time that we anticipate their responses. For Vološinov:


 * The word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is meant.  As word, it is precisely the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addresser and addressee . . . .  I give myself verbal shape from another’s point of view, ultimately from the point of view of the community to which I belong.  A word is a bridge thrown between myself and another . . . .  A word is territory shared by both addresser and addressee (Vološinov, 1973, pp. 85-6).

This concept of discourse is fundamentally different from the common view that utterances are the independent expressions of thoughts by speakers, an account that starts with thoughts and ends with words and verbal articulation. But individual utterances are never completely independent from the utterances of others. Rather, because they respond to, at the same time that they anticipate other utterances, they are “sequentially contingent” upon each other And thoughts, Bakhtin contends, are never simply “garbed,” or wrapped in words, by an active speaker/writer for expression, transmission, and reception by a passive listener/reader. Rather, understandings evolve—are co-constructed—in “the unique interaction between author and reader, the play of two consciousnesses” (Bakhtin/Medvedev, 1978, p. 128).

Since learning is significantly shaped by learners’ interactions, plus the responses they anticipate from teachers, peers, and texts, a key issue concerns the dialogic potential of different kinds of instructional discourse for learning. Is all instruction equally dialogic? In recitation, for example, the teacher’s voice is so dominant compared to interactive discussion that such instruction seems arguably far more “monologic” than dialogic. Teachers in recitation often abruptly change topics as soon as they are satisfied with students’ mastery of a particular point, and they follow up student responses mostly to evaluate them, not to elaborate student ideas. By contrast, discussion is defined by the character of its tightly interlaced comments and responses.

Yet can we validly claim that some instruction is more dialogic than others? After all, isn't the fundamental premise of dialogism that all language is dialogic, even discourse we might be inclined to call monologic? Even in recitation, aren’t students responding to teachers’ questions? Isn’t this interaction? Bakhtin addressed this issue first in his discussion of authoritative, official discourse. During the 1930s, when the Writers’ Union announced that all Soviet writers were expected to write “fixed-form,” “party-minded” social-realist novels (see Clark & Holquist, 1984), Bakhtin published Discourse in the Novel, contending that novels by definition can have no fixed form since they are quintessentially novelists’ orchestrations of competing voices, demonstrating what he called “heteroglossia” (‘many voicedness’).

More generally, he argued, the language and discourse of any given time and place are continuously shaped and pulled in different directions by interacting forces of stability and change. On the one hand are the “centripetal” forces of stability and canonization—rules of grammar, usage, “official genres,” “correct” language, privileged ideologies; on the other hand are the “centrifigual” forces of life, experience, and the natural pluralism of language. Hence, established public “authoritative discourse” is perpetually in conflict with the “innerly persuasive discourse” of the individual; to varying degrees they resist and subvert each other. The history of language and literature, he claimed, is replete with regular efforts to resist, censor, and suppress the forces of heteroglossia in the interests of stability and canonization; as an example, he cited the Russian Orthodox Church seeking to impose a “single language of truth.” Such authoritative, official discourse monologically resists communication, seeking to extinguish competing voices and all differences between the group and the individual. “Monologism, at its extreme,” Bakhtin (1984) writes:


 * denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal rights and responsibilities . . . . Monologue is finalized and deaf to the other’s response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it any decisive force . . . .  Monologue pretends to be the ultimate word (pp. 292-93).

Holquist (1990) characterizes such discourse as “totalitarian”—“autism for the masses” (p. 34). Yet such efforts to impose a contrived monologism, Bakhtin argued, must inevitably fail since discourse is inherently dialogic. Regarding teaching and learning, Bakhtin (1984) wrote:


 * In an environment of . . . monologism the genuine interaction of consciousness is impossible, and thus genuine dialogue is impossible as well. In essence idealism knows only a single mode of cognitive interaction among consciousnesses: someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error; that is, it is the interaction of a teacher and a pupil, which, it follows, can only be a pedagogical dialogue (p. 81).