User:MobyOctopad

Criticisms of Protected Geographical Status framework
Somewhat paradoxically the PGS framework can be posited as both a protectionist move against global agro-economic policy, and a market-based neoliberal tool of agricultural governance. This makes it an equally important battle-ground for both the anti-globalization movement, and the free-trade proponents of Australia and the United States. Either way, a number of valid criticisms have been put forward;

Issues of governance

 * Conceding the market as the locus of regulation. Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms have slowly introduced a raft of market-based instruments (MBIs) to regulate the agro-food sector (the PGS framework is one of them). The market is seen as the ideal ‘arms-length’ mechanism with which to foster growth, re-balance imperfections in the connected industries and add previously uncalculated value to European produce. But their social and ecological protections are perpetually unequal, falling short of providing any instance of a Polanyian 'double-movement'. That is, generating a societal reaction to the 'dehumanizing' effects of the self-regulating market.
 * Creating markets where none previously existed. By creating so-called ‘ethical food markets', food producers have been able to command a greater price for their goods. The PDO/PGI regimes foster the creation of ethical food markets, predicated on ‘local’ produce. For example, traditional Grimsby smoked fish producers have seen PGI accreditation 'help keep the margins up', in difficult economic circumstances. However, in these instances, the ‘local’ is valorized as inherently ‘good’ or at least better than produce from an unrestricted, globalized food market.
 * Providing barriers to entry. The drawing of boundaries around certain food and drink produce prevents other actors entering particular markets. On this point the PGS framework can potentially deny (or make extremely difficult) entry into the agro-food sector. For example, there are stringent geographical, productive, facilitative, planning, temporal and skilled constraints to entry into the Stilton cheese market in the UK. The successful application to protect the Cornish pasty is another recent example; with Ginsters of Cornwall central to the bid (itself owned by the ‘extra-local’, Leicestershire-based Samworth Brothers – also makers of fellow PGS protected Melton Mowbray Pork Pies).
 * Narrowing competition in existing markets. Where markets already exist, there is the propensity for the narrowing of competition, if certain PGS applications are accepted. The state – instead of absolving all responsibility (often thought of as occurring in a neoliberal economy) – is tied with the task of carefully controlling the market. Product price fixing, supermarket consolidation, labour control, and profit-channelling are all potential issues. Within the UK, the Competition Commission is charged with investigating regulatory powers vis-à-vis markets and company mergers, to prevent (or at least temper) such problems.
 * Geographically fixing capital. Due to the nature of the PGS framework, capital is concentrated in particular areas. As rights are not directly transferable, PGI/PDO certification is granted to those with landed property rights. Monopolized (and thus higher) land rents can often result; to the detriment of those who rely on such lands.
 * Devolving power to consumers. Some proponents have suggested that ethical food markets – and the PGS framework directly - has furthered a ‘cash till’ form of political democracy, whereby consumer spending power can masquerade as a legitimate governance structure and mechanism (i.e. democratically voted, representative, and therefore accountable). This is part of a broader shift from forms of ‘government’ to ‘governance’ seen in a neoliberalizing world, where a raft of non-state actors, arguably, make informed decisions about where and what to purchase.