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The foreign relations of Bhutan, as a small, landlocked country with most of its territory located on the Tibetan plateau, have mostly involved those with the much larger countries surrounding its borders. Since the mid-20th century, Bhutan has been bordered by India to its south, following Indian independence from British rule in 1947, and bordered by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the north following the China’s annexation of Tibet in 1951. As such, Bhutan has only shared a direct border with China for a relatively short period of history. For the majority of its recorded history, Bhutan was bordered to the north by Tibet. The sovereignty of Tibet itself is a topic of intense debate, with periods of independence, patronage and as a protectorate of Mongol, and later Manchu dynasties. Regardless of the Tibet's status, the historical relationship between Bhutan and Tibet not only influence Bhutanese culture and national identity, but also heavily influence the relationship between Bhutan and China today, with historical Chinese claims over Bhutan having been totally dependant upon Tibetan claims over Bhutan.

Historical relationship and shared history with Tibet
Beyond their shared geography, Bhutan and Tibet have had a longstanding and mostly close relationship for well over 1000 years. In terms of people, for centuries, those of Tibetan ethnicity have lived not only in Tibet (and today the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China) or other regions of China, but also lived in and migrated over an area larger than that of Western Europe, including areas that today is part of Nepal, Bhutan, India (particularly Ladakh, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh). More broadly, this may include the Ngalop people, the dominant ethnic group in Bhutan today, who are thought to be the descendants of Tibetans.

Written historical records from before the introduction of Buddhism in the 7th century CE are scarce, especially for Bhutan, but the indigenous Tibetan religion of Bon appears to have been practiced in what is Tibet, Bhutan and Ladakh today. The 7th century CE saw the reign of Songsten Gampo, the 33rd Yarlung King of Tibet, marked the start of the Tibetan Empire that lasted until the 9th century. Bhutan became part of this empire within Gampo’s reign, which at its maximum extent, stretched to cover an area from beyond Afghanistan to the west, to the borders of Chang’an (modern Xi'an), China in the east.

Gampo is considered as overseeing the formal introduction of Buddhism to Tibet, Bhutan and beyond, and for the most part, the history and politics of both Bhutan and Tibet have centred around religion. For centuries after the fall of the empire, the region became fragmented and controlled by rival fiefdoms and local monarchies, but as Buddhism moved from India to Tibet, and from Tibet to Bhutan, with Tibet becoming a place of important religious meaning and (original) home to all four schools of Tibetan Buddhism, a deep religious and cultural connection between Tibet and Bhutan was established that would endure far beyond the 9th century into the modern day. With Buddhism came the liturgical language of Classical Tibetan (known as Chöke in Bhutan) that remained the language of education in Bhutan until the 1960s. Dzongkha, the national language of Bhutan today, is a Tibetic language close to Tibetan, and along with some other languages of Bhutan, is written using Tibetan script. Politically, the Cho-sid-nyi (or traditional Tibetan dual system of government) has historically governed Tibet, was brought into existence in Bhutan in the 16th century, with a modified form of this government still in use in Bhutan today. In terms of ethnicity,

Tibet itself remained fully independent until coming under Mongol and Yuan dynasty rule in 1271–1368, with Tibet coming under the control of the Yuan branch of the Mongol Empire. Tibet was governed under a diarchic structure; under the Tibetan Sakya lama (or spiritual leader from the Sakya school of Tibetan Buddhism), retaining a high degree of political autonomy, with the Sakya lama being the de jure head of Tibet and a spiritual leader of the Mongol Empire whilst administrative and military rule of Tibet remained under the auspices of the Yuan government. At the end of Yuan rule in 1354, un terms of Tibetan self-governence, the rule over Tibet by a succession of Sakya lamas came to a definite end in 1358, when central Tibet came under control of the Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism.

The 14th to 18th centuries, Tibet was an de facto independent state. Until the 17th century, Tibet was ruled by various families, when it was succeeded by the succession of Dalai lamas. In China, the Yuan dynasty was replaced by the Ming dynasty. Most scholars consider the Ming-Tibetan relationship to be one of suzerainty whereby Tibet was largely independent and under self-rule, whereby Tibet was a tributary state required to pay tribute to the Imperial dynasties of China under the tributary system. The Ming kept mostly friendly relations with Tibet, with some religious leaders granted titles, although as with other tributary states, these were nominal.

In 1642, the Tibetan government established the Ganden Phodrang under the 5th Dalai Lama with military assistance of Güshi Khan of the Khoshut Khanate. Lhasa became the capital of Tibet in the beginning of this period, with all temporal power being conferred to the 5th Dalai Lama by Güshi Khan in Shigatse. The Khoshut Khanate became a major sponsor of the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism, with the Khoshut and Gelugpa leaders forming a close alliance. The relationship between the khanate and Tibet is debatable, with opinions ranging from it being one of priest-patron to Tibet being a protectorate of the khanate.

The Qing rule over Tibet was established after a Qing expedition force defeated the Dzungars who occupied Tibet in 1720, and lasted until the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912. The Qing emperors appointed imperial residents known as the Ambans to Tibet, who commanded over 2,000 troops stationed in Lhasa and reported to the Lifan Yuan, a Qing government agency that oversaw the region during this period. During this era, the region was dominated by the Dalai Lamas with the support from the Qing dynasty established by the Manchus in China.

History and emergence of premodern Bhutan separate from Tibet
With the fall of the Tibetan empire in the 9th century, up until the 17th century, what is today Bhutan came under no central control. It was ruled as many localised fiefdoms and kingdoms, one of the largest being the Kingdom of Bumthang. As Bhutan is sited beyond Tibet, across highly mountainous and difficult to navigate terrain, Bhutan became home to many refugees who fled Tibet during times of political instability and religious sectarianism. Bhutan is one of the few countries which has been independent throughout its history, never conquered, occupied, or governed by an outside power (notwithstanding occasional nominal tributary status). From the time historical records are clear, Bhutan has continuously and successfully defended its sovereignty.

The 17th century marks the birth of a unified, fully independent Bhutan as a political and cultural entity. The arrival of Ngawang Namgyal was key in the emergence of premodern Bhutan. Namgyal was a lama and rinpoche born in Tibet of the Drukpa lineage of the Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism. Namgyal came to Bhutan as a refugee in 1616, fleeing the domination of the Gelug school of Buddhism led by the Dalai Lama in Tibet. In Bhutan, Namgyal is seen as the great unifier of the country that since the end of the Tibetan Empire in the 9th century CE, had been under fragmented ruled by many rival families. Namgyal established a centralised government under a traditional Tibetan dual system of governance, a modified version of which is still in power today. Beyond political unification, Namgyal also oversaw the start of a Bhutanese identity separate to one of a Tibetan identity.

The emergence of a united Bhutan did not go unnoticed by Tibet. Tibet was not only angered by Namgyal receiving refuge in Bhutan but Tibet also considered developments in Bhutan as standing in the way of consolidating the entire Himalayan Buddhist regions into a Gelugpa domain. Throughout the 17th century, Bhutan faced at least seven unsuccessful invasions by a mixture of Tibetan and Tibetan-Mongol forces. Not only did Bhutan emerge victorious, but the events served to further consolidate and unify the country.

In 1720, Tibet came under Qing rule. From a Bhutanese perspective, the arrival of the Qing in Tibet lead to an improvement in relations and a relative peace. Under the Qing dynasty, Tibet was ruled as the "borderlands" or a vassal state. From this time, the external existential threat to Bhutan wasn't Tibet or their Qing rulers, but the growing presence of the British in India to the south.

Relations with India under British rule and British interests in Tibet
Compared to the plight of many territories coming into contact with colonial Britain, for the part, provided Bhutan was not an obstacle to British intentions, relations with Bhutan were relatively cordial. Bhutan and colonial British forces came into conflict twice, first in 1774, and then again in the Duar War in 1864. Both times saw Bhutan cede territory to Britain, and although significant, most of this territory was land Bhutan controlled outside of its borders. The latter war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Sinchula. Although Bhutan had been plagued by interval rivalries for some time, the losses of the Duar War saw the outbreak of civil war in Bhutan, ultimately seeing the Penlop of Trongsa (Ugyen Wangchuck), who saw the benefits of an improved relationship with the British, emerge victorious over the Penlop of Paro who held more pro-Tibetan and anti-British views. In 1907, Wangchuck would be enthroned as the first hereditary Druk Gyalpo (King of Bhutan).

At the turn of the 20th century, Britain had become increasing suspicious of perceived Russian interests in Central Asia. In 1903/1904, the British Expedition to Tibet had the purported mission to establish diplomatic relations and resolve the dispute over the border between Tibet and Sikkim. In reality, it was a temporary military invasion that imposed a treaty, and led to the death of several thousand poorly armed Tibetans. As all previous attempts to establish relations with Tibet had failed, the British requested Wangchuck, the Penlop of Trongsa, to act as mediator. The Convention of Lhasa treaty required the payment of indemnity to the British, to open up Tibet to British trade, whilst preventing Tibet from entering into relations with other foreign powers. Whilst the treaty appeared as if signed by two sovereign countries without the involvement of China, but the British government continued to recognize that Tibet was under Chinese suzerainty. The treaty was later ratified by he Sino-British treaty (1906) was signed between the Qing and British empires, but excluding Tibetan representatives.

From Qing military occupation of Tibet and along the border to the fall of the Qing dynasty
As series of largely unforeseen events followed the British Expedition. A combination of foreign involvement (both the British Expedition and work of French missionaries) and the decisions of the Qing assistant amban Feng Quan triggered the Batang Uprising in 1905, leading to the killing of missionaries and Feng Quan. A punitive mission led by the Amban of Tibet, Zhao Erfeng (also known as the butcher of Kham) was launched, destroying monasteries and leading to many deaths. The Qing military invasion at Batang attempted to change the power structure in the region fundamentally. The historical system of autonomous polities was also attacked, and the Tibet was briefly under Chinese military occupation, until 1911.

Between 1908-1910, diplomatic records with China reveal a policy shift towards Chinese expansionism in the Himalayas. At the start of 1908, Zhao Erfeng, Amban of Tibet, wrote to the Deb Raya (Holy King) of Bhutan announcing a Chinese officer was to visit to 'report on the conditions of the country, its climate, its crops and people' suggesting a lack of knowledge of Bhutan, yet also stated that the Bhutanese are subjects of China. By 1910, Zhao Erfeng had laid claim to Bhutan and Nepal as vassal states, as well as Sikkim and Ladakh in India. Clearly, the countries or states claimed by China grew concerned, as did the British, who administered, or in the case of Bhutan supported, these areas as a borderland region to protect the core British interests in India.

In response to developments north of the border, the Treaty of Punakha was signed in 1910 between Britain and Bhutan, not as a new treaty, but as an expansion of the earlier Treaty of Sinchula (1865). Under the Treaty of Punakha, Britain recognised, affirmed and guaranteed Bhutan's independence, explicitly stating Britain would not interfere with its internal affairs, whilst Bhutan in terms of its foreign affairs, Bhutan became a protectorate of British with "the Bhutanese government agreeing to be guided by the advice of the British government in regard to its external relations.” Despite this Treaty, the Amban of Tibet wrote to the King of Bhutan attempting to claim suzerainty over Bhutan and to assert that it was China’s ‘vassal’.

Expansionist aims came to a halt after the the Xinhai (or 1911) Revolution saw fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911. To the north, Tibet saw the Xinhai Lhasa turmoil, and the Amban Zhao Erfeng was expelled from Tibet, and was soon decapitated near Chengdu, Sichuan.

Indian independence and establishment of a defence relationship between India and Bhutan
The Treaty of Punakha remained active until Indian independence in 1947, that saw Britain continue to recognise and guarantee Bhutanese independence. After Indian independence came in 1947, and in 1949 the Treaty of Friendship between Bhutan and India. The Treaty of Friendship is not unlike the Treaty of Punakha, calling for peace between the two nations and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, with Bhutan agreeing to let India "guide" its foreign policy and both countries would consult each other closely on foreign and defence affairs. Compared with the Treaty of Punakha, the Treat of Friendship was more flexible, with Bhutan being an independent, protected state rather than a protectorate, because Bhutan continues to have the power to conduct its own foreign policy.

Annexation of Tibet and events in Tibet under PRC rule
The People's Republic of China (PRC), founded in October 1949 by the victorious Communists under the leadership of Mao Zedong, lost little time in asserting a new Chinese presence in Tibet. Tibet came under the control of People's Republic of China (PRC) after the Government of Tibet signed the Seventeen Point Agreement which the 14th Dalai Lama ratified on 24 October 1951, something the Dalai Lama later repudiated on the grounds that he had rendered his approval for the agreement under duress. After the Seventeen Point Agreement was signed, a build up of troops in Tibet saw Bhutan remove

The Tibet Uprising in 1959 saw the Chinese military crackdown on Tibetan rebels resulting in full-scale resistance throughout Tibet. Fearing capture of the Dalai Lama, unarmed Tibetans surrounded his residence, and the Dalai Lama fled to India. Tibet saw a huge influx of soldiers and heavy fighting. The uprising saw an influx of Tibetan refugees from the north. Bhutan, fearful of the potential Chinese repercussions of hosting Tibetans, gave the refugees the option of either accepting Bhutanese citizenship or transit on to India, giving asylum to at least 4000 refugees. Despite the historical connection to Tibet, many of these refugees have struggled to assimilate, demonstrating strong differences between cultures.

Chinese expansionism and the Five Fingers of Tibet policy
The Five Fingers of Tibet policy was a Chinese territorial claim to a large area of the Himalayan region bordering India attributed to Mao Zedong. It considers Tibet to be China's right hand palm, with five fingers on its periphery: Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and North-East Frontier Agency (now known as Arunachal Pradesh) that are considered China's responsibility to "liberate". The policy however has never been discussed in official Chinese public statements and is now dormant, but concerns have often been raised over its possible continued existence or revival.

Chinese maps were printed showing nearly the whole eastern district of Tashigong and portions of north-eastern and north-western Bhutan as being parts of China. Bhutan’s National Assembly passed a special resolution specifically about errors in Chinese maps depicting Bhutan’s borders, including about 300 square miles of territory which, according to the McMahon Line and Indian maps, belongs to Bhutan.

In 1959, the Chinese military took over one Indian and 8 Bhutanese enclaves in western Tibet. These enclaves had been under Bhutanese jurisdiction for over 300 years, with jurisdiction previously recognised by the government in Lhasa. Bhutan asked India to raise the issue with China in 1959/1960, but China refused any discussion.

In 1960, Bhutan sealed its borders and travel between Bhutan and the Tibet region ended. The closure of borders also saw the end of several ancient trade routes, including those from Tashigong, Paro and Punakha to Shigatse and Lhasa in Tibet. In 1962, Sino–Indian border dispute escalated into the Sino-India War with conflict breaking out between China and India from October to November 1962. Fighting occurred along India's border with China, in India's North-East Frontier Agency east of Bhutan, and in Aksai Chin west of Nepal. War between the two broke out again in 1967.

Establishing contact between Bhutan and China
In 1971, Bhutan joined the United Nations with China voting to support Bhutan's membership.

In 1972, India surveyed Bhutan’s border with the Tibetan region occupied by China, and assisted Thimphu in establishing its own Survey Department. The establishment of the Boundary Commission followed in 1981, which, based on the survey reports and historical data and documents, formulated definite Bhutanese claims on its boundary with Tibet (China). Following this, Bhutan established informal contacts with the Chinese when a diplomatic note was sent to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi in March 1981, followed by informal contacts in New York and New Delhi.

In 1974, the coronation of the Druk Gyalpo (or King) Jigme Singye Wangchuck was held in Thimpu in front of up to 150 foreign guests, which was reported in the New York Times as being 'the first time that this once‐forbidden nation has opened its doors to so many outsiders'. Most foreign guests were either representatives, or foreign diplomats based in New Delhi. Amongst these guests was the Chinese delegation led by Ma Muming, chargé d’affaires and interim of the Chinese embassy in New Delhi. The Chinese congratulatory message emphasised the “desire of the Bhutanese government in developing its economy and safeguarding its national independence”. The invitation of a Chinese delegation in Thimphu was a clear message showing that Bhutan was ready to normalise its relations with China, assuming that India had agreed with that process. A few years later in 1977 and 1979, the visit to China of the Bhutanese ping-pong team provided other opportunities of interaction.

In April 1984, the first formal bilateral meeting between Bhutan and China was held in Beijing, largely focused on boundary related issues, with Bhutan using the modern maps and surveys produced since 1972. Since then, similar talks have been held annually, held on a alternating basis in either Beijing or Thimphu. From this first meeting, the Chinese stance insisted upon three sets of claims: Bhutan's claim, held by the Bhutanese government since the late 1950s; China's first claim, and included areas around the Chumbi valley; and China's second claim was based somewhere between the two, but mapped land changes through incursions.

Bhutan and China subsequently signed two key bilateral agreements, the first in 1988 (on the Guiding Principles on the Settlement of Boundary Issues) and the second in 1998 (Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity). Neither treaty directly involved demarcation of territory, but discusses the principals and processes of future agreement.

In 2007, a new Treaty of Friendship between India and Bhutan was signed, effectively a renegotiation of the Treaty of Friendship signed in 1949. The renewed treaty can be seen as the outcome of the evolution and maturity of Bhutan as an independent and sovereign state. Whilst clearly reaffirming India's interests in Bhutan, the treaty replaced the provision requiring Bhutan to take India's guidance on foreign policy with broader sovereignty and not require Bhutan to obtain India's permission over arms imports.

In 2012, the first informal meeting between a Bhutanese Prime Minster and a Chinese Premier was reported to have taken place on the side lines of the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met with his Bhutanese counterpart, Jigmi Y. Thinley. Bhutan's press office released a press release saying “The meeting carries great historic significance as it marks the first meeting between the heads of the two governments. [...] They discussed bilateral issues of mutual interest and multilateral cooperation including Bhutan’s bid for a non permanent seat on UN Security Council for the term 2013-2014, elections for which are to be held in fall this year.”

In 2017, saw an increase in tensions in the Doklam region of Bhutan, as they had previously in 1966. Both Bhutan and India claimed the territory as rightfully belong to Bhutan, whilst China demanded the removal of the Indian military from what China claimed was its own territory. The 2017 China-India border standoff began on 16 June when a column of Chinese troops accompanied by construction vehicles and road-building equipment began moving south into what Bhutan considers its territory. Although conflict was avoided, and the standoff itself was short-lived, it served as a reminder of tensions, particularly between China and India, on Bhutanese soil. Whilst strongly worded statements and warnings were issued by both China and India, largely directed at the one another, Bhutan, whilst reiterating its claim to the territory, remained relatively silent.

???The Bhutanese have suspected that China will refuse to accept the Bhutanese claim line and instead bargain toughly over its two claim lines. This will be to eliminate the strategic advantage that India and Bhutan enjoy over China in the Chumbi Valley region. That is why China, while formulating the basic criteria for the settlement of boundaries, added the principle of ‘existing reality’ (in order to justify its physical presence) to the traditional references to ‘watershed’ and ‘traditional practices of grazing rights and collection of local taxes.’ Archives reveal that, in 1984, the Bhutanese side did not accept the principle of ‘existing reality’ that became a key point of contention during the subsequent round of talks held in Thimphu following the Beijing talks. Bhutan and China subsequently signed two key agreements in 1988, namely, the Guiding Principles on the Settlement of the Boundary Issues and the Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Border Areas, to set the base for talks that basically focus on disputed areas to Bhutan’s north and west, abutting the Doklam plateau. In 1989, both countries claimed the Pasamlung and Jakarlung valleys, with China offering Pasamlung and Jakarlung in return for Bhutan’s key western sectors in 1990. Bhutan reasserted its claims in the western sector in 1996, highlighting its importance as pastureland and complaining of the intrusion of herdsmen from China (Tibet) in disputed regions in the north. China declined to reduce or go back on any of its claims in the western sector. In 2000, Bhutan extended new claims in the western sector and proposed technical discussions between experts. Almost a decade and a half later in 2014, Bhutan and China endorsed the joint technical field survey to set the base for talks that basically focus on disputed areas to Bhutan’s north and west, abutting the Doklam plateau. In 1989, both countries claimed the Pasamlung and Jakarlung valleys, with China offering Pasamlung and Jakarlung in return for Bhutan’s key western sectors in 1990. Bhutan reasserted its claims in the western sector in 1996, highlighting its importance as pastureland and complaining of the intrusion of herdsmen from China (Tibet) in disputed regions in the north. China declined to reduce or go back on any of its claims in the western sector. In 2000, Bhutan extended new claims in the western sector and proposed technical discussions between experts. Almost a decade and a half later in 2014, Bhutan and China endorsed the joint technical field survey

K. Warikoo (2019). Himalayan Frontiers of India: Historical, Geo-Political and Strategic Perspectives. Routledge. p. 240. ISBN 9781134032945.

In October 2021, signed a memorandum of understanding on a 3-step roadmap intended to facilitate the boundary negotiations between Bhutan and China.

In October 2023, the most senior bilateral meeting to date occurred between Bhutan and China with Tandi Dorji being the first Bhutanese foreign minister travelling to Beijing, meeting with his counterpart Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and the Chinese Vice President Han Zheng.

In an interview with the Indian newspaper The Hindu, the outgoing Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering talked about the possibility of completing the demarcation of the boundary between Bhutan and China. Tshering described the three-step roadmap as "first, agreeing on the table; then visiting the sites [on the ground]; and formally demarcating the boundary" and commented that "we are nearing the completion of the three-step roadmap. I think there will be one more round, I hope that happens while we are still in office. I have about a month left. But I can say we are inching towards the completion of the three-step [roadmap]." The interview also hinted towards a change of Bhutanese foreign policy. When asked if Bhutan is considering to establish diplomatic ties with China, Tshering responded saying "every country should have a dynamic foreign policy and adjust according to its interests. For Bhutan, with every change of government, our foreign policy does not change. Theoretically, how can Bhutan not have any bilateral relations with China? The question is when, and in what manner."

Bhutan and China signed a three-step road map aimed at resolving the border dispute.

October 2023 saw the first

In 2021, satellite images showed extensive building work in the Menchuma Valley. In recent times, the valley has been under the de facto control of China, with Chinese troops believed to be stationed in or nearby. Both Bhutanese herders and army patrols denied access.

Between 2022-2023, satellite images revealed another wave of Chinese settlement and a new road network being built in the Jakarlung Valley region.

Boundary issues
The Bhutan–China border is the international boundary between Bhutan and China (specifically the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) of China, running for 477 km (296 mi) through the Himalayas between the two tripoints with India, where Bhutan, China and India meet at the border.

Talks over boundary issues have largely focused on three distinct regions.

Western section
The western section includes the contiguous areas of Doklam, Sinchulung, Dramana, and Shakhatoe, amounting to an area of 269 km2 altogether. The disputed areas in this section have seen Chinese construction and settlement for the longest time, for example the establishment of Pangda, a village approximately 2 km from the border inside of Bhutanese territory.

Doklam is frequently used in news reports and the media as referring to the entirety of all disputed territory in the western section, but strictly, refers to 89 km2 area of land consisting mostly of a high plateau (Doklam plateau) sloping down into an adjacent deep valley below. It is strategically located at the point where Bhutan's (mostly northern) border with China meets Bhutan's (mostly southern) border with India, or more specifically, lies between China's Chumbi Valley to the north, Bhutan's Haa District to the east and India's Sikkim state to the west. Although Doklam is a relatively small area of land, it holds great strategic significance in terms of defence and logistics. At considerable height, it provides a vantage point overlooking the Siliguri corridor, a narrow 24 km wide corridor in West Bengal, bound by Nepal to the northwest and Bangladesh to the southeast, and serves as the only land route and connection between the bulk of India and Sikkim and the other 7 states of north-east India. The southern end of the Doklam plateau slopes into this corridor. It has been described as being among the most "strategic mountain chokepoints critical in global power competition", and "the single most strategically important piece of real estate in the entire Himalayan region".

The remainder of disputed territory in the western section is contiguous with and located north east of Doklam. The area is made up of a series of tributary river valleys, (Shakhatoe, Dramana, and Langmarpo) flowing into the Torsa (or Amo Chhu) river that runs from north to south. The Amo Chhu basin in the gewog is part of Torsa national forest and is designated as a "strict nature reserve". These valleys form a disputed area of around 138 km2 of Bhutanese territory. The pastures of Shakhatoe had always been used by the yak herders of the Haa district. Since August 2004, China has started building its own motor roads in the region, disregarding Bhutanese protests. By 2022, Chinese occupation of the region seems complete, with a trunk road running through the area, with several branch roads and multiple built-up townships. Langmarpo Chu has not been ceded but is under effective occupation of China with a highway and several villages constructed along it. China has also constructed a road in the eastern part of the valley towards the Phutegang ridge, where it overlooks the Charitang valley. Further up along its course, there is a high plateau covering an area of 42 km2 with several small lakes at elevations ranging from 3700 to 4400 metres. It is referred to as Sinchulung or Sinchulungpa in Bhutan the Bhutanese. It is said to measure 42 square kilometres, and is part of the 269 square kilometre area that China included in its "package deal" for border settlement.

Middle section
The second area is located in the north of Bhutan, measuring approximately 500 square km and includes Beyul Khenpajong, the Menchuma Valley, and the Chagdzom area. Satellite photography shows that areas within the Jakarling and Pasamlung valleys have shown significant Chinese construction, for example the establishment of the new village Gyalaphug in the area in 2015, and subsequent development since.

Eastern section
Prior to 2020, China had made no territorial claims on the eastern third of Bhutan, despite 24 previous rounds of bilateral border meetings and China previously offering final or 'package' deals to end the border disputes and complete border demarcation.

China's new claim came during the 58th meeting of the Global Environment Facility Council in June 2020 when Bhutan applied for funding at Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary, located in the Trashigang district located in the far east of the country. The sanctuary of about 650 km2 has been a protected conservation area of since 2003 and is listed on the tentative list for UNESCO admission. When discussing the project proposal, the council member for China stated "the project [...] is located in the China-Bhutan disputed areas which is on the agenda of China-Bhutan boundary talk, China opposes and does not join the Council decision on this project". In response, the council member representing Bhutan responded saying "Bhutan totally rejects the claim made by the Council Member of China. Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary is an integral and sovereign territory of Bhutan and at no point during the boundary discussions between Bhutan and China has it featured as a disputed area". A modified project proposal was later voted through. The Chinese foreign minister spokesperson, Wang Wenbin, later confirmed claims to the eastern section saying “China’s position has been consistent and clear. The boundary between China and Bhutan is yet to be demarcated, and the middle, eastern and western sections of the border are disputed.”

Previously disputed territory
Older maps, many of which are still in use, include a strip of land in the north/northeast of the country belonging to Bhutan called Kula Khari (often written as Kulha Kangri). Bhutan quietly relinquished its claims in at some point in the 1980s or shortly after, yet how it came about is poorly documented.

The border talks between Bhutan and China began in 1984. They signed the Guiding Principles on the Settlement of Boundary Issues in 1988 and the Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the border areas in 1998. Since 1984, talks between Bhutan and China have largely focused on two separate areas of dispute, including Doklam and other areas in Bhutan’s west, near the Bhutan-China-India tri-junction measuring 269 square kilometers and the Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys located near Tibet to Bhutan’s north, which measure 495 sq. km. More recently, China has also laid claims to Bhutan’s eastern Sakteng region. On July 5, 2020, China explicitly stated that it has a border dispute with Bhutan in the eastern region, for the first time since 1986.

The possible “exchange” of disputed territories involving the Doklam tri-junction area has long been a particular concern for India. Bhutan’s Ministry of External Affairs did not indicate whether India was taken into confidence about the details of the most recent MoU in advance. It should be noted that Bhutan and China don’t have direct diplomatic relations, and liaise via their embassies in Delhi.

Chinese construction within Bhutanese administered territory
Using satellite images from October 2020 taken by the US-based satellite operator Maxar Technologies, Maxar reported that “there has clearly been significant construction activity this year all along the Torsa River valley area.” In a statement, Maxar added there had also been construction of “new military storage bunkers” near the Doklam area.

In 2020, the Indian newspaper The Hindu reported on an investigation and satellite imagery and an investigation documenting the Chinese construction of Pangda, a village 2.5 km from the border within Bhutanese administered territory. According to an NDTV report, also covered elsewhere, a (since deleted) tweet by Shen Shiwei, a senior producer with Chinese CGTN News revealed the images showcasing Pangda village in the Doklam area and indicated the precise location of the settlement. With this came a network of roads. Indian media also reported the construction of a heliport and surface-to-air battery on the Chinese side of the border.

Efforts to solve border disputes
Bilateral meetings between Bhutan and China started in 1984 and have taken place on an annual basis, with the meeting's location alternating between Beijing and Thimphu. Up until the 6th round of talks, the Bhutanese delegation was led by the Bhutanese ambassador to India in New Delhi, while the Chinese delegation was headed by a Vice Foreign Minister. From the 6th round of meetings in 1989, talks were upgraded, and the Bhutanese delegation was led by the Foreign Minister of Bhutan, and the Chinese delegation led by a Senior Vice Foreign Minister. Whilst up until the 10th round of talks, progress was slow, as the talks have progressed, the meetings have become increasingly productive. Increasing senior ministers or heads of state have attended. At more recent rounds of talks, the Chinese delegation has been typically granted an audience with the King at meetings held in Bhutan, and when meetings are held in Beijing, the Chinese Prime Minister will meet with the Bhutanese delegation.

From the 11th round of bilateral talks in 1990, China has preferred demarcation and settlement of border disputes in a single and final bilateral agreement (or a 'package deal', as opposed to a series of sector-by-sector settlements. One such package deal offered by China through the 1990s involved China offering to end claims on the northern sector (approximately 495km2 in the Beyul Khenpajong region (the Jakurlung and Pasamlung Valleys) in exchange for Bhutan removing all claims over the north-west area (approximately 269 km2 in north-west Bhutan) centred on the Doklam plateau. Through the minutes of bilateral border meetings and the Bhutanese King's statements to the National Assembly of Bhutan, Bhutan appeared responsive to such a deal, with the Bhutanese King saying “the northern boundary will be successfully demarcated through the process of friendly dialogue.”.

Yet, there are indications that in the 10th round of talks, the Bhutanese were ready to strike a deal with the Chinese and indeed agree to the swap. This can be gleaned from the king’s statement to the 73rd session of the National Assembly in August-September 1995, which said among others that the differences in claims have to be negotiated in four areas only—the 89 sq km of Doklam, 42 sq km in Sinchulumpa, and 138 sq km in Dramana-Shakhartoe, all totalling 269 sq km. At the same time, the king had stated that [iv] It needs to be kept in mind that at the time Bhutan was an absolute monarchy and the National Assembly’s role was purely advisory. The Bhutanese position hardened thereafter. When the two sides met for the 11th round of talks in November 1996, “to China’s surprise, Bhutan revised its claims in the south and asserted a claim to larger territory than before, leading the talks to break down.” There is no doubt that China saw an Indian hand in this development and so Beijing reverted to its earlier stance of calling for an exchange of claims. [v]

The National Assembly’s 75th session was told that in the 11th round of talks, Bhutan had put forward their claim to Doklam, Sinchulung, Dramana and Shakhatoe in the western area. It was not only the Indian hand; the session report suggests that the deal would not have been popular within Bhutan. As one of the ministers pointed out during the session, the Chinese were essentially offering to exchange what were essentially Bhutanese lands. [vi]

In 1997, the king told the 75th session of the Assembly that the two sides were back to discussing the exchange of the 495 sq km of the Pasamlung and Jakarlung Valleys with the western claims, that included the 89 sq km of Doklam. [vii] Thus the current dispute involves some 764 sq km since the Bhutanese had earlier voluntarily shed some 400 sq km in the north, along with Kula Kangri.

It presented the “package deal” in 1996 under which it offered to give up claims on Jakurlung and Pasamlung Valleys in exchange for the Doklam Plateau (Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses [IDSA], January 19, 2010). Additionally, it has pressed for establishment of trade and diplomatic relations and has made that a quid pro quo for a border settlement. In fact, it seems to be willing to give up claims on Jakurlung and Pasamlung Valleys only after Bhutan establishes formal trade and diplomatic relations with Beijing. As for the Doklam Plateau, Beijing appears willing to make only “minor adjustments” here (Chennai Center for China Studies, January 15, 2010).

Diplomatic relations
Bhutan’s diplomatic engagements with China have been described as carefully calibrated balancing act. The government in Thimphu has not adopted any diplomatic stance on, nor spoken publicly about, foreign affairs or geopolitical issues that might provoke a strong reaction from China, for example those involving Taiwan. The same is true for Tibet, despite Bhutan not only hosting thousands of Tibetan refugees today, but also historically being a place of refuge to Tibetans for over a thousand years, the most notable being Ngawang Namgyal in the 16th century, known as the great 'unifier of Bhutan'.

Bhutan has also engaged in relative silence on border issues, even when those issues have resulted in tensions and military stand-off on Bhutanese land. During the Doklam crisis in 2017, when Chinese and Indian troops came face-to-face on the Bhutanese Doklam plateau in a military standoff lasting 72 days, a war of words broke out between China and India yet Bhutan issued a single statement asserting its ownership of the territory. Bhutan's silence on the Doklam crisis has been suggested as being due to Doklam not being perceived as a vital interest to itself, as opposed to the strategic interest Doklam represents to Bhutan's ally and defence partner, India. Despite being Bhutanese territory and Bhutan having established a small military of its own, Bhutan did not deploy its own troops to the site of standoff in Doklam.

Despite religion being described as the foundation of relations between Bhutan and Tibet, with Bhutan being not just the only Mahayana Buddhist state in the world (as legislated in the Constitution of Bhutan)

(a) The Je Khenpo as Chairman; (b) The Five Lopons of the Zhung Dratshang; and (c) The Secretary of the Dratshang Lhentshog who is a civil servant.
 * Article 3, Spiritual Heritage
 * Buddhism is the spiritual heritage of Bhutan, which promotes the principles and values of peace, non-violence, compassion and tolerance.
 * The Druk Gyalpo is the protector of all religions in Bhutan.
 * It shall be the responsibility of religious institutions and personalities to promote the spiritual heritage of the country while also ensuring that religion remains separate from politics in Bhutan. Religious institutions and personalities shall remain above politics.
 * The Druk Gyalpo shall, on the recommendation of the Five Lopons, appoint a learned and respected monk ordained in accordance with the Druk-lu, blessed with the nine qualities of a spiritual master and accomplished in ked-dzog, as the Je Khenpo.
 * His Holiness the Je Khenpo shall, on the recommendation of the Dratshang Lhentshog, appoint monks blessed with the nine qualities of a spiritual master and accomplished in ked-dzog as the Five Lopons.
 * The members of the Dratshang Lhentshog shall comprise:
 * The Zhung Dratshang and Rabdeys shall continue to receive adequate funds and other facilities from the State.

but also one of the last bastions of Tibetan Buddhism (along with Mongolia), Bhutan has avoided speaking publicly about religious matters connected to Tibet or the Dalai Lama. Bhutanese government policy has excluded all official contact with the Tibetan government in exile in Dharamshala, India. In addition, the 14th Dalai Lama who has travelled extensively, has never visited Bhutan. This is in contrast to the 13th Dalai Lama, who while exiled from Tibet, was hosted by a key Bhutanese politician on behalf of the Bhutanese king, at Bhutan House in Kalimpong, India. Whilst Bhutan's stance might be interpreted as seeking to avoid displeasing China, it may also reflect the historically entrenched rivalries between the Gelugpa Buddhist sect of Tibet and the Drukpa Buddhist sect of Bhutan.

Bhutan seemingly established a One China policy when it voted to restore China's United Nations' (UN) seat in 1971, in the same year China voted to admit Bhutan into the UN. As Vice Chair during the 55th UN General Assembly, Bhutan rejected motions to allow the participation of Taiwan at the UN and the World Health Organization (WHO). Bhutan also expressed opposition to Taiwan's proposal to host the Asian Games in 2002.

Bhutan has been notably silent about Chinese settlement and the construction of infrastructure within Bhutanese territory, despite multiple reports and investigations revealing satellite imagery of such events. In 2020, when the Indian newspaper The Hindu reported on an investigation and satellite imagery and an investigation showing one such example, in this case the Chinese construction of Pangda, a village 2km from the border within Bhutanese territory, a statement was released by Vetsop Namgyel, the Bhutanese Ambassador to India in New Delhi stating "There is no Chinese village inside Bhutan.” Since that time, there have been no public statements or interventions made by the Bhutanese government. In an interview with the Belgian newspaper La Libre, Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering again stated "there was no Chinese intrusion of its territory".

Chinese methods
China's surprise move to make entirely new territorial claims over Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in the east of Bhutan in June 2021, despite 24 rounds of negotiations, has been interpreted as renewing pressure on Bhutan to push for a finalization of a border agreement. It came as a sharp surprise to insiders, with Tenzing Lamsang pointing out, never was a claim made in any of the border talks between 1984 and 2016, nor has it featured in any Chinese maps in recent decades. In 2014, in the midst of high tensions between China and India, China produced a controversial official map portraying the most ambitious claims over neighbouring territory in recent decades (including ownership of the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh), yet even here, Sakteng was clearly depicted within Bhutan's borders. In terms of area, if agreed, this new claim would represent 11% of Bhutanese controlled territory, dwarfing the area that has been discussed over the past 24 rounds of meetings.

News reports and some academics, particularly from India, have suggest the new claim on Sakteng is designed to push Bhutan into making a deal, particularly one agreeing to a "package deal" offered by China, whereby China would drop claims on the rest of the country if Bhutan agrees to give up claims on Doklam and the western section.

If the whole of Sakteng was claimed, it would add another 742km2, making 12% of Bhutan's total land disputed.

speculation that China is attempting to rattle New Delhi through Bhutan, a development that could potentially increase cross-border tensions.

The Global Times, the Chinese government flagship tabloid newspaper has called 'the territorial disputes between China and Bhutan are not significant'.

Construction
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that “China’s normal construction activities on its own territory are entirely within the scope of China’s sovereignty, and there is nothing wrong with it.”

The Chinese government tabloid The Global Times denied claims that Pangda was in Bhutanese territory, and accused India of creating the illusion that "China is bullying the small" whilst claiming India's "extreme nationalism and regional hegemony of Hinduism the greatest threat to peace and stability in South Asia".

Chinese accusations at India

Chinese sources have claimed that India stands in the way of

Indian accusations at China
In 2014, China released a map with the ambitious claims over Himalayan territory In 2014, with tensions between China and India close to boiling point, China created a map with the most ambitious and controversial claims over Himalayan territory in recent decades, including ownership of the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh

China has employed both persuasion and coercion to solve its territorial disputes with Bhutan. Some of these “rewards” include recognising Bhutan as a sovereign state, and offering it grants and new trade routes.1 It has so far largely failed, however, to convince Bhutan to come to its fold; China is therefore employing more coercive strategies to achieve its objectives with Bhutan.

Historic Silk Road trade
Trans-Himalayan trade between western and south-western China (including Yunnan, Sichuan and Xinjiang) and South Asia has played a pivotal role in much of the economic and cultural development of both regions, yet this trade required complex networks covering vast distances, often situated over difficult to navigate terrain, especially without local knowledge of the land.

From the Tang dynasy (618-907 CE) onwards, the Ancient Tea Horse Routes (sometimes called the Southwest Silk Road) were an important network of caravan paths carrying trade through the mountains of Sichuan, Yunnan and Tibet in Southwest China. On reaching Tibet, most of these routes converged at the market town of Lhasa, and from here would connect with trans-Himalayan routes (sometimes known as "Salt routes" travelling to South Asia via Bhutan, Sikkim or Nepal.    Whilst tea and salt were important commodities, in reality many diverse goods and commodities were sold, and supply and demand varied over time.

For centuries, Bhutan had an extensive network of caravan traders regularly carrying out trade from Lhasa to the north, and Bengal to the south. Whilst Bhutan was an importer of Chinese goods for domestic use (an account of a foreign traveller in 1626 noted that Bhutan was "well provided with Chinese merchandise such as silk, gold and porcelain") and Bhutan would export surpluses of Bhutanese origin, the value of such trade was dwarfed by the trade and transit of Chinese and Tibetan goods from Lhasa, for sale in Bengal (notably in Rangpur and Cooch Behar) and vice versa. In the mid-18th century, Bhutan recorded annual trade valued at Rs 150,000 with Tibet and China and Rs 200,000 with Bengal.

In Lhasa, the major domestic Tibetan products bought by Bhutanese traders for re-export included gold, raw wool, woollen products, rock salt and musk. For Bhutanese import and re-export to Bengal, gold and musk were the most valuable due to scarcity, but the trade of high volumes of rock salt was also lucrative as, along with musk, Bengal did not have alternate source for these commodities. The trade in Chinese goods, for re-export to Bengal, included tea, silk, brocade, carpets, porcelain, chinese wax, lac/shellac, and silver. At the same time Bhutanese traders would produce bought in Bengal, for the Tibetan and Chinese market, including imported English broadcloth and other products imported from England; indigo, tobacco, coral, pearls, leather, sandal-wood, betel-nut, spices, camphor and sugar.

Current trade and investment
After the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1959-1960 and the closure of Bhutan's borders with China, bilateral trade between the who ceased to exist. Ever since the border closure, India has accounted for the vast majority of imports and exports to and from Bhutan, and with the Bhutan-China border closed, all imports and exports travelling by land must pass through India. The sheer size differential between the market size of India and Bhutan and logistics of trading via India mean most of Bhutan's import and export needs are satisfied through direct trade with India. This trading relationship is further supported via free trade agreements between Bhutan and India reinforced by Bhutan's ngultrum currency being pegged to Indian rupee. In contrast, the ongoing boundary disputes and the lack of official diplomatic relations extend to a lack of any bilateral or regional trade agreements between Bhutan and China. Bhutanese-China trade was almost non-existent until about 2020 but has grown strongly in the past few years, albeit from a very low base, meaning the value of trade remains small.

According to OEC data as of 2022, China is the Bhutan's second largest import partner, importing approximately $165M worth of goods (in US dollars), with 'computers' comprising the majority (or $138M) of imports. This figure is dwarfed by imports from India, with a total value of just over $1bn. Also in 2022, Bhutan exported $2.62M of goods to China, of which, almost 99% consisted of ferroalloys. Also as of 2022, China is Bhutan's 6th largest export partner, again dwarfed in comparison to trade with Bhutan's largest export partner, with $343M of exports. Government of Bhutan data, for 2023, reported China as being the second largest trade partner overall, with a 5% share of total trade, in contrast with India with a 79% share in total trade. Top exports to China comprised of ferro-silico-manganese, whilst imports consisted of Automatic data processing units, smartphones, and coke or semi-coke.

In terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), in 2023, 65% of Bhutan's inward FDI originated from within Asia with 57% of this investment coming from India, 13% from Singapore and 10% from Thailand. China was not listed as a major source of FDI.

Travel and tourism
Pre-COVID, Bhutan received 6,878 visitors from China in 2018, with China being the 4th largest source of foreign visitors to Bhutan. In 2019, this increased to 7,564 visitors from China. Bhutan reportedly received a boost in tourism after the country was thrust into the limelight after Hong Kong actress Carina Lau married Tony Leung Chiu-wai in the country in 2008. Internationally, there are few countries with direct flights to and from Bhutan, and as of April 2024, none to or from China.

In December 2023, Bhutan received its first award in China for travel and hospitality when it won the ‘Outstanding Destination Excellence Award’ at the 18th National Geographic Traveler China Golden Awards Ceremony.

There are no official border crossings in operation between Bhutan and China (Tibetan Autonomous Region). All transportation by land is via India.

Bhutanese visitors to China require a entry visa for travel. Bhutanese visitors to Hong Kong may enter and stay for 14 days without a visa. There is no Chinese embassy in Bhutan. Consular matters, including issuance of visas is handled via the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, India.

Mutual involvement in economic engagements
Bhutan is engaged with relatively few international, regional or bilateral investment, trade or development agreements or organizations. Those that it is a part of are generally limited to those involving India and South Asia, but not China.

In terms of trade, Bhutan is a member of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC). Bhutan and China are both members of the pan-Asian Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), where both Bhutan and China are members and the Asian Development Bank.

Bhutan has had various but continuous free trade agreements with India in place since 1972.

China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WHO) on 11 December 2001. Bhutan first applied to join the WTO in 1999 and as an applicant, was quickly granted observer status Beyond that, ascension proceedings at the WTO have been much delayed and periodically put on pause, largely stemming from concerns and considerations of the Bhutanese government itself. The Bhutanese government approved ascension to the WTO in April 2023, at least partly hastened by the country's upcoming graduation from the UN-defined 'least developed country (LDC) category. Under WTO rules and processes, ascent of a country with LDC status comes with some leniency in certain requirements, more relaxed timeframes for compliance, and additional support; so, whilst the loss of LDC status, as happened in December 2023, was a reflection of Bhutan's success and development progress, it also meant much further delay in WTO ascension (that is, ascent after the loss of LDC status) would make the journey through to full WTO member status even harder.

It is hoped that the combination of resolving boundary issues with China, and establishing formal relations with the country, and finally acceding to the WTO may help Bhutan diversify its trade partners and avoid overdependence on India, thus giving Thimphu more leverage in negotiations.

China (PRC) has bilateral investment agreements with over 100 countries and economies and is a member of 18 free trade agreements (FTAs), with another 3 FTAs an early phase of development. with its trade and investment partners and is negotiating or implementing an additional eight FTAs. In addition, in November 2020, China and 14 other countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. China announced the ratification of the agreement in early 2021.

China has invited Bhutan to join it's Belt and Road Initiative. At present, Bhutan is neither a member nor an observer of the Belt and Road Initiative with both India and Bhutan being the only non-members in the region. Bhutan has not attended previous Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) meetings, with the most recent (3rd meeting) held in Beijing in April 2023.

Recent Economic Developments