User:NScheinerman/Epistemic Democracy

Definition and Etymology
A democratic society “may be said to be ‘epistemic’ to the degree to which it employs collective wisdom to make good policy.” "Epistemic" refers to the branch of epistemology, the theory of knowledge or what it means to know something. Democracy refers to rule by the people, usually through fair and competitive elections. An epistemic democracy is one that produces truth in the sense of accurately reflected values of the people and/or scientifically integral policies.

Origins
Epistemic democracy has its roots on the concept of collective wisdom, which is born out of Ancient Athens. Aristotle argued that the wisdom of the multitude was an essential ingredient for democracy. In Politics, Aristotle writes "the many, who are not as individuals excellent men, nevertheless can, when they have come together, be better than the few best people, not individually but collectively, just as feasts to which many contribute are better than feasts provided at one person's expense." Jeremy Waldron has provided a modern day understanding of this as the "doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude." The diversity of lived experiences was seen to be essential for proper law making and governing.

Overview
Despite its many attractions, democracy has a number of criticisms. The classical concerns relate to the problem of disproportionate representation, such as tyranny of the majority, the suppression of minority rights, and the problem of factions. Other critics present consequentialist arguments: what if the outcome of a democratic procedure is not ultimately good for society? In a system that is self-governed, what if the ignorance and evilness of the masses results in the voluntary election of corrupted leaders who choose immoral policies based on incorrect scientific evidence? The field of epistemic democracy is born out of these concerns, and offers a positive vision for the ability of the people to know their preferences, values, and the facts that will lead them toward realizing their vision of a truly good society. There are two dimensions to epistemic democracy: the people (a) are aware of the outcomes of their actions and (b) have the capacity and knowledge to attain those outcomes. Josh Cohen is accredited to coining the term “epistemic democracy” to refer to the “the importance to the populist of ensuring that the basic institutions that provide the framework for political deliberation are such that outcomes tend to advance the common good.” His three main elements of an epistemic interpretation of voting are: This populist account of epistemic processes and outcomes maintains that majorities and institutional arrangements do in fact provide sound evidence of the general will. Further, this also lends “legitimacy to the outcomes. The populist does not simply want procedures that in fact produce outcomes that are more likely to be correct than alternative procedures-that is, procedures that are in fact reliable apart from their legitimacy effects. It should also be manifest that they have the property of producing good outcomes. That is, the populist wants procedures that are reliable, and that citizens have reason to expect to be reliable as well.”
 * 1) an independent standard of correct decisions (the general or popular will that is an account of the common good)
 * 2) a cognitive account f voting (voting expresses a belief about what the correct outcome is rather than just personal preference)
 * 3) an account of decision making as an adjustment of beliefs should evidence that requires adjustment arise

Diversity
Elizabeth Anderson endorses the “John Dewey experimentalist account of democracy,” arguing that “interaction of voting with discussion” and “periodic elections and protests” are key to preventing those deemed “uneducated” or inferior from being excluded from the decision-making process. She worries about special interest groups dominating the “knowledge market” and argues that some combination of “votes and talk rather than prices are the appropriate form of information to which states should be responsive.” The strength of Dewey’s model lies in that “democratic decision-making [is] the joint exercise of practical intelligence by citizens at large, in interaction with their representatives and other state officials. It is cooperative social experimentation.” This best reflects the powers of “diversity, discussion, and dynamism.” Society as a diverse collection of individuals can only best arrive at a decision when all those of different walks of life and who have experienced different problems and policies of public interest can situate their knowledge towards solving the complex problems of modern democracies. Anderson, as well as Ian Shapiro, hold great skepticism towards the idea of consensus offering proof of knowledge. What is at stake is the loss of a challenging disagreement that, when done correctly, can only perfect the account being given.

Michael Feurstein poses more skepticism than Anderson about the ability of the people to determine epistemic outcomes for society, relying instead more on aristocratic guidance. He endorses a system of what he calls “democratic epistemology” wherein the “social character of political knowledge” is integral. The “social-epistemic perspective” reveals that democracy is the best way to produce well-informed policy. He posits that the knowledge of politics is distinct from individualist knowledge. Political knowledge is more complex, requiring knowledge of the effects of social organization as well as individual experiences in isolation. He argues thus that “a social-epistemic perspective allows us to see that the type and degree of epistemic competence required of any individual, with respect to some body of knowledge is distributed across the community of inquirers in which the individual is embedded as well as where within that distribution the individual fails.” For example, “a community of mediocre scientists, well distributed throughout the natural sciences, is likely to be more epistemically successful than one full of brilliant scientists who are all doing physics.”

Independent Standard v. Proceduralism
A procedural epistemic democrat holds that a system of democracy is epistemically valid because it adheres to an epistemic procedure. An anti-proceduralist system is considered epistemically integral because it attains an outcome that can be checked via an independent standard.

Christian List and Robert Goodin, for example, maintain that “for epistemic democrats, the aim of democracy is to ‘track the truth.’” For them, democracy is more desirable than alternative forms of decision-making because, and insofar as, it does that. One democratic decision rule is more desirable than another according to that same standard.” In contrast, “procedural democrats” hold that the “aim of democracy is to embody certain procedural virtues…. Democracy is not about tracking any ‘independent truth of the matter’; instead, the goodness or rightness of an outcome is wholly constituted by the fact of its having emerged in some procedurally correct manner” such as through voting or deliberation. Fabienne Peter, for example, offers a conception of epistemic proceduralism that does not depend on a procedure-independent standard for a good outcome. Instead, a decision is legitimate “if it is the outcome of a process that satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness.”

In contrast, David Estlund argues that we do not even need a strong justification of “epistemic proceduralism.” Rather, all that is needed is to show why it is better than the alternatives. Estlund argues that pure epistocracies are problematic because there is most likely a “biasing features of the educated group… which do more harm than education does good.” In the US this can be seen in the income and racial inequality that leads to imperfect meritocratic systems that produces those with greater money with the highest education. Estlund uses the case of jury systems to show that original authority can be drawn from an epistemic proceduralist account grounded in normative consent. For him, democracy has no normative authority unless it has a minimal epistemic threshold, which he sets at “better than random” (as in majority rule, better than just 51% of the vote). Cohen and Estlund’s accounts hold that the common will and values can be knowable in society through democracy.

Empirical Evidence
Helene Landemore examines this concept more rigorously by offering an account of “democratic reason” wherein the “phenomenon of collective intelligence” is key to good decision making. Public reason offers cognitive diversity, or “the variety of mental tools that human beings used to solve problems or make predictions in the world.” Using social science evidence, she argues that majority rule and deliberation are complementary procedures and that representative government can accommodate these goals. She combines the epistemic and procedural perspectives of facts and values as well, claiming that democracies are the best of the alternative systems to producing good outcomes, again compared with an independent standard that focuses on the idea of collective intelligence. The cultivation of a diverse array of different viewpoints, experiences, and expressions is essential for her epistemic argument for democracy. Landemore’s text contains more empirical evidence for the phenomenon of collective intelligence, which then necessitates deliberation to include as many groups as possible. As a result, there is less of a role of the “expert” because this is epistemically and empirically shown to not be able to represent or express the full array of knowledge present in society. At the end of deliberation, when consensus and decision by interpretation fail to occur, voting is used.

Technocracy
Epistemic Democracy is perhaps best contrasted with a that of technocracy, or epistocracy, rule by experts. The idea is that experts know better than the people who to sculpt social policy and thus society should e ruled by experts. However, there has been much push back, such as by Jim Scott regarding the corrupting nature of merritocratic systems, as well as their anti-democratic features, that make technocracies problematic.

Deliberative Democracy
Many of the ideas of epistemic democracy relate to the role of deliberation, and how deliberation can enhance the aggregation of collection of the communal wisdom.

Majority Rule and Voting
Epistemic democracies are almost always advanced as relying on mechanisms such as majority rule and voting in order to arrive at a conclusion of wisdom aggregation.

Epistemic democracy has its roots on the concept of collective wisdom, which is born out of Ancient Athens. Aristotle argued that the wisdom of the multitude was an essential ingredient for democracy. In Politics, Aristotle writes "the many, who are not as individuals excellent men, nevertheless can, when they have come together, be better than the few best people, not individually but collectively, just as feasts to which many contribute are better than feasts provided at one person's expense." Jeremy Waldron has provided a modern day understanding of this as the "doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude." The diversity of lived experiences was seen to be essential for proper law making and governing. Today, the concept of an "epistemic democracy" is one that has the capacity to reflect truth in society through the aggregation of knowledge and contribution of popular opinions.

Definition and Etymology
A democratic society “may be said to be ‘epistemic’ to the degree to which it employs collective wisdom to make good policy.” "Epistemic" refers to the branch of epistemology, the theory of knowledge or what it means to know something. Democracy refers to rule by the people, usually through fair and competitive elections. An epistemic democracy is said to be one that "tracks the truth" in the sense of accurately reflected values of the people and/or scientifically integral policies.

Overview
Josh Cohen is accredited to coining the term “epistemic democracy” to refer to the “the importance to the populist of ensuring that the basic institutions that provide the framework for political deliberation are such that outcomes tend to advance the common good.” His three main elements of an epistemic interpretation of voting are: This populist account of epistemic processes and outcomes maintains that majorities and institutional arrangements do in fact provide sound evidence of the general will. Further, this also lends “legitimacy to the outcomes. The populist does not simply want procedures that in fact produce outcomes that are more likely to be correct than alternative procedures-that is, procedures that are in fact reliable apart from their legitimacy effects. It should also be manifest that they have the property of producing good outcomes. That is, the populist wants procedures that are reliable, and that citizens have reason to expect to be reliable as well.”
 * 1) an independent standard of correct decisions (the general or popular will that is an account of the common good)
 * 2) a cognitive account f voting (voting expresses a belief about what the correct outcome is rather than just personal preference)
 * 3) an account of decision making as an adjustment of beliefs should evidence that requires adjustment arise

Helene Landemore examines this concept more rigorously by offering an account of “democratic reason” wherein the “phenomenon of collective intelligence” is key to good decision making. Public reason offers cognitive diversity, or “the variety of mental tools that human beings used to solve problems or make predictions in the world.” Using social science evidence, she argues that majority rule and deliberation are complementary procedures and that representative government can accommodate these goals. She combines the epistemic and procedural perspectives of facts and values as well, claiming that democracies are the best of the alternative systems to producing good outcomes, again compared with an independent standard that focuses on the idea of collective intelligence. The cultivation of a diverse array of different viewpoints, experiences, and expressions is essential for her epistemic argument for democracy. Landemore’s text contains more empirical evidence for the phenomenon of collective intelligence, which then necessitates deliberation to include as many groups as possible. As a result, there is less of a role of the “expert” because this is epistemically and empirically shown to not be able to represent or express the full array of knowledge present in society. At the end of deliberation, when consensus and decision by interpretation fail to occur, voting is used.

Diversity
Elizabeth Anderson endorses the “John Dewey experimentalist account of democracy,” arguing that “interaction of voting with discussion” and “periodic elections and protests” are key to preventing those deemed “uneducated” or inferior from being excluded from the decision-making process. She worries about special interest groups dominating the “knowledge market” and argues that some combination of “votes and talk rather than prices are the appropriate form of information to which states should be responsive.” The strength of Dewey’s model lies in that “democratic decision-making [is] the joint exercise of practical intelligence by citizens at large, in interaction with their representatives and other state officials. It is cooperative social experimentation.” This best reflects the powers of “diversity, discussion, and dynamism.” Society as a diverse collection of individuals can only best arrive at a decision when all those of different walks of life and who have experienced different problems and policies of public interest can situate their knowledge towards solving the complex problems of modern democracies. Anderson, as well as Ian Shapiro, hold great skepticism towards the idea of consensus offering proof of knowledge. What is at stake is the loss of a challenging disagreement that, when done correctly, can only perfect the account being given.

Michael Feurstein poses more skepticism than Anderson about the ability of the people to determine epistemic outcomes for society, relying instead more on aristocratic guidance. He endorses a system of what he calls “democratic epistemology” wherein the “social character of political knowledge” is integral. The “social-epistemic perspective” reveals that democracy is the best way to produce well-informed policy. He posits that the knowledge of politics is distinct from individualist knowledge. Political knowledge is more complex, requiring knowledge of the effects of social organization as well as individual experiences in isolation. He argues thus that “a social-epistemic perspective allows us to see that the type and degree of epistemic competence required of any individual, with respect to some body of knowledge is distributed across the community of inquirers in which the individual is embedded as well as where within that distribution the individual fails.” For example, “a community of mediocre scientists, well distributed throughout the natural sciences, is likely to be more epistemically successful than one full of brilliant scientists who are all doing physics.”

Independent standard v. proceduralism
A procedural epistemic democrat holds that a system of democracy is epistemically valid because it adheres to an epistemic procedure. An anti-proceduralist system is considered epistemically integral because it attains an outcome that can be checked via an independent standard.

Christian List and Robert Goodin, for example, maintain that “for epistemic democrats, the aim of democracy is to ‘track the truth.’” For them, democracy is more desirable than alternative forms of decision-making because, and insofar as, it does that. One democratic decision rule is more desirable than another according to that same standard.” In contrast, “procedural democrats” hold that the “aim of democracy is to embody certain procedural virtues…. Democracy is not about tracking any ‘independent truth of the matter’; instead, the goodness or rightness of an outcome is wholly constituted by the fact of its having emerged in some procedurally correct manner” such as through voting or deliberation. Fabienne Peter, for example, offers a conception of epistemic proceduralism that does not depend on a procedure-independent standard for a good outcome. Instead, a decision is legitimate “if it is the outcome of a process that satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness.”

In contrast, David Estlund argues that we do not even need a strong justification of “epistemic proceduralism.” Rather, all that is needed is to show why it is better than the alternatives. Estlund argues that pure epistocracies are problematic because there is most likely a “biasing features of the educated group… which do more harm than education does good.” In the US this can be seen in the income and racial inequality that leads to imperfect meritocratic systems that produces those with greater money with the highest education. Estlund uses the case of jury systems to show that original authority can be drawn from an epistemic proceduralist account grounded in normative consent. For him, democracy has no normative authority unless it has a minimal epistemic threshold, which he sets at “better than random” (as in majority rule, better than just 51% of the vote). Cohen and Estlund’s accounts hold that the common will and values can be knowable in society through democracy.

Rule by the People v. Experts
Epistemic Democracy is perhaps best contrasted with a that of technocracy, or epistocracy, rule by experts. The idea is that experts know better than the people who to sculpt social policy and thus society should e ruled by experts. However, there has been much push back, such as by Jim Scott regarding the corrupting nature of merritocratic systems, as well as their anti-democratic features, that make technocracies problematic.