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Dual process theory is an influential theory of human moral judgment that alleges that human beings possess emotion-based and rationally-based cognitive subsystems that compete in moral reasoning processes. Initially proposed by Joshua Greene along with Brian Sommerville, Leigh Nystrom, John Darley, Jonathan Cohen and others, the theory can be seen as a domain specific example of more general dual process accounts in psychology.

Assertions and Influence
The dual process account asserts that human beings have two separate methods for moral reasoning. The first refers to intuitive or instinctual responses to moral violations. These responses are implicit and the factors affecting them may be consciously inaccessible. Greene asserts that these responses are supported by emotional activation. The second method refers to conscious, controlled reasoning processes. These processes ignore the emotional aspects of decision making, instead focusing on maximizing gain or obtaining the most desirable overall outcome. In everyday decision making, most decisions use one or other system, but in moral dilemmas in which an individual must compromise between violating moral rules and maximizing overall good, the systems come into conflict.

Greene ties the two processes to theories of ethics existing in moral philosophy, specifically consequentalism and deontological ethics. He argues that the existing tension between systems of ethics that focus on "right action" and those that focus on "best results" can be explained by the existence of the proposed dueling systems in individual human minds.

This theory of moral judgment has had influence on research in moral psychology. The original fMRI investigation proposing the dual process account has been cited in excess of 2000 scholarly articles, generating extensive use of similar methodology as well as criticism.

Evidence
The dual process account first grew out of fMRI experiments showing that moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem engaged areas of the brain corresponding to emotional processing when the context involved "personal" moral violations (such as direct bodily force). When the context of the dilemma was more "impersonal" (the decision maker pulls a switch rather than use bodily force) areas corresponding to working memory and controlled reasoning were engaged instead. Neuropsychological evidence from lesion studies focusing on patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex also points to a possible dissociation between emotional and rational decision processes. Damage to this area is typically associated with antisocial personality traits and impairments of moral decision making. Patients with these lesions tend to show more frequent endorsement of the "utilitarian" path in trolley problem dilemmas. Greene et al. claim that this shows that when emotional information is removed through context or damage to brain regions necessary to render such information, the process associated with rational, controlled reasoning dominates decision making.

Another critical piece of evidence supporting the dual process account comes from reaction time data associated with moral dilemma experiments. Subjects who choose the "utilitarian" path in moral dilemmas showed increased reaction times under high cognitive load in "personal" dilemmas, while those choosing the "deontological" path remained unaffected. Cognitive load in general is also found to increase the likelihood "deontological" judgment.

Criticisms
Several criticisms have been leveled against the dual process account. The most common criticism asserts that the dual emotional/rational model ignores the motivational aspect of decision making in human social contexts A more specific example of this criticism focuses on the ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesion data. Although patients with this damage display characteristically "cold-blooded" behavior in the trolley problem, they show more likelihood of endorsement of emotionally laden choices in the Ultimatum Game. It is argued that moral decisions are better understood as integrating emotional, rational, and motivational information, the last of which has been shown to involve areas of the brain in the limbic system and brain stem.

Other criticism focus on the methodology of using moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem. These criticisms note the lack of affective realism in contrived moral dilemmas and their tendency to use the actions of strangers to offer a view of human moral sentiments. Paul Bloom in particular, argues that a multitude of attitudes towards the agents involved are important in evaluating an individuals moral stance, as well as evaluating the motivations that may inform those decisions.