User:Naw03d/the self

Definition and Beginnings
In sociology, the self refers to an individual person from the perspective of that person (“Self (sociology)”, 2006). It is the individual's conception of himself or herself, and the underlying capacity of the person's mind or intellect which formed that conception (one's "true self") (“Self (sociology)”, 2006). What an individual thinks of him or herself is at least temporarily directly influenced by interactions with others: the instruction and example behaviors they provide, and the way they treat him or her (“Self (sociology)”, 2006). Essentially described by George Herbert Mead as the ability to take oneself as an object (Ritzer, 2003)

In Mind, Self and Society, Mead (1947), describes how the individual mind and self arises out of the social process. Instead of approaching human experience in terms of individual psychology, Mead (1947) analyzes experience from the "standpoint of communication as essential to the social order." Individual psychology, for Mead (1947) is intelligible only in terms of social processes. The "development of the individual's self, and of his self- consciousness within the field of his experience" is preeminently social (Mead, 1947). For Mead (1947), the social process is prior to the structures and processes of individual experience.

Theoretical Origins and Application
The self is not so much a substance as a process in which the conversation of gestures has been internalized within an organic form (Burke and Stets, 2005). This process does not exist for itself, but is simply a phase of the whole social organization of which the individual is a part (Burke and Stets, 2005). The organization of the social act has been imported into the organism and becomes then the mind of the individual (Burke and Stets, 2005). It still includes the attitudes of others, but now highly organized, so that they become what we call social attitudes rather than roles of separate individuals (Burke and Stets, 2005). This process of relating one's own organism to the others in the interactions that are going on, resulting in its importation to the conduct of the individual with the conversation of the "I" and the "me," constitutes the self (Burke and Stets, 2005). The value of this importation of the conversation of gestures into the conduct of the individual lies in the superior co-ordination gained for society as a whole, and in the increased efficiency of the individual as a member of the group (Burke and Stets, 2005). It is the difference between the process which can take place in a group of rats or ants or bees, and that which can take place in a human community (Burke and Stets, 2005). The social process with its various implications is actually taken up into the experience of the individual so that that which is going on takes place more effectively, because in a certain sense it has been rehearsed in the individual (Burke and Stets, 2005). He not only plays his part better under those conditions but he also reacts back on the organization of which he is a part (Burke and Stets, 2005).

The very nature of this conversation of gestures requires that the attitude of the other is changed through the attitude of the individual to the other's stimulus (Burke and Stets, 2005). In the conversation of gestures of the lower forms the play back and forth is noticeable, since the individual not only adjusts himself to the attitude of others, but also changes the attitudes of the others (Burke and Stets, 2005). The reaction of the individual in this conversation of gestures is one that in some degree is continually modifying the social process itself (Burke and Stets, 2005). It is this modification of the process which is of greatest interest in the experience of the individual (Burke and Stets, 2005). He takes the attitude of the other toward his own stimulus, and in taking that he finds it modified in that his response becomes a different one, and leads in turn to further changes (Burke and Stets, 2005).

Our view of self and society is rooted in the structural approach to the symbolic interactionist perspective (Stryker, 1980). Within this perspective, we do not see society as tentatively shaped. Instead, we assume that society is stable and durable as reflected in the “patterned regularities that characterize most human action” (Stryker, 1980). Patterns of behavior within and between individuals have different levels of analysis, and this is key to understanding the link between self and society (Burke and Stets, 2005). At one level, we can look at the patterns of behavior of one individual over time and come to know that individual (Burke and Stets, 2005). By pooling several such patterns across similar individuals, we can come to know individuals of a certain type (Burke and Stets, 2005). At still another level, we can look at the patterns of behavior across individuals to see how these patterns fit with the patterns of others to create larger patterns of behavior (Burke and Stets, 2005). It is these larger, inter-individual patterns that constitute social structure (Burke and Stets, 2005).

The symbolic interactionist perspective in sociological social psychology sees the self as emerging out of the mind, the mind as arising and developing out of social interaction, and patterned social interaction as forming the basis of social structure (Mead, 1947). The mind is the thinking part of the self (Burke and Stets, 2005). It is covert action in which the organism points out meanings to itself and to others. The ability to point out meanings and to indicate them to others and to itself is made possible by language, which encapsulates meanings in the form of symbols (Burke and Stets, 2005). When one’s self is encapsulated as a set of symbols to which one may respond to itself as an object, as it responds to any other symbol, the self has emerged(Burke and Stets, 2005). One would say the trademark of this process – of selfhood – is reflexivity. Humans have the ability to reflect back upon themselves, taking themselves as objects(Burke and Stets, 2005). They are able to regard and evaluate themselves, to take account of themselves and plan accordingly to bring about future states, to be self-aware or achieve consciousness with respect to their own existence (Burke and Stets, 2005). In this way, one can assume that humans are a processual entity. They formulate and reflect, and this is ongoing (Burke and Stets, 2005). To be clear, the responses of the self as an object to itself come from the point of view of others to whom one interacts (Burke and Stets, 2005). By taking the role of the other and seeing ourselves for others’ perspectives, our responses come to be like others’ responses, and the meaning of the self becomes a shared meaning (Burke and Stets, 2005). Thus, paradoxically, as the self emerges as a distinct object, there is at the same time a merger of perspectives of the self and others, and a becoming as one with the others with whom one interacts (Burke and Stets, 2005). This becoming as one is possible through the shared meanings of the objects and symbols to which individuals respond in interaction (Burke and Stets, 2005). In using language, individuals communicate the same meanings to themselves as to others (Burke and Stets, 2005). The self is, thus, both individual and social in character (Burke and Stets, 2005). It works to control meanings to sustain itself, but many of those meanings, including the meanings of the self, are shared and form the basis of interaction with others and ultimately social structure (Burke and Stets, 2005). Because the self emerges in social interaction within the context of a complex, organized, differentiated society, it has been argued that the self must be complex, organized and differentiated as well, reflecting the dictum that the “self reflects society” (Stryker, 2003).

This idea is rooted in James’ (1950) notion that there are as many different selves as there are different positions that one holds in society and thus different groups who respond to the self. This is where identity enters into the overall self. The overall self is organized into multiple parts (identities), each of which is tied to aspects of the social structure. One has an identity, an “internalized positional designation” (Stryker, 2003), for each of the different positions or role relationships the person holds in society. Therefore we can assume, self as daughter is an identity, as is self as co worker, self as mate, and self as any of the other innumerable of possibilities corresponding to the various roles one may play.

Modern Implications
Most interaction is between persons who occupy positions (statuses) in groups or organizations in society (Burke and Stets, 2005). Interaction is thus not between whole persons, but between aspects of persons having to do with their roles and memberships in particular groups or organizations: their identities (Burke and Stets, 2005). An assumption and implication of the above is that any identity is always related to a corresponding counter-identity (Burke, 1980). When one claims an identity in an interaction with others, there is an alternative identity claimed by another to which it is related (Burke and Stets, 2005). In each of these cases, there are things that are not talked about because they are not relevant to that identity, and there are things that are more likely to be talked about given the identity that is currently being claimed (Burke and Stets, 2005). There are various styles of interaction that are appropriate in each situation for each identity (Burke and Stets, 2005). We move into and out of these modalities very easily, and generally with very little thought (Burke and Stets, 2005). Often we operate in two or more identities at a time as in being both a friend and colleague (Burke and Stets, 2005). Fundamental attitudes are presumably those that are only changed gradually, and no one individual can reorganize the whole society; but one is continually affecting society by his own attitude because he does bring up the attitude of the group toward himself, responds to it, and through that response changes the attitude of the group (Burke and Stets, 2005). This is, of course, what we are constantly doing in our imagination, in our thought; we are utilizing our own attitude to bring about a different situation in the community of which we are a part; we are exerting ourselves, bringing forward our own opinion, criticizing the attitudes of others, and approving or disapproving (Burke and Stets, 2005). But we can do that only in so far as we can call out in ourselves the response of the community; we only have ideas in so far as we are able to take the attitude of the community and then respond to it (Burke and Stets, 2005).