User:Nkanfer/G. E. Moore

Principia Ethica is a 1903 book by the British philosopher G. E. Moore, in which the author insists on the indefinability of "good" and provides an exposition of the naturalistic fallacy. G.E. Moore was a highly influential English philosopher whose work was dedicated to scrutinizing the meanings of key and crucial terms involved in philosophical and ethical debate. A multitude of philosophers have provided their own concepts of the term, but Moore believes their arguments are fallacious because they are based upon false pretenses and a misunderstanding of philosophical principles. According to G. E. Moore, there is no definition or answer to the question, “what is good?”. By taking the argument step by step, Moore looks to provide evidence to convince the philosophical community that simple properties are indefinable, and therefore cannot hold a definition. Through the Principia Ethica, Moore shares his opinion that good is indefinable and simple through discussion surrounding simple and complex properties, the ‘open question argument’, and ethical non-naturalism. Principia Ethica was influential, and Moore's arguments were long regarded as path-breaking advances in moral philosophy, though they have been seen as less impressive and durable than his contributions in other fields.

Ethics[edit]
The title page of Principia Ethica His influential work Principia Ethica is one of the main inspirations of the movement against ethical naturalism (see ethical non-naturalism) and is partly responsible for the twentieth-century concern with meta-ethics.

The naturalistic fallacy[edit]
Main article: Naturalistic fallacy

Moore asserted that philosophical arguments can suffer from a confusion between the use of a term in a particular argument and the definition of that term (in all arguments). He named this confusion the naturalistic fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy is a mistake of identifying a natural property or characteristic with a moral property or characteristic. In other words, Moore argued that it is wrong to define good or right in terms of what is natural or observable in the world, there must be empirical evidence to prove something is good or right. For example, an ethical argument may claim that if a thing has certain properties, then that thing is 'good.' A hedonist may argue that 'pleasant' things are 'good' things. Other theorists may argue that 'complex' things are 'good' things. Moore argues that even if such arguments are correct, they do not provide definitions for the term 'good'. The property of 'goodness' is undefinable. It can only be shown and grasped. Any attempt to define it (X is good if it has property Y) will simply shift the problem (Why is Y-ness good in the first place?).

Open-question argument[edit]
Main article: Open-question argument

Moore's argument for the indefinability of 'good' (and thus for the fallaciousness in the "naturalistic fallacy") is often called the open-question argument; it is presented in §13 of Principia Ethica. The argument hinges on the nature of statements such as "Anything that is pleasant is also good" and the possibility of asking questions such as "Is it good that x is pleasant?". According to Moore, these questions are open and these statements are significant; and they will remain so no matter what is substituted for "pleasure". The open question argument is set up in a way that if you are to define "good" in any manner, along with trying to define properties for being "good", than the attempt to do so will just be invalidated. According to Moore, since moral concepts are considered to be "open" (in a sense that they cannot be reduced in any natural terms) then the attempt will fail. In other words, if value could be analyzed, then such questions and statements would be trivial and obvious. Since they are anything but trivial and obvious, value must be indefinable.

Critics of Moore's arguments sometimes claim that he is appealing to general puzzles concerning analysis (cf. the paradox of analysis), rather than revealing anything special about value. The argument clearly depends on the assumption that if 'good' were definable, it would be an analytic truth about 'good', an assumption that many contemporary moral realists like Richard Boyd and Peter Railton reject. Other responses appeal to the Fregean distinction between sense and reference, allowing that value concepts are special and sui generis, but insisting that value properties are nothing but natural properties (this strategy is similar to that taken by non-reductive materialists in philosophy of mind).

Good as indefinable[edit]
Moore contended that goodness cannot be analysed in terms of any other property. In Principia Ethica, he writes:


 * It may be true that all things which are good are also something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not "other," but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. (Principia, § 10 ¶ 3)

Therefore, we cannot define 'good' by explaining it in other words. We can only point to a thing or an action and say "That is good." Good is a simple and unanalyzable concept that we understand inherently, and that any attempt to do so would result in a failure. The argument is based on the ability to understand what good is and not having diverge into any deeper meaning surrounding that concept. For example, we cannot describe to a person born totally blind exactly what yellow is. We can only show a sighted person a piece of yellow paper or a yellow scrap of cloth and say "That is yellow." For Moore, having the concept "good" be indefinable allows people to use their inherent knowledge to find what is good and what is not. It really assists in deterring whether or not a sentence, paragraph or conversation has valid claims or statements.

Moral knowledge[edit]
Moore argued that, once arguments based on the naturalistic fallacy had been discarded, questions of intrinsic goodness could be settled only by appeal to what he (following Sidgwick) called "moral intuitions": Self-evident propositions which recommend themselves to moral reflection, but which are not susceptible to either direct proof or disproof (Principia, § 45). Moore thought that moral knowledge could be understood as knowledge that cannot be refuted, meaning we know that information is true without having to rely on any other premises or evidence. By having this inherent knowledge, Moore thinks we have the ability to generate the moral truths and moral knowledge for ourselves, without any of it being questioned by empirical evidence. As a result of his view, he has often been described by later writers as an advocate of ethical intuitionism. Moore, however, wished to distinguish his view from the views usually described as "Intuitionist" when Principia Ethica was written: In order to express the fact that ethical propositions of my first class [propositions about what is good as an end in itself] are incapable of proof or disproof, I have sometimes followed Sidgwick's usage in calling them 'Intuitions.' But I beg that it may be noticed that I am not an 'Intuitionist,' in the ordinary sense of the term. Sidgwick himself seems never to have been clearly aware of the immense importance of the difference which distinguishes his Intuitionism from the common doctrine, which has generally been called by that name. The Intuitionist proper is distinguished by maintaining that propositions of my second class—propositions which assert that a certain action is right or a duty—are incapable of proof or disproof by any enquiry into the results of such actions. I, on the contrary, am no less anxious to maintain that propositions of this kind are not 'Intuitions,' than to maintain that propositions of my first class are Intuitions.

—  Moore distinguished his view from the view of deontological intuitionists, who held that "intuitions" could determine questions about what actions are right or required by duty. Moore, as a consequentialist, argued that "duties" and moral rules could be determined by investigating the effects of particular actions or kinds of actions (Principia, § 89), and so were matters for empirical investigation rather than direct objects of intuition (Principia, § 90). On Moore's view, "intuitions" revealed not the rightness or wrongness of specific actions, but only what things were good in themselves, as ends to be pursued.

Publication history
Principia Ethica was first published in October 1903 by Cambridge University Press. It was reprinted in 1922 and 1929. An Italian translation by Gianni Vattimo, with a preface by Nicola Abbagnano, was published by Bompiani in 1964.

Summary
Moore suggests that ethics is about three basic questions: (1) "what is good?" (which is noted as the most important of the three), (2) "what things are good or bad in themselves?", and (3) "what is good as a means?". Put simply, Moore believes that simple properties can hold a multitude of definitions and opinions, which can be debated for eternity. Moore describes this eloquently by stating, “Moreover, apart from the fact that, when we think we have a definition, we cannot logically defend our ethical principles in any way whatever, we shall also be much less apt to defend them well, even if illogically. For we shall with the conviction that good must mean so and so, and shall therefore be inclined either to misunderstand our opponent’s arguments or to cut them short with the reply, ‘This is not an open question: the very meaning of the word decided it; no one can think otherwise except through confusion” (Moore, 12).

Simple and Complex Properties
In the preface to Principia Ethica, Moore distinguishes between two different kinds of ethical claims: claims about what things are good, and claims about what actions we ought to perform. He endorses a particular view about the relationship between these two kinds of claims, which is sometimes called ‘consequentialism’: An act is right if and only if it produces more good than any other available action. Moore’s view was that of these two kinds of ethical properties: the property of a state of affairs being good, and of an act being right – the former was the more fundamental. The distinction between things which are good ‘in themselves’ and things which are good as a means to some other good. Moore argues that there are three senses of the question ‘What is good?’

1. The sense relevant to casuistry: which actions are good ones?

2. A sense relevant to ethics, considered as a ‘more general’ form of casuistry: saying what properties invariably accompany goodness.

3. The definitional sense: what is the definition of good?

Three kinds of definitions: (i) arbitrary verbal definition; (ii) verbal definition proper; (iii) definitions of properties rather than words — real definition (§8).

When thinking of what is ‘good’, Moore believes it is crucial to differentiate between simple and complex properties. Moore alludes to the idea that some ‘properties’ are truly complexes of different, more simplified properties. This he labels as a complex property. Due to the lacking knowledge surrounding the differentiation between the two forms of properties, Moore believes that defining ‘good’ is describing what properties invariably accompany it, rather than its true complex nature. Simple properties cannot be analyzed or broken down into simple components. These include attributes such as colors, tastes, and sounds. Moore believes that simple properties are immediately known through our senses and cannot be reduced to anything else. "When describing this fallacy, Moore provides the example of defining a horse. He affirms, “. . . when we define a horse . . . we may mean something much more important. We may mean that a certain object, which we all of us know, is composed in a certain manner: that it has four legs, a head, a heart, a liver, etc., etc. all of them arranged in definite relations to one another . . .We might think just as clearly and correctly about a horse if we thought of all its parts and their arrangement instead of thinking of the whole . . . ” (Moore, 6)."In other words, when many describe a horse, they tend to describe its components, rather than its wholeness. Moore narrates that the being of a horse is identical to a certain combination of more basic properties, such as what constitutes its ‘horseness’. "He provides another example, which constitutes how one describes the properties of color. Moore comments, “consider yellow, for example. We may try to define it, by describing its physical equivalent; we may state what kind of light vibrations must stimulate the normal eye so that we perceive it. But a moment’s reflection is sufficient to shew that those light vibrations are not themselves what we mean by yellow. They are not what we perceive. Indeed, we should never have been able to discover their existence, unless we had first been struck by the patent difference of quality between the different colors” (Moore, 6-7)."For this reason, Moore claims that we can say what properties configure yellowness, but we cannot truly vocalize what the nature of the property of being yellow is. This is because color is a simple property, which is not analyzable. These two definitions can provide the evidence necessary to explain that goodness is a simple and indefinable property, just like yellow. A simple property is indefinable since its complexity can be described in a multitude of diverse and contradicting ways. Moore ties the two together by stating, “good, then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, which we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition” (Moore, 6). Since we cannot state the true and simple property of ‘good’, we must realize that it is simple, broad, and undefinable.

What is good?
The first question is concerned with the nature and definition of the term "good". Moore insists that this term is simple and indefinable. But two forms of goodness have to be distinguished: things that are good in themselves or intrinsically good and things that are good as causal means to other things. Our knowledge of value in itself comes from self-evident intuitions and is not inferred from other things, unlike our knowledge of goodness as a means or of duties. Among the things that are good in themselves, there is an important difference between the value of a whole and the values of its parts. It is often assumed that the value of a whole just consists in the sum of the values of its parts. Moore rejects this view and insists that it fails for certain types of wholes: "organic unities" or "organic wholes". Cases of retributive justice are examples of organic wholes. Such cases are wholes comprising two negative things, a morally vicious person and pain inflicted on this person as punishment. But the value on the whole is less negative (or maybe even positive) than the sum of the values of the two parts. Again we have to depend on our intuitions to determine how the intrinsic value of a whole differs from the sum of the values of its parts.

What things are good or bad in themselves?
The second question of ethics asks about what kinds of things are good in themselves. Moore discusses various traditional answers to this question, especially naturalism, which he contrasts with his own approach. The main problem with naturalism in ethics is its tendency to identify value with natural properties, like pleasure in hedonism or being more evolved in "Evolutionists Ethics". He accuses such positions of committing the naturalistic fallacy in trying to define the term "good", an unanalyzable term according to Moore, in terms of natural properties. If such definitions were true, then they would be uninformative tautologies, "'Pleasure is good' would be equivalent to 'Pleasure is pleasure'". But Moore argues, it is not a tautology but an open question whether such sentences are true. This is why the definition above and naturalism with it fails.

Moore agrees with hedonism that pleasure is good in itself, but it is not the only intrinsically valuable thing. Another important good that is valuable in itself is beauty, for example, the beauty of mountains, rivers and sunsets. Moore proposes a thought experiment, the "method of isolation", as a test to determine whether something has intrinsic value. The test is meant to remove any considerations of the thing being good as a means by isolating the intrinsic values. The method consists in imagining a world that contains only the thing in question, for example, a world composed only of a beautiful landscape. Moore argues that such a world would be better than an ugly world, even though no one is there to enjoy it in either case, which is to show that pleasure is not the only thing good in itself. Due to the information provided through the separation of simple and complex properties as well as the use of the open question principle, Moore introduces the naturalistic fallacy that occurs when attempting to assign a definition to ‘goodness’. Moore opposes naturalism as it proposes definitions that could be used to analyze goodness in natural terms. Moore argues that moral goodness is a non-natural property, meaning it cannot be reduced or explained by any natural facts. Moore ties in his argument surrounding the color yellow and states, “it may be true that all things which are good are also something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what those other properties belong to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not ‘other’, but absolutely and entirely the same as goodness. This view I propose to call the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ (Moore, 7). Moore asserted that philosophical arguments can suffer from a confusion between the use of a term in a particular argument and the definition of that term (in all arguments). He named this confusion the. For example, an ethical argument may claim that if a thing has certain properties, then that thing is ‘good.’ A hedonist may argue that ‘pleasant’ things are ‘good’ things. Other theorists may argue that ‘complex’ things are ‘good’ things.

What is good as a means?
Having answered the second question of ethics, Moore proceeds to the third question: "What is good as a means?". This question is of particular relevance since it includes the domain traditionally associated with ethics: "What ought we to do?". For this it is necessary to further limit the third question since the main interest is in "actions which it is possible for most men to perform, if only they will them; and with regard to these, it does not ask merely, which among them will have some good or bad result, but which, among all the actions possible to volition at any moment, will produce the best total result". So right acts are those producing the most good.

The difficulty with this is that the consequences of most actions are too vast for us to properly take into account, especially the long-term consequences. Because of this, Moore suggests that the definition of duty is limited to what generally produces better results than probable alternatives in a comparatively near future. As the reference to causal means suggests, a detailed empirical investigation into the consequences of actions is necessary to determine what our duties are, it is not accessible to self-evident intuitive insight. Moore is describing that one may view an analysis of ‘good’ as strong, ethical, and dependable, while another may think the exact opposite. This sense of subjectivity diminishes the ability for a true definition of goodness to be presented and it, therefore, creates a roadblock in describing any proposed analysis or definition of goodness.

Given this information, Moore states the second two potential answers to the open question argument are invalid. Moore’s defense of goodness being a simple and indescribable property aligns with his answer to his question: moral facts cannot be reduced to natural properties.Whether a given rule of action turns out to be a duty depends to some extent on the conditions of the corresponding society but duties agree mostly with what common-sense recommends. Virtues, like honesty, can in turn be defined as permanent dispositions to perform duties.

Moore provides support for the claim that goodness is simple and undefinable, by utilizing the ‘open question argument’. The open question is “why is good undefinable?”. Moore creates three potential answers to this question that read as follows: 1) goodness is a simple and undefinable property. 2) it is a complex, definable property, or 3) the word ‘good’ is meaningless, and ‘there is no such subject as ethics’ (Speaks, 3) Moore dismisses three and aligns the open question argument to the idea that goodness could be a complex, definable property. By vocalizing the difference between complex and simple properties and his previous claim that simple properties cannot be defined, Moore claims “the hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning of good is disagreement with regard to the correct analysis of a given whole, maybe the most plainly seen to be incorrect by consideration of the fact that, whatever definition be offered, it may always be asked…whether it is itself good.” (Moore, 13).

Conclusion
It is evident that “good” is both an indefinable and simple property. Goodness is a simple, non-natural property that cannot be fully described. A simple property cannot be analyzed or broken down into simple components. “Good” follows this suit. On top of this, “the open question argument” proves why “good” is not complex and definable. This flows into his argument of why applying natural terms to definitions creates the naturalistic fallacy. Moore supports ethical non-naturalism or the exclusion of natural terms being used to describe morality. Moore believes that it is better for good not to be defined than for it to be defined falsely, and proves this through his argument of the Principia Ethica.

Reception
Principia Ethica was influential, and helped to convince many people that claims about morality cannot be derived from statements of fact. Clive Bell considered that through his opposition to Spencer and Mill, Moore had freed his generation from utilitarianism. Principia Ethica was the bible of the Bloomsbury Group, and the philosophical foundation of their aesthetic values. Leonard Woolf considered that it offered a way of continuing living in a meaningless world. Moore's aesthetic idea of the organic whole provided artistic guidance for modernists like Virginia Woolf, and informed Bell's aesthetics.

Moore's ethical intuitionism has been seen as opening the road for noncognitive views of morality, such as emotivism.

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls compares Moore's views to those of Hastings Rashdall in his The Theory of Good and Evil (1907). Moore's views have also been compared to those of Franz Brentano, Max Scheler, and Nicolai Hartmann.

Principia Ethica has been seen by Geoffrey Warnock as less impressive and durable than Moore's contributions in fields outside ethics. John Maynard Keynes, an early devotee of Principia Ethica, would in his 1938 paper 'My Early Beliefs' repudiate as Utopian Moore's underlying belief in human reasonableness and decency.

References[edit]

 * 1) ^ Jump up to:a b c d Warnock 1995, p. 585.
 * 2) ^ Jump up to:a b Schilpp 1952, "Bibliography of the Writings of G. E. Moore", p. 693.
 * 3) ^ Baldwin 1993, p. xi.
 * 4) ^ Gargani 1966, p. 352.
 * 5) ^ Moore 1903, §2, §109.
 * 6) ^ Warnock 1978, p. 3.
 * 7) ^ Jump up to:a b Moore 1903, preface.
 * 8) ^ Moore 1903, §23.
 * 9) ^ Stratton-Lake 2014, p. 32.
 * 10) ^ Jump up to:a b
 * 11) ^ Moore 1903, §128.
 * 12) ^ Jump up to:a b c d Hurka 2015.
 * 13) ^ Jump up to:a b Moore 1903, §35.
 * 14) ^ Jump up to:a b Baldwin 1998.
 * 15) ^ Moore 1903, §55.
 * 16) ^ Bosanquet 1904, p. 255.
 * 17) ^ Sylvester 1990, p. 88.
 * 18) ^ Moore 1903, §88.
 * 19) ^ Jump up to:a b c d Moore 1903, §109.
 * 20) ^ Jump up to:a b Schneewind 1997, p. 153.
 * 21) ^ Moore 1903, §95.
 * 22) ^ Schneewind 1997, p. 155.
 * 23) ^ Jump up to:a b Lee 1999, p. 249.
 * 24) ^ Bywater 1975, p. 32.
 * 25) ^ Lee 1999, pp. 296–297.
 * 26) ^ Briggs 2006, p. 72.
 * 27) ^ Dean 1996, pp. 135–136.
 * 28) ^ Bates 2003, pp. 18–21.
 * 29) ^ Rawls 1971, p. 326, n. 52.
 * 30) ^ Lee 1999, p. 700.

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Open-question argument[edit]
Main article: Open-question argument

Moore's argument for the indefinability of 'good' (and thus for the fallaciousness in the "naturalistic fallacy") is often called the open-question argument; it is presented in §13 of Principia Ethica. The argument hinges on the nature of statements such as "Anything that is pleasant is also good" and the possibility of asking questions such as "Is it good that x is pleasant?". According to Moore, these questions are open and these statements are significant; and they will remain so no matter what is substituted for "pleasure". Moore concludes from this that any analysis of value is bound to fail. In other words, if value could be analyzed, then such questions and statements would be trivial and obvious. Since they are anything but trivial and obvious, value must be indefinable.

Critics of Moore's arguments sometimes claim that he is appealing to general puzzles concerning analysis (cf. the paradox of analysis), rather than revealing anything special about value. The argument clearly depends on the assumption that if 'good' were definable, it would be an analytic truth about 'good', an assumption that many contemporary moral realists like Richard Boyd and Peter Railton reject. Other responses appeal to the Fregean distinction between sense and reference, allowing that value concepts are special and sui generis, but insisting that value properties are nothing but natural properties (this strategy is similar to that taken by non-reductive materialists in philosophy of mind).