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= Russia-Georgia Relations in late Soviet years and after independence (1986-2019) =

The current condition of Russia-Georgia relations stems from a period of attempted reforms of the Soviet Union. It continues to exist through the intensification of ethnopolitical conflicts that have been taking place on the territory of Georgia.

“Restructuring” (Perestroika)
By the 1980s, political, social, and economic crisis of the Soviet Union became unsustainable and the communist regime’s reformation was inevitable. Numerous changes within the Politburo (Political Bureau) of the Communist Party, the governing body of the Soviet Union, brought to the nomenklatura a team of young and reformer communists led by Mikhail Gorbachev. Eduard Shevardnadze, the head of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, advanced as one of the obvious leaders within the group. The reform that caused the collapse of the Soviet Union is known as “restructuring” (Perestroika). One of its main goals was to refresh the principle of nations’ self-determination and on its basis make a new union treaty of the Soviet Union.

Political and social processes caused by Perestroika gave additional energy to ethnic nationalism and thrive for independence in constituent republics, including Georgia and its autonomies. Public groups and movements were created that fought for revival and protection of ethnic identity. The aim of these movements’ social and legal activity was to legitimize the issues of sovereignty based on ethnic and territorial identity that were hushed for years.

National Liberation Movement
During 5-29 November 1988, large-scale protests took place in Tbilisi. This was the beginning of the National Liberation Movement’s political activity in Georgia. The November protest was caused by the decision of Moscow to make changes to the Constitution of the Soviet Union, that would significantly limit the rights of union republics. Ethnic Abkhaz and Ossetians living on the territories of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, constituent parts of the Georgian SSR, alarmingly observed the processes in Georgia. A significant part of Georgia’s population agreed with the national movement’s idea concerning the renewal of Georgia’s independence and correspondingly, it’s secession from the Soviet Union. However, ethnic Ossetians, as well as Abkhaz, saw outcome in distancing from Georgia and staying within the reformed Soviet Union for protecting their identities. It was becoming clear that radically different and opposing views towards the future were forming among Georgian, Ossetian, and Abkhaz societies. Georgian society was not fully realizing fears and dangers of Ossetians and Abkhaz, and evaluated their attitudes merely as processes governed by the Kremlin.

9 April 1989
For implementing the reforms of Perestroika, on 26 March 1989, for the first time in the Soviet Union multiparty elections were announced for electing the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union. On 18 March 1989, eight days prior to the elections, Abkhaz society held a massed congress in the village of Likhni in the Gudauta District. A letter was created asking the Soviet Union’s governing bodies for seceding the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia from Georgia and renewing the Union Republic status to Abkhazia.

As a response to the Likhni letter, the leaders of Georgia’s national movement started permanent anti-Soviet demonstrations in Tbilisi and other cities of Georgia. The demonstrations peaked at the beginning of April. At dawn on 9 April, special forces of the Soviet army broke up peaceful demonstration. As a result, 21 people died, hundreds of demonstrators were injured and poisoned. The events of 9 April had a decisive influence on Georgian society and the fight for independence from the Soviet Union became irreversible.

Communist Regime Opposes Soviet Past
The Communist Party’s authority started to significantly decline after the April events. In reality, the social and political processes were managed by the leaders of the national movement. The local communist administration was forced to consider attitudes within the republic and tried to formally distance from Kremlin politics. On 18 November 1989, the Supreme Council of the Georgian SSR addressed the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union regarding the legal and political evaluation of violating the treaty of 7 May 1920 between Georgia and Soviet Russia. On 9 March 1990, the Supreme Council of the Georgian SSR adopted the resolution “On the Guarantees of Protecting Georgia’s State Sovereignty.”

Reforms Bring Soviet Union to Dead End
By the spring of 1990, the Kremlin had passed a number of laws towards modernization and reformation of the Soviet Union. The law “On Procedure for Resolving Questions Connected with a Union Republic’s Secession from the USSR” was passed on 3 April. According to this law, constituent republic’s secession from the Soviet Union must have been decided by means of a referendum. In the case of Georgia, which included three autonomous units, referendums must have been held individually in each one. Besides, in the case of a republic’s secession, the law considered five-year-long procedural limitations and a transient period. In reality, this made it impossible for union republics to secede from the USSR. This law additionally supported the intensification of separatist attitudes within autonomous units all across the Soviet Union.

The law “On the Principles of Economic Relations Between the USSR, the Union and Autonomous Republics” was passed on 10 April. It significantly extended economic independence of union and autonomous republics. Both had equal rights to address the Soviet Government for suspending those legislative acts of the USSR that they believed opposed the economic interests of their republic.

The law “On the Languages of the Peoples of the USSR” was passed on 24 April. Officially the State Language status did not exist in the Soviet Union until 1990. Georgian and Armenian languages were exceptions with this status. The law of 24 April established the Russian language as an official language of the Soviet Union. The law considered the right of union and autonomous republics to independently decide on legislative conditions for developing and using the languages of their territories. It prohibited discrimination of labour rights on the basis of language. Legal proceedings must have been conducted in the language of all-union, or that of republic’s, or autonomous republic’s majority. Citizens had the right to address state structures in native or any language, and receive the answer in a desired language.

The law “On the Delimitation of Powers Between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation” was passed on 26 April. It defined Soviet republics as sovereign states that voluntarily joined the USSR. Autonomous republics were defined as states that were the subjects of the Soviet Union. This law was planting the so-called autonomization plan that gave autonomous republics the right to gain the Union Republic status. It turned out to be unacceptable not only for a republic like Georgia, but also for the Russian Federation itself. The autonomization plan caused political confrontation between all-union leaders and those of the Russian Federation. Russia saw the risk of losing 50 percent of its territories by the enforcement of this law.

On 20 June 1990, the Supreme Council of the Georgian SSR deemed the laws passed in April by the legislative body of the Soviet Union as inappropriate for the interests of Georgia. Despite such oppositions, the reformation of the Soviet Union was rapidly continuing. Consultations were taking place about creating and signing a new union treaty of the USSR. On 1 October 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the resolution “On the Development of Consultations and Elaboration of the New Union Treaty Concept” which, for the first time on an official level, considered reasonable to involve the representatives of autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts in the preparatory works of the USSR’s reformation. On 25 December 1990, already the highest political body of the USSR - the Congress of People's Deputies - adopted the resolution “On a General Concept of the New Union Treaty and the Rules of Its Conclusion.” According to this, “multinational Soviet Union was transforming into a democratic federal state that was a voluntary union of equal sovereign countries.” The rule on concluding the New Union Treaty must have been defined by supreme authorities of republics and autonomous units.

Unlike the leaders of Georgian society, the leaders of Abkhaz and Ossetian societies tried to adapt their national interests to the Soviet Union’s reformation process. Their interests essentially opposed that of Georgian society concerning state independence.

National Liberation Movement Wins Supreme Council Elections
At the same time, Georgia was going through the process of political and social alienation from the reforms of the Soviet Union. On 28 October 1990, multiparty elections were held for the first time in the history of Soviet Georgia. These elections ended the governance of the Communist Party in the country. A coalition called “Round Table” led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia won the elections. The results additionally tensed the situation in autonomous units. Contrary to the Georgian Government’s will, on 9 December, the Supreme Council of South Ossetia elections were held on the territory of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. As a response, the Supreme Council of Georgia abolished the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast on December 11.

Two Mutually Exclusive Referendums
In the framework of the Soviet Union’s reformation, an all-union referendum was held on 17 March 1991 for preserving the renewed Soviet Union. Georgia boycotted the referendum, however, it was still held on the territories of Abkhazia and abolished South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. Majority of Georgian population living in the autonomous units did not participate in it, however, a significant part of ethnic Abkhaz and Ossetian voters voted for preserving the Soviet Union. As a response to the all-union referendum held on 17 March, another referendum was held in Georgia on 31 March, where the majority voted for regaining state independence based on the act of 26 May 1918. As a result, Georgia declared state independence on 9 April 1991.

Gamsakhurdia and Yeltsin Meet in Kazbegi
Between the two referendums, Chairman of the Supreme Council of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR Boris Yeltsin met in Kazbegi on 23 March. A joint protocol was adopted that defined a new status of South Ossetia: “For stabilizing situation in the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, as a result of an agreement on mutual action parties decided the following: …The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Georgia will create a joint militsiya unit that will disarm any illegal formation on the territory of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast”. According to this protocol, Russia had confirmed abolishing the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. However, the diplomatic success of Georgia did not last long. In a week, on 31 March, the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian SFSR adopted the resolution “On the Situation in South Ossetia” where the term “South Ossetia” was used in a familiar status for Russia. The resolution asked the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia to make a decision on restoring status to the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast and every structure of state governance. The Congress addressed the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia to lift the blockade of South Ossetia, return refugees from the territory of North Ossetia to their former living places, and restore normal functioning of the local economy. The resolution was signed by Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR Boris Yeltsin, who had acknowledged a few days before that the “South Ossetian” Autonomous Oblast did not exist.

Synchronized End of Soviet Union and Government of National Movement
Opposition between conservative communists and reformers regarding the Soviet Union’s reformation became unsustainable in Moscow. Signing ceremony of the New Union Treaty by the Soviet republics was planned on 20 August 1991. Georgia refused to sign the treaty, but the ceremony did not take place anyway. A military coup, known as ГКЧП, was attempted in Moscow on 19-21 August. Its main aim was to avoid signing the New Union Treaty of the USSR, which instead of the Union of Sovereign States aimed to establish a federation. Despite the fact that the coup collapsed, it still reached its aim - signing the new treaty was thwarted. However, in the end ГКЧП got an opposing result - it initiated a new process that conditioned the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established and the Soviet Union ceased to exist on 8 December 1991.

The August coup attempt caused significant changes in Georgia as well. Zviad Gamsakhurdia did not clearly distinguish himself from the organizers of the coup. This provoked demonstrations of society with opposing attitudes. By the end of December 1991, demonstrations between the opposition and the Government turned into an armed conflict that ended on 6 January by overthrowing the Government of “Round Table.” The “Military Council” took the power.

Eduard Shevardnadze’s Return to Georgia and War in Abkhazia
In search of a way out of political crisis, the temporary Government of “Military Council,” that came to power after the coup, invited former Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Eduard Shevardnadze. He arrived in Georgia on 7 March 1992. He soon established and became the Chairman of the “State Council of Georgia” that replaced the “Military Council.”

Considering Russia’s interests, quite soon Shevardnadze managed to stop the bloodshed on the territory of South Ossetia. On 24 June 1992 in Sochi, Russia’s President Yeltsin and Shevardnadze signed the agreement “On the Principles of Resolving the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict,” after which peace remained on the territory of former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast until 2004.

If Eduard Shevardnadze’s actions were successful in regulating the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, in contrast his steps towards Abkhazia were strange and ill-considered. Throughout 1992, the supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who was defeated during the military coup, opposed Military and later State Councils of Georgia by the demonstrations of insubordination. The opposition’s central points were mostly in Samegrelo and partly in Abkhazia, entirely paralyzing railway transportation by 10 August 1992. Economic crisis emerged on top of already tense socio-political situation. To improve the situation, the State Council decided to exercise special regulations in relation to railway transportation for a month starting on 15 August. On 14 August 1992, units of Georgia’s internal troops were dispatched on the territory of Abkhazia. The Abkhaz side announced military mobilization on the same day. An armed period of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict began.

In a few days after the hostilities had started, the society of the North Caucasus Republics and their governing bodies expressed solidarity towards the authorities of Abkhazia. It was obvious that their activity was orchestrated from the same centre. On 17 August 1992, the cabinet of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic adopted the resolution “On the Political Support and Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to the Republic of Abkhazia.” On 18 August, a special parliamentary session of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus issued the resolution “On the Situation in Abkhazia and Resistance to the Aggressive Actions of the Army of the State Council of Georgia.” On 20 August, leaders of the North Caucasus republics addressed President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation Ruslan Khasbulatov. They were evaluating the military conflict ongoing in Abkhazia as a risk for the North Caucasus, which could have caused a civil war in the south of Russia. The leaders of the North Caucasus were concerned about Russia’s fate. This call obliged the Government of Russia to implement a peacekeeping mission. On 21 August, President of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus Musa Shanibov issued a decree declaring Tbilisi as a disaster area.

3 September Agreement and Real Face of Two Russias
On 3 September 1992, the leaders of Georgia and Russia signed the first large-scale agreement in Moscow to resolve the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. The leaders of Abkhazia and of every republic of the North Caucasus agreed by signing it. The agreement confirmed generally acknowledged principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of the states. Armed forces of the Russian Federation, present on-site, obliged themselves to keep neutrality. Governments of the republics of the North Caucasus guaranteed that irregular armed forces would not enter Abkhazia from their territories.

Despite the obligatory character of the Moscow Treaty, actions against the peace process were still taking place in the North Caucasus. On 16 September, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Adygea issued the statement “On Nonfulfillment and Violations of the Document Reached During 3 September Meeting in Moscow.” The document was still appealing to the inevitable destabilization of socio-political situation in the North Caucasus.

On 25 September, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted two documents against Georgia: the resolution “On the Situation in the North Caucasus in Connection with the Events of Abkhazia and Georgia’s Destructive Actions” and the statement “On Georgia’s Destructive Actions in Connection with Ongoing Events in Abkhazia.” In both documents the Parliament of Russia condemned the actions of the Government of Georgia, trying to solve problems between the nations through violence. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation recommended the President and Government of Russia to suspend the agreement with Georgia on the provision of weaponry, and refrain from making economic agreements with Georgia. Russia linked withdrawing terrorist groups, consisting of Russian citizens, from the territory of Georgia with removing Georgia’s armed forces from the territory of Abkhazia.

As a response to the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, the Government of Georgia issued a statement on 29 September, considering this resolution as an infringement of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and as an intervention in a sovereign state’s internal affairs. On 30 September, the Government of Georgia adopted the resolution on passing former all-union and union-republican sanatoriums, holiday homes, and dachas, situated on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, to the management of the Chancellery of the Government of Georgia.

Ceasefire of 3 September agreement was regularly violated and the parties blamed each other. On 1 October, Abkhaz armed forces attacked the town of Gagra and it fell on 2 October. On 3 October, the State Council of the Republic of Georgia issued a statement, accusing the resolution of 25 September by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation of renewing hostilities in Gagra. Additionally, the statement mentioned that within the Georgian-Russian-Abkhaz committee, responsible for supervising the peaceful resolution of the conflict, the representatives of Russia had biased positions and actually, supported increasing military potential in Abkhazia. The Georgian side confirmed that the Abkhaz side had types of contemporary weaponry that they did not possess on the earlier stages of conflict, and which they could have received only with the support of various units under the Russian Federation’s jurisdiction. Besides, the State Council adopted the resolution on passing military property and weapons of the former Soviet army, deployed on the territory of Georgia, to the ownership of the Republic of Georgia.

On 6 October, Chairman of the State Council of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze addressed President of Russia Boris Yeltsin with a letter, requesting as an ultimatum to immediately stop providing ammunition and heavy equipment to illegal military formations of Abkhazia. In case of unfulfilling the Moscow Agreement of 3 September, the State Council of Georgia had the right to request withdrawing Russia’s every armed force from the territory of Georgia and accordingly, passing respective agreements’ entire weaponization quota to Georgia.

Permanent violation of ceasefire agreement of 3 September between Russia and Georgia, and renewing hostilities on Gagra revealed opposition that existed between different branches of the Russian Government. The decisions of the majority of the Russian Parliament showed that the Parliament and the President’s Administration had different positions regarding the processes in Abkhazia. Political oppositions inside Russia significantly affected conflicts that were taking place on the territory of Georgia. An aggressive wing was getting stronger in Russian politics, further motivating the North Caucasus nations’ involvement in the conflict of Abkhazia.

On 17 December 1992, the Parliament of Georgia issued one of the most dramatic statements concerning the complication of relations between Russia and Georgia. The Parliament of Georgia believed that armed forces of Russia deployed in Abkhazia had turned into conflict participants, and together with separatists armed by them and Russia’s reactionary political circles they were implementing imperial politics towards infringing Georgia’s territorial integrity. The Parliament believed that if Russian troops deployed in Abkhazia had not directly intervened against the interests of Georgia, peace negotiations between Georgians and Abkhaz would have ended successfully, and the scale of the conflict and victims would have been much smaller. Authors of the statement were requesting immediate withdrawal of Russia’s armed forces from the conflict region. On 25 February 1993, the Parliament of Georgia adopted resolution that declared further stay of Russia’s military units on the entire territory of Abkhazia unacceptable.

On 18 February 1993, negotiations between Russia and Georgia took place in Tbilisi with following participation: from Russia - Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of Russia Ramazan Abdulatipov and Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Sergey Shakhray; from Georgia - Roman Gotsiridze, Vakhtang Rcheulishvili, and Sandro Kavsadze. As a result, a communique was issued that implied changing the format of 3 September 1992. According to the new format, every party of the conflict, as well as representatives of the North Caucasus republics, must have participated in resolving the conflict. The Russian side proposed to hold a high-ranking meeting at the steering committee meeting of the North Caucasus. However, part of the members of the Georgia’s Parliament, led by Zurab Zhvania, deemed the communique’s equivocal statements unacceptable, and the communique of 18 February was abolished by the resolution of 4 March.

On 17 March 1993, the Parliament of Georgia addressed the United Nations, the European Parliament, and parliaments worldwide to condemn the aggression of Russia. The Parliament accused Russia of starting an undeclared war against Georgia. The city of Sokhumi was being bombarded by military aircraft and naval ships of Russia. The Parliament believed that it was time to name the actions accordingly and declared that the political aim of Russia’s military actions against Georgia was to detach Abkhazia and infringe Georgia’s territorial integrity. The statement once again actualized withdrawal of Russia’s troops from the territory of Georgia. At the beginning of April 1993, the Parliament of Georgia adopted a resolution that blamed Russia in supporting ethnic cleansing and genocide of Georgians in Abkhazia.

From 6 until 9 April 1993, governmental negotiations took place in Sochi, led by Prime Minister of the Republic of Georgia Tengiz Sigua and Defence Minister of the Russian Federation Pavel Grachev. Negotiations confirmed earlier agreements that the Russian troops would remain in the Republic of Georgia until the end of 1995 and withdraw according to a schedule by 31 December 1995; if the parties did not express mutual interest of continuing military collaboration, border troops of the Russian Federation would leave Georgia until the end of 1994. At the end of April, the Parliament of Georgia adopted another resolution concerning the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Abkhazia. Otherwise, the territory of Abkhazia would have been considered occupied by Russia.

On April 30, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted another resolution “On the Situation in the North Caucasus in Connection with the Events of Abkhazia.” Making the territory of Abkhazia constituent part of Russia was considered for the first time in this resolution: The Supreme Soviet “is satisfied by the will of the peoples of Abkhazia to become a constituent part of the Russian Federation, or to be under its protection, as expressed in the statement of 23 March 1993 of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia addressed to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation… to keep stability, the President and the Government of the Russian Federation should be given a proposition that in accordance with respecting international legal norms, first and foremost human rights and right to self-determination, it can activate negotiation with the Government of the Republic of Georgia regarding normalization of situation in Abkhazia, which concerns the statement of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia addressed to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.” The Government of Georgia virtually turned a deaf ear and did not respond to this position at all.

On 14 May, Shevardnadze and Yeltsin signed a communique in Moscow that concerned regulation of situation in Abkhazia. The parties agreed to organize a recurring meeting in the format of the agreement made on 3 September 1992.

On 1 June 1993, the Parliament of Georgia adopted another resolution concerning the shortest term of withdrawing Russian armed forces from the territory of Georgia. Besides withdrawing, the Parliament obliged Russian troops to hand its weapons and ammunitions over to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Georgia.

Defeat in Abkhazia
On 27 July 1993 in Sochi, with Russia’s mediation the representatives of parties involved in the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict signed the agreement “On a Ceasefire in Abkhazia and On a Mechanism to Ensure Its Observance”. The Georgian side completely fulfilled the agreement - dismissed military units and withdrew war machines from the territory of Abkhazia. However, like others, the agreement of 27 July did not work as well. Military and political tension became irreversible by 20 September. As a result of intensive battles, military units of the Abkhaz side took control of Sokhumi centre on 27 September.

The Government of the Russian Federation issued a few statements regarding the fall of Sokhumi, blaming Abkhaz separatists in renewing hostilities. In the circumstances, the Government of Russia was still supporting Georgia’s territorial integrity and held the Government of Abkhazia liable for violating the ceasefire agreement of Sochi. The Government of Russia acknowledged and condemned the facts of genocide, and supported creation of an international tribunal for investigating such crimes and punishing criminals. Besides, the Government of Russia took responsibility to support tens of thousands of displaced persons.

In the autumn of 1993, the relationship between the Parliament of Russia and the President became very intense. This opposition culminated in the days following the fall of Sokhumi. President Yeltsin attacked the Russian Parliament building, ending the dual governance of Russia.

After overcoming the constitutional crisis of Russia, its Government continued Georgia’s support. On 14 October, the Government of the Russian Federation issued a statement concerning violence in Abkhazia, massive ethnic cleansing of non-Abkhaz population, and safe return of displaced persons. The statement - concerning violence on the territory of Abkhazia, looting, plundering Russian, Georgian and other ethnic group representatives - held liable only the Government of Abkhazia. The Government of Russia requested from them to stop massive ethnic cleansing of non-Abkhaz population.

Joining CIS and Deploying Russian Peacekeeping Forces in Abkhazia
After leaving Abkhazia, internal civil opposition became more intense in other parts of Georgia. In October 1993, Gamsakhurdia’s supporting armed forces took control of a few important cities and transport communications in western Georgia, getting closer to the city of Kutaisi. Taking control of the Poti seaport had already caused the suspension of cargo designated for Azerbaijan and Armenia. With the Georgian Government’s permission, marine forces of the Black Sea transferred landing led by Admiral Baltin in western Georgia and expelled Gamsakhurdia’s supporting forces from the cities. Civil opposition ended in Georgia as well.

In December 1993, under the aegis of the UN and the OSCE, as well as with Russia’s clear role, negotiations concerning full-scale settlement of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict started in Geneva.

On 3 February 1994, President of Russia Boris Yeltsin visited Tbilisi and together with Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze signed the treaty “On Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation between the Republic of Georgia and the Russian Federation.” However, the treaty did not become effective as the State Duma of the Russian Federation refused to ratify it. The Duma was against Russia’s participation in reforming and strengthening armed forces of Georgia. On the same day, Yeltsin and Shevardnadze sent a joint letter to the UN Secretary-General about implementing a peaceful operation on the territory of Abkhazia. The letter asked the UN to execute a peaceful operation on the territory of Abkhazia, which if necessary, would rely on Russian military contingent.

New circumstances and endless civil oppositions on the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia made the Government of Georgia decide to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Parliament made corresponding decision on 1 March 1994. Georgia was the last post-Soviet country that joined this organization. According to the Government of Georgia, this step should have stopped the process of country’s collapse. The CIS Charter guaranteed the member states to protect sovereignty, territorial integrity, supremacy of international law, non-interference in each country’s domestic and international affairs, etc. On 14 August 2008, the Parliament of Georgia decided to withdraw from the CIS.

On 10 March 1994, the Parliament of Georgia adopted the resolution “On Legislative Practice of Apartheid and Racism in the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia.” Ongoing processes on the territory of Abkhazia were considered as ethnic cleansing and genocide. In the resolution, the accusation for military and political conflict was transferred to Abkhaz separatists and external reactionary forces in alliance with them, which had violently taken over the territory of Georgia. The resolution did not suggest responsibility of the Russian Government.

On 4 April 1994, bilateral agreement was signed in Moscow on the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons. The Georgian and Abkhaz sides, as well as the Russian Federation and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees signed an agreement. The parties expressed their readiness to provide voluntary, safe, and proper return conditions in every region of Abkhazia to displaced persons regardless of their ethnic, social, or political belonging. Displaced persons were given the right to return without imprisonment, detention, and prosecution. Return must have happened consistently, following districts and according to a plan agreed by the parties. They agreed that the first stage of return should have started from Gali District.

Declaration “On Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict” was signed in Moscow on the same day by Georgian and Abkhaz parties with the presence of the Russian Federation and the OSCE. Georgian and Abkhaz parties addressed the UN to include Russian military contingent among peacekeeping forces.

On 15 April 1994, CIS member states adopted the declaration “On Respect for Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Immunity of Borders of the State Parties of the Commonwealth of Independent States.” Primarily, this declaration was adopted following Georgia’s interests. On the same day, CIS decided to implement a peacekeeping operation in the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict zone. CIS member states addressed the United Nations Security Council for implementing a peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia. The CIS decision concurred with the joint statement of Georgia and Russia on 3 February 1994 to the UN Secretary-General on including Russian military contingent among the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations.

On 22 March 1995, the Russian and Georgian Ministers of Defence signed the treaty of establishing Russian military bases on the territory of Georgia. Four bases were created in Akhalkalaki, Batumi, Vaziani, and Gudauta. Negotiations also continued for a long time concerning the duration of these bases on Georgia’s territory. The Kremlin requested establishing Russian military bases for 25 years. Initially, the Georgian side considered 10 years, but in the end Eduard Shevardnadze agreed with Russians to establish the bases for 25 years (with a possible extension in the future); but with following conditions: 1.Russia would recognize Georgia’s jurisdiction in Abkhazia; 2. Russia would help Georgia in creating army. Otherwise, Georgians refused to ratify the treaty. Russia agreed with Georgia’s requirements.

Road to Stagnation. Georgia Adapts to Orbit Around Russia
From the summer of 1995, Russia significantly changed its politics towards the conflicts in Georgia. Russia started to implement unilateral actions without considering positions of the Georgian Government and the CIS member states. On 14 July 1995, the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted the resolution on helping the population of Abkhazia. The resolution offered the Government of Russia to renew air travel from airports of the Russian Federation to Sokhumi; to open field offices of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation on the territory of Abkhazia; to abolish limitations at the state border of the Russian Federation on passing of cargo, women, children under 16, and pensioners.

On 17 April 1996, the Parliament of Georgia adopted the resolution “On Measures of Conflict Settlement in Abkhazia.” Due to its spirited and principled approach, this resolution can be considered as a distinguished political document in Georgia’s modern history. It re-evaluated many positions that the Georgian political elite had avoided before. Despite this, the Parliament of Georgia was not brave enough to clearly distinguish the Russian Federation’s decisive role in unsettling the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict. The resolution evaluated given situation as an occupation of Abkhazia, implemented by Abkhaz separatists with the help and participation of Russian antidemocratic, reactionary, and other external forces. The Parliament also acknowledged that ethnic cleansing and genocide of Georgians took place on the territory of Abkhazia, however, only separatist forces were implied in implementing these.

On 3 June 1996, President of the Russian Federation Yeltsin and President of Georgia Shevardnadze met with the leaders of the North Caucasus republics in Kislovodsk.

In November 1999, the representation of Georgia to the UN started to work on establishing international monitoring on the Chechen section of the Georgian-Russian border. This was conditioned by Russian publicity campaign, as though certain danger was coming from the Pankisi Gorge. A well-orchestrated Russian propaganda intensified Georgia-Russia relations even more. On 9 December, at the OSCE Permanent Council Meeting Georgia received support on establishing international monitoring.

The Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was planned at the OSCE Istanbul summit in November 1999. Georgia proposed abolishing and withdrawing part of the Russian bases (Gudauta and Vaziani) from its territory. The adapted treaty and Istanbul Document were signed by Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, Eduard Shevardnadze, and other presidents. According to these documents, the Kremlin had to withdraw from Vaziani and Gudauta bases until 1 July 2001. Georgia was temporarily allowing Moscow to use Akhalkalaki and Batumi military bases, however, during 2000 parties had to conclude negotiations on the terms of closing these two bases as well.

On 23 December 2000, Georgian and Russian Governments made an agreement in Tbilisi to mutually act in the process of economic rehabilitation in the conflict zone and in return of displaced persons. The document mostly discussed return of displaced persons and development of economy. Relatively earlier, the Russian Duma had made a unilateral decision on provision of electricity to “South Ossetia.” By the agreement of 23 December, the Georgian side practically agreed to cover electricity payable.

Changes in the law of the Russian Federation concerning citizenship came into force in July 2002, giving Russia conditions for massive distribution of Russian passports on the territories of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Adjara.

Rose Revolution: From New Perspectives to New Challenges
The so-called Rose Revolution took place in Georgia in the late autumn of 2003. As a result, political and social landscape essentially changed in the country. On 18 December, President of Russia Vladimir Putin announced that Russia will support Georgia’s territorial integrity if the rights of people living in the conflict zone will not be violated. On 11 February 2004, Georgia’s newly-elected President Saakashvili and Russia’s President Putin met in Moscow for the first time. After the meeting, Saakashvili announced that “we managed to find common ground. Unlike my predecessor [Shevardnadze], I did not have any problems with him [Putin].” The decision was also made to start working on renewing railway connection between Russia and Georgia through Abkhazia.

In the Spring of 2004, political crisis developed in Adjara and ended with its leader Aslan Abashidze leaving his position. Russia played a significant role in resolving the crisis, convincing Abashidze to leave Batumi and to go to Moscow. By a telephone call Mikheil Saakashvili thanked Vladimir Putin for his role in peaceful settlement of the crisis.

In July 2004, new relations between Russia and Georgia could not pass the first test, stimulating irreversible escalation of tension between the countries. Uncoordinated and mutually exclusive military and political actions between the Georgian-Russian-Ossetian peacekeeping units on the territory of South Ossetia turned into an armed conflict,  and up to 20 service members died as a result. By 20 August, the Georgian side received terms of the international community and ceded positions. The military-political crisis of summer 2004 resulted from irrelevant and superficial evaluations of Russia’s factor, taking unresolved Russia-Georgia relations from a static to a dynamic phase.

In December 2004, Russia made the first indication about the connection of topics concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia to those concerning Kosovo. “Why should we behave as if we do not notice what is happening in the world and in Europe? Everyone used to say: Kosovo will never be independent and remain as part of Yugoslavia. But what is happening in reality? Kosovo seceded and everyone is acting like they do not notice it and have not heard about it” - said Vladimir Putin. In the same period, Russia made a decision on abolishing the OSCE monitoring mission on the Chechen section of Georgia’s state border.

On 10 March 2005, the Parliament of Georgia determined terms of withdrawing Russian military bases. As a response, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated that “negotiations about this topic are being held with the Government of Georgia, which does not support the Parliament’s decision.” Lavrov meant the position of Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome Zourabichvili, who recommended the deputies on 9 March to postpone issuing the resolution.

In the spring of 2005, Russia started to appoint citizens of Russia at law enforcement agencies of South Ossetia. Anatoly Zaitsev, earlier appointed as the Deputy Minister of Defence of Abkhazia, was appointed as the head of General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the South Ossetian Republic in March. On 25 April, former head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of North Ossetia – Alania Mikhail Mindzaev became South Ossetia’s Minister of Internal Affairs. On 4 July, commercial director of Kursk Refinery Yury Morozov became the Prime Minister of South Ossetia. Anatoly Yarovoy, the head of the Federal Security Service of the Republic of Mordovia, became the Chairman of the Committee for State Security in South Ossetia.

Government of Georgia Starts Changing Principles of Conflict Resolution Formats
From the autumn of 2005, the Government of Georgia initiated an internalization of peacekeeping operations in the conflict zones. On 11 October, the Government of Georgia issued the first resolution concerning the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers. It tasked the Government of Georgia with taking measures on withdrawing Russian peacekeeping forces from the conflict zones. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation referred to this resolution of Georgia as provocative, aimed towards failing the peace process. Russia’s statement underlined that negotiations in the given format united not only Russia, but also the UN and the CIS in case of Abkhazia, and the OSCE in case of South Ossetia. Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov announced that “the peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are pursuant to the mandate issued by two parties - respectively, Abkhazia and Georgia, and South Ossetia and Georgia. In order to withdraw the peacekeepers, at least an agreement of all sides is needed.” Due to the resolution’s ethos, the Government of Georgia started to regularly condemn the activities of the CIS peacekeeping forces and request their replacement with international forces. This had objective basis, however, it was implemented on the background of unilateral decisions. The international community consistently reminded the Government of Georgia that Western institutions did not see a possibility of replacing Russian peacekeeping forces. They also asked Georgia to find common ground with Russia.

In January 2006, the President of Russia reverted to the topic of Kosovo. He thought that Kosovo’s status should have been an example for other conflicts. Regarding the status of Kosovo, Russia had to support a decision that would have been universal and relevant to settle conflicts in the post-Soviet space. “Considering the practical interests of the post-Soviet space, this is a very important topic for us. Every option of proposed decisions must have a universal character. It is very important for the post-Soviet space and we cannot follow the path on which we will use certain principles at one place, and different ones at another.”

In February 2006, the Government of Georgia continued working on withdrawing Russian peacekeeping forces. On 15 February 2006, the Parliament requested withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the territory of South Ossetia. The resolution implied fundamental revision of the Sochi agreement of 24 June 1992, and strived toward replacing Russian peacekeeping forces by international ones. The resolution evaluated Russia’s actions on the territory of South Ossetia as “a permanent attempt of annexing this region of Georgia.” The Parliament’s activity raised concerns in Moscow, where the decision was evaluated as part of an “anti-Russian campaign” and a precondition of escalating tension in the conflict zone.

Unlike withdrawing Russia’s peacekeeping forces from Georgia’s territory, negotiations on removing Russia’s military bases were going relatively successfully. On 31 March 2006, Georgia and Russia signed two treaties on withdrawing Russia’s military bases from Georgia. One of them concerned removing military bases from Batumi and Akhalkalaki, and another allowed Russia transiting its military load through Georgia. President Saakashvili called these agreements “historic” and evaluated them as “a victory of constructive diplomacy of Georgia.” Russia had to withdraw military bases from the territory of Georgia until the end of 2008.

In July 2006, the Parliament of Georgia became more principled regarding the withdrawal of Russia’s peacekeeping forces. On 18 July, the Parliament requested from the Government an immediate ceasing of Russia’s peacekeeping mission: “The Government of Georgia should be tasked to start necessary procedures concerning the most rapid ceasing of the so-called peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia and the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, and instant withdrawal of the Russian Federation’s armed forces from the territory of Georgia.” “The actions of the Russian Federation’s armed forces in Abkhazia and the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast are one of the main barriers in the peaceful settlement of conflicts.” According to the parliament’s resolution, Russia is accused of “a permanent attempt to annex part of Georgia.” At the same time, the Parliament tasked the Government to ensure changing the format of peaceful operations with international police forces.

In July 2006, a meeting planned between the Presidents of Georgia and Russia did not take place. According to Defence and Security Committee Chairman of the Georgian Parliament Givi Targamadze’s statement, President Saakashvili’s visit was postponed due to a reason from the Russian side: “I think that President Putin has nothing new to say, he is indecisive about his current position, and he is not ready to make as impertinent appearances as his ministers [of Foreign Affairs and of Defence] do these days.”

On 2 October 2006, Russia suspended all transport with Georgia. Moscow denied that this decision was politically motivated. The official statement said that this decision was conditioned by the accumulated debt that Georgian airline companies owed to Russia. However, the statement of Chairman of the State Duma Boris Gryzlov affirmed that Russia started economic strangulation of Georgia. He verified that a bill was in the making that would allow the Government to prohibit money transfer from Russia to Georgia.

In January 2007, President Vladimir Putin reminded the world again that Kosovo’s problem had a universal character and could become a precondition for resolving similar conflicts in the CIS: “Small states feel undefended. If we resolve the problem in Kosovo by a certain way, of course, this approach should become universal for similar situations. If we bypass the principle of territorial integrity of countries, then other nations also have the right to say: we will share a similar approach. This does not only concern the post-Soviet space, it should also cover other states.”

On 15 March 2007, the President of Georgia launched an initiative to change the format of conflict resolution. He called existing formats of negotiation “inefficient” and “discredited,” where according to his evaluation, Russia had a dominant position, and he stated “we want a lot more active participation of European Institutions and the United States of America in all of these.”

On 20 April 2007, Georgia cancelled the agreement “On Mutual Actions in the Process of Economic Rehabilitation in the Conflict Zone of South Ossetia.” The existing decision, signed with Russia on 23 December 2000, was evaluated as the Georgian side’s attempt to prevent Russian funding of those projects in Tskhinvali District, which were being implemented without prior agreement with the Georgian side.

By August 2007, diplomatic tension between Russia and Georgia turned into armed incidents. On 6 August, Tbilisi accused Moscow of bombarding the Kodori Valley. The Georgian side stated that a Russian plane had violated Georgia’s airspace. Two groups of international experts supported the Georgian side’s version. However, Russian investigatory group denied the violation of airspace.

On 21 March 2008, after many countries recognized the independence of Serbia’s Kosovo District, the State Duma recommended the Kremlin to consider the topic of recognising the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the example of Kosovo. The resolution has a character of recommendation. The document also addressed the Government to discuss “the possibility of strengthening [Russian] peacekeeping forces deployed in the Abkhaz-Georgian and Georgian-Ossetian conflict zones.”

The confrontation between Georgia and Russia was becoming unsustainable. On 16 April 2008, the President of Russia unilaterally, without the Georgian Government’s agreement, tasked the Government to establish official relations with respective bodies of self-declared republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In reality, this decision was dictating different ministries and governmental bodies to start their representations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, so that they could establish direct official relations with respective bodies of self-declared republics. This decision was clearly showing the Russian Government’s will of creating relevant basis for recognizing independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

August War Becomes Inevitable
On 15 July 2008, Russia’s North Caucasus Military District started large-scale military trainings, with up to eight thousand service members, called “Kavkaz-2008.” Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces Igor Konashenkov announced that the main aim of the exercises was to coordinate mutual activities of military administrations for avoiding existing risks of terrorism in the south of Russia. Concurrently on 15 July, approximately two thousand service members, mostly from the US and Georgia, started “Immediate Response - 2008” military training at the Vaziani Military Base. Service members from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine also participated in the trainings.

Even in the first days of August 2008, the Government of Georgia was not expecting large-scale hostilities from Russia. On 7 August, State Minister for Reintegration Temur Iakobashvili stated that “currently Russia is not really interested in escalating the situation.” However, in a few hours Russia implemented a full-scale military operation on the territory of Georgia. According to Igor Konashenkov, the representative of Russian Ground Forces, the units of 58th Army had managed to reach Tskhinvali and started preparing for the operation. The Kodori Valley in Abkhazia was bombarded by Russian planes, and Abkhaz armed forces started a land operation there. The United Nations Security Council gathered in New York and did not manage to agree on the text of a statement regarding the situation in South Ossetia. Ambassador of Russia to the United Nations, Vitaly Churkin accused Georgia of “ethnic cleansing.” President Saakashvili addressed the Parliament to declare a state of war on the whole territory of Georgia.

On 12 August, President of France Nicolas Sarkozy offered the conflict parties a six-point peace plan elaborated by the EU on ceasing hostilities in Georgia. After certain corrections, the Georgian and Russian Presidents agreed and signed the EU plan. However, on 26 August Russia violated the peace plan of 12 August and declared independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. “I signed the decrees to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia” - stated Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev, and also addressed other countries to follow Russia’s decision. On 26 August, President Saakashvili announced that Russia made “an unbelievable strategic mistake” by recognizing self-proclaimed regions of Georgia, and now the West had to respond. Because of recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Government of Georgia broke off diplomatic relations with Russia on 29 August. Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigol Vashadze announced that “neither Georgia, nor the Russian Federation will have diplomatic representation in each other’s countries that carries out political activity… we retain only the consulate. Breaking off diplomatic relations does not automatically mean breaking off consular relations.” The Swiss Confederation was asked to represent the consular interests of Georgia and Russia. Switzerland started to perform duties to represent the interests of Russia in Georgia and that of Georgia in Russia. Due to the absence of diplomatic relations, interests sections of Russia and Georgia were placed respectively at the Swiss Embassies in Tbilisi and Moscow.

On 17 September 2008, the President of Russia signed the treaties of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the de facto Presidents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. “We will provide all kind of mutual assistance including military” - said Medvedev after the signing ceremony. Russia additionally announced that it was intending to make treaties in the military sphere with separatists, because it was planning to legitimize the placement of three thousand eight hundred Russian soldiers in each region. Deputy Foreign Minister of Georgia Grigol Vashadze announced that these treaties are illegal and the international community does not recognize them.

Working Days of Occupation
On 23 October 2008, the Parliament of Georgia passed the law “On Occupied Territories.” It limited free movement and conducting economic activity on the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Additionally, the law prohibited air, maritime and railway traffic, international overland traffic, as well as obtaining natural resources and money transfers. The law says that the Russian Federation - “the state carrying out military occupation” - is fully responsible for violating human rights in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

On 19 November 2008, discussions on safety and stability in the South Caucasus were held in Geneva with the participation of representatives from Georgia, Russia, the USA, as well as from the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and with the EU, UN, and OSCE mediation. The participants met in the so-called individual format. This way they avoided disagreement of parties regarding the status. The Georgian delegation welcomed the fact that this was the first format that did not give Russia the main mediator’s role.

On 30 April 2009, the de facto Governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia asked the Russian Federation to take the function of protecting the so-called state border. President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev signed agreements on border protection with the de facto Presidents of separatist regions.

On 2 August 2009, Russia installed barbed wire fences on the territory of occupied South Ossetia. “Russian occupants went” to the village of Kveshi in the Gori District and marked the territory of a Georgian village with posts to move the so-called “border” - stated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia - this is “Russian occupants’ attempt to further reach the territory of Georgia.”

On 6 August 2009, one year after the war, the Government of Georgia published a report called “On the Full-Scale Aggression of the Russian Federation Against Georgia.” According to the report, based on operative data at 03:41 am on 7 August 2008, approximately 150 armoured vehicles and trucks entered the Roki Tunnel. At 23:35 on 7 August, following bombarding of villages in Georgia’s region, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Georgia ordered to “Start the operation of Self Defence.” In two months, on 30 September, head of mission probing into the August war Heidi Tagliavini presented a report  to the Georgian and Russian sides, the EU, OSCE, and UN. It specified that Georgia’s claim that “a large-scale Russian military incursion” happened before 8 August, could not be considered as “sufficiently substantiated” by the Mission. According to the Mission, it is impossible “to assign overall responsibility for the conflict to one side alone.”

In the Spring of 2010, Moscow made an agreement with Sokhumi and Tskhinvali concerning united Russian military bases. The term of these agreements was determined as 49 years, with a possibility of extension for 15 more years. The documents considered using Russian united bases for ensuring “the sovereignty and safety” of separatist republics, including resisting international terrorist formations.

On 7 June 2010, the International Crisis Group published a report that described the increased dependency of South Ossetia on Russia after Moscow had recognized its independence. According to the report, more than half of South Ossetia’s Government was staffed by Moscow and 99% of its budget was provided by Russia. “Since recognition, South Ossetia has increasingly come to resemble a North Caucasus republic,” and Moscow’s approach towards South Ossetia is similar to that towards the North Caucasus republics. According to the report, there are approximately 3 000 - 4 500 Russian service members in South Ossetia, as well as 900 border guards of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation serve there.

On 29 September 2010, Russian armed forces renewed the borderization process. The European Union Monitoring Mission mentioned that the borderization line, made by Russian forces, coincides with the Soviet time administrative border of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. The borderization process continues today with varying regularity.

Georgia Allows Russia to Join World Trade Organization
On 9 November 2011 in Geneva, Georgia and Russia signed the agreement “Between the Government of Georgia and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Basic Principles for a Mechanism of Customs Administration and Monitoring of Trade in Goods.” Based on the agreement, with Switzerland’s mediation Georgia and Russia made several agreements individually with the Swiss company SGS. Based on this agreement, Georgia allowed Russia to join the World Trade Organization. Until November 2011, Georgia and Russia had a long and dramatic path. On 5 December 2002, the Parliament of Georgia had adopted a resolution according to which the Government of Georgia vetoed Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization. After the Rose Revolution, when an attempt was made to improve relationship with Russia, the Parliament of Georgia temporarily suspended the veto in February 2004. Despite this, negotiations reached deadlock - the main aim of the Georgian Government was the placement of Georgian customs officers at the Georgia-Russia border, however, negotiations did not bring results for 8 years. In the end, with the participation of the US, Georgia’s interest was determined as following - if Georgia could not control the freight turnover along the state border of Georgia and Russia, then an authoritative foreign organization should have assumed this responsibility. Accordingly, the neutral third party was the Government of Switzerland, which already had a special diplomatic role following the cut of diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia. In December 2017, a contract was signed between Georgia and the Swiss company SGS. As a response, Russia signed a corresponding agreement with the Swiss company in May 2018. In February 2019, final negotiations took place between Georgia, Switzerland, and Russia, but the monitoring process has not commenced yet. It is unknown when the agreement of 2011 will come into force.

On 20 December 2011, the European Court of Human Rights received Georgia’s lawsuit against Russia. The Court stated that declaring it admissible cannot mean making any preliminary decisions. Georgia accuses Russia of violating eight articles of the European Convention on Human Rights. Russia considers all of these accusations unsubstantiated.

“Karasin-Abashidze Format”
The Special Representative of the Prime Minister of Georgia for relations with Russia, led by an experienced diplomat Zurab Abashidze from its beginning until now, was established in November 2012. Mostly, this office conducts work in the format of an informal dialogue between Russia and Georgia. In media it was informally called the “Karasin-Abashidze Format.” This institute of negotiation was essentially established to resolve topics connected to trade, economic, humanitarian, and cultural aspects, and it does not include the issues of conflict, which is done in the format of the Geneva discussions. As a rule, meetings in “Karasin-Abashidze Format” are held in Prague with varying regularity.

In November 2014 and March 2015, Moscow signed new illegal treaties with Sokhumi and Tskhinvali. President of Russia Vladimir Putin stated that according to the 25-year-long treaty, armed forces and certain units of security structures of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will constitute armed forces and security structures of the Russian Federation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia condemned the treaty and called it “the factual annexation of the occupied Tskhinvali region.”

On 13 October 2015, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court requested authorization to start investigating military crimes against humanity that were allegedly committed during the August 2008 war in Georgia. Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda filed a request to the ICC chamber, where she described in detail alleged crimes connected to the Georgian, Russian, and South Ossetian sides.

On 21 March 2018, the Parliament of Georgia adopted the resolution “On Gross Violation of Human Rights by Russian Federation in Occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region and “Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili Act.”” After lengthy consultations, the resolution was adopted by the consensus of the parliamentary majority and minority.

Meeting of Zalkaliani and Lavrov
On 26 September 2019, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Georgia and Russia met in New York in the framework of the UN General Assembly session. It was the first meeting of this level after the August 2008 war. Switzerland, as a mediator country, participated in organizing the meeting. According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Topics that are urgent for both sides were discussed during the conversation. Thoughts were exchanged about the problematics of regional security.”