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Science and religion have classically been viewed as irreconcilable, opposing paradigms that provide different means to the same end: an understanding of the confusing and seemingly chaotic world around us. Through a scientific lens, one sees the world as predictable and empirically testable, governed by natural laws. Conversely, the religious perspective perceives the world as governed by supra-human agency, and requires the believer to accept this on faith rather than fact. Increasingly, however, the conflict between scientific and religious viewpoints is being dispelled by an understanding of how the former explains the latter. This paper will examine recent psychological research which points to a neurobiological substrate for religious behaviour and spiritual experiences. Psychology’s pursuit of conciliation between science and religion is almost as old as the discipline itself. William James (1902/2004) was critical of the movement within the emerging discipline to ignore religion and mysticism as unscientific; he argued that religion was an important component of the human experience which should not be discounted.

Freud’s (1927/1989) psychoanalytic perspective regarded religious beliefs as mere wishful thinking – an attempt to recreate the “oceanic feeling” of infancy before a person possesses the sense of separation from the surrounding world: the sense of self. One of the earliest theories for a physiological basis underlying mystical experiences actually predates Freud’s theoretical approach by two years, appearing in Leuba’s (1925/2002) book, The Psychology of Religious Mysticism. Leuba described mystical experiences as erroneous cognitive attributions, based on the Mystic’s personal beliefs, for normally-occurring physiological states. Though psychoanalytic theories have fallen out of favour, Leuba’s cognitive misattribution view has persisted and remains a common thread running through contemporary scientific explanations of religion.

While one could write volumes about the social, cognitive, and evolutionary explanations of religion (see e.g. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion), this paper will limit its focus to the biological paradigm in understanding spiritual experiences. Spiritual experience is defined in this case as a subjectively profound event associated with some of the following characteristics: ecstasy or euphoria, visions or auditions of a religious nature, the sensation of supra-human agency (feeling that a higher power is at work), out-of-body sensations, and feelings of an external presence (Helminiak, 1984).

It should be noted that spiritual experiences and sensed presences are certainly not a prerequisite for religious belief; indeed, only a tiny proportion of religious adherents will probably experience religious hallucinations over the course of a lifetime. Nevertheless, they have been chosen for examination here because the importance of such experiences in religious history and religious dissemination cannot be overstated.

Several obvious examples come to mind, such as the major prophets of the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) who purportedly saw and spoke to angels or God. These prophets were compelled by these experiences to collectively write the books of the Bible and the Koran. Likewise, Constantine the Great, the 4th century emperor of Rome, claimed to see a vision of Apollo when he was a young man. Two years later, he claimed to witness the miracle of a Christian cross appearing in the sky. His subsequent conversion and legalization of that faith represented one of the most important single turning points in Christian history.

More recently, Joseph Smith claimed to have had multiple encounters with God and angels in the early 19th century. Smith went on to write the Book of Mormon, supposedly at God’s instruction. He is noteworthy for founding the Mormon faith, which today has millions of adherents worldwide. Is it possible that all of these enormously influential figures throughout theological history were simply suffering from disorders of the brain? Could there be a biological explanation for their religiosity?

Relatively recent evidence does indeed support this hypothesis. Altschuler (2002) argues that Ezekiel, author of the Old Testament Book of Ezekiel, had a pattern of symptoms, evident from his writings, which point to a diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE). Similarly, it is has been suggested by a number of scholars that Mohammed’s “holy trances” in which he was visited by the angel Gabriel were the product of epilepsy (see e.g. Archer, 1924, p. 16). Not surprisingly, however, this view is extremely contentious.

Unfortunately, it is difficult assess these historical/biblical figures in the absence of specific medical evidence. In general, the diagnoses of these individuals was based on self-report evidence present in their writings, or on observations made by acquaintances. However, more recent cases have also been observed, and in these cases there is medical confirmation of the illness. Fyodor Dostoyevsky is one of the more prominent examples.

Hughes (2005) presents a review of the epilepsy of Dostoyevsky, one of the most celebrated writers of all time. Dostoyevsky was diagnosed with generalized epilepsy including some localization in the temporal lobe by at least three physicians who examined him. Therefore, unlike the previously described cases, we have a specific medical foundation upon which to consider his symptoms. Among these, Dostoyevsky was described as having “a strong religiosity with God as his central obsession” [emphasis added] (Ibid.). In fact, the writer claimed that God had sent him a message of salvation which compelled him to write Crime and Punishment (Ibid.); this latter compulsion suggests hypergraphia as well. Additionally, Dostoyevsky claimed to experience ecstatic auras: peculiar sensations which immediately precede an epileptic seizure. His description of these auras can be found in Yarmolinsky (1965): “I experience such happiness as is impossible under ordinary conditions, and of which other people can have no notion. I feel complete harmony in myself and in the world and this feeling is so strong and sweet that for several seconds of such bliss one would give 10 years of one’s life, indeed perhaps one’s whole life.” Evidence that Dostoyevsky thought of his seizures as religious experiences comes from his later work, The Idiot, which depicts a Christ-like figure whose visions were also the product of epileptic seizures (Dostoyevsky, 1868/1998).

Religion also played an important role in the life of Vincent van Gogh, another temporal lobe epileptic, who was also described as an “utterly selfless” evangelist (Blumer, 2002). As a preacher, he was so devout that he was dismissed from the church for excessively charitable behaviour (it was considered “incompatible with the dignity of an ecclesiastic position”) (Ibid.). When he was hospitalized for psychotic symptoms of epilespy, van Gogh described the religious nature of his hallucinations and transferred this imagery to the canvas (Ibid.).

Upon further consideration of the cases mentioned above, it would appear that the behaviours are typical of a particular organic psychological disorder, once referred to as “the sacred disease” by Hippocrates (Hippocrates, 1846). These unique patterns of visions and experiences, specifically characterized by aggression, hypergraphia, religiosity, and hyperreligiosity are consistent with a diagnosis of epileptic activity in the right temporal lobe. The interictal behavioural characteristics of right TLE were first outlined in detail by Geschwind (1970), Dewhurst & Beard (1970), and Waxman & Geschwind (1975) and have subsequently been referred to in the literature as Geschwind’s syndrome or the “temporal lobe personality.”

REVIEW OF GESCCHIWnD Behavioral changes in temporal lobe epilepsy GOES HERE

REVIEW OF DEWHURST AND BEARDED LADY: Sudden religious conversions in temporal lobe epilepsy GOES HERE

REVIEW OF WAXMAN AND WHATEVER: hypergraphia in TLE. GOES HERE.

One interesting discovery from Geschwind’s (1980) work with temporal lobe epileptics was the finding that these dramatic changes in religious behaviour could be stopped completely with pharmacotherapy. Geschwind made use of Carbamazepine, an anti-convulsant (neural inhibitor) drug commonly used in the treatment of epilepsy (Czapinski et al., 2005). This is a crucial finding, because unlike case study approaches which can be difficult to generalize to larger populations and provide no understanding of causality, a drug effect is pseudo-experimental in that it demonstrates a possible cause-effect relationship. If a psychoactive drug, which targets and modifies biological processes, is capable of completely eliminating hyperreligiosity symptoms, it is a strong clue that the symptom has an underlying biological etiology.

Interestingly, a similar case study in India found that Carbamazepine completely prevented the manifestation of hyperreligious symptoms in the post-seizure period of three TLE sufferers (Unni et al., 1995). This latter finding is important for several reasons. First, it is a replication which strongly supports Geschwind’s original findings. Next, it demonstrates cross-cultural validity since the cases were discovered in a very different culture half a world away. This suggests that environmental factors are less likely to be the cause of hyperreligious behaviour, and that such behaviour is instead due to biological abnormality.

Although this paper has thus far only explored the small subset of religious behaviour characterized by bizarre spiritual experiences, it is entirely possible that more common religious beliefs are produced by the same biological structures. Whereas right temporal lobe epilepsy causes abnormal firing of neurons localized in a particular part of the brain, it is plausible that normal neural activity in the same area could be the basis for more typical religious beliefs. Interestingly, more typical spiritual experiences may be more common than expected. An extensive survey of a representative American sample found that 35% responded affirmatively to the question: “Have you ever felt as though you were close to a powerful, spiritual force which seemed to lift you out of yourself?” (Greeley, 1975). A survey of Britons replicated this finding, with 36.4% claiming to have had spiritual experiences (Hay and Morisy, 1978). There is of course the possibility that these findings were due to a poor operational definition of spiritual experiences; subjects may have interpreted the question in a number of different ways. Perhaps a dizziness or fainting spell could be experienced as a powerful, spiritual force drawing one out of the body. One must also consider the phenomenon of socially desirable responding, wherein devout religious adherents may have responded in the affirmative to appear more pious. Conversely, an atheist may have responded in the negative in spite of actually experiencing such a sensation. There is also the chance that people who have had such an experience would not remember them when surveyed, though one would expect biased recall of spiritual experiences given their profundity. In spite of these considerations, the latter two of which would actually deflate the figures, the numbers of assenting responses are large enough to be compelling.

While spiritual experiences appear to be fairly common in normal individuals, the above surveys provide no indication of their etiology. Evidence does exist, however, for an organic explanation of spirituality in healthy subjects.

The biological hypothesis is supported by data from the classic Minnesota Twin Study. This is a continuing, longitudinal study of monozygotic and dizygotic twins separated in infancy and then reared apart. Waller et al. (1990) studied the religious beliefs of these twins in order to determine whether genetics play a role in religiosity. The sample consisted of 53 identical and 31 fraternal twin pairs raised apart, as well as 458 identical and 363 fraternal twin pairs raised together. Waller et al. utilized five self-report measures of religiosity, such as the Religious Fundamentalism subscale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Religious Values scale. The results were mean correlations of about 0.5 for MZ twins regardless of whether they were reared together or apart. DZ twins raised together demonstrated a correlation of about 0.25, while those raised apart showed no correlation at all. By comparing the data for identical twins who possess 100% genetic similarity versus fraternal twins with only 50% genetic similarity, the authors concluded that the heritability coefficient for religiosity is approximately 0.50 (Ibid.). The results also indicated that shared environment effects (i.e. individuals growing up in the same household with the same parents, etc.) were minimal. Notwithstanding the limitations of heritability estimates, the important thing to consider here is that any genetic component for religious experience, (in this case, a rather large one) suggests an organic origin for those experiences.

Further substantiation of a biological substrate comes from Borg et al.’s (2003) study of the serotonergic system’s involvement in spiritual experiences. Based on previous research, the authors hypothesized that serotonin receptor density would be associated with personality traits like spirituality. this paragraph is a bit confusing - '''sorry, it is only half-written. this is the paragraph I am working on right now'''

Finally, some of the most compelling (and controversial) evidence for localization of religious functions to the temporal lobe comes from the research of Michael Persinger. Previous evidence tends to be anecdotal or correlational in nature, and subject to the common limitations of these methodological designs. For example, small sample sizes are difficult to draw conclusions from, and it is also difficult to generalize the results of case studies to any larger population. Internal validity has also been a classic problem, because spiritual experiences are themselves quite difficult to define. On the other hand, Persinger claims to have produced a design capable of testing the biological hypothesis experimentally.

In one study, -- PERSINGER STUDY GOES HERE - Perceptual & Motor Skills, 1997, 85, 2, 683-693.

GEOMAGNETIC PERSINGER STUDY GOES HERE.

Localization of religious experiences to the temporal lobe makes intuitive sense as well. The fact that the medial temporal lobe contains limbic subnuclei, including the hippocampus and the amygdala, is especially telling. Activity in these structures, respectively associated with memory and emotional judgments, contributes to “deepening of emotional response” (Waxman and Geschwind, 1974) and probably the emotional salience of religious experiences.

In summation, the evidence presented in a growing body of methodologically diverse literature strongly suggests a biological substrate for religion. Research specifically implicates the right temporal lobe as the seat of spiritual experiences. More generally, it suggests that this part of the brain may be responsible for the overwhelmingly popular belief in a supra-human agency. Additional research, especially of the type which moves away from case studies and anecdotes, and towards controlled experiments, is necessary to further this hypothesis.

Perhaps the answer to one of the most important questions of all time exists within all of us; a greater understanding of the mysteries of the human brain may help us shed light on the existence of God. Ultimately, it is important that such study not be perceived as an atheistic attack on religious beliefs. After all, the next question becomes: if supra-human agency doesn’t exist outside our own minds, why is the brain designed to make us believe it does?

References

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Freud, S. The future of an illusion. New York: W. W. Norton & Company; 1989.

James, W. The varieties of religious experience. New York: Barnes and Noble Books; 2004.

Archer, JC. Mystical elements in Mohammed. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1924.

Unni KES, Anand KS, Sadanandan Unni KE. Carbamazepine in interictal hyperreligiosity: three case reports. Indian Journal of Psychiatry. 1995; 37(3): 136-8

Czapinski P, Blaszczyk B, Czuczwar SJ. Mechanisms of action of antiepileptic drugs. Current Topics in Medicinal Chemistry. 2005; 5(1): 3-14.

Yarmolinsky A. Dostovesky: His life and art. NJ: S.G. Philips; 1965.

Dewhurst K, Beard AW. Sudden religious conversions in temporal lobe epilepsy. British Journal of Psychiatry 1970; 117: 497–507.

Hippocrates. The sacred disease. In: The genuine works of Hippocrates. London: Sydenham Soc.; 1846.

Hay D, Morisy A. Reports of ecstatic, paranormal, or religious experience in Great Britain and the United States. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 1978; 17: 255-268.

Greeley A. The sociology of the paranormal. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage; 1975.

Dostoyevsky F. The idiot. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1998.

Blumer D. The illness of Vincent van Gogh. American Journal of Psychiatry. 2002; 159: 519–526.

Helminiak DA. Neurology, psychology, and extraordinary religious experiences. Journal of Religion and Health. 1984; 23 (1): 33-46.

Waller NG, Kojetin BA, Bouchard TJ, Lykken DT, Tellegen A. Genetic and environmental influences on religious interests, attitudes, and values: a study of twins reared apart and together. Psychological Science. 1990; 1(2): 138-142.

Borg J, Andrée B, Soderstrom H, Farde L. The serotonin system and spiritual experiences. American Journal of Psychiatry. 2003; 160: 1965-1969.