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The definition of the principle of command and obedience (Befehl und Gehorsam) for the Bundeswehr in line with the concept of "citizens in uniform" (Staatsbürger in Uniform) is a central part of the 1953 introduction of "leadership development and civic education" (offcial translation of Innere Führung ). The revision of the definition of military orders and obedience as well as superior-subordinate relations by the former "Amt Blank" (Bureau Blank, predecessor of the Federal Ministry of Defense) was one of the consequences taken in the 1950s to respond to the negative experiences of military life in Nazi Germany. Central aims were the reduction of command power of superiors and to share responsibility of obedience with subordinates.

Military orders
A military order is defined in § 2 (2) of the German military penal law (Wehrstrafgesetz, WStG) as an
 * instruction expecting a defined behavior (Anweisung zu einem bestimmten Verhalten),
 * given by a military superior to his subordinate(s),
 * in written or oral form, or by any other means (e.g. by signals, by signs etc.),
 * in a general or a specific case,
 * with entitlement to obedience (Anspruch auf Gehorsam).

Consequently, a simple instruction is a military order only if a soldier giving this instruction is a military superior defined by the Ministerial Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations (Vorgesetztenverordnung). If an order is given by a person who is not a military superior, this order is legally defined a "military non-order" without claim of obedience. Fundamentally, a superior is responsible for his orders and has to enforce his instructions. He may only give orders for official purposes and has to prove his orders' legitimacy, purposefulness and adequacy. As the case may be he always has to be aware of the consequences of his order. Whenever it is possible, military orders should be given describing the task and especially the aim of it. This is called Auftragstaktik, and would enable subordinates to act aim-oriented in terms of superiors in case of unattainability, if situations changed.

Superior-subordinate relations
The different command relationships in the Bundeswehr are defined in the Ministerial Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations (official translation of Verordnung über die Regelung des militärischen Vorgesetztenverhältnisses, shortly Vorgesetztenverordnung (VorgV)). These service regulations were introduced on March 19, 1956, shortly before the first soldiers joined the just established Bundeswehr, taking effect on June 7, 1956. They were modified by ordinance on October 7, 1981. The Vorgesetztenverordnung applies to Bundeswehr soldiers only - non-military personnel of the Bundeswehr are not affected. Superior-subordinate relations of Federal Defense Administration members as well as military-civilian or civilian-military superior-subordinate relations are defined by other regulations and ordinances. The contents and meanings of the Vorgesetztenverordnung are among the first things Bundeswehr recruits are trained in.

Differences in command authority of superiors
In §§ 1-3 VorgG the assignments of command authority are laid out. It is possible that a soldier is superior to another in multiple ways. Definitions: :

Conflicting orders
If a subordinate received an order, that is conflicting with an already given different order or defers substantially the achievement of its aim, he would have to inform the superior who gave the second order about this. On the basis of this knowledge, the second superior would have due to his order responsibility to prove once more the given order and to decide, if the subordinate had to obey his order instead of the first received order or not. Nevertheless the subordinate has to obey the last given order, if the second one will not be canceled. This is necessary, because the second superior may have new information about a changed situation. In the case, that a subordinate has not been able to execute the first order or to reach the expected aim because of the second order, he has to inform the first superior as soon as possible. The subordinate could not be punished by him, because the second superior is responsible for his given order.

Prioritization in case of opposite superior relations
It might be possible, that two soldiers are superior to each other due to different paragraphs of the Vorgesetztenverordnung. For such situations the following prioritization of relation importances are defined: § 6 VorgG is excluded, because an officer or NCO could only declare himself to superior, if there was no superior to him at scene.

Duty of obedience
Before all else, subordinates have to obey their superiors and they have to inform superiors of non-executed orders or unreached aims. Subordinates have to execute military orders
 * by using their best endeavors,
 * completely,
 * painstaking and
 * immediately.

Although a superior has to prove his orders, the recipient has to do this once more. At first he would have to prove, if an instruction was even given by a defined military superior by the Vorgesetztenverordnung. If not, it would not be a military order with claim to obedience. If he executed this "military non-order", he would be responsible for possibly consequences. If the instruction is given by a military superior, he has to check its legitimac. Illegitimacy of orders would be given, if they were not concerning to official aims, if they were illegal, or if they contravened service regulations or public international law. Not all illegitimate are without claim of obedience, so he has to prove the bindingness in a last step. Infeasible orders as well as orders that violate human dignity or without official aims need not be executed. Orders including criminal activities that are punished with imprisonment not less than one year or heavy violation of International humanitarian law must not be executed, otherwise subordinates are guilty of their deeds, if the criminal character was obviously to them. Obviously unavoidable errors may stay unpunished fundamentally.

Punishment of disobedience and insubordination
Punishment of disobedience is regulated in the Wehrstrafgesetz (military penal law). Germany does not have any military courts. Jurisdiction have civilian courts.

Subordinates, who try or do not execute military orders with claim to obedience, may be punished in case of following severe consequences with imprisonment up to three years, in particularly heavy cases up to five years, if they acted at least negligently. A sever consequence means aggravated battery, a heavy disadvantage for the national security of Germany or for the military clout of the armed forces. Insubordination is the oral or physical revolt against military orders or the denial in spite of repetition of an order, and may be punished with imprisonment up to three years. In case of a revolt against a military order at first, a court could refrain from sentencing, if the subordinate executed the order voluntarily and in time afterwards. If subordinates avoided to execute orders with levity, they could also be sequenced by imprisonment up to two years in case of severe consequences.