User:OberMegaTrans/ss2022/Weimar Republic Role of Individuals

Role of individuals
Beside the reasons for the failure of the Weimar Republic relating to social history, structural policy and economy, influence and actions of persons in prominent positions and of responsibility are likewise examined by historical scholarship with regard to their effective contribution to the process of democratic decline, in particular in the era of the presidential cabinets (Präsidialkabinette).

Due to his military career and monarchic stance formed in the era of the German Empire, his major role in the propagation of the stab-in-the-back myth (Dolchstoßlegende), and his affiliation with the conservative East-Prussian milieu of large landowners, proponents of the Republic must have been suspecting President (Reichspräsident) Paul von Hindenburg of reactionism ever since his election back in 1925. As the head of state he epitomised the political power shift to the right, demanded and promoted authoritarian governance. At the same time, he saw himself in a function where he had to preserve the constitution, and refused to let instruments of power be used for blatant violations of the latter. For a long time, he staunchly opposed Hitler’s appointment as chancellor (Reichskanzler) with a clear reference to the latter’s dictatorial ambitions and imperious claim to power of his violent followers. His yielding in January 1933 was less due to his own person than the counsellors in his entourage who underestimated the dynamic potential of Hitler and his acolytes.

Meanwhile the policies and role of Heinrich Brüning, whom Hindenburg appointed as the first chancellor in the succession of presidential cabinets, are controversial. This includes his actions when the Great Coalition fell apart in March 1930. In January 1930 Otto Meißner, Hindenburg's State Secretary (Staatssekretär), as well as Kuno von Westarp a member of the German National People's Party (DNVP), envisaged a government that would be both "anti-Marxist" and "anti-parliamenty", and would bring about a "change in Prussia". That is, a replacement of the Social Democratic-led state government of Otto Braun. The question of whether the Great Coalition failed because of an internal crisis of the particracy or because of the intentions of Hindenburg and the commanders of the Reichswehr was the subject of a research disagreement between the historians Werner Conze and Karl Dietrich Bracher in the 1950s.The question remains controversial to this day. There is, however, a consensus that the end of Müller's regime on March 27th, 1930, marked an important turning point. The historian Arthur Rosenberg thus wrapped up his 1935 book on the Weimar Republic with this event. What followed was only epilogue for him. Along with Brünings taking office came "the end of relatively stable times, leading to the the phase of dissolution of Germany's first democracy", as Heinrich August Winkler assessed.

With regard to Franz von Papen's chancellorship, with its increasingly authoritarian features, two contrasting options for protecting the Republic are considered. On the one hand, the essentially resigned acquiescence of the 1932 Prussian coup d'état by the SPD leaders Otto Braun and Carl Severing and by the trade unions is problematized. However, even recent research does not come to the conclusion that the proclamation of a general strike or the appeal for armed resistance to the Prussian police and the Iron Front, for example, would have been likely to succeed. Against this stood not only the forces of the NSDAP, but also an expected decisive deployment of the Reichswehr. On the other hand, the chances of establishing an even more one-sided authoritarian regime were considered, as Papen sought to do by declaring a state of emergency and suspending new elections indefinitely. But since Hindenburg rejected such a breach of the constitution at crucial moments, the Republic could be, at best, hypothetically saved by this means.

Kurt von Schleicher, the last chancellor of Germany before Hitler, also prepared the declaration of a state of emergency for his own continuation in office after his other plans had failed. He thus would have been contained by Hindenburg as well. However, the Reichswehr leadership was already thoroughly prepared for the tasks ahead in this case.

Among the conditions of a presidential government that might have survived the economic and national crisis, the historian Peter Longerich cites social concessions and an active crisis-fighting policy, most clearly associated with Schleicher's Querfront ("cross-front") concept. Yet this approach by Schleicher, who had lobbied Hindenburg at the time for both Brüning's and Papen's appointments, came too late to make up for the loss of confidence and to sustainably revive lost hopes with the help of a program that had yet to be implemented. Hans Mommsen states: "Certainly this would have had greater chances in August 1932 than after the discrediting of the presidential system by Papen's amateurish solo efforts."