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DPP v Heffernan [2017 IESC 5 ] was a Irish Supreme Court case in which the Court held that “establish” in s 6(2) of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006 requires a murder accused to prove on the balance of probability that, at the time the offence was committed, they suffered from a mental disorder which justified a finding of not guilty of murder by reason of diminished responsibility.

Background
Heffernan was convicted of murder of Eoin Ryan in 2011 at the Central Criminal Court. The facts leading up to the death of the deceased was on the 6th June 2011. The appellant meet with the deceased for a brief conversation after drinking. At 6 am, the next morning, the Garda received a call from the appellant saying he had killed a man that had the devil in him.Upon interview, the appellant accepted that he had killed the deceased but denied intending to kill a person, stating that the devil had taken over the deceased and it was only after he had beaten the deceased to death that the devil left him and he had realized what he had done to the young man. He then claimed that he had spoken to Jesus and Jesus told him to ring the Gardaí.

At trial, Heffernan admitted to causing Ryan’s death but raised a defense of diminished responsibility under s 6(2) of the 2006 Act. The trial judge instructed the jury that the burden of proof for that defence is the balance of probabilities and was found guilty.

Heffernan appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal on grounds that the trial judge had misdirected the jury: he claimed that the defense of diminished responsibility is proven where the accused raises a reasonable doubt.

Heffernan appeal to the Court of Appeal was unsuccessful. The Court of Appeal found that the word "establish" in S 6(2) meant that the appellant bores the burden of proof which was the balance of probabilities.

Heffernan then went ahead and was granted appeal to the Supreme Court as to if the Court of Appeal was incorrect in their judgement.

Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. They held that it was on the appellant to establish on the balance on probabilities that during the alleged act, his responsibility had been diminish due to the fact he was suffering from a mental disorder. When the Oireachtas was writing up this legislation, they intended that the word "establish" and by requiring the court or jury to make a finding, to cast a burden of proof on the defence that goes beyond the raising of reasonable doubt.

Charleton J found that if all the appellant had to do was prove reasonable doubt that it would not be practical. It may not be enough for the accused to simply test the prosecution evidence and to probe potential weaknesses, thus leaving the task of persuading the jury that a particular defence is inapplicable to the prosecution. The accused should actively take part in the trial and to advocate their own case on the balance of probability.

Charleton J -

''It is fair that someone who claims a mental illness impairing their understanding or conduct in high degree in the context of homicide should have a defence in the form of diminished responsibility. But equally fair is the requirement that, in putting forward such a defence, the accused should truly engage with setting out his or her defence. Justifiably, the burden may be on the accused to bring forward testimony upon which that fact can safely be found''.

Probability in a legal context is the expression of satisfaction that a fact can safely be found.

number 2
BS v DPP [2017 IESCDET 134 ], was a Irish Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Supreme Court is not a court that corrects the errors of other court but a court that has the principle constitutional task of finding issues that is of general public importance.

Background
The accused was charge with rape offences that had allegedly took place in the 1970 when he was 16 years of age. The accused applied to the High Court asking for the trail to be dismissed due to the ground of delay and that he would not receive a fair trail as key witnesses were deceased. The High Court found this to be irrelevant. The accused appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal who held that the accused had show enough reason as to why he had a high risk of an unfair trial and dismissed the trial. The DPP sought to appeal the order of the Court of Appeal prohibiting the historical rape case from proceeding.

Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court held that under the 33rd Amendment of the Constitution, the Supreme Court is not a court that corrects the said errors of the lower courts. It was made clear that an appeal from the High Court under Art. 34.5.4 or the Court of Appeal under Art. 34.5.3 requires that the decision that was decided under these courts to be of a general public importance or that it was in the interest of justice necessary to allow the appeal.

In the view of the court "unless it can be said that the case has the potential to influence true matters of principles rather that the application of those matters of principle to the specific facts of the case in question then the constitutional threshold will not be met".

Following the facts of this case, the Supreme Court held that the judgement in the Court of Appeal applied established principles and requirements set out were not met. The appeal was dismissed

Subsequent developments
In Quinn Insurance Ltd v Price Waterhouse Cooper a case decided six days after BS, O'Donnell clarified the meaning of "A matter of general importance and in the interest of justice

A matter of general importance

O Donnell gave two points that should be applied when deciding if the appeal was a matter of general public importance. The first is that the point of the decision must be state-able and secondly, that it has to applied to other cases

In the interest of justice

O Donnell J found that "the fact that a court might make a decision which a further court might consider to be an error, does not itself establish injustice" and also stated that this category that applies when when the decision being appeal is not a matter of general public importance.