User:Osunpokeh/Essays/Second Cold War

In January 2021, Joseph R. Biden was inaugurated as the President of the United States, succeeding previous president (and electoral rival) Donald J. Trump. In the months since Biden's inauguration and the current time of writing, Biden and his administration has reversed nearly every policy position of the previous president, especially with regards to immigration, climate change, and public policy. Observing this, those who viewed United States foreign policy through a partisan lens may have assumed that because Donald Trump adopted an aggressive stance against China during his presidency that Biden would "reflexively adopt an anti-Trump stance" and foster cooperation with China.

This does not appear to be the case. Biden has upheld the precedent posed by the previous Trump administration and has maintained an assertive stance against China. During the Trump administration, the United States began to recognize the rising power of China as a threat, and has engaged in a long and drawn-out trade war, added tariffs to Chinese goods, and sanctioned Chinese firms over concerns of alleged intellectual property theft and other unfair trade practices. In addition to economic engagement, the United States and China has come to odds with each other militarily: the U.S. had carried out freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea and sailed warships through the Taiwan Strait in a defense of the sovereignty of Taiwan. After Biden assumed the presidency, he continued with a tough, assertive approach to the Chinese regime: Biden refused to roll back trade war tariffs enacted under Trump, and has continued carrying out military exercises around the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Biden appointed China hawk Kurt Campbell to direct Asian policy on the National Security Council. Biden's Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, actually acknowledged that "Trump was right in taking a tougher approach to China," although expressing disagreement with Trump's methods. Biden himself described China as "our most serious competitor", and asserted that "the United States does need to get tough with China."

Although Biden may have disagreed with Trump as a politician, their implied agreement that China was a threat to the United States gives strong credence to the idea that U.S.–China competition is not a partisan issue but instead one that concerns the entire nation. Congressional bills concerning China are often bipartisan and pass with unanimous consent. American public opinion of China is at an all-time low, with eighty-nine percent of Americans holding China to be an enemy. In all aspects, the People's Republic of China is now unambiguously an opponent to the United States.

But what explains adversarial competition between the United States and China?

Second Cold War
The term "Second Cold War" is not new, but it has gained relevance to describe growing tensions between the United States and China (and to a lesser extent, Russia). Citing deteriorating relations between the two nations in general and recent phenomena such as the ongoing trade war, increasing Chinese expansionism, and American sanctions in particular, scholars and journalists alike have stated that the two nations are on course for a Cold War-like scenario, or even stated that China and the United States were in a Cold War outright. But if global tensions today may be described as a Cold War (or on the verge of one), what are the differences between the first and the second?

The First Cold War has been characterized as a largely military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, with both nations building up their military strengths and engaging in proxy wars across the globe — Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan being prominent examples. But while the Soviet Union achieved parity with the United States militarily (both nations' nuclear weapons arsenals were comparable), the USSR's communist system could not ever match the market-based United States economically — in 1989, the poverty rate in the Soviet Union was twenty percent, compared to fourteen percent with the United States.

The Second Cold War (if it can be described as such), by contrast, is far more of an economic contest than a military conflict, as China is a (primarily) economic competitor rather than a military adversary. At the World Economic Forum in 2017, Chinese General-Secretary Xi Jinping put an emphasis on global economic growth with China playing a leading role. China now has the globe's largest national economy, having surpassed the United States in gross domestic product around 2017. When Donald Trump took action against China, he targeted their economy with a trade war, instituting tariffs and blacklisting several Chinese technology firms.

The fact that the so-called "Second Cold War" is primarily economic rather than military leads some to dismiss the "Cold War" label entirely. Although China maintains a large military presence and exerts its power across the Asia-Pacific region, China and the United States are still not militarily comparable, nor are they militarily competing on a scale that is similar to the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the first Cold War. Instead, China continues to exert its economic prowess in order to gain influence, as evidenced by the existence of institutions such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank that invest in developing nations around the world.

Chinese journalist Chen Weihua, working for state-owned news outlet China Daily, claimed — and criticized Biden over a "cold war" that the United States is allegedly waging against China, so the term "cold war" does indeed see use in Chinese circles rather than being exclusive to the United States or the West.

Zhao Minghao analyzes the context and implications of "the possibility of a new [U.S.–China] Cold War" through an analysis of the Chinese circles of debate. He mentions that Chinese foreign relations observers weren't taken by surprise by the trade war and competition, but in fact anticipated U.S.–China competition as far back as the recession of 2008, when the weakening of the United States's economic power around the world "gradually [compelled] the United States to treat China as a co-equal." At the same time however, this newfound rivalry would lead to a "Cold War mentality" as the United States seeks to preserve its hegemony by resisting the rise of China: just as the United States's policy of containment sought to prevent the Soviet Union from spreading communism around the world during the first Cold War, now the United States seeks to contain another allegedly authoritarian nation from "export[ing] globally its model of state-capitalism and authoritarian governance."

China and the United States find themselves in a unique situation where both want expand their global influence at the cost of the other, and competition between the two nations has spilled over into pretty much every facet of geopolitics, from commercial competition to climate change. Each of them sees the other as an enemy to not just their own interests but their ideologies — and ideological conflicts play a major role in explaining why the United States and China are at odds with each other. But although the motivations driving competition between the two nations may be complex, it isn't hard to see how competition or a Cold War between the world's two most powerful nations will have global, far-reaching implications.

Explaining China–United States conflict
"To grow its economy, China must have the courage to swim in the vast ocean of the global market. — Xi Jinping (2017)" It is unquestionable that China's economic rise has been one of the greatest, if not the greatest, to occur during the past half-century. Whereas China's GDP was dismal immediately after the founding of the People's Republic, and in fact declined further under Mao Zedong's disastrous industrialization program, it has since risen meteorically in the late-20th and 21st centuries as the nation developed. Chinese economic policy can be described as mercantilist, id est, maximizing net value exported. Historically, this has meant producing and exporting massive quantities of cheap goods, which made China an attractive market for foreign (including American) multinational firms to benefit from cheap labor costs. Around the turn of the century, however, China began instead adopting a policy of prioritizing indigenous technology development over foreign companies. In doing so, the Chinese government enacts policies that benefit Chinese firms domestically and abroad. Foreign businesses seeking to enter the Chinese market and take advantage of a potential customer base numbering at over a billion must accede to numerous demands by the Chinese government, for example, being required to procure goods and services from Chinese-owned suppliers, form joint ventures with Chinese firms, et cetera. Domestic firms gain preferential treatment, while foreign firms are discriminated against with government subsidies and loans. Many of these policies violate World Trade Organization regulations. Often, foreign firms must transfer technology and intellectual property to domestic ones in order to do business and expand in China. In other instances, China encourages outright theft of intellectual property secrets from U.S. and other foreign firms to unfairly advantage domestic producers, exacerbated by lack of recognition of foreign patents.

Although China stands to benefit from these aggressive trade agreements, American companies stand to lose. Uber became a notable example when in 2016, it divested its Chinese subsidiary to competitor DiDi after facing a billion dollars per year in losses, with impending government regulations threatening to make that number even worse. This pattern of China stealing U.S. intellectual property and "unfairly" subsidizing domestic firms over their American competitors has become a point of contention with the United States, and leaders like Biden are rightly concerned that this may give China a technological (and therefore) strategic advantage in future competition. China's aggressive mercantilist policies were used by the United States and the Trump administration as a justification for the trade war, and Biden appears to have little intention to stop it.

The United States is also fighting back in other ways, most notably with 5G communications technology, the strategic importance thereof which cannot be understated. As a study by the Defense Innovation Board states, "historical shifts between wireless generations suggest that the first-mover country stands to gain billions in revenue accompanied by substantial job creation and leadership in technology innovation ... Conversely, countries that fell behind in previous wireless generation shifts ... missed out on a generation of wireless capabilities and market potential." Therefore, the United States has every interest to ensure that the forefront of the "race for 5G" is led by companies that are strategically aligned with and not against the United States and its allies.

With that said, the United States's Clean Network initiative, begun in 2020, has the intention of denying market share to Chinese telecommunications companies such as Huawei in building out 5G infrastructure. As then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated, these actions were intended as a reactionary measure to Chinese human rights abuses and to prevent the Chinese government from surveilling Americans' personal information and communications, but plausibly, in addition to its stated goals, may also be a tit-for-tat retaliation against Chinese discriminatory practices. Whereas China had discriminated against foreign firms in Chinese markets, now the United States is attempting to discriminate against Chinese firms by denying them access to infrastructure opportunities in the United States altogether. Furthermore, the United States is then using its extensive political leverage in allied nations, as well as shared interests in security, safety, and ethical decency to encourage them to act against China as well. Keith J. Krach, one of the key individuals behind The Clean Network, reports that over 50 nations have signed agreements with the United States all promising to eliminate "untrusted" Chinese services vendors from within their borders. The United Kingdom, now a member of The Clean Network, made the expensive choice to prohibit the purchase of Huawei equipment and order telecom companies to decommission all existing Huawei infrastructure by 2027. As for Huawei themselves, whereas they previously had boasted over 90 contracts to deploy 5G infrastructure abroad,

Biden has effectively and implicitly endorsed the Clean Network, stating in 2020 that "a Biden administration will join together with the United States' democratic allies to develop secure, private-sector-led 5G networks" — one of (the few) things Biden has the Trump administration to thank for. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, in her confirmation hearing, described "untrusted vendors" in general and Huawei in particular as "a threat to the security of the U.S. and our allies." Continuing, she would state express intention to continue denying Huawei and company access to American 5G assets: "We will ensure that American telecommunications networks do not use equipment from untrusted vendors and will work with allies to secure their telecommunications networks and make investments to expand the production of telecommunications equipment by trusted U.S. and allied companies."

Economic diplomacy and the Indo-Pacific
A 2020 report by American think tank RAND Corporation investigated the dynamics of influence in the Asia-Pacific, where the People's Republic of China seeks to extend its control to its nearest neighbors, and where the United States seeks to resist said Chinese expansion. China seeks to bring Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific into the Chinese sphere of influence through extensive use of investments while the United States seeks to enhance regional security for itself and its allies, usually against the interests of China. While United States has more political and military influence in nation-states across the region, China holds and leverages more economic influence.

The epitome of China's expansion outside its physical borders is the Belt and Road Initiative. Started in 2013, the ambitious Belt and Road initiative plans to provide trillions of dollars in funding for infrastructure projects in developing and developed nations alike — one estimate gives a program cost of US$4–8 trillion. Its stated objective is to "connect Asian, European and African countries more closely and promote mutually beneficial cooperation to a new high and in new forms." Not only does this program aim to provide economic investment in developing nations, it also consequently leads to increased political leverage. China stands to gain from its investments with increased political influence in local and national governments around the world, in turn giving it a greater presence in influencing international institutions and norms in China's own image. It has also given China substantial military capability, with newly-constructed roads and ports lending themselves to military bases — such as China's first overseas base in the African nation of Djibouti.

When Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa wished to build a new marine port near the town of Hambantota, they sought out billions of dollars in Belt and Road loans to finance its construction. Unfortunately for them, traffic at the port was slow, and clearly it would not pay off its debts in any reasonable timeframe. As a result, Sri Lanka was effectively coerced to sell an 85% majority stake of the port to a Chinese state-owned corporation in order to raise US$1.1 billion to pay off debts — now, China has a 99-year lease on a strategic port and 15000 acre, positioned in the centre of a strategic ocean route and only a short distance from India, a noted Chinese rival. Although the terms of the agreement only allow Chinese military activity in the port with Sri Lanka's permission, former Indian national security advisor Shivshankar Menon expressed concerns that China may have been interested in the location for military reasons (India is an enemy of China), and is willing to use Sri Lanka's US$5 billion debt as leverage. "Another milestone along path [sic] of #BeltandRoad," Chinese state-owned media organization Xinhua boasted on Twitter.

Behind the scenes, Chinese sources had been funneling millions of dollars into Rajapaksa's campaign accounts (despite the Belt and Road Initiative promising mutual noninterference in internal affairs), as Maria Abi-Habib reports for The New York Times. Although feasibility studies concluded that the port at Hambantota "was not economically viable" nor was it a sound alternative to expanding the existing Port of Colombo, Rajapaksa dismissed the studies and proceeded with construction of the port anyway with Chinese money. In the lead-up to the 2015 Sri Lanka election, Abi-Habib writes that China Harbor bank accounts had transferred US$7.6 million to Rajapaksa campaign affiliates, including $3.7 million in checks for gifts and promotional material. (Rajapaksa ultimately lost the election in an upset victory for the opposition party, and now has to deal with allegations of corruption, which is not exactly the first time this has happened with regard to Belt and Road projects. ) Although this is one of the more significant examples of what critics have called debt-trap diplomacy, it demonstrates that China is willing to leverage its financial wherewithal as the world's largest economy for increased influence in nations across the world.

At times, this works out less conveniently for China. Since 2016, Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte has advocated for closer economic ties to China and a rejection of the United States, for example, welcoming extensive Chinese Belt and Road investment and announcing that he would terminate the Philippines–United States Visiting Forces Agreement that allowed U.S. military personnel and materiel unrestricted movement in the Philippines. But increasing Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea, especially in Philippine-controlled maritime areas, has made Duterte's pro-Chinese policy increasingly unviable — a significant opposition of government officials and citizens alike are showing their resentment towards China. When Chinese naval vessels illegally harassed a Philippine fishing boat within the Philippines' EEZ (only one incident of Chinese aggression in many), senators not only criticized China for violating international law, but also on failing to deliver on investments, including COVID-19 vaccines, further undermining the credibility of Duterte's pro-China policy and forcing his hand in the opposite direction.

Duterte conceded that in spite of his anti-American animosity, the United States military was indeed a valuable asset to the nation in countering increased Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea, Although the Visiting Forces Agreement has been terminated, Duterte has since authorized temporary extensions that keep the agreement in effect. The Philippines is only one of many Southeast Asian nations to break from China for closer ties with the United States: across the Asia-Pacific region and around the world, surveys indicate that the United States is consistently more popular than China. After Chinese military aircraft intruded into Malaysian airspace in 2021, the government of Malaysia declared China to be a security threat. Combined with allegedly "unfair" and "colonial" Belt and Road infrastructure projects, Malaysia has been pushing for greater ties with the United States in order to offset Chinese influence in the nation. And Vietnam: considering that Vietnam and the United States were at war fifty years ago, it is almost impressive that China and its aggressive expansionism has managed to make Vietnam one of America's strongest Indo-Pacific allies.

In general, the United States policy regarding the Belt and Road initiative and Chinese expansion has been one of intense discouragement: under Trump, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo commented that Belt and Road projects exact "a political cost ... which will greatly exceed the economic value of what you were provided." But all of this anti-China rhetoric from the United States still lacks an underlying explanation. What explains the United States treating China not as a partner for a globalized Earth and vice versa? Why are the goals of the United States and China fundamentally opposed to each other?

Are the two nations ideologically incompatible?

The role of ideology
"We simply cannot afford to leave China ... to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates, and threaten its neighbors ... The world cannot be safe until China changes. — Richard Nixon (1967)" In 1967, American presidential candidate Richard Nixon wrote, on the subject of Asian foreign policy, that "our aim ... is to persuade China that it must change: that it cannot satisfy its imperial ambitions, and that its own national interest requires a turning away from foreign adventuring and a turning inward toward the solution of its own domestic problems." Only five years later, President Nixon would visit the People's Republic of China, with the immediate goal of rapprochement but also the ultimate goal of influencing the political liberalization of the authoritarian state in the hopes that Chinese economic development would come with a transformation of Chinese government and society into a liberal democracy.

This attempt by the United States at liberalizing China has not gone well.

Why? Simply, "the fear that greater openness would threaten both domestic stability and the regime's survival drove China's leaders to look for an alternative approach ... putting up walls and tightening state control, constricting, rather than reinforcing, the free flow of people, ideas, and commerce", as stated by foreign policy experts Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner. Significantly, a an infamous leaked 2012 Communist Party memo that came to be known as "Document Number Nine" stated that the liberal values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights, were dangerous Western values that posed a threat to the rule of the Communist Party and therefore a threat to China.

This failure by the United States to liberalize China is attributed by Zhao as one of the reasons why the United States seeks to compete with (and contain) China: "Washington seeks to abandon its engagement policy towards China due both to its failure to mould China’s modernisation to its liking and its perception of China as more willing to compete, rather than to cooperate with Western democracies." In fact, Tsinghua University professor (and CPC member) Yan Xuetong goes as far as "[emphasizing] ideological rivalry as a key factor defining the trajectory of US–China relations in the coming decades."

Interestingly, the original Cold War was also a conflict driven by ideological differences, the Soviet Union championing communism, while the United States remained staunchly capitalist. In today's ideological battle, China represents an authoritarian model of a nation, while today's United States does the opposite (at least in theory). But the similarities may end there. Whereas the first Cold War quickly settled into a bipolar world of capitalism versus communism with lines drawn cleanly between them, the paradigm of today's world is comparatively much more complex. The rise of globalization has caused the 21st century United States and China to depend on each other, in a way that the 20th century Soviet Union and United States would have found unthinkable — China, being a mercantile power, arrived at its current position of power by means of exporting large quantities of goods to the rest of the world. Likewise, the United States is dependent on importing said goods — a paradigm that China Foreign Affairs University professor Wang Fan describes as "competitive interdependence". American economist Stephen S. Roach describes it as "destructive codependency" — noting that Trump's trade war against China has led to harm for both U.S. and Chinese economic activity.

Human rights has been a contentious part of U.S.–China relations. China is deeply unpopular in the U.S. and the West in part because of its human rights violations,                          a topic that U.S. government officials regularly issue condemnations on. A Pew Research survey conducted in February of 2021 found that, when asked, "what's the first thing you think about when you think about China?", an entire twenty percent of respondents said "human rights".

Debate exists within both Western and Chinese circles pertaining to whether this ideological competition will remain as a contest of material power, or escalate into violence through proxy wars.

Human rights and international norms
and China has contributed to human rights in
 * Constructive theorists such as Kim Hun Joon claim that ideology plays a defining role in U.S.–China relations.

In the words of Kim himself, international norms "arise when actors categorize behaviors as right or wrong, legitimate or illegitimate, or desirable or undesirable."

Nonetheless, China is not particularly known well for human rights.

Before continuing, we would have to actually define what human rights is.

Moreover, the Chinese idea of cultural relativism asserts that human rights are not universal but should instead be dependent on the context of cthe

Returning to Zhao, the United States

'''I definitely want to be thinking about the why, i.e. why are the United States and China competing instead of perhaps cooperating. Attribute to ideology?'''

Trade and technology
"If China has its way, it will keep robbing the United States and American companies of their technology and intellectual property. It will also keep using subsidies to give its state-owned enterprises an unfair advantage—and a leg up on dominating the technologies and industries of the future. The most effective way to meet that challenge is to build a united front of U.S. allies and partners to confront China’s abusive behaviors and human rights violations ... China can’t afford to ignore more than half the global economy. That gives us substantial leverage to shape the rules of the road on everything from the environment to labor, trade, technology, and transparency... — Joe Biden (2020)" The U.S.–China trade war and associated actions has caused the flow of trade between China and the United States to shrink, a phenomenon known as economic decoupling, when both nations forgo interdependency for independency in economies, technology, and politics. This shares many similarities to the world under the first Cold War, where both nations were politically and economically disjointed. During the U.S.–China trade war, U.S. tariffs had the effect of pushing American firms to supplanted Chinese goods with imports from Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and other Asian nations.

Neither nation benefits from economic decoupling, as the flow of trade between the two nations benefits both. Economic decoupling will be a drawn-out and excruciating process for both nations: the United States has lost 0.3% of its GDP and 300 thousand jobs, despite Trump's claims that a trade war would increase such claims. China's economy is not doing very well either, even before the pandemic hit. Although the two nations have tried to remediate their economic relationship for mutual benefit, and  Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd stated that "there seems to be limited appetite to do further damage to the trading relationship, an interest in repairing it somewhat, as well as sustaining a process for resolving the rest over time," a good end to the U.S.–China trade war is not guaranteed. Robert Zoellick, former President of the World Bank, writes "do not assume that the cyber era of the 21st Century is immune to crack-ups or catastrophes of equal or even greater scale."

Decoupling between the United States and China economically may also feed back into deteriorating U.S.–China relations further. Not only would decoupling negatively impact China and the U.S. individually, mutual economic interests between the two nations play a vital role in keeping relations in check, and the elimination of such interests in a "fully decoupled world", as Kevin Rudd states, may "[herald] the return of an iron curtain between East and West and the beginning of a new conventional and nuclear arms race with all its attendant strategic instability and risk."

Rudd continues, among the fields where the symptoms of decoupling are the most acute is technological development.

Race for the Future
The trade war has been accompanied with a war over technological development. The possession of more advanced technologies is correlated with global power, and both nations are rushing to acquire dominance in developing and possessing the technologies that will influence the geopolitics of the future. Biden views technology as a defining challenge of the time, and China's aggressive investment in "dominating the technologies and industries of the future" as a challenge to the United States.

Both U.S. and Chinese technological progress has nominally been accompanied by the expense of the other. As Derek Levine writes, "consensus among researchers suggests that the state plays an important role in promoting technology". The Chinese government has made clear that they want domestic production of high-tech goods and services through industrial policy, as evidenced in the National Medium and Long Term Plan for Science and Technology, from 2006 to 2020, and Made in China 2025, from 2015 to 2025. These policies aim to emphasizes domestic research into high-technology fields, such as electronics, information technology, and pharmaceuticals, that China currently relies on imports for. China's extensive state intervention to support domestic firms over foreign ones, as well as tactics such as intellectual property theft and forced technology transfer agreements, have been decried by opponents such as the United States as unfair, further precipitating competition and tensions between the two nations. At the same time, United States scrutiny on Chinese firms, such as ZTE (over surveillance concerns and violations of export restrictions), have only made such domestic technology development more urgent as China rushes to supplant their increasingly restricted access to foreign high-tech manufacturing with domestic production.

Meanwhile, the government of the United States is also pushing forward with its own research and development investments. The Endless Frontier Act, a US$110 billion research and development bill currently in the U.S. Senate at the time of writing, has been cosponsored by politicians from both major U.S. political parties with the stated intention of "[allowing] the United States to out-compete countries like China, create more good-paying American jobs and help improve our country's economic and national security," according to Senator Chuck Schumer, one of the cosponsors of the bill The bill also includes provisions that block Chinese firms from taking advantage of American research sponsored by the Endless Frontier Act, in fact, some believe that the bill doesn't go far enough to defend American firms from Chinese espionage.

5G technology development and deployment, mentioned earlier, is a particularly prominent aspect of the technology war between the U.S. and China. Although Chinese firms enjoy a vast domestic market of over a billion people, increasing resistance from the United States and its allies has effectively denied Huawei access to export 5G equipment to U.S.-aligned Western nations outside China, further contributing to the divide between China and the West. Huawei's technological lead in 5G, initially showing immense promise, has run up against an impassable wall built by the United States.

The United States still wields significant leverage across global supply chains of semiconductors, and has used its power to wage a multiple-pronged attack on Chinese electronics manufacturing. A vital piece of tooling in manufacturing semiconductor chips is the photolithography machine, and the world's most advanced photolithography systems are manufactured by Netherlands-based ASML. In 2020, the United States had successfully lobbied the government of the Netherlands to prevent ASML from exporting their machines to Chinese semiconductor manufacturers such as SMIC, setting back Chinese semiconductor production and privileging their foreign competitiors. CNBC writes that analysts believe that "expansion and node advancements of SMIC and other Chinese foundries will inevitably suffer in the next three years" Huawei, dependent on advanced semiconductors in a variety of consumer products, would have been forced to resort to foreign-manufactured chips by TSMC, had the United States not banned them from buying from TSMC months earlier. With foreign sources banned from selling to China, and domestic sources banned from procuring the equipment necessary to produce at a technology level satisfying Huawei's needs, the company has found itself in a particularly difficult position, further putting pressure on China to onshore the entirety of their semiconductor manufacturing supply chain.

Meanwhile, American politicians have been also discussing using subsidies to attract semiconductor firms to invest in manufacturing capabilities on American soil. Taiwan-based TSMC,  Korea-based Samsung and U.S.-based Intel have taken up the offer, and have begun constructing semiconductor factories in Arizona and Texas: Samsung plans to invest US$17 billion, Intel $21 billion, and TSMC an enormous $35 billion in investments. While China falters under American pressure, the United States pushes forwards with developing its own cutting-edge semiconductor manufacturing capability.

Michael Klare, an outspoken critic of increasing hostilities between the U.S. and China, raises concerns that the metaphorical wall set up between the two nations will lead to "wasted resources, inadequate financing, duplicative research" in reference to the development of climate change mitigation technology and COVID-19 vaccines. At the same time, the (first) Cold War drove tremendous technological development which ushered in the modern age, and a second Cold War may see similar results.

Climate change
Of course, it is imprudent to discuss such a global-scale phenomenon without the context of climate change. Indeed, climate change, one of the most pressing issues facing humankind nowadays, also plays a major role in U.S.–China relations. China and the United States produce 30% and 14% of the world's carbon dioxide emissions, respectively. Combined, they produce a disproportionate 44% of the global total, and therefore their climate policies quite literally have the power to change the world.

Climate change as a geopolitical tool
One observed effect of competition between the United States and China is that climate policy has been used by both the United States and China as a political leverage to demonstrate moral superiority over their rival. Joe Biden has stated that he plans to target 2050 as a goal for net-zero greenhouse gas emissions and to execute upon his plans with “massive, urgent investments.” Meanwhile, Xi Jinping announced that China would set 2060 as their carbon neutrality target during a convention of the United Nations General Assembly in 2020. Notably, Xi’s speech at the General Assembly was tactically scheduled to take place immediately after one by Trump, who was generally considered to be weak on climate, having withdrawn the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement in 2020. Chinese climate analyst Li Shuo stated that Xi’s move was “bold and well calculated” and that “it demonstrates Xi's consistent interest in leveraging the climate agenda for geopolitical purposes.

At the same time, Biden has spent no time identifying flaws within China's climate policy and holding China to their actions. In 2019, (prior to his election) he stated that he would insist that China "stop subsidizing coal exports and outsourcing pollution to other countries by financing billions of dollars’ worth of dirty fossil fuel energy projects." Indeed, China has poured US$1 billion into coal plants in developing nations as part of the Belt and Road Initiative in the first half of 2019 alone — China seems less interested in reducing global carbon dioxide emissions than just offshoring it to other developing nations to save face. Estimates project that if countries participating in the Belt and Road initiative continue to follow such carbon-intensive development schemes, the global climate will warm by 2.7 °C, even if all other nations strictly obey by 2 °C scenario carbon reductions.

Concerns on warming
Furthermore, the prospect of deteriorating relations between the United States and China have raised concerns that this would interfere with collective climate action. Critics like Michael Klare argue that a Cold War between the world's two most powerful nations — and two worst polluters — would have dangerous consequences for collective climate action. He continued that cooperation between the two nations in climate policy and clean technology research is vital to combating climate change, and a standoff between the two would waste resources, duplicate research, and stall green technology deployment. For example, the Paris Agreement, Klare argues, was made possible only with the collective ratification of both China and the Obama-era United States, and "a cold war environment" between the two nations "would make such cooperation a fantasy."

Averting a crisis
Or maybe not. Seemingly in the face of rising tensions (and Klare's warnings), in April 2021, U.S. climate envoy John Kerry traveled to China to meet with Chinese climate envoy Xie Zhenhua, signing an agreement to cooperate on future climate issues. The following week, Biden held a global climate summit where he pledged to halve U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by the year 2030, while at the same time announcing a multitude of international collaborations to defeat the climate crisis.

Derek Grossman believes that comments that competition is here to stay, but cooperation in mutual issues such as climate may still happen "the United States are more likely to only cooperate on very narrow and limited challenges of mutual concern rather than ambitiously pursue a wholesale reset of the relationship Perhaps sensing this, the Biden administration's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance notes that 'we welcome the Chinese government's cooperation on issues such as climate change, global health security, arms control, and nonproliferation where our national fates are intertwined.'" At the same time, we see Chinese president Xi Jinping acknowledge that climate change "should not become a geopolitical chip, a target for attacking other countries or an excuse for trade barriers,"

In the end, the relationship between a Second Cold War and climate change is complex. We have observed how state leaders both of the United States and China are willing to use their climate action as a political card in order to highlight their own nations' role as stewards of the common good, or otherwise demonstrate their superiority. Some believe that a Cold War between the United States and China will undermine collective climate action and spell doom for the planet, while others hope that the United States and China will take enough action together in order to avert disaster. So far, because of collaboration between the U.S. and China in the face of adversity, we seem to be in the latter scenario and might very well find ourselves in a few decades to have escaped the worst of climate change consequences.

That is, assuming we last a few decades at all.

Escalation

 * It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this instilled in Sparta, that made war inevitable."— Thucydides"

The term "Thucydides Trap" refers to an observation that when a rising power threatens to displace or otherwise rival a ruling power, the result almost always ends in war, named after Hellenic historian Thucydides who first made the observation with regards to the war between Athens and Sparta. Interestingly, the similarities do not just end there: Athens was a mercantile power, while Sparta was renowned for projecting power through its military strength.

But although China's influence projection strategies in the Indo-Pacific and around the world are primarily economic in character, by no means is China limited to solely economic strategies. Former Chinese army officer Liu Mingfu states that in order for China to compete and eventually displace the United States as the leading world power, "China's role as a great power cannot be limited to a major economic role ... only by becoming a military power can China effectively maintain its security." Although China's role in force projection around the globe is relatively limited (compared to the United States, of course), China's gross domestic product is already substantially greater than that of the United States, and military analysts predict from current trends that it may achieve military parity with the United States around the year 2035. However, at the same time, the strategic value of the United States being a current global hegemon cannot be understated, and Chinese global preeminence is by no means guaranteed.

Military conflict
Although both the United States and China have massive militaries, neither stand to benefit from war breaking out between the two nations, as such a war would very likely cause massive collateral damage across the world. Ian Bremmer describes a militarily-entrenched Cold War as a "strategic blunder" with the United States disinterested from a history of endless, costly foreign wars, and China's globalized economy that made it a world power in the first place has left it with costly dependencies that it can ill afford to lose. Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis states that the United States has good reason to avoid an armed confrontation which may "leave our country in far wore shape than it is right now". Zhao Minghao writes that China seeks to "[reposition] the country on 'the world central stage'" while carefully avoiding an armed confrontation that would cause a war.

Nonetheless, although neither want war, both are prepared for one should it happen. China and the United States possess the world's two largest militaries by military spending, and while the United States has greater funding, the People's Liberation Army's aggressive modernization program has raised alarms within American circles. Strategic competition between the two nations has raised concerns that the world is now at a much greater risk of conflict between the two nations.

And when asked where a hypothetical engagement between Chinese and American armed forces is most likely to happen, all eyes turn towards Taiwan.

The Taiwan issue
Before we continue, a clarification on terminology: there are actually two nations that self-describe as "China". The People's Republic of China controls the Chinese mainland and is commonly referred to as "China" in regular discourse. The Republic of China controls the island of Taiwan. Of course, it's more complicated than that. The Republic of China existed first, having been founded in 1912, it governed the mainland for several decades, until it became engaged in a bloody civil war against a rebel faction of Communists. Ultimately, the Communists were able to win and take control of the Chinese mainland, proclaiming the People's Republic of China in 1949. The fleeing government of the Republic of China retreated to the island of Taiwan, where they remain to this day. In this essay, as per convention, we will use "China" and "Taiwan" to describe the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, respectively.

Continuing, (the People's Republic of) China has repeatedly stated that it plans to invade the island of Taiwan and finally bring an end to the Republic of China, which the People's Republic holds to be in illegitimate government controlling territory that is the rightful property of itself. In 1954, fighting once again broke out between China and what was now Taiwan, after China seized several islands controlled by Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait, in what would become the Taiwan Strait Crisis. In response, the United States under President Harry S. Truman would intervene on behalf of Taiwan, sending a fleet of warships to the Taiwan Strait to assist Taiwanese forces in defending the islands. In 1958, Chinese forces would again attack Taiwanese holdings in the Taiwan Strait, leading to a second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Then, Dwight D. Eisenhower again sent a naval fleet to the area and to engage Chinese invasion forces. In 1995 and 1996, China fired ballistic missiles at Taiwan for intimidation purposes during an election in a third Taiwan Strait Crisis; their plans were foiled when Bill Clinton would set up "the biggest display of US military power in Asia since the Vietnam War," dispatching two entire carrier groups to Taiwan. In all three instances, the United States consistently demonstrated that it would intervene on behalf of Taiwan and do so with military might. Since 1979, the United States has been legally obligated to sell arms to Taiwan.

In the present day, China's military strength far outclasses Taiwan in size. However, numbers don't tell the entire story: transporting troops across 180 km of ocean is already a daunting task for any invasion force, much less one consisting of hundreds of thousands of soldiers (not to mention the Taiwanese missile batteries). And out of fourteen viable landing sites on the Taiwanese coast, all fourteen are surrounded by both difficult terrain and decades' worth of artificial fortifications. Both American experts as well as People's Liberation Army analyses (leaked to CNN) show that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be "extremely difficult". In addition, Taiwan's military might is supported by the United States through weapons purchases and political support, and both nations share common security concerns with the rise of the People's Republic of China. Such material commitment from the world's foremost military power is intended to, and makes China's coercion tactics against Taiwan less effective. Factoring the prospect of United States support in a military invasion of Taiwan would only further tip the odds against China's favor, no rational mind would consider an invasion of Taiwan to be advisable.

But Xi Jinping is not exactly a rational mind. Unlike his predecessors, Xi has consistently emphasized a rhetoric that Taiwan "must and will be" reunited under the governance of the People's Republic of China. Xi has been one of the most aggressive Chinese heads-of-state in pushing for a reunified China, stating that "we do not promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option to use all necessary measures" against anyone, including the United States, who stand by the sovereignty of Taiwan. The threat of U.S. deterrence on Taiwan may not actually deter an increasingly hawkish China from launching an invasion anyway, with sketchy prospects of actually succeeding in occupying the island.

And recent, adversarial developments in relations between the United States and China around the globe has threatened to reignite tensions across the Taiwan Strait, raising the stakes for war. Donald Trump became the first president to contact the Taiwanese government since 1979. After a lull in U.S. military demonstrations during Obama, the Trump administration has resumed conducting Taiwan Strait transits with naval vessels. The Biden administration has continued these "routine" military demonstrations in the Taiwan Strait, "[demonstrating] the U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific." These moves have provoked strong condemnation by China, who stated that "U.S. actions ... [endanger] peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait". Meanwhile, China has been flying fighters into Taiwanese airspace, not to mention sailing their own warships into the Taiwan Strait,  drawing the ire of the United States.

Both parties showing their intent with demonstrations of military force run the risk that one such demonstration may very well lead to an altercation, spiraling out of control from there into full-on conflict. Michael Klare has warned that war is a very real risk when assertive parties face even a small altercation, something that could easily happen when borders are not only vague but highly contested, as in the case with disputed territories around the Asia-Pacific such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Senkaku Islands, where Chinese military forces frequent regularly in assertions of internationally unrecognized territorial claims. Economically, a trade-war induced "decoupling" of the U.S. and Chinese economies may eliminate mutual economic interests crucial to moderating the relationship, and in turn may make competition much more volatile. "There is a very real possibility that a misstep by one or the other" in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, or in other geopolitical issues of contention, Bremmer writes, "will lead to real escalation, and even violence in some instances." But although (thankfully) a conflict between the United States and China remains unlikely due to common interests between the two, "violence" may be an understatement.

Summary of findings
Recent developments in relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China paint a clear picture that the two are now rivals in the global sphere. As China develops as a nation and amasses power around the world, its methods have drawn the ire of the United States, pitting the two against each other across a variety of fronts as they attempt to counter each other's influence across the globe in competition for global dominance.

The consequences of strategic competition between China and the United States, due to their immense size, are inherently going to have global, large-scale effects. We already see the U.S. and China entrenched into a trade war. At the same time, both nations are pouring billions of dollars to develop (and control) the technologies that will define future power, and complicating each other's efforts to do the same. There exists some hope in climate change, where both nations seem to understand that climate change is an issue of mutual concern and one to be addressed with cooperation even in the face of turbulent relations between the two nations. And finally, increased tensions between the two lead to a small but very real risk of escalating into full-on war.