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= Status and Role of the Indigenous Peoples' Organizations in the Arctic Council =

Context
In the second half of the 21. century the Arctic became a distinct region for international and transnational politics[1]. New interests created new needs for governance in the Arctic[2]. This led to the creation of the intergovernmental forum of the Arctic Council (AC)[3]. The AC facilitates discussion on all affairs affecting the Arctic except issues of military security[4] with the primary focus on environmental and social issues[5]. It has a leading role as a promoter of human rights and environmental protection[6] in the region.

Arctic Indigenous Peoples (AIPs) have played a crucial role in the creation of the AC. The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), besides others, lobbied the Canadian government to form a multilateral Arctic body[7]. Gorbachev, who took the step which led to the creation of the AC, saw Indigenous participation “important for the success of the proposed council”[8]. The institutional structure of the Arctic Council integrates Indigenous peoples’ organizations (IPOs) on every level (Hossain and Maruyama 2016).[9]

The AC provides a forum for geographically disperse inhabitants of the Arctic, advancing communication and cooperation among Indigenous groups[10]. These groups inhabit seven of the eight Arctic states (Iceland is the exception) and comprise ten per cent of the region’s four million residents[11]. [1] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

[2] Young 2012, S. 391.

[3] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

[4] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

[5] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

[6] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

[7] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

[8] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

[9] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

[10] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

[11] Greaves 2016, S. 463.

Transnational Identity and nation state
AIPs have transboundary identities and “demonstrate continuity with pre-colonial patterns of settlement and activity”[1]. Their culture and identity is challenging to the concept of the sovereign nation state, which only operates in or inbetween boundaries and borders[2]. AIPs “never fit well within the spatial template of the state system”[3].

Indigenous peoples are increasingly involved in political processes[4]. The participation of AIPs in the AC is one example of that. The ACs structure seems to be a good answer to the problems evolving from the disparity of nation states (and (inter-)national politics) and the AIPs transboundary identity.

Investing in the autonomy of non-state participants will promote Indigenous participation and advance the Council’s core priorities.[5] [1] Greaves 2016, S. 463.

[2] Gerhardt et al. 2010, S. 1000.

[3] Gerhardt et al. 2010, S. 1000.

[4] Koivurova, T., Tevro, H., and Stepien, A. 2008.

[5] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

Permanent Participant Status
The founding of the AC has broken new ground in governance structures of international fora by including AIPs. It did this by creating the member status of the “Permanent Participants” (PPs)[1] besides or inbetween the eight Arctic states and the observer states. The PPs, organizations that represent many of the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic[2], “provide for active participation and full consultation [of] the Arctic Indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council" (Arctic Council, 1996). The focus of the AC on environmental questions is supported buy the fact, that the environment and natural resources are central to the economic, cultural and spiritual systems of the AIPs. Including the PPs in all the Council’s activities ensures that these subjects will surface on a regular basis in Council deliberations.[3]

PPs discuss policies with state representatives during ministerial meetings in the AC. They facilitate networking among governmental agencies, NGOs and AIPs.[4] Decision-making however is only to be made by the eight member states of the AC.

Any actor (state or non-state) who aims to engage in the AC must consult the PPs beforehand. This includes states and organizations seeking observer status in the AC[5]. [1] Larsen und Fondahl 2015, S. 187.

[2] Larsen und Fondahl 2015, S. 211.

[3] Larsen und Fondahl 2015, S. 283.

[4] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

[5] Koivurova and Heinämäki 2006; Koivurova 2010; Graczyk 2011

PP-Status in the Ottawa Declaration
The predecessor of the AC, the AEPS relegated AIPs to observers of the AEPS working groups[1]. This status has been enhanced to that of the permanent participant. Paragraph 2 of the Ottawa declaration, the founding declaration of the AC, provides the AIPs with the status “Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council”. This participation “is equally open to other Arctic organizations of indigenous peoples with majority Arctic indigenous constituency’.[2] The declaration underlines the AIPs’ “important role in the negotiations to create the AC”. It provides for their full consultation and involvement[3]. The word “indigenous” appears 17 times in the 5 pages of the declaration, the words “permanent participants” 7 times.

In order to be eligible to become a permanent participant, an organisation must be “representing: a. single indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic State; or b. more than one Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic State”. The determination that these criteria are met is to be made by a decision of the AC. At any given time, the number of permanent participants should be fewer than the number of members in the AC (as of today, there are 8 members of the AC)[4].

The establishing authorities of the AC did so via a declaration (and not by signing e.g. a treaty) to avoid committing their respective state to any legal responsibility in the Arctic[5]. The role of AIPs in the AC stands out in its importance when compared to other international organizations and fora. Nevertheless, the PP-Status does not mean that AIPs are recognized as peoples by the Ottawa declaration. In a footnote to paragraph 2 of the declaration it states "The use of the term 'peoples' in this declaration shall not be construed as having any implications as regard the rights which may attach to the term under international law."[6] [1] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

[2] Koivurova und Heinämäki 2006, S. 104.

[3] Andrew Jenks 1996.

[4] Koivurova und Heinämäki 2006, S. 107.

[5] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

[6] Andrew Jenks 1996.

Uniqueness of PPs
The AC’s structure creates a platform for AIPs to “express opinions and participate in decision-making processes with member states, marking a unique and important function of the Council”[1]. The far-reaching influence PPs have on every level of deliberation and decision-making in the AC is unique in inter- and transnational fora. The indigenous peoples’ movement has explicitly referred to the AC as “a model that could be used in other regions of the world.” The Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus stated in 2002 that “models for […] Governance, such as the Arctic Council which incorporate principles of genuine partnership between States and Indigenous Peoples, ecosystem approaches, collaboration between scientific and traditional knowledge, and local, national and regional implementation plans” in fact are “a model that could be used in other regions of the world”[2]. [1] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

[2] Dorothée Cambou und Timo Koivurova 2021.

PP-Status vs. NGO-Status
The PP-Status in the ACs’ soft law model is unique because it does not equate indigenous peoples with NGOs or states. It rather gives a intermediate position of the PPs but no formal decision-making power[1]. Constuctivist thinkers state that this accomodation of indigenous peoples as peoples with more powers than NGOs but fewer than states challenges “the current anomaly that indigenous peoples participate as NGOs to international treaty-making processes” [2]. Over time this would challenge the “traditional rules of who can participate in the making of international law and with what status”[3]. The PP-Status in the AC as a structure could be adapted give an answer to the problem of representation of indigenous peoples in international law and institutions. The fact that the AC is a soft law model made it easier for nation states to give AIPs the PP-Status because it frees them of hard law responsibilities and rules. AIPs still are entitled to govern their own affairs within states. But self-determination and the PP-Stauts should grant them a better status in international policy-making. There is no opportunity for them to adress global problems such as the impacts of climate change if they only have acces to national and local self-governance structures. [4] [1] Koivurova und Heinämäki 2006, S. 105.

[2] Dorothée Cambou und Timo Koivurova 2021.

[3] Dorothée Cambou und Timo Koivurova 2021.

[4] Dorothée Cambou und Timo Koivurova 2021.

PP-Status vs. Observer-Status
The AC besides the categories of member states and PPs also has states as observers. There are many accredited observers including non-Arctic states such as China, India, the United Kingdom and Singapore among others. Paragraph 3 of the Ottawa declaration opens acces for non-Arctic states, NGOs and others. The PP-category is distinguished from that of the observer states[1]. Observers may also attend meetings but have far less reaching competences and opportunities to influence deliberations in the AC than PPs. [1] Koivurova und Heinämäki 2006, S. 104.

PP-Status has been challenged
Throughout the negotiations on the AC the PP-status was questioned, particularly by the USA[1]. There were concerns formulated about a “potential emasculation of the [PP-]category”[2] which also were part of debates about creating a special category of observers (for countries like e.g. the UK) destinct from the observer-category for NGOs. The Ottawa declaration finally resolved these debates by affirming the PP-status[3]. [1] Koivurova und Heinämäki 2006, S. 105.

[2] Scrivener (1999: 54)

[3] Koivurova und Heinämäki 2006, S. 105.

Veto Right?
The AC being an intergovernmental forum does not allow it for legally binding arrangements or regulations[1]. It operates in the realm of soft power, nevertheless AIPs have played a substantial role in shaping Arctic policy. This underlines the “effectiveness of moral suasion through the [AC]”[2].

Even though they do not have voting rights, PPs play an actively influence the deliberations of the Council. They participace alongside states, take part in meetings and in the ACs’ varios working groups. They influence deliberations “through the state delegations of the voting members”[3].

The eight member states in consensus make final decisions. However, the PPs must be fully consulted beforehand every time, which is “close to a de facto power of veto should they all reject a particular proposal”[4]. [1] Coates und Holroyd 2020.

[2] Larsen und Fondahl 2015, S. 212–213.

[3] Larsen und Fondahl 2015, S. 211–212.

[4] Koivurova und Heinämäki 2006, S. 104.

Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat
The PPs’ work in the AC is supported by the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS). The IPS was created in 1994 within the ACs’ predecessor, the AEPS. Its structure and function has been integrated into the governance framework of the AC when it was established in 1996[1].

The creation of the IPS was important to institutionalize and professionalise the administrative capacity of AIPs in the AC. Its main interest is being an instrument to “[f]acilitate dialogue and communications among the [PPs]”[2] and among PPs and the AC and its bodies[3]. It also helps PPs to present their views in the AC and communicates information about the AC and its works to the AIPs in the Arctic. As funding still is a major issue for the PPs and attending every meeting and working group in the AC can be difficult to them because of a lack of resources, the IPS aims to ensure that the PPs get to be represented in the AC succesfully. [1] Larsen und Fondahl 2015, S. 211.

[2] https://web.archive.org/web/20200826230021if_/https://www.arcticpeoples.com/about/#bio

[3] Larsen und Fondahl 2015, S. 213.

= Securitization =

Securitization explains how security issues are designated and subjects transformed from “regular” issues into ones of “security” through the intersubjective (re)production of certain phenomena as threatening[1]. This is being done by the securitizing actor in order to enable extraordinary means to adress the subject. In the case of the AIPs the identity of the securitizing actor is particularly relevant. It generally operates “as a catalyst or gate-keeper in accepting a particular idea as a threat”[2]. The identity of AIPs as transboundary and transnational inhabitants of the circumpolar North enables them to use various securitizing moves by stressing that they are being vulnerable to different threats. Some AIPs used securitizing moves within the framework of their organization as well as PPs in the AC.

The Inuit, represented by the ICC as PP in the AC, have a “widespread […] use of concepts such as threat and vulnerability” [3] which can be seen as securitizing moves because environmental hazards are being connected to fields such as “culture, language, livelihoods, and Indigenous rights”[4]. [1] Buzan et al., 1998, p. 35

[2] Sjöstedt, 2013: 153

[3] Greaves 2016, S. 465

[4] Greaves 2016, S. 465

Threats to Indigenous Peoples
Arctic Security Public Opinion Survey. Conducted in 2015 and 2010, it finds that a large plurality of more than a third of Northern Canadians (including Inuit and non-Inuit respondents) identify the environment, global warming, and climate change as the most important Arctic issues and the greatest threats facing the region

Of 538 available documents, 25 made securitizing moves depicting threats to referent objects such as: the Arctic environment; food security, especially caribou herds; culture, language, or traditional ways of life; Indigenous health; and Indigenous human rights. Survival for all these referent objects was linked to human-caused environmental changes; no securitizing move was made that did not identify the direct or indirect impacts of climate change as the source of threat.

‘Security from our societal perspective comes from access to the basic essentials of life – food, shelter and water.’

Mary Simon, former president of ICC and ITK, notes that Inuit ‘subscribe to the concept that security should be understood in a broad sense. Just as health is more than the absence of disease, so, too, security is more than the absence of military conflict’ (Simon, 2011: 891)

Rosemarie Kuptana (2013: 11–12), another former president of ITK, also defines security in holistic terms:

Security is more than about arms build-up. Security is about ensuring that Inuit are equal members of the human family and have the economic base to ensure a reasonable life-style as defined by contemporary Canada…. Security to Inuit was, and is, having food, clothing and shelter.

Terry Audla, president of ITK until 2015, links ‘the insecurities that Inuit face as a result of our living […through] a firestorm of cultural change’

Sámi generally do not employ securitizing language to discuss environmental and social issues, rarely characterizing them as existential issues threatening their survival or wellbeing.

Academic research has contributed to the (re)production of Indigenous non-dominance through the explicit and implicit privileging of settler perspectives, resulting in the erasure and denial of Indigenous histories, epistemologies, and interests.

Climate Change
‘The urgency surrounding mitigating the impact of climate change grows with the almost daily news … Arctic ice is melting three times faster than models had earlier predicted – and the earlier predictions were alarming. The Arctic is melting, with dramatic consequences for all of us’ (Simon, 2009: 256)

‘climate change is threatening the lives, health, culture and livelihoods of the Inuit’ (Watt-Cloutier, 2005)

‘the changes to our climate and our environment will bring about the end of the Inuit culture’ (quoted in Smith and Parks, 2010: 7–8).

Eventually, the survival of many

groups as distinctive peoples is endangered. Additionally, housing, infrastructure and

transport connections of coastal indigenous communities are seriously affected by climate

changes, with rising maintenance costs and sometimes even the necessity of relocation.

In the Arctic, our physical security has already been challenged by such things as changes to wildlife patterns, unreliable wind and temperature patterns and associated thawing and freezing cycles, rising sea levels, and shifting building foundations due to permafrost variation…. Climate change at a rate and of an intensity that appears unprecedented, and well outside Inuit cultural memory, creates insecurities of an entirely new nature, generating concerns about the sustainability of large aspects of our inherited and acquired patterns of life … our very sense of who and what we are as Inuit. (Audla, 2013: 8)

Pollution
Because the Arctic contains approximately 90 billion barrels of oil and other untapped natural resources, international media outlets regularly claim that these countries want access to the economic trade potential of energy and resource extraction in the region (Chater 2016)

= Difficulties =

relationships between Arctic Indigenous peoples and governments remain structured by settler-colonial values, institutions, and interests

Funding
Arctic Council should continue to secure and allocate resources to protect and promote the interests of the ordinary people who live and work in the region.

we have the knowledge, we have the data sets, but we just don't have the resources to to either publish it or write about it or put it out there for the general public. [Der Titel "UW College of Arts and Sciences 20 November 2015 – Arctic Council at Twenty" kann nicht dargestellt werden. Die Vorlage "Kurznachweis im Text - Internetdokument - (Standardvorlage)" enthält keine Informationen.]

Indigenous knowledge
draw attention to the ways in which the

449

ocesses of self-governance and self-determination of Indigenous peoples in the North is so rare in comparison to down south,” Mason said: “As a non-Indigenous researcher, I want to participate in and promote research that doesn’t infringe on these essential capacities” (Mason quoted in Quinn 2018)

drew attention to the role of non-state actors in deliberations about environmental protection and cultural integration

[Der Titel "UW College of Arts and Sciences 20 November 2015 – Arctic Council at Twenty" kann nicht dargestellt werden. Die Vorlage "Kurznachweis im Text - Internetdokument - (Standardvorlage)" enthält keine Informationen.]

Expertise
Research pertaining to Indigenous peoples that excludes their voices and perspectives contributes to the ‘cognitive imperialism’ that has underpinned colonization (Battiste, 2000: xvii)

the empowerment of indigenous peoples through new structures of

governance as well as through devolution of legislative powers. Indigenous peoples are

increasingly involved in political and decision-making processes, although, from an

indigenous perspective, much work still needs to be done to strengthen these processes.

to be able to find those people good qualified people that understand policy, it's quite difficult. And on top of that, asking them to leave their job for maybe a week without pay is an added burden to them. [Der Titel "UW College of Arts and Sciences 20 November 2015 – Arctic Council at Twenty" kann nicht dargestellt werden. Die Vorlage "Kurznachweis im Text - Internetdokument - (Standardvorlage)" enthält keine Informationen.]

Rapid growth of AC
has raised awareness as an advocate for the concerns of Arctic Indigenous peoples.

leading role as a pro-

moter of human rights and environmental protection.

the Arctic Council has grown a lot since its founding in 96, where it was a relatively small sort of cozy organization to being now quite a large Intergovernmental forum [Der Titel "UW College of Arts and Sciences 20 November 2015 – Arctic Council at Twenty" kann nicht dargestellt werden. Die Vorlage "Kurznachweis im Text - Internetdokument - (Standardvorlage)" enthält keine Informationen.]

Einzelnachweise
Andrew Jenks: '' CANADA-DENMARK-FINLAND-ICELAND-NORWAY-RUSSIAN FEDERATION-SWEDEN-UNITED STATES: JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ AND DECLARATION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.  In:  International Legal Materials. '' 35, Nr. 6 1996, S. 1382–1390.

[Der Titel "UW College of Arts and Sciences 20 November 2015 – Arctic Council at Twenty" kann nicht dargestellt werden. Die Vorlage "Literaturverzeichnis - Internetdokument - (Standardvorlage)" enthält keine Informationen.]

Carina Keskitalo: '' International Region-Building: Development of the Arctic as an International Region.  In:  Cooperation and Conflict. '' 42, Nr. 2 2007, S. 187–205.

Ken S. Coates und Carin Holroyd: '' The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics. '' Springer International Publishing, Cham 2020, ISBN 978-3-030-20556-0.

Dorothée Cambou und Timo Koivurova: '' The participation of Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations in the Arctic Council and beyond.  In: Timo Koivurova  et al. '' (Hrsg.). '' Routledge handbook of indigenous peoples in the Arctic.  Routledge, London, New York 2021, ISBN9780429270451 (  Routledge International Handbooks '' ), S. 320–334.

Hannes Gerhardt  et al.  : '' Contested Sovereignty in a Changing Arctic.  In:  Annals of the Association of American Geographers. '' 100, Nr. 4 2010, S. 992–1002.

Wilfrid Greaves: '' Arctic (in)security and Indigenous peoples: Comparing Inuit in Canada and Sámi in Norway.  In:  Security Dialogue. '' 47, Nr. 6 2016, S. 461–480.

Timo Koivurova und Leena Heinämäki: '' The participation of indigenous peoples in international norm-making in the Arctic.  In:  Polar Record. '' 42, Nr. 2 2006, S. 101–109.

Koivurova, T., Tevro, H., and Stepien, A.: '' Background paper: Indigenous peoples in the Arctic. '' 2008.

Joan Nymand Larsen und Gail Fondahl: '' Arctic Human Development Report. '' Nordic Council of Ministers 2015.

Oran R. Young: '' Building an international regime complex for the Arctic: current status and next steps.  In:  The Polar Journal. '' 2, Nr. 2 2012, S. 391–407.