User:PalaceGuard008/ARATS-SEF meetings

Meetings between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) are the principal means by which the governments of the Republic of China (ROC) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) conduct their mutual relations, which is often called cross-Strait relations

Due to complications arising out of the Chinese Civil War, the PRC and the ROC each officially claim to be the legitimate government of all China. AS such, neither recognises the other as a legitimate government or a separate, sovereign state. This has created a great deal of complexity when conducting their mutual relations. As a result, the SEF and the ARATS were created by the ROC and the PRC respectively to conduct their relations. Formally privately constituted bodies, both the SEF and the ARATS are actually led by senior politicians and staffed by senior bureaucrats, and each is answerable to the main executive bodies of each government: the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Counil of the PRC in the case of ARATS, and the Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan of the ROC in the case of SEF.

Negotiations through meetings between the SEF and the ARATS led to a significant improvement in cross-Strait relations in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. However, changing internal political environments in both the ROC and the PRC in the early 1990s and early 2000s led to a disruption in these talks. In 2008, the talks resumed, and are in future expected to be regularised at 6 month intervals.

Background
The cessation of major hostilities in the Chinese Civil War left two governments each contending to be the legitimate government of all China - the Republic of China (ROC), founded in 1912, controlled the island of Taiwan and some nearby islands; and the People's Republic of China (PRC), founded in 1949, controlled mainland China. Thereafter, relations between the two sides were characterised by animosity and non-contact.

Prior to 1987, the ROC government, now on Taiwan, maintained the "three noes" policy, under which it did not "contact, negotiate, or compromise" with the PRC government. However, ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo decided in 1987 to allow Taiwan residents to visit family in mainland China. The technical issues this engendered necessitated a mode of contact between the two sides. In 1990, ROC President Lee Teng-hui set up the National Unification Council to promote re-unification with the mainland under the terms of the Guidelines for National Unification. Shortly after, on 8 January 1991, the Mainland Affairs Council was set up under the Executive Yuan to administer mainland-related policies. On 8 February 1991, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) was set up as a formally privately constituted foundation but which was appointed as agent by the Mainland Affairs Council to negotiate with the mainland government.

On 28 April, 1991, Chen Changwen, the deputy Chairman and Secretary General of SEF visited Beijing, and held talks with Tang Shubei, the deputy head of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. The two sides reached preliminary agreement that cross-Strait relations should be conducted on the basis of the one China policy. From 3 November to 7 November 1991, Chen and Tang again met in Beijing to discuss technical issues in relation to co-operation against smuggling and piracy. On 1 December, 1991, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) was established in Beijing. Wang Daohan, the former Mayor of Shanghai, was appointed the first President. ARATS was officially not a government body, but was lead by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. From this point onwards, ARATS and SEF would become the key contact points in negotiations between the PRC and ROC governments. This system allows both governments to negotiate on technical and operational issues without engaging politically. It also avoided issues of protocol and nomenclature flowing from the two government's mutual non-recognition.

Early meetings and the 1992 Consensus
From 22 March 1992 to 27 March 1992, Xu Huiyou, the head of the legal department of the SEF led a six-member delegation to Beijing, and met with the ARATS on the issues of recognition of notarisations and registered mail between the two sides. The Mainland Affairs Council in Taiwan required the SEF not to engage on the issue of "one China". However, the ARATS insisted that negotiations be on the basis of the "one China" policy. At a press conference on 30 March, 1992, Tang Shubei of ARATS proposed the mainland side's understanding of the "one China" principle that would later evolve into the 1992 Consensus as follows: that there is "one China" is an objective fact; cross-Strait relations are the internal affairs of a country, but due to the fact that the two sides are not yet unified,

1992年3月22日至3月27日，海基會法律服務處處長許惠祐等六人赴北京，並於23日至26日間與海協會李亞飛就「海峽兩岸公證書使用」和「開辦海峽兩岸掛號函件查詢、補償」問題進行第一次工作性商談. 海基會方面遵照陸委會的要求，多次表示「沒有受權談一個中國問題」. 海基會方面初期曾一度主張，在解決兩岸公證書使用問題中，比照國家間駐外使領館認證的做法來處理大陸公證書在台灣的使用；在解決開辦兩岸掛號函件業務問題中，則援引國家間通郵的做法. 3月30日，海協會召開記者招待會，常務副會長唐樹備就在事務性商談中應表明堅持一個中國原則的態度問題，作出大陸立場的闡述. 他說，一個中國是客觀事實，而兩岸交往中的事務性問題，包括文書使用、掛號函件查詢等，作為一個國家的內部事務，本不需要特別的協議；但基於兩岸尚未統一的事實，也的確需要採取某些特殊的做法，不過不應同國與國間的作法相混淆，因此有必要明確海峽兩岸交往中的事務性問題是中國人的內部事務，在堅持一個中國的原則下，考慮實事求是、合情合理地處理方式. 他也說，海協會堅持先談這個問題，只是要雙方表明堅持一個中國原則的態度，並不要討論「一個中國」的涵義，至於具體表述方式，雙方可協商. 海協會方面的立場概括為：海峽兩岸交往中的具體問題是中國的內部事務，應本著一個中國原則協商解決；在事務性商談中，只要表明堅持一個中國原則的基本態度，可以不討論一個中國的政治涵義；表述的方式可以充分協商，並願意聽取海基會和台灣各界的意見. [5]

1992年8月1日，國家統一委員會通過對關於「一個中國」的涵義，全文如下：

一、海峽兩岸均堅持「一個中國」之原則，但雙方所賦予之涵義有所不同. 中共當局認為「一個中國」即為「中華人民共和國」，將來統一以後，臺灣將成為其轄下的一個「特別行政區」. 台灣方面則認為「一個中國」應指一九一二年成立迄今之中華民國，其主權及於整個中國，但目前之治權，則僅及於臺澎金馬. 臺灣固為中國之一部分，但大陸亦為中國之一部分. 二、民國三十八年（公元一九四九年）起，中國處於暫時分裂之狀態，由兩個政治實體，分治海峽兩岸，乃為客觀之事實，任何謀求統一之主張，不能忽視此一事實之存在. 三、中華民國政府為求民族之發展、國家之富強與人民之福祉，已訂定「國家統一綱領」，積極謀取共識；深盼雙方均以務實的態度捐棄成見，共同合作，為建立自由民主均富的一個中國而貢獻智慧與力量. 1992年10月26日至10月30日，許惠祐與海協會咨詢部副主任周寧，繼續就「公證書使用」及「掛號函件」問題在香港舉行第二次處長級工作性商談，這就是產生後來「九二共識」的香港會談.

兩會在香港會談時，海協會希望先就「一個中國」的議題，達成協議. 海協會提出五項表述方案，其中最有代表性的方案是：「在海峽兩岸共同努力謀求國家統一的過程中，雙方均堅持一個中國的原則，對兩岸公證文書使用（或其他商談事務）加以妥善解決」. 對此，海基會亦提出五項文字表述方案其中最有代表性的方案是：「鑑於海峽兩岸長期處於分裂狀態，在兩岸共同謀求國家統一的過程中，雙方咸認為必須就文書查證（或其他商談事項）加以妥善解決. 」（李銘義，2001年）海協會對此不能接受，海基會隨後又提出三項口頭表述方案，最有代表性的為：「在海峽兩岸共同努力謀求國家統一的過程中，雙方雖均堅持一個中國的原則，但對於一個中國的涵義，認知各有不同. 惟鑑於兩岸民間交流日益頻繁，為保障兩岸人民權益，對於文書查證，應加以妥善解決. 」[6] [7]

海協會研究該第八方案，認為該方案表明了海基會謀求統一、堅持一個中國原則的態度，雖然提出對一個中國涵義的「認知各有不同」，但海協會歷來主張「在事務性商談中只要表明堅持一個中國原則的態度，不討論一個中國的政治涵義」，因此，可以考慮與海基會以上述各自口頭表述的內容表達堅持一個中國原則的態度. 海協會希望海基會能夠確認這是台灣方面的正式意見.

11月3日，海基會致函海協會，表示已徵得台灣有關方面的同意：「以口頭聲明方式各自表述. 」同日，海協會副秘書長孫亞夫電告海基會秘書長陳榮傑，在這次香港工作性商談中，「貴會建議採用貴我兩會各自口頭聲明的方式表述一個中國原則. 我們經研究後，尊重並接受貴會的建議」，並建議，「就口頭聲明的具體內容，進行協商. 」海基會在同日發佈新聞稿表示，「海協會在本次香港商談中，對『一個中國』原則一再堅持應當有所表述，本會徵得主管機關同意，以口頭聲明方式各自表達，可以接受. 至於口頭聲明的具體內容，台灣方將根據『國家統一綱領』及國家統一委員會對『一個中國』涵義所作決議表達」. 海基會的表述內容為，「在海峽兩岸共同努力謀求國家統一的過程中，雙方雖均堅持一個中國的原則，但對於一個中國的含義，認知各有不同. 惟鑑於兩岸民間交流日益頻繁，為保障兩岸人民權益，對於文書查證，應加以妥善解決. 」當時海基會代表仍然留在香港，一直停留到11月5日才離港返台.

11月16日，海協會致函海基會，表示同意以各自口頭表述的方式錶明堅持一個中國原則的態度，並將海協會的口頭表述重點函告海基會：「海峽兩岸都堅持一個中國的原則，努力謀求國家的統一. 但在海峽兩岸事務性商談中，不涉及『一個中國』的政治含義. 本此精神，對兩岸公證書使用（或其他商談事務）加以妥善解決. 」海基會在此函中，以附件形式將海基會第八案載明：「在海峽兩岸共同努力謀求國家統一的過程中，雙方雖均堅持一個中國的原則，但對於一個中國的涵義，認識各有不同. 惟鑒於兩岸民間交流日益頻繁，為保障兩岸人民權益，對於文書查證，應加以妥善解決. 」

12月3日，海基會函覆海協會：「鑒於『兩岸文書查證』及『兩岸間接掛號信函查詢與補償』是兩岸中國人間的事務，問題懸係多時，不但影響兩岸人民權益，且使人民對於交流產生疑慮，誠然遺憾！」…「台灣方始終認為：兩岸事務性之商談，應與政治性之議題無關，且兩岸對『一個中國』之涵義，認知略有不同. 台灣方為謀求問題之解決，建議以口頭各自說明. 至於口頭說明之具體內容，台灣方已十一月三日發佈之新聞稿中明白表示，將根據『國家統一綱領』及國家統一委員會本年八月一日對於『一個中國』涵義所作決議加以表達. 」

這就是香港會談的全部經過與成果.

The Wang-Koo talks
During the time of the 1992 talks, ARATS wrote to SEF inviting its head, Koo Cheng-fu, to visit mainland China. SEF responded positively, and after a series of preliminary meetings, it was decided that the meeting would be defined as "non-governmental, operational, economic and functional". Following mediation by Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore, the meeting was set to be held in Singapore.

From 27 April 1993 to 29 April 1993, Koo Cheng-fu met with ARATS head Wang Daohan. A number of agreements were signed, establishing notarial procedures and registered mail mechanism, as well as agreements on communications between ARATS and SEF and future meetings.

However, a second meeting was long delayed due to ROC President Lee Teng-hui's increasingly independence-leaning rhetoric, and his visit to the United States in June 1995. This was followed by a breakdown of communication between the two sides from 1995 to 1996 due to the first direct Presidential election in Taiwan, and mainland China's missile tests, timed to coincide with the elections.

Contact resumed after 1996, and Koo Cheng-fu visited mainland China in October 1998 for the second Wang-Koo meeting.

Both Wang Daohan and Koo Cheng-fu died in 2005.

First 2008 meeting
A series of meetings were held between the SEF and the ARATS at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing from 11 June 2008 to 14 June 2008. By convention, SEF-ARATS negotiations proceed in three rounds: a technical round led by negotiators seconded from the relevant government departments, a draft round led by deputy heads of the two organisations, and a formal round led by the heads of the two organisations. In this case, however, both sides have already reached broad consensus on these issues on both the technical and political levels through previous negotiations via the non-governmental and inter-party channels. As a result, the initial technical round was dispensed with, and the negotiations began with the second, draft round.

The two sides agreed to the following:
 * Initiate direct passenger airline services every weekend from 4 July, 2008. Both parties agreed to negotiate on the routes of cross-strait direct flights and establish direct communication procedures concerning air traffic management systems as soon as possible. But before the routes of direct flights are finalized, charter flights may temporarily fly across Hong Kong Flight Information Region. There is no need to stop in Hong Kong, but planes still have to fly through its airspace. Weekend charter flights shall fly from each Friday to the following Monday for a total of four full days.


 * Mainland China agreed to open the following five cities as destinations: Beijing, Shanghai (Pudong), Guangzhou, Xiamen and Nanjing. Mainland China shall open Chengdu, Chongqing, Hangzhou, Dalian, Guilin, Shenzhen and other destinations later on and other cities if so demanded by the market.


 * Taiwan agreed to open the following eight cities as destinations: Taoyuan, Kaohsiung (Siaogang), Taichung (Chingchunkang), Taipei (Sungshan), Penghu (Makung), Hualien, Kinmen and Taitung.


 * Opening Taiwan to mainland Chinese tourists. Both parties agreed that mainland Chinese tourists must travel to the Taiwan in groups. Tourists must enter into, visit, and exit from Taiwan in groups. The maximum quota of tourists received by the party responsible for tourist reception shall not exceed the average of 3,000 persons per day, and each group shall consist of a minimum of ten persons and forty persons at the maximum, being in Taiwan for a maximum of ten days.

To facilitate the above, both sides also agreed to further discuss on the possibilities of exchanging representative offices, with an SEF office to be opened in Beijing and an ARATS office in Taipei to issue travel permits to cross-Strait visitors, among other duties.

Second 2008 meeting
Following an invitation issued by the SEF at the first meeting, the heard of ARATS, Chen Yunlin, began a visit to Taiwan on 3 November 2008. . Items on the agena raised by SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung included direct maritime shipping, chartered cargo flights, direct postal service, and co-operation in ensuring food safety, in response to the 2008 Chinese milk scandal, while ARATS chairman Chen Yunlin raised the matters of direct freight service, and opening up air routes that directly cross the Taiwan Strait. Previous routes avoided crossing the STrait for security reasons, with planes detouring through Hong Kong or Japanese air control areas.

On 4 November 2008, ARATS and SEF signed a number of agreements in Taipei. The agreement relating to direct passenger flights increased the number of charter flights from 36 to 108 per week, operating daily instead of the four days a week previously. Flights would now operate to and from 21 mainland Chinese cities. Flights would also take a more direct route. Private business jet flights would also be allowed. The agreement relating to cargo shipping allowed direct shipping between 11 sea ports in Taiwan and 63 in mainland China. The shipping would be tax free. The agreement relating to cargo flights provided for up to 60 direct cargo flights per month. Finally, an agreement was made to set up food safety alerts between the two sides.

During Chen's visit in Taipei, he was met with a series of strong protests directed at himself and Ma Ying-jeou, some of which were violent with Molotov cocktails being thrown by the protesters at riot police. A series of arrests were made after the protests. Local police reported that 149 of its officers were injured during the opposition protests. Consistent with the 1992 Consensus, Chen did not call Ma as "President". Similarly, the representatives from Taiwan did not call the PRC President Hu Jin-tao as "President" in the previous meeting in Beijing.

The polls in two of Taiwan's biggest newspapers after the visit reported that the public was pleased with Chen's visit, with about 50% of the Taiwanese public considered Chen's visit having a positive effect on Taiwan's development, while 18 to 26% of the respondents thought the effect would be negative. In another poll, it suggested that 26% of the respondents were satisfied with the DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen's handling of the crowds in the series of protests, while 53% of the respondents were unsatisfied. The same poll also showed that 33% of the respondents were satisfied with President Ma's performance at his meeting with Chen Yunlin, while 32% of the respondents were not satisfied. According to a telephone poll conducted by Taiwan's top-selling Apple Daily newspaper on 7 November 2008 on the subject of a series of anti-Chen protests organised by the DPP, 62.12% of the respondents considered it bad for DPP's image, describing it as a "violent party", 31.13% of the respondents considered it good for the DPP's image, as it demonstrated Taiwan's democracy, while 6.75% of the respondents did not express an opinion.