User:Phoebebruce628/The Background of the Six-Day War

The Six-Day War between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan broke out in June 1967. Opinions are still divided as to why Gamal Abdel Nasser, then President of Egypt, initiated a series of moves that led to the outbreak of the war and its unique outcomes.

Reverting to the Previous Status Quo
In May 1967, Nasser decided to retaliate against Israel. Several factors contributed to this decision:

Nasser declares the imposition of the blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba during his visit to the Egyptian Air Force base in the Sinai. Seated to his left is Abdel Hakim Amer, the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Army. Behind them, several pilots in pressure suits. May 23, 1967.

On April 7, 1967, a widespread military clash occurred between Israel and Syria, during which the Israeli Air Force downed six Syrian MiG-21 planes. The incident marked a escalation in the recurring and changing hostilities between Israel and Syria that had been taking place since the late 1950s.

On May 15, 1967, Egyptian forces began to flow into the Sinai Peninsula. The official justification for this move was information conveyed by the Soviet Union to Egypt, claiming that Israel was concentrating forces against Syria, even though there was no factual basis for it. Egypt justified the action by citing the defense pact signed between Egypt and Syria. On April 18, the UN was requested to withdraw its forces stationed in the Sinai, and on April 19, Egyptian paratroopers seized the UN position at Sharm El-Sheikh.

On April 17, the Supreme Action Committee of Nasser's party, the Arab Socialist Union, which included Nasser, Amin al-Husseini, Vice President Zekri Mohey Eddin, Prime Minister Mohammed Tawfiq Soliman (acting), and National Assembly Chairman Sadat, decided to close the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping and renew the blockade on the port of Eilat. Nasser clarified to the forum that the entry of Egyptian forces into Sinai increased the chances of war with Israel to fifty percent, but the closure of the Tiran Strait would make the war inevitable. The decision was made by a majority, with the only opponent being Prime Minister Soliman. On April 22, Nasser announced the closure of the Tiran Strait.

It is possible that Egypt was willing to settle for these steps and not initiate a war against Israel. However, additional processes unfolded that pushed the leaders towards confrontation and led to the escalation. Thus, the region was dragged into a war that changed the face of the Middle East:

Conclusion
U Thant, the Secretary-General of the UN, accepted Egypt's demand to remove the observers from Sinai and the Straits and did not attempt to delay it. The Soviet Union, as mentioned, set the wheels in motion and could not turn back. The United States tried to organize an international fleet to break the blockade without success. De Gaulle contented himself with saying that he would be responsible for the war against whoever fired the first shot. Foreign Minister Abba Eban's diplomatic efforts in the capitals of the maritime powers changed nothing. It is noteworthy that U Thant flew to Cairo in a last-minute effort to prevent war. While Nasser offered several solutions, he refused to give up his main achievements: the removal of the observers and the imposition of the blockade. To clarify, his primary concern was to nullify Israel's accomplishments rather than plunge into another war. It's worth underscoring that Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, attuned to the intricacies of the situation and serving as Defense Minister, fully grasped the might of the IDF and its capabilities. Although he attempted diplomatic solutions, his efforts found no receptive audience. Conversely, the military brass, champions of the General Staff, advocated for a preemptive war before Egypt could complete its Sinai preparations, a move that would hinder the mobilization of reserve troops. The deadlock persisted until Israel recognized the inevitability of launching an offensive. Israel's actions were met with understanding, particularly in the Western bloc, and there was no immediate, substantial pressure to withdraw from the recently captured territories, in contrast to the Sinai Campaign a decade prior.