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Ahrar al-Sham

1.     Ideology

1.2  Nationalist motivations- Some scholars have argued for Ahrar al-Sham to be noted as a "nationalist jihadist salafi" group. '''The goal of regime change can be seen in Ahrar al-Sham's involvement in the conflict in Syria. Ahrar al-Sham has joined forces with other groups in the conflict in their opposition to the Assad regime in Syria'''.

2.     History

2.1  Formation and early activities

2.2  Syrian Civil War battles and offensives- In September of 2015: In collaboration with Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham overtook an Assad regime stronghold, the Abu al-Zuhur military air base in Idlib governorate. '''Autumn 2015: In alliance with Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham was involved in offensives in Northern Aleppo against ISIS and in Southern Aleppo against Assad regime forces. May and June of 2016: Allied with Jabhat al-Nusra, they conducted attacks in Northern Aleppo against ISIS that initially made rapid advances but were eventually pushed back. Spring 2016: Ahrar al-Sham was involved in heavy fighting with other Anti-ISIS rebel forces in Eastern and Western Ghouta and in the Dar'a region in southern Syria. June 2016: In alliance with Jabhat al-Nusra and others, major offensive against Assad regime forces in Jabal al-Akrad.'''

2.3 ''' Salafi principles – Salafi groups emerged as important political and social actors in Egypt and Tunisia after the Arab Spring. Salafist groups can look very different from each other but author Markus Holdo identifies three accepted categories of Salafist groups. There are scripturalist Salafis who refuse to participate in politics because they find it useless in achieving their goals, the political Salafist who do engage in politics while seeking to put in place a fundamentalist agenda, and lastly there are the Jihadist Salafis who identify as part of a global jihad and generally find more popularity among younger people. While there may be differences in how Jihadist Salafist groups define the act of jihad, they generally reject the institutional politics of liberal democracy and westernization because "of its inability to deliver the material and ethical goods they demand." Jihadist Salafist do not just rally behind a shared religious view, but around fighting the ideals they think exist in institutional politics such as hierarchy, exclusion, and corruption. Ahrar al-Sham can be described as Jihadist Salafis whose definition of Jihad is one of active war fighting. Often times, this view of Jihad is used as a recruitment tool by calling fighters to join a cause and complete their duty to Islam. '''

2.3  2013-2014: The Islamic front

2.4  2014-2016: Shifting alliances with rebels and Islamists

2.4.1       September 2014: leadership killed in bomb attack

2.5  2017 onwards: conflict with al-Nusra/HTS

'''3.    Capabilities and Tactics- Ahrar al-Sham has between 10,000 and 20,000 members. when they have cooperated with Jabhat al-Nusra they have been a force capable of offensives that have taken territory and pushed back Assad forces and the Islamic State. Aside from large scale offensives, Ahrar al-Sham was known for its use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and a tactic in which they would target military bases and capture weapons. Ahrar al-Sham's arsenal included tanks, mobile artillery, anti-tank missiles, rocket and grenade launchers, and even a technical division devoted to cyber attacks. There are no reports of Ahrar al-Sham engaging in suicide attacks, though they associate with groups who do.'''

4.     Foreign Support

'''4.1 Foreign Fighters- Ahrar al-Sham generally welcomes foreign fighters without demanding too much of them. Ahrar al-Sham encourages foreign fighters to arrive unmarried, committed to stay with the organization for six months, and prepared to pay in advance for their stay and their own weapon. While Ahrar al-Sham does not consider jihad to be a duty for all Muslims, they do consider they objective of toppling the Assad regime in Syria to be a conflict that at its core is about Muslim concerns. While foreign fighters may come from other countries, Ahrar al-Sham extends welcoming arms because they believe in a common linkage among Muslims fighting for an Islamic regime in Syria.'''

4.2 Foreign Funds- Ahrar al-Sham has recieved support in the form of money and weapons from Qatar in 2014, and later Saudi Arabia and Turkey in 2015.

4.3- International image and branding: Although Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham have been very close allies in the past, disagreements about branding doomed any official merger between the two organizations. Tensions rose between Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham over Ahrar al-Sham's desire to improve its reputation with the United States and Jabhat al-Nusra's refusal to distance themselves from al-Qaeda and their leader al-Zawahiri.

5.     Designation as a terrorist organization and relations with other designated groups

5.1  Relations with other designated groups

6.      Flags- I would just like to know what the text or imagery on the flags mean

7.     Member groups

8.     Former groups

9.     See also

10. References

11. External links

11.1  GTD link for Ahrar al-Sham- https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&perpetrator=40140

'''11.2 "Ahrar al-Sham." Stanford.edu' . August 7 2017.'' http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/523

'''1.3  Anzalone, Christopher. “The Multiple Faces of Jabhat Al-Nusra/Jabhat Fath Al-Sham in Syria’s Civil War.” Insight Turkey; Ankara, vol. 18, no. 2, Spring 2016, pp. 41–50,'''

'''11.4 Greenwood, Maja. "Islamic State and al-Qaeda's Foreign Fighters." Connections: The Quarterly Journal, vol.16, no.1, Winter 2017, pp. 87-97.'''

11.5 Holdo, Markus. "'''Post-Islamism and fields of contention after the Arab Spring: feminism, Salafism and the revolutionary youth." Third World Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 8, March 2016, pp. 1800-1815.'''

'''11.6  Zuhur, Sherifa. “The Syrian Opposition: Salafi and Nationalist Jihadism and Populist Idealism.” Contemporary Review of the Middle East, vol. 2, no. 1–2, Mar. 2015, pp. 143–63,'''