User:Practice Turn Group I/sandbox

1.1 Reflexive epistemology and relational ontology 1.1.1 Reflexive epistemology One of Pierre Bourdieu’s metatheoretical contributions he offers to International Relations is his reflexive epistemology. The central assumption of Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology is that social sciences themselves, to which International Relations belong, require objectivity. The specific challenge for social scientists is the fact that they are themselves a part of their object of research - the social world - and, therefore, are products of it.[1] The sociologists, then, also construct their objects of research. By doing so, they break with commonly held knowledge.[2] Bourdieu describes this abstraction as an “epistemological break”[3] which needs to be neutralised. Essentially, there are three forms of scholastic fallacy which hinder the objective knowledge production in social sciences because they affect the research: 1.    The presuppositions which accompany the social background and social position of the researcher, such as age, level of education or ethnic group.[4] 2.    The researcher’s position in the academic field and the set of rules in the academia.[5] 3.    The “intellectualist” bias of the researcher is produced within the academic field. It leads to a scientific viewpoint from which researchers observe social life as a spectacle rather than a series of concrete problems which require practical solutions.[6] To limit the effects of these biases in the research, Bourdieu argues for a “radical reflexivity”[7] where the “scientific unconscious”[8] becomes reconstructed. For this reason, the knowledge production as well as the construction of the object of research need to be objectified. Subsequently, social scientists must pose the question under which conditions the academic discourse is produced and constantly scrutinise their research practices. By doing so, the practices of knowledge production themselves become the object of research.[9] That is what Bourdieu calls the “science of science”[10] where the objectification of the research object itself becomes objectified.11]. Thus, following Bourdieu, a reflexive sociology requires a critical analysis not only for the constructed object but also for the position of the social scientist in the academic field to limit the influence of social conditions and to master the subjective relation to the object.[12],[13] 1.1.2 Relational ontology The term relational ontology describes Bourdieu’s philosophy of science that can be allocated to relationalism. Its basic principle is that the social world is understood through relations. Therefore, the objects of research in International Relations are not examined regarding their intrinsic characteristics but in context and as a part of the whole. Therefore, they need to be analysed in reference to their field, their activities and their practices in which they are embedded.[14],[15]

Concepts of Bourdieu (Johannes):

(Social) Field: Bourdieu conceptualizes social fields (@) as arenas of struggle. Structured around the specific objects of struggle all actors agree upon, e. g. security or economic gain, they are relatively independent from each other and defined by hierarchical power relations between actors as well as the doxa (@), truths, beliefs and norms taken for granted. In international relations research the concept of fields has been used to examine delineate domains of power struggles, e. g. international security or economics, and the power relations within the specific field.

Habitus: For Bourdieu the Habitus (@), acquired tacit learning, actors are only partly able to reflect their habitus as source of their beliefs and behaviour. Naturally holding certain forms of cultural and social capital the Habitus defines an actor’s position within a field and inclines them to recognize these forms of capital and apply certain practices and strategies. In international relations theory the concept is used to explain the positions of, and power relations between actors, as well as the capital they hold. Being representations of the habitus, practices and strategies actors apply, such as diplomacy or economic sanctioning, researchers are able to examine their habitus and position within a given field.

Capital: Capital, for Bourdieu, consists of every resource an actor can utilize productively within a certain field in the pursuit of their specific objective. He differentiates between social, cultural, economic and, as a product of the other forms, symbolic capital, which define an actor’s position within a field and thereby their amount of power. Conceptualized as a means for actors to better their position within a field, it can be translated into other forms of capital. In international relations theory the concept often is used to examine why and how actors can utilize different resources such as natural resources, scientific inventions, military capabilities or technological know-how in the pursuit of their objectives.

Practices: Practices for Bourdieu are representations of an actor’s position within a field. If an actor’s habitus and position are homologic, their practices become part of the doxa. As such specific practices become representations of the position actors hold within a field and its hierarchy. In international relations this often can be practices such as diplomacy, international aid or norm advocacy, but also military interventions or economic sanctions. Research regarding practices often focussed on the question when and why actors use certain practices and how these practices represent their positions within the field of International Relations.

Symbolic Power: Conceptualized as the power to shape the doxa in a productive way, symbolic power (@) for Bourdieu is based on the possession of different forms of capital. Dominant actors have the ability to change the rules of the game and the tacit knowledge structuring the field. Being able to align their position and dispositions, these actors are able to define the power hierarchy in a self-perpetuating, tacit way that consolidates their dominant position. In international relations theory this concept has been used to research how actors can shape international norms, define which practices, believes and value, such as democracy and liberalism or the practice of diplomacy, are seen as acceptable.

Hysteresis and Homology: The alignment of an actor’s position within a field and their dispositions defined by their habitus is what Bourdieu calls Homology. If perfectly aligned the habitus and the practices it inclines actors to reproduce the power hierarchy and structure of the field. If, however, the dispositions and position of an actor are in misalignment, change within the structure of a field is possible. In international relations theory, these concepts have been used to explain and research the demise of the Soviet Union, as well as the subsequent relations between Russia and NATO. Situating Bourdieu – The Logic of Practicality Situating Bourdieu’s practice approach in International Relations (IR) theory brings, according to IR theorist Vincent Pouliot, ontological issues to the fore. The big strands of IR theory centre around the logic of consequences (see rational choice theory), the logic of appropriateness, and the logic of arguing (see The Theory of Communicative Action). These three logics of social action all have in come that they rely on representational knowledge.[1] In contradiction, Pierre Bourdieu’s approach relies on practical knowledge.[2] Pouliot emphasizes ontological priority to practical knowledge over representational knowledge, thus, to the logic of practicality over the three other logics.[3] Representational knowledge Representational knowledge is conscious, verbalizable, and intentional. Likewise, it is learned consciously and intentionally. As it is rational and abstract, conclusions that are drawn from representational knowledge are explicit and justified. Representational knowledge leads to social action that can be described by the formula: “In situation X, you should do Y”.[4] Practical knowledge Practical knowledge is background knowledge. It is tacit, inarticulate, and automatic. It is learned experientially. It is taken for granted knowledge that was learned by doing without reflection or deliberation. It is learned in practice, on the field, and forms the habitus.[5] However, it needs to be visioned in distinction to bare habits, since habits are strictly iterative, whilst practical knowledge is not static but contingently builds on past experiences.[6] As it is reasonable and contextual, practices constituted by practical knowledge are self-evident and implicit. Bourdieu describes practical knowledge with the term of the body[7] as it is the body that through for example the coincidental situation of being a male or a female generates practical knowledge.[8] This automatic and inarticulate character of practical knowledge is described by the formula “In situation X, Y follows”.[9] Logics of social action By dividing knowledge into these two categories, it becomes obvious that the logic of consequences, the logic of appropriateness, and the logic of arguing all rely on representational knowledge. In the logic of consequences, it is consciously evaluated on the costs and benefits of one action. [10] In the logic of appropriateness, the agents consciously decide whether to comply to a norm is appropriate.[11] In the logic of arguing, it is conscious deliberation between agents that leads to social action.[12] However, Bourdieu’s practice approach emphasizes ontological priority to practical knowledge, thus, to the logic of practicality. It is prior to representational knowledge, as in every rational decision, norm compliance, or deliberation a form of background experience on which has never been reflected upon plays a role.[13]