User:PspOU/Aftermath of the Falklands War

Political aftermath
Diplomatic relations between the UK and Argentina were not restored until 1989 under a formula which put the issue of sovereignty to one side (the sovereignty umbrella) and established a framework within which further talks on matters of mutual interest could be held.

USA and Latin America
The United States' reputation in parts of Latin America was damaged because of the perception that it had broken the Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance or TIAR) by providing the UK with military supplies. American intervention in the war led to many Latin Americans believing that the United States held a strong fascination over the East-West dichotomy over hemispheric interests.

In September 2001 the then President of Mexico Vicente Fox cited the Falklands War as proof of the failure of the TIAR.

Regarding the attitude of the Latin American governments, K. J. Holsti presents another sight of the South American dilemma: "While South American governments (except Chile) publicly supported Argentina in its conflict with Great Britain, in private many governments were pleased with the outcome of the war. Argentina's bellicosity against Chile over the Beagle Channel problem ... [its] foreign intervention ([in] Bolivia and Nicaragua) ... and [its] propounded geopolitical doctrines that were seen in other countries as threatening to them". So, according to David R. Mares, "Brazilian military analysts worried about the problems of having a successful and belligerent Argentina as neighbour".

For Chile, engaged with Argentina in a long-standing territorial dispute over the Cape Horn islands, the outcome of the war delayed and overall averted a planned Argentine military invasion of Chile and made possible the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1984 between Chile and Argentina.

Military analysis
Militarily, the Falklands conflict remains the largest air-naval combat operation between modern forces since the end of the Second World War. As such, it has been the subject of intense study by military analysts and historians. The most significant "lessons learned" include the vulnerability of surface ships to anti-ship missiles and submarines, the challenges of coordinating logistical support for a long-distance projection of power, and reconfirmation of the role of tactical air power, including the use of helicopters.

Logistics
The logistical capability of the UK armed forces was stretched to the limit in order to mount an amphibious operation so far from a land base, in mountainous islands with few roads. After the war much work was done to improve both the logistical and amphibious capability of the Royal Navy. Task force commander Rear Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward referred to the conflict as "a lot closer run than many would care to believe", reflecting the naval and military belief that few people understood—or understand—the extent to which the logistical dimension made the war a difficult operation for the UK.

Royal Navy communication was hindered during the conflict due to misinterpretation and lack of clear Rules of Engagement(ROE) which had to be forwarded from the Ministry of Defense to the Prime Minister in order to establish clear orders. When the British Navy was engaged with two Argentine Navy forces using a pincer tactic, Admiral Woodward who was in charge of the Royal Navy during the conflict, bypassed the delays in getting the ROE changed by ordering the British nuclear submarine, Conqueror, to fire on the oncoming Argentine naval vessels with his permission. The admiral's judgement call highlighted the flaws in the ROE approval process and would improve British communications.

The ships of the task force could only remain on station for a limited time in the worsening southern hemisphere winter. With such a high proportion of the Royal Navy's surface fleet engaged, or lost in combat, there were few units available for northbound traffic. At the core of the fleet, Invincible could possibly have been replaced by the hastily prepared Illustrious or the loaned USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2), but there was no replacement available for Hermes, the larger of the two British carriers. Woodward's strategy, therefore, required the land war to be won before Hermes, in particular, succumbed to the harsh environment. Woodward called the operation "a damned close-run thing", quoting the Duke of Wellington after the Battle of Waterloo.