User:RQGuo/sandbox/Domain specificity

Domain specificity is a theoretical position in cognitive science (especially modern cognitive development) that argues that many aspects of cognition are supported by specialized, presumably evolutionarily specified, learning devices. The position is a close relative of modularity of mind, but is considered more general in that it does not necessarily entail all the assumptions of Fodorian modularity (e.g., informational encapsulation). Instead, it is properly described as a variant of psychological nativism. Other cognitive scientists also hold the mind to be modular, without the modules necessarily possessing the characteristics of Fodorian modularity.

Domain specificity emerged in the aftermath of the cognitive revolution as a theoretical alternative to empiricist theories that believed all learning can be driven by the operation of a few such general learning devices. Prominent examples of such domain-general views include Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, and the views of many modern connectionists. Proponents of domain specificity argue that domain-general learning mechanisms are unable to overcome the epistemological problems facing learners in many domains, especially language. In addition, domain-specific accounts draw support from the surprising competencies of infants, who are able to reason about things like numerosity, goal-directed behavior, and the physical properties of objects all in the first months of life. Domain-specific theorists argue that these competencies are too sophisticated to have been learned via a domain-general process like associative learning, especially over such a short time and in the face of the infant’s perceptual, attentional, and motor deficits. Current proponents of domain specificity argue that evolution equipped humans (and indeed most other species) with specific adaptations designed to overcome persistent problems in the environment. For humans, popular candidates include reasoning about objects, other intentional agents, language, and number. Researchers in this field seek evidence for domain specificity in a variety of ways. Some look for unique cognitive signatures thought to characterize a domain (e.g. differences in ways infants reason about inanimate versus animate entities). Others try to show selective impairment or competence within but not across domains (e.g. the increased ease of solving the Wason Selection Task when the content is social in nature). Still others use learnability arguments to argue that a cognitive process or specific cognitive content could not be learned, as in Noam Chomsky’s poverty of the stimulus argument for language.

Prominent proponents of domain specificity include Jerry Fodor, Noam Chomsky, Steven Pinker, Elizabeth Spelke, Susan Carey, Lawrence Hirschfeld, Susan Gelman and many others.

Modularity of Mind
The functional architecture of the mind has remained subject to debate in the literature. Whilst horizontal views assert that mental processes derive from interactions across domains (i.e. not domain specific), vertical views suggest that each mental faculty owes itself to specific domains that are genetically, neurologically and computationally independent of each other.

In his 1983 publication on the Modularity of mind, Jerry Fodor takes an approach that merges horizontal and vertical views. Contrary to the more popular empiricist (horizontal view) theories of the time which support domain-general arguments, Fodor proposed that the mind consists at least partly, by evolutionarily-developed, innate mental modules that characterise specific functions in our brains (vertical view). Fodor proposed the Hypothesis of Modest Modularity, asserting that modularity (domain specificity) is not consistent across all human processes, and that it varies at different levels. He argued that input systems are modular, referring to those such as perception and language, whereas central systems are not, which include systems involved in belief fixation and practical reasoning.

Evolutionary Psychology
A more recent development in the modularity hypothesis proposed by Fodor has emerged from Evolutionary psychology. Whereas Fodor believed there was an extent to which the mind is modular, evolutionary psychologists contend that our minds are made up of domain-specific modules that have been shaped by selection pressures. As a result, each module has genetically evolved over time to carry out innate and complex functions. The Massive Modularity Hypothesis has convinced many researchers from this field such as Dan Sperber and Peter Carruthers (philosopher),


 * 1) Explain Massive Modularity Real Quick
 * 2) Compare to Fodor