User:Rbuenconsejo/sandbox

Causes
Scholars have identified three major areas that contribute to bureaucratic drift: how a bureaucracies are structured, interest groups that lobby bureaucracies, and presidential appointments of bureaucratic leaders. Structural Bureaucratic agencies are often structured so that legislators and their staffers have the opportunity to easily monitor bureaucratic activity. While some scholars believe that structural organizations can help lessen bureaucratic drift. , other scholars have found that this is approach can backfire. When a bureaucracy is permeable anyone can have access to the bureaucracy, including legislators who were originally adverse to the legislation being implemented. Further, scholars argue that if a bureaucratic agency is designed to represent a single interest their implementations are more likely to reflect the views of the clientele than they are the rules of the bureaucracy or the views of the legislature. Lobbying Making bureaucracies easily accessible means that interest groups can have a greater influence on the outcome of policy implementation. Some scholars believe that bureaucracies can have positive interactions with interest groups. An example of such an interaction is when interest groups support bureaucracies by providing information and facts about areas the bureaucracy is meant to promote or serve. Other scholars, however, have found that interest groups can cause bureaucratic drift. When a bureaucratic agency is infiltrated or corrupted by an external group whose views do not align with the preferences of the legislature it said that the bureaucratic agency is captured. If an interest group negotiates with a bureaucracy they can bias the bureaucracy to implement policy that drifts from the original intention of the legislation so the policy instead better serves the needs of the interest group and its clients.  Presidential Appointments Scholars consider presidents active in the affairs of "independent" bureaucracies. Presidential nominations are sometimes considered a check on bureaucracies because it ensures reliable agent performance. A president may wish to maintain bureaucratic drift if such a drift lies in his or her favor. An administrative agency can be captured by a president when he or she appoints a bureaucratic head that reaffirms bureaucratic drift that is favorable to the president's policies. Scholars believe that if bureaucratic drift does not lie in the favor of the president or if there is no bureaucratic drift present, the president will be unable to capture a bureaucracy with an executive appointment. In cases where bureaucratic drift is present, scholars believe that the president can change policy more rapidly than in a zero-drift scenario.

Implications
Scholars have identified possible implications of bureaucratic drift, ranging from effects on coalition drift to effects on the decisions of presidential appointments. In cases where staffers are used to monitor bureaucratic drift it necessarily entails increasing coalition drift because agency rules are made subject to the preferences of future legislative coalitions. Consequently, legislatures must weigh the trade-off between bureaucratic drift and coalition drift. A president may wish to maintain bureaucratic drift if such drift lies in his or her favor. An administrative agency can be captured by a president when he or she is able to appoint a bureaucratic head that reaffirms the already favorable bureaucratic drift. Scholars believe that if bureaucratic drift is does not lie in the favor of the president or if there is no bureaucratic drift present, the president will be unable to capture a bureaucracy with an executive appointment. In cases where bureaucratic drift is present, scholars believe that the president can change policy more rapidly than in a zero-drift scenario. As a consequence, presidents may prefer agency heads who are hostile to his or hers policy views over agency heads who are believe in neutral policy implementation. Some believe that bureaucracies are a necessary part of the American government and that bureaucratic drift is then a risk that simply must be weighed when delegating implementation powers. However, other scholars believe that bureaucratic drift is so detrimental to American politics that it constitutes grounds for eliminating bureaucracies entirely.

Some scholars argue that when Congressional staffers have the opportunity to influence bureaucracies, they bring policy closer to their political ideals. This phenomenon leads to increased coalition drift. Consequently, legislatures must weigh the trade-off between bureaucratic drift and coalition drift. Others argue that presidents may wish to preserve bureaucratic drift if the policy lies in his or her favor.

Some believe that bureaucracy's distance from public preference actually has a beneficial effect upon the legislative body that created it.