User:Realpolitik agenda/SdWWII

Course of events
Regarding military equipment, before the outbreak of the war, the Swedish Ministry of Defense (Kungl. Flygförvaltningen) had ordered some 300 combat aircraft from the United States, which were primarily Seversky P-35s and P-66 Vanguards. In 1940, the US administration halted these exports after only about 60 aircraft had been delivered. Sweden then succeeded in buying 200 aircraft from Italy, a fascist ally of Germany at the time, which were primarily Fiat CR.42s, Reggiane Re.2000s, and Caproni Ca.313s.
 * Pre war preparations

Outbreak of World War II
1 September 1939 After the outbreak of World War II between Germany and the Soviet Union versus Poland, and France and Britain versus Germany, Sweden declared itself a neutral country in regard to the conflict in whole.

Foreign trade
At the beginning of the war, agreements were signed between Sweden and the two great powers in order to sustain vital trade. In spite of the fact that Sweden had declared itself as a neutral country, the belligerents started to attack Swedish shipping.

The "Lejdbåtstrafik
However, when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway in April 1940, coupled with a German blockade of the North Sea, every single shipment had to be negotiated with both British and German authorities, which drastically reduced the volume of trade. Sweden's trade with Britain was cut by a total of 70%. Within the North Sea blockade, trade with Germany increased, until 37% of Sweden's exports were shipped to Germany.

Shortages and Rationing
Between 1938 and 1944, the Swedish import of petroleum products and coal decreased by 88% and 53% respectively, which lead to severe shortages. Other critical items were natural rubber, alloy metals and food. This lead to extensive rationing of fuels and food. Sweden started production of different substitutes. Wood gas was invented as a fuel for motor vehicles and oil shale as a substitute for bunker oil.

The Winter War
30 November 1939 - 12 March 1940

Impact on domestic politics
The Liberal, Conservative and Agrarian parties were concerned about a perceived threat from the Soviet Union and were more favorably disposed towards Finland than the Social Democrats were. Among the latter, a certain wariness from the Finnish Civil War still lingered. The Communists, on the other hand, were loyal to the Soviet Union, and supported its Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Germany. However, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, they swung around to a pro-Allied view.

At the outbreak of the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union in November 1939, Sweden declared itself to be ”non-belligerent” in regard to that particular conflict, actively siding with Finland. This allowed Sweden to aid Finland economically, and with armaments. Sweden and Finland also laid minefields in the Sea of Åland to deter Soviet submarines from entering the Gulf of Bothnia.

The defense of Finland
When the Soviet Union invaded Finland in November 1939, many Swedes favored some sort of involvement in the conflict, both on a humanitarian and military basis. Sweden's interest in Finland lay in the fact that Finland had been an integrated part of Sweden for more than six hundred years, with Sweden losing control of its eastern provinces in 1809. Despite several pleas from the Finnish government, the Swedish government chose not to engage militarily when the Red Army advanced during the Winter War. However, Sweden was declared a "non-belligerent" rather than neutral during the conflict and accepted that as many as 8,000 Swedes voluntarily went to Finland. The Swedish government and public also sent food, clothing, medicine, weapons and ammunition to aid the Finns during the Winter War, but avoided direct military involvement. The military aid included:
 * 135,402 rifles, 347 machine guns, 450 light machine guns with 50,013,300 rounds of small arms ammunition;
 * 144 field guns, 100 anti-aircraft guns and 92 anti-armor guns with 301,846 shells;
 * 300 sea mines and 500 depth charges;
 * 17 fighter aircraft, 5 light bombers and 3 reconnaissance aircraft.

Twelve of Sweden's most modern fighter aircraft, Gloster Gladiators, were flown by volunteer Swedish pilots under Finnish insigninas, which was one third of the Sweden's fighter force at the time. In addition, some 70,000 Finnish children were sent to safety from Finland to Sweden during the 1940s.

February crisis of 1940
Within a month, the Soviet leadership began to consider abandoning the operation, and on 29 January 1940, via intermediaries in Sweden, Finland's government was approached on the subject of preliminary peace negotiations. Until this point, Finland had fought for its existence as an independent and democratic country. However, at the news that Finland might be forced to cede its territory or sovereignty, public opinion in France and Britain, already favorable to Finland, swung in favor of intervention. When rumors of an armistice reached governments in Paris and London, both decided to offer military support.

On the 1 February, the Finnish president Risto Ryti met with Swedish prime minister Per Albin Hansson to request Swedish support. Finland asks for two divisions from the regular Swedish army, 20.000 men. The Swedish reply is that a reacessment of the neutrality is out of the question, but that it is willing to raise the roof of the number of voulonteers to Finland from 8.000 to 12.000. This proposal is totally insufficient for the Finnish needs, and as a result, Finland starts to consider an intervention by the Western Allies.

Potential Allied invasion

 * Main article: Winter War: Franco-British Plans for Intervention

Franco-British support was offered on the condition their armed forces be given free passage through neutral Norway and Sweden instead of taking the difficult passage from Petsamo. It was alleged by some that French and British governments sought to occupy the iron ore districts in Kiruna and Malmberget. (Borders as of 1920–1940.)In February 1940, the Allies offered to help: the Allied plan, approved on 4–5 February by the Allied High Command, consisted of 100,000 British and 35,000 French troops that were to disembark at the Norwegian port of Narvik and support Finland via Sweden while securing supply routes along the way. Plans were made to launch the operation on 20 March under the condition that the Finns first make a formal request for assistance (this was done to avoid German charges that the Franco-British forces constituted an invading army). On 2 March, transit rights were officially requested from the governments of Norway and Sweden. It was hoped that Allied intervention would eventually bring the two still neutral Nordic countries, Norway and Sweden, to the Allied side by strengthening their positions against Germany — although Hitler had by December declared to the Swedish government that Western troops on Swedish soil would immediately provoke a German invasion.

However, only a small fraction of the Western troops were intended for Finland. Proposals to enter Finland directly, via the ice-free harbour of Petsamo, had been previously dismissed. There was speculation in some diplomatic quarters, encouraged by German sources, that the true objective of the operation was to occupy the Norwegian shipping harbour of Narvik and the vast mountainous areas of the north-Swedish iron ore fields, from which the Third Reich received a large share of its iron ore, critical to war production. If the governments of France and Britain later broke their pledge not to seize territory or assets in Norway and Sweden, and Franco-British troops later moved to halt exports to Germany, the area could become a significant battleground between the Allies and the Germans.

End of the Winter War
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Allied Background
One of the Allies main strategic goals in the north, was to disrupt the Swedish-German ore trade. When Norwegian and Swedish reluctance to allow Allied troops on their territory, halted the original Allied plan, the Allies decided to try a "semi-peaceful" invasion nevertheless. On 12 March troops were to be landed in Norway, and proceed into Sweden to capture the Swedish mines. However, if serious military resistance was encountered they were not to press the issue. However, Finland sued for peace on March 12, so the revised version of this plan had to be abandoned too.

With First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill as a mayor proponent, the Allies decided to commence Operation Wilfred, and mine the Norwegian waters close to Narvik, to force the ore transports out on internationall waters, and expose them to attacks from the Royal Navy. On 5 April Norway and Sweden was notified by the United Kingdom of Brittish intentions to place mines on Norwegian territorial waters, and on the morning of 8 April, Brittish destroyers started to lay mines close to Norway. By then the German invasion was already on its way.

German Background
The strategic goals of Germanys campaign in Norway was both offensive and defencive. In 1928 the German Admiral Wolfgang Wegener had pointed out the necessity for Germany to occupy Norwegian naval bases, to offensivly threaten Brittish sea lines of communication, in an eventual war with the United Kingdom. The defencive aspect of an occupied Norway was to secure the access to Swedish iron ore.

Strategically, Denmark's importance to Germany was as a staging area for operations in Norway, and of course as a border nation to Germany which would have to be controlled in some way. Given Denmark's position in the Baltic Sea the country was also important for the control of naval and shipping access to major German and Russian harbours.

Swedish Background
During the Winter War, Sweden mobilized 100,000 men, who were deployed along the Finnish border in northern Sweden. The war ended with the Moscow Peace Treaty on March 12, 1940, but when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway on April 9, 1940, this force was under demobilization. Before World War II, Sweden had no plans for defending Norway or defense against a German invasion from there. Moreover, an agreement from the Dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden in 1905 stated that no fortification was allowed along the common border.

Operation Weserübung
9 April 1940The goal of the German operation was simultaneous occupation of Denmark and Norway through a strategic Coup d'état. Denmark was considered vital because its location facilitated greater air and naval control of the area.

In Norway, the plan called for the capture of six primary targets by amphibious landings: Oslo, Kristiansand, Egersund, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. Additionally, supporting paratroops (Fallschirmjäger) were to capture other key locations such as airfields at Fornebu outside of Oslo and Sola outside of Stavanger. The plan was designed to quickly overwhelm the Norwegian defenders and occupy these vital areas before any form of organized resistance could be mounted.

The operation as planned was a decisive success for Germany. Both Denmark and Norway were occupied with relatively light casualties. Surprise was almost complete, particularly in Denmark, and only in the Narvik area did the invasion prove problematic.

After the operation Hitler wrote in a letter to Sweden's King Gustaf V, dated April 24, 1940: "I have no doubt that our action (the invasion of Norway and Denmark), which at the last moment forestalled the execution of the Allied plan and which under all circumstances will stop France and England from getting a foothold in Scandinavia, will have consequences which will be a blessing to the Scandinavian peoples."

German demands on Sweden
In a note to the Swedish government Germany demanded: Strict neutrality, no moblilisation, rights to use the Swedish telephone network, continued shipments of ore, and no Swedish marine activity beyond Swedish territorial waters.

In the following note, Swedish declared: to maintain neutral, but reserved the rights to all actions necessery to maintain it. Sweden organized its mobilization system so that personal order by letter was possible as an alternative to official proclamations, so 320,000 men were raised in a few weeks.

Evaluation of German capabillitys
The impressive and successfull operation led to a Swedish tendency to overrate the German capabillities to stage coup-like invasions.

This led to the Government being a lot more responsive, to the Supreme Commanders requests of heightened readiness. It also resulted in discussions, and evaluations, over how to responde to an hypothetic German demand to transit troops to Norway.

Changes in strategic conditions

 *  Encirclement of Sweden and Finland 

The speedily conduction of the operation was most likely benefitial to Sweden. It made eventual German demands on Sweden, to transit invasion forces unnesseccary. Further more, the the outlook of Scandinavia as a long-time theatre of war lessened considerably.

However, through Denmark and Norways falling into German hands, Sweden and Finland became strategically encircled by the German-Soviet pact. Since the Baltic states; Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; had been forced to accept limited Soviet forces on their soil, in the fall of 1939, they were therefore de facto more or less in a state of occupation. For Sweden and Finland, this means that the only possible trade route to nations other than Germany and the Soviet Union, is through Petsamo harbour, in the far north of Finland. This seriously hampered the supply situation in both these nations. It also led to, an invasion of Sweden could be launched from almost any direction. Sweden therefore started to build fortifications at the Norwegian border and along the coast of Scania.


 *  Effects on Swedish politics and relations 

By choosing neutrality towards the conflict in Norway, the relations between the two nations worsened. On 12 April, the Norwegian King Haakon, the Crown Prince Olav, and some members of the government, was denied entrance to Sweden. Allowing them to do so, and not interning them, would have been a crime against internationall law.

Neutrality also ment that niether economical nor material aid would be sent to Norway. It was the Finland situation in reverse, and it rendered the policy somewhat inpopular, domestically and abroad. When the organisor of the National fund for Finland, wanted to extend the fund to include Norway, the request was imediatley dissmissed by the Swedish government.

Carl Hambro a member of the Norwegian parliament, and a active organisor of the Norwegian resistance movement, had fled to Sweden, but was denied to speak on radio, by the Swedish Foreign Office.

Desciphering German telecomunications
Germany also demanded that the telephone and telegraph lines between Germany and Norway be left undisturbed. Sweden allowed this, but tapped the lines. Swedish mathematician Arne Beurling succeeded in deciphering and reverse-engineering the Geheimfernschreiber cypher machine that Germany used, which afforded the Swedes advance knowledge of Germany's military intentions.

Narvik
28 May 1940

The "Permittenttrafik"
18 June 1940 - 15 August 1943

The March crisis
14 March 1941

Operation Barbarossa and the 1941 "Midsummer Crisis"
22 June 1941

Transition of "Division Engelbrecht
After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in early summer of 1941 (Operation Barbarossa), the Germans in June 22 asked Sweden for military concessions. The Swedish government granted these requests for logistical support (mainly German troop transports between Finland, occupied Norway, occupied Denmark). In Sweden, the political deliberations surrounding this decision has been called the "midsummer crisis".

Recent research by Carl-Gustaf Scott argues, however, that there never was a "crisis", stating that:


 * "the crisis was created in historical hindsight in order to protect the political legacy of the Social Democratic Party and its leader Per Albin Hansson."

The Continuation War
25 June 1941

February crisis of 1942
February

After 1943
From 1943 onwards, Germany began to meet with a series of military reverses after its losses at the Battle of Stalingrad and elsewhere. Germany was forced into a more defensive position while Allied forces met with greater success on the battlefield, such as in North Africa. It was apparent to Sweden that Germany was unlikely to win. Prior to 1943, Sweden's policy of neutrality was largely under the influence of German politics and the course of events that involved Germany. Following August and September 1943, Sweden was able to resist German demands and soften its stance to Allied pressure. However, despite Germany's defensive posture, Sweden was in constant fear that "the whole course of events suggested that the unexpected might happen", an attitude that was sustained until the very end of the war. With Germany's weakening position came stronger demands from the Allies. The Allies pushed for Sweden to abandon its trade with Germany, and to stop all German troop movements over Swedish soil. Sweden accepted payments from the Allies to compensate for loss of income, but continued to sell steel and machined parts to Nazi Germany (at inflated  'smugglers' rates' ).

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 * See also: Winter War: Franco-British Plans for Intervention

German industry was heavily dependent on Swedish iron ore. The Allies had intended to use the Soviet November 30, 1939, attack on Finland as a cover for seizing the important Swedish ore fields in the north, and the Norwegian harbors through which it was shipped to Germany.

The plan was to get Norwegian and Swedish permission to send an expeditionary force to Finland across northern Norway and Sweden, ostensibly to help the Finns. Once in place they were however to proceed to take control of the harbors and mines, occupying cities such as Gävle and Luleå and shutting down the German access to Swedish ore, presenting Norway and Sweden with a fait accompli. Realizing the danger of Allied or German occupation and of the war being waged on their territory, both the Swedes and the Norwegians refused the transit requests. Meanwhile, the Germans having realized the Allied threat, were making plans for a possible invasion of Norway in order to protect their strategic supply lines.

The Allied plan had two parts, Operation Wilfred and Plan R 4. In operation Wilfred, to take place on April 5 (but delayed to April 8), the Norwegian territorial waters were to be mined, violating Norwegian neutrality. This would force the ships carrying ore to Germany to travel outside the protection of Norwegian territorial waters and thus accessible to the British navy. It was hoped that this would provoke a German military reaction. As soon as the Germans would react, under "Plan R 4", 18,000 Allied troops were to land in Narvik, closing the railroad to Sweden. Other cities to be captured were Trondheim and Bergen. The first ship with Allied troops were to start the journey a few hours after the mine laying. On April 8, a Royal Navy detachment led by HMS Renown mined Norwegian waters in operation Wilfred, but German troops were already on their way, and the original "Plan R 4" was no longer feasible. The Allies had, however, provided Hitler with an invasion excuse. Although "Plan R 4" could not be executed as planned, Allied troops were swiftly sent to Norway and were able to fight alongside the Norwegians quite successfully against the Germans (see the Allied campaign in Norway). However, the successful German campaign against France and the low countries led to an Allied troop re-deployment. Allied troops were evacuated from Norway by June 8, 1940.