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The Battle of Blenheim (referred to in some countries as the Second Battle of Höchstädt), fought on 13 August 1704, was a major engagement of the War of the Spanish Succession. Up till this point the war had gone well for King Louis XIV of France, whose generals were contesting the Grand Alliance on several fronts: against the Duke of Marlborough's Anglo-Dutch army in the Low Countries; against Prince Louis of Baden's Imperial army along the Rhine and Holy Roman Empire's western frontier; and against Prince Eugene of Savoy's Austrian forces in northern Italy. When Maximilian II Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria, allied himself with the French king in the early stages of the war, new strategic opportunities arose in southern Germany and on the Upper Danube. In consequence, Austrian Habsburg territories came under direct threat, including Emperor Leopold I's capital, Vienna, a city already looking anxiously towards a Hungarian rebellion to the east. To a handful of statesmen in London and Vienna it was clear that only the combined efforts of England, the Dutch Republic, and Austria could prevent the Emperor's defeat and forestall the collapse of the Grand Alliance.

Pressed by the Emperor's Ambassador Marlborough abandoned his plans to campaign on the Moselle and instead marched his army 250 mi south from the Low Countries to southern Germany. Joining with Baden's Imperial army the Duke sought to eliminate the Elector of Bavaria from the war before the French could send him reinforcements; but a combination of diplomacy and force ultimately failed to bring Max Emanuel to compliance. When Marshal Tallard brought his French army from the Rhine to bolster the Elector, and Prince Eugene of Savoy arrived with reinforcements for the Allies, the scene was finally set for the decisive encounter on the Danube, astride and beyond the Nebel stream. The battle was hard-fought and remained in the balance throughout the day, but by late afternoon Marlborough at last gained the upper hand before launching a final cavalry charge through the centre of the French line. His horsemen proved irresistible: the Franco-Bavarian position collapsed and the defenders in the villages of Blindheim (Engl.: Blenheim), Oberglauheim, and Lutzingen either fled or surrendered. The Grand Alliance had secured an overwhelming victory.

The whole campaign dominated events in 1704 and was one of the turning points of the war: French ascendency had been stemmed and the threat to Vienna and the Austrian Habsburg territories was eliminated. The remnants of the Franco-Bavarian army retreated back across the Rhine, and Bavaria was placed under Austrian rule. Max Emanuel returned to the Spanish Netherlands to continue the fight against the Emperor and the Grand Alliance, while Tallard became a prisoner of war in England. The victory did not bring about the end of the war, however, which would last another ten years, and the Allies failed to capitalise on their success in the following year's campaign. Yet the Battle of Blenheim secured the first major defeat of French arms in 50 years, and confirmed Marlborough and Eugene as two of Europe's pre-eminent commanders who led what is considered one of the great campaigns of European history.

Background
In November 1700 Philip, Duke of Anjou, grandson of King Louis XIV of France, succeeded Charles II as ruler of Spain and its empire. Louis XIV had secured advantages for the House of Bourbon, but his recognition of Philip V's place in the line of succession to the French throne gave rise to the prospect of France and Spain uniting under a single monarch. To counter Louis XIV's ambitions England, the Dutch Republic, and Austria reformed the Grand Alliance in September 1701. Beyond preventing the hegemony in Europe of the House of Bourbon, each member of the Alliance had their own limited and specific objectives. The Austrian Holy Roman Emperor, Leopold I – who had himself a claim to the Spanish throne – had from the start refused to accept the Bourbon inheritance, particularly the Spanish domains in Italy, and had already sent Prince Eugene of Savoy across the Alps to secure the Duchy of Milan by force. In Germany the Rhineland principalities sought to secure a strong Reichsbarriere on the Holy Roman Empire's western front and recover lost territory from previous wars; while in England ministers sought colonial advantages at the expense of Spain. The Dutch also had trade interests, but their primary objective was to re-establish their fortress 'Barrier' in the Spanish Netherlands and secure their state's borders.SOURCE

The Emperor under pressure
By the time war was formally declared on 15 May 1702 the Anglo-Dutch Stadtholder-King William III – Louis XIV's long-standing rival – had died. William's sister-in-law, Anne, ascended the throne in England and Anthonie Heinsius, Holland's Pensionary, became de facto executive head of state in the Dutch Republic. Recognizing the necessity of English troops and money the Dutch accepted Anne's Captain-General, John Churchill, Earl of Marlborough, as the Allied commander-in-chief in the Low Countries; but his command necessarily had its limitations. The Dutch naturally had concerns about handing over their army to an relatively unknown Englishman, and were wary that a major defeat on their borders would be fatal to the security of their state – policy was worked over in a Council of War and submitted to the Dutch government through their Field Deputies (civil representatives) for final ratification. In his first campaign in the Low Countries Marlborough pushed back Franco-Spanish forces threatening the Dutch Republic; but less success was forthcoming in 1703. The patchwork of heavily defended fortresses and defensive lines, coupled with disputes amongst commanders, limited Allied gains. Moreover, on other fronts Louis XIV's generals and their allies were making rapid progress as the Holy Roman Empire and the Austrian Habsburg territories were threatened from every direction.

The most dramatic gain for the Bourbon cause in the early years of the war was the defection in September 1702 of Maximilian II Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria. Due to a coincidence of interests the Bavarian Wittelsbachs had been closely tied to the Austrian Habsburgs for over a century, but on the death of Charles II of Spain their interests had diverged. As governor of the Spanish Netherlands Max Emanuel now looked to France for the realization of his ambitions – the sovereign ownership of the Spanish Netherlands (which was no longer the Emperor's to grant) or the Imperial Crown itself. The Elector's alliance opened up new opportunities for Louis XIV: it had the potential to undermine the entire Allied position in southern Germany and provide a base from which the French could strike towards the Emperor's capital Vienna, or across the Alps into northern Italy where Eugene's now threadbare army was struggling against Vendôme's superior forces. But the alliance also created problems: Bavaria was surrounded by hostile territories, and it could be overrun if the French did not provide substantial military support.



With the war stagnating in the Low Countries, the war on the Upper Danube and the Upper Rhine began well for Louis XIV. In October 1702 the King's best general, Marshal Villars, had defeated the Imperial commander-in-chief, Prince Louis of Baden, at Friedlingen, and in March 1703 he had captured Kehl, opposite Strasbourg. By the time Villars had moved to link with the Bavarians in May, the Elector was already in control of much of the Upper Danube, including Ulm, Neuburg, and Regensburg (Ratisbon); he would later take Passau, thereby securing the approaches to Upper Austria. Villars opted for an immediate attack on Vienna; an ambitious plan which was at first agreed to, then rejected by, the Elector who instead campaign unsuccessfully in the Tyrol. The strategic differences contributed to the breakdown of their relationship, and soon after their victory at Höchstädt in September, the less able Marshal Marsin replaced Villars as the French commander in theatre. Nevertheless, French victories on the Upper Danube were mirrored on the Upper Rhine where, in September 1703 Vauban and the duc de Tallard captured Old Breisach, before laying siege to Landau, the key to Alsace. With the situation in Germany deteriorating it became clear to Marlborough, now a duke, that some effort would have to be made to relieve the pressure. By the end of his 1703 campaign in the Low Countries he was already moving his weight southwards, either to support Baden directly or to prepare the way for a campaign along the Moselle (and possibly against Landau) in order to free the Imperial commander for action against Bavaria. As a preliminary to these strategic goals Marlborough sent the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel to recapture Moselle fortresses of Trier and Trarbach, which Tallard had captured in 1702. However, persuaded that Landau was about to fall the Landgrave diverted his attention to the relief of that fortress and was in turn defeated by Tallard at Speyerbach on 15 November. Landau fell two days later and the Moselle fortresses remained in French hands.

Notwithstanding these victories Louis XIV lost two allies in 1703: King Peter II of Portugal who signed an offensive treaty with the Maritime Powers in May; and Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy who, fearing he would become little more than a French vassal, secured himself behind the walls of Turin and declared war on France in October. Louis XIV had new enemies to fight, but the Austrians still faced severe peril on several fronts. Vendôme remained at the head a large army in northern Italy, while on the Danube Franco-Bavarian forces still posed a potential threat to Vienna. Of equal alarm was Francis II Rákóczi's anti-Habsburg rebellion in Hungary where, following the Turkish wars, the peasants had risen under the weight of crippling taxation and feudal burdens. By the end of 1703 Rákóczi, encouraged and funded by Louis XIV, had control of most of Hungary, and rebel horseman were raiding as far as Moravia and Lower Austria. Under pressure from all directions, and with his finances in disarray, Leopold I faced the prospect of losing significant territory and authority in Germany and Hungary. 'Everything here is quite desperate', wrote the Dutch representative in Vienna, 'the Monarchy is on its last legs … it looks as though enemy will soon be at the gates of Vienna – advancing from both sides. There is absolutely nothing to stop them.' The survival of the Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy as belligerents in the war against France necessitated the need for a concerted Allied effort to halt the advance of their enemies.

Situation in 1704
Since the latter half of 1703 Count Wratislaw had pressed Marlborough to relieve the pressure in southern Germany and help ensure the continuing involvement of the Emperor in the Grand Alliance. Leopold I's ambassador was energetic and highly persuasive, and he knew the peril the Empire faced. He urged Marlborough to abandon his initial scheme of campaigning up the Moselle and instead march his army in person to southern Germany and secure the destruction of the Elector of Bavaria. Wratislaw assured Marlborough that the Emperor would meet 'all his wishes'; the alternative, he warned, would not just be the fall of the Empire, but the collapse of the whole Grand Alliance. For Anne's Captain-General the practicalities of a campaign on the Danube were numerous, requiring substantial logistical organisation for which he would be dependent on the the Dutch Field Deputies whose contribution would be fundamental to its success. Yet for Marlborough the campaign offered the chance for offensive and decisive action.

In order to obtain a binding commitment from the English government, Wratislaw presented Queen Anne with a formal memorandum, drafted in agreement with the Duke and the Lord Treasurer in London, Sidney Godolphin. Dated 2 April, Anne was requested to 'instruct Marlborough to concert with the States-General the provision of effective help to the Emperor, or at least to ensure that the troops which Her Majesty maintained on the Continent would be used to protect Germany from a complete collapse'. On 4 April Wratislaw received the answer which he desired, securing for Marlborough a free hand and royal authority for which strategy he chose. The final details of the campaign were settled at The Hague in the third week of April. However, as the States-General would not permit their army to venture as far south as southern Germany – faced as they were by the threat from Marshal Villeroi's army – Marlborough at first withheld his true destination from most of the Dutch representatives. On 29 April the Duke committed his plan to paper:


 * 'My intentions', he wrote from The Hague to Godolphin, 'are to march with the English to Coblenz and declare that I intend to campaign on the Moselle. But when I come there, to write to the Dutch States that I think it absolutely necessary for the saving of the Empire to march with the troops under my command and to join with those that are in Germany that are in Her Majesty's and the Dutch pay, in order to make measures with Prince Lewis of Baden for the speedy reduction of the Elector of Bavaria.'

For these ends the Duke had required Wratislaw to secure the full backing of Emperor Leopold I. 'Marlborough,' wrote the envoy, 'requests me to lay his personal homage at your Majesty's feet and assure you that he and his whole army will advance into the Empire with the determination to sacrifice the lives of all or to conquer the Elector … But nevertheless he declares that should he see on the part of your Majesty no sincere resolve to suppress the Elector, he will be compelled to withdraw himself and his troops immediately.' The Emperor expressed his delight in his envoy's diplomatic zeal: 'Especially have you done well in giving Lord Marlborough every possible assurance that I cannot now do anything else but seek, in every way and earnestly, to secure that the Elector of Bavaria is brought to recognise his shame and his blunders … Consequently the time has at last come for him to suffer the operations of justice.' Leopold I also agreed to send Prince Eugene, now President of the Court War Council (Hofkriegsratspräsident) and a member of the Emperor's inner circle. When the Elector of Bavaria heard that Eugene had left Vienna on 25 May, he wrote to Louis XIV: 'It is certain that the Prince of Savoy can only have come to the seat of war to carry out some great project'.

For his part, Louis XIV had reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the war thus far and the gains he had made. Trier and Trarbach gave his commanders control of the Moselle; Landau secured the Upper Rhine; and Kehl and Old Breisach gave them gateways into Germany. For the forthcoming campaign it was settled that Vendome and La Feuillade would concentrate their efforts against the Duke of Savoy in northern Italy; Villeroi would stand on the defensive in the Low Countries; a small force under Coigny would watch Alsace; and Tallard on the Upper Rhine, and the Elector and Marsin on the Danube, would attack Germany. Tallard would cross the Rhine into Swabia, securing French communications with Bavaria, while the Franco-Bavarian army would besiege Nördlingen and Nuremberg, thereby securing the foundations for an advance which would eventually carry them to Leopold I's capital, Vienna. Contributions in the Swabian and Franconian circles (kreiss) would be levied, severely hampering the Imperial army's ability to maintain itself. However, the Elector and Marsin, somewhat isolated from France, had first to be replenished. Leaving Strasbourg on 13 May with 10,000–13,000 reinforcements (sources vary) of varying quality, Tallard, with vast supplies and munitions, slipped passed Freiburg and through the Black Forest while avoiding Baden's attempts to intercept him. He handed over the convoy in the neighbourhood of Villingen on the 19th and 20th, before returning with his own force to the Upper Rhine. Baden now attempted to intercept the long column as it passed through the defile of Stockach, north of Lake Constance, but again he was too late, and the reinforcements made it safely to the Franco-Bavarian stronghold north of Ulm. The French had begun their German campaign with notable success.

March to the Danube


Marlborough began his march on 19 May from Bedburg, ~20 mi north-west of Cologne, with an army of some 21,000 men, made up of troops in British pay, both subject troops and foreign auxiliaries. His departure raised little immediate comment in the French high command whose natural conclusion was that the Captain-General was planning to campaign up the Moselle, with Trier and Trarbach his intended target. While Marlborough marched Lord Overkirk remained on the defensive in the Spanish Netherlands. The Duke had assured the Dutch that if the French were to launch an offensive against their position he would return in good time, but he had also calculated that as he marched south a significant number of the French army would be drawn after him. In this assumption he was correct. Villeroi shadowed Marlborough with some 30,000 men, leaving Bedmar with the remainder to oppose Overkirk. With Tallard at Strasbourg commanding 36,000 men, the French were in a good position to meet Marlborough on the Moselle, but the Marshal could not quit the Rhine until the Allied plan was known for certain. Nor, under such uncertainty, could the Elector and Marsin begin their march against Nördlingen and Nuremberg. Their original plan was now held in suspense.

The Allied scheme of seizing the initiative was bold, but to Marlborough it was strategically sound. The Rhine protected his right flank for much of the way; thereafter, Baden would secure his position around Philippsburg, the newly constructed Lines of Stollhofen, and the Black Forest. This done, Marlborough's plan envisaged the French reinforcing their position to the front of his advancing column, namely, their army in isolated Bavaria. A campaign in that country would expose the French to long, hazardous lines of communication. But there were dangers for the Allies. With Louis XIV's generals controlling the left bank of the Rhine and its central reaches, Marlborough's own lines of communication could be exposed to French interference during the march. Moreover, such a long trek over poor earthen roads and great rivers would almost certainly involve a high wastage of men and horses through exhaustion and disease. To counter this danger Marlborough and his small personal staff under his Quartermaster-General, William Cadogan, and his personal secretary, Adam Cardonnel, had been thorough in their preparation. Contracts had been made and arrangements to supply food, fodder, new boots and clothes along the line of march were made in advance, and local rulers were assured all would be paid for in English gold – his army, he promised, would maintain strict discipline. However, Parliament had not authorised such a transfer of troops to a remote theatre of operations, and to many the Duke had exceeded his brief as commander. If he failed he faced impeachment, yet the Captain-General was convinced of the urgency: 'I am very sensible that I take a great deal upon me', he had earlier written to Godolphin, 'but should I act otherwise, the Empire would be undone …'

With Villeroi following Marlborough Dutch anticipation of an immediate counter-offensive against their weakened position in the Netherlands thus proved unfounded. With the north secure, Marlborough now urged the States-General to send him the strongest reinforcement they could. On his own initiative Overkirk had already secured the release of the Danish auxiliaries of seven battalions under Lieutenant-General Scholten, and 22 squadrons under the Duke of Württemburg. Marlborough received news of this boon on 26 May, the day he crossed the Rhine at Coblenz, where he was met by 5,000 waiting Hanoverian and Prussian troops. If the Duke intended an attack along the Moselle he must now turn west, but, instead, the following day the army crossed to the right bank of the Rhine. 'When we expected to march up the Moselle,' wrote Captain Robert Parker in his memoirs, 'to our surprise we passed over that river by a stone bridge and then the Rhine over two bridges of boats and proceeded on our march through the country of Hesse-Cassel, where we were joined by the hereditary Prince with the troops of that country.' The French were also surprised. 'There will be no campaign on the Moselle', wrote Villeroi who had taken up a defensive position on the river, 'the English have all gone up into Germany.' A second possible objective now occurred to the French – an Allied incursion into Alsace and an attack on Strasbourg or Landau. Marlborough encouraged this apprehension by constructing bridges of boats across the Rhine at Philippsburg (~50 miles, 80 km, ahead of the march), a ruse that encouraged Villeroi, Tallard, and Coigny to remain on the left bank of the Rhine.

On 3 June, Marlborough reached Ladenburg, in the plain of the Neckar and the Rhine, and halted there for three days to rest his cavalry and allow the guns and infantry to close up. On 6 June he arrived at Wiesloch, south of Heidelberg. The following day, the Allied army swung away from the Rhine towards the hills of the Swabian Alps and the Danube beyond. At last, Louis XIV and his Marshals had established Marlborough's destination. The Elector of Bavaria knew the danger he was now in; moreover, as early as 5 June he had learnt that Eugene was in the field, sent from Vienna to attack him. Repeated requests were sent to Versailles for aid and assistance, and in an urgent dispatch to Louis XIV Marsin warned that it was no longer a case of the Franco-Bavarian army taking the offensive, but of saving the Elector from destruction.

Gathering forces
On 10 June Queen Anne's Captain-General, the Duke of Marlborough, met for the first time Prince Eugene of Savoy, President of the Imperial Court War Council, at the village of Mundelsheim in Württemberg, half-way between the Rhine and the Danube. Unlike Marlborough, who had yet to command an army in a major battle, Eugene had already secured his military reputation with victory over the Ottoman Turks at the end of the 17th century, as well as his initial successes against Franco-Spanish troops in northern Italy at the beginning of the current war. Though utterly different in personality and temperament the two commanders immediately established a rapport, mutual respect, and a lasting friendship. On the 13 June they were joined by the Imperial Commander-in-Chief, Prince Louis of Baden, at the Inn of the Golden Fleece (or Lamb Inn) at Großheppach, near Stuttgart. Like Eugene, Baden had established his reputation as a fine soldier fighting the Ottoman Turks, but unlike his co-commanders he had become a cautious general wedded to static siege warfare, and was by now in poor health.



The three Allied generals commanded over 80,000 men. Earlier on 8 June, at Baden's headquarters in Ermingen, near Ulm, the two Imperial generals (together with Wratislaw who had been sent ahead by Marlborough) had discussed the division of the Emperor's forces. Wishing to remain at the centre of the coming action Baden persuaded Eugene to take command on the Upper Rhine. Here he would direct nearly 30,000 men at the Lines of Stollhofen to observe Villeroi and Tallard and prevent them sending further reinforcement to the Danube. Meanwhile, Baden's Imperialists and Marlborough's Anglo-Dutch army would combine and seek out the Elector and Marsin before they could be reinforced. The two men would work together on an equal status, though it was clearly understood in Vienna that Marlborough was the senior director; moreover, Eugene had confided to the Duke that the Emperor had given him full powers if necessary 'to take such measures as not to leave him [Baden] with the army'.

Tallard and Villeroi met at Landau on 9 June to rapidly construct an action plan to save Bavaria. Decisive action was imperative but Tallard was hampered by the rigidity of the French command system, and their drafted plans had to be sanctioned by Versailles. The Count of Mérode-Westerloo, commander of the Flemish troops in Tallard's army wrote, 'One thing is certain: we delayed our march from Alsace for far too long and quite inexplicably ...' Louis XIV, however, was not only concerned of losing Bavaria as an ally, but also of providing support and a means of retreat for Marsin's army if the Elector chose to find an accommodation with the Emperor and his allies. After much hesitation and indecision between the King and his commanders, orders from Versailles finally arrived on 27 June. Tallard was to reinforce Marsin and the Elector on the Danube via the Black Forest; Villeroi was to pin down the Allies defending the Lines of Stollhofen, or, if the Allies should move all their forces to the Danube, he was to join with Tallard. Coigny, with around 8,000 men, would protect Alsace. On 1 July Tallard's army of 36,000 men re-crossed the Rhine at Strasbourg. The marshal was unhappy about the size of the contingent allotted to him, particularly in cavalry, and was concerned that Louis XIV and his advisors had opted to divide the French forces. But he reluctantly obeyed his instructions. '… we left the fortress of Kehl [3 July] and entered the Black Forest down the Kintezingerthan valley.' Wrote Mérode-Westerloo. 'Villeroi left Kehl for Offenburg eight days later.'

In the mean time Marlborough passed his army through the Geislingen defile; on 22 June, he linked elements of his army with those of Baden's at Launsheim before combining with Count Styrum who, with an Imperial force of 10,000 men, had been observing Ulm. Marlborough had covered a distance of 250 miles (400 km) in five weeks, averaging 7.5 miles (12 km) per day. The march-rate was not unprecedented for the period, but what stands out was the total distance travelled and the fine condition of the troops when they arrived. Thanks to a carefully planned time-table the effects of wear and tear had been kept to a minimum; impedimenta such as large guns had remained in the Netherlands, and where possible lighter stores and guns were transported up the Rhine on barges. Captain Parker marching with the foot a day or two behind Marlborough and the cavalry, described the discipline. 'As we marched through the country of our Allies, commissars were appointed to furnish us with all manner of necessaries for man and horse … the soldiers had nothing to do but pitch their tents, boil kettles and lie down to rest.' It had not been without its difficulties, however: some 1,200 had been lost to sickness en route, and the weather had turned unseasonably bad. Private John Marshall Deane complains, 'It hath rayned thirty-two days together more or less and miserable marches we have had for deep and miry roads and through tedious woods and wildernesses and over vast high rocks and mountaines, that it may be judged what our little army endured and what unusuall hardship they went through.' Nevertheless, the most dangerous part of the march was now over, and communications running from Marlborough's financial base at Frankfurt down the river Main replaced the previously exposed system based on the Rhine. Marlborough now pushed on to Giengen, and on 26 June received further reinforcements, including Lieutenant-General Johan Wijnand van Goor's 11 Dutch battalions (including foreign troops in the pay of the States-General) which had been serving with Baden in Germany since the beginning of the previous year.

Schellenberg and the ravaging of Bavaria
Responding to the new strategic situation the Elector and Marsin, conscious of their numerical disadvantage with about 40,000 men, moved their forces to the entrenched camp at Lauingen-Dillingen on the north bank of the Danube. The Allies' first task was to secure a crossing over the river, but lacking large siege artillery they could not attack the major fortress of Ulm. In the end Marlborough passed in front of the Franco-Bavarian camp and marched the army north-east to Amerdingen and towards the lesser fortress of Donauwörth. Standing at the confluence of the Danube and Wörnitz rivers between Ulm to the west and Ingolstadt to the east, the town would provide the Allies with a magazine; it would also render them new lines of communication – and if necessary of retreat – running naturally back into Franconia where, at Nördlingen, large magazines and hospitals had already been set up, beyond which lay Nuremberg and its fertile regions. Moreover, Donauwörth's fall would expose Bavaria to attack, and thereby threaten the Elector's supply chain – circumstances which might even persuade him to withdraw from the war.



Donauwörth had for some time been in Marlborough's sights, but when he arrived in the vicinity of the town he knew it had to be taken quickly before its defences, hurriedly being strengthened, became too strong. Therefore, in the early evening on 2 July, with a selected infantry detachment, the Allies stormed the crumbling walls on Schellenberg Heights above the town. Count Jean d'Arco, a Piedmontese officer in Bavarian service, had been sent with about 12,000 men from the Franco-Bavarian camp to hold the position, but after a ferocious and determined defence he was at last overwhelmed by Marlborough's and Baden's combined efforts. D'Arco's losses were as high as 8,000 men, including many of the Elector's best infantry which was to have a considerable effect on the coming campaign. Of the 22,000 Allied troops engaged in the assault over 5,000 became casualties: the influential Johan van Goor, upon whom Marlborough had heavily relied, and Count Styrum, numbered amongst the fatalities. Nevertheless, Donauwörth had been secured and the Allies now had access to the heart of Bavaria. The Elector, knowing his position at Dillingen was now not tenable, drew his garrisons out of Neuburg and Regensburg and fell back from the line of the Danube, taking position behind the river Lech and the strong fortifications of Augsburg. Although the Tories in England criticised Marlborough's 'butchers bill' in storming the Schellenberg, the initiative had passed to the Allies.

The transfer of Bavaria from the party of the Two Crowns back to the Grand Alliance was the prime concern to the Allied commanders. Their army was growing in strength – the 22 Danish squadrons arrived shortly after the fall of Donauwörth – and the Elector's abandonment of Neuburg had improved still further their lines of communication northward. But time was not on their side. Autumn was approaching, and if Marlborough could not force a decision on the Danube before winter he would have to withdraw north into central Germany; by then the Dutch would almost certainly demand the return of their own troops. The Elector's reticence to fight and the desire for a quick resolution induced Marlborough to ravage his rich Bavarian lands south of the Danube. The spoliation was designed to force the Elector to fight or treat before Tallard arrived; but for Baden, pressing him to such extremities was the wrong course of action: it might strengthen his resolve to remain in the French camp and thereby permanently establish French influence in south Germany where Baden's own territories were situated. To counter this influence Wratislaw had offered the Elector persuasive bribes: there would be a full pardon, as well as subsidies and restoration of all his territories if he returned to the Imperial fold; he would even receive the additional territories of Pfalz-Neuburg and Burgau. At first these pressures had the desired effect and the Elector agreed to sign an accommodation on 14 July. At the moment of resolution, however, news arrived that Tallard was on his way through the Black Forest to come to his relief. Consequently Wratislaw, who had expected to receive the Elector in person that day, met only the latter's secretary to announce the end of the negotiations.

Tallard and Eugene march to the Danube


After leaving the Rhine Tallard reached Emmendingen on the 7 July, before moving on to Waldkirch and eventually Hornberg. His original plan envisaged taking Villingen and Rothweil, thereby opening communications between the Rhine and Danube. However, when on 16 July he heard for the first time of the action on the Schellenberg he abandoned his plans to attack Rothweil altogether, and instead concentrated his resources on besieging Villingen, and only then until his supplies had caught up with him through the mountain passes. For Eugene, Tallard's march had presented a dilemma: if Marlborough and Baden were not to be outnumbered he must either intercept the French column before it reached the Danube or he must hasten there himself. However, there was also the danger that if he withdrew from the Rhine Villeroi might also make a move south to link up with the Elector and Marsin. His solution was to compromise: leaving 12,000 troops behind guarding the Lines of Stollhofen under John Ernst, Count of Nassau-Weilburg, he marched off after Tallard on 18 July with 18,000 men. Having committed himself to the devastation of Bavaria Marlborough was not himself in a position to prevent the junction of Tallard and Marsin, and was therefore reliant on the Austrian commander. To assist in his task Marlborough had sent 30 squadrons from the main Allied army; but Eugene was still too weak to forestall the French column. Moreover, Tallard was determined to avoid a battle and reach the Danube unscathed. When he finally abandoned Villingen on 22 July the French Marshal continued on towards the Elector and Marsin, leaving Villeroi the task of securing his supply route and dealing with Eugene.

Although Tallard's march was not slower than Marlborough's he had suffered considerably more. Many of his cavalry were suffering from sickness (probably glanders), and the mountain passes were proving tough going for the guns and wagons. Local German peasants, angry at French plundering, compounded his problems, leading Mérode-Westerloo to bemoan, 'the enraged peasantry killed several thousand of our men before the army was clear of the Black Forest.' Nevertheless, Tallard had evaded Eugene, the latter of whom now had to make haste for the Danube to reinforce the main Allied army; the Austrian commander also had to anticipate Villeroi's reaction. In an effort to tie down the French as long as possible at Strasbourg, Eugene first marched north down the Neckar valley towards Tübingen with 18 battalions and 47 squadrons (including those sent by Marlborough), giving no indication of his true destination. Villeroi, unsure of Eugene's whereabouts, now hesitated. With directions from Louis XIV ordering him to send reinforcements to Count Bedmar in the Spanish Netherlands, the French Marshal decided to await further developments and hold himself in readiness on the Rhine to meet them. He would play no part in the forthcoming battle.

Marlborough had left his big guns behind in the Low Countries, and the failure of the Empire to provide an effective siege train had thus far limited Allied options – Munich and Ulm could not be taken with the artillery available, and Augsburg was well defended. The Elector had neither been defeated nor compelled to change allegiance, and by now there was little goodwill between Marlborough and Baden. The Allied commanders had been unable to agree on a satisfactory plan of action, and ministers in London and The Hague would soon demand to know what the Duke had to show for his campaign so far south. Eugene urged them to be bold, but Marlborough had temporarily lost his drive and dynamism. Although he and Baden took Rain [(9–16 July)], thereby improving further their communications across the Lech and Danube rivers, it was scant reward for the army's week-long exertions and did nothing to gain any significant advantage over their enemy. In a letter to the Duke of Savoy, Eugene himself lamented the lack of results in Bavaria. ' … since the Donauwörth action I cannot admire their performances … They have been counting on the Elector coming to terms. They claim of course that no time has been lost over that; nevertheless since the action nothing has been done … They have amused themselves with the siege of Rain, and burning a few villages instead of … marching straight upon the enemy.'

On 22 July the Allies moved to Friedberg to observe the Elector and Marsin across the Lech in Augsburg; but there seemed little prospect of battle and no plan was forthcoming. Following the fall of Rain Baden had proposed to take the city of Ingolstadt, about 20 miles (~30 km) farther down the Danube from Donauwörth. However the Duke, with the backing of Wratislaw, also insisted on the renewal of the devastation of Bavaria. Baden had again objected, but under pressure he gave way, writing to the Emperor '… in a short time there may be little of Bavaria left. I hope I have taken the right course for Your Majesty's service in accepting other people's opinion.' The object of the first act of spoliation was to compel the Elector to come to terms with the Emperor. But now there were sound military reasons for the destruction. The country needed to be ruined as a base and source of supply from which the French and Bavarian armies could either threaten Vienna or pursue the Allies into Franconia if the latter had to withdraw northwards. The action also had the advantage of inducing the Elector to disperse a large part of his army in protecting his country. But whatever the military advantages Marlborough found the raids personally discomforting. 'We sent this morning 3000 horse to his [the Elector's] chief city of Munich, with orders to burn and destroy all the country about it. This is so contrary to my nature that nothing but absolute necessity could have obliged me to consent to it, for these poor people suffer for their master's ambition.'

Manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre
Tallard had reached Ulm on 29 July. He arrived in Augsburg on 3 August, and on the 6th he combined with the Elector and Marsin at Biberbach. The French Marshal was alarmed to find that the Elector had dispersed much of his army in response to Marlborough's destruction: 'There was a total ignorance of the enemy's strength,' he later wrote to the French War Minister, 'and M de Baviere [the Elector] having all his troops, except five battalions and about twenty-three squadrons, spread out about the country to cover his salt-works, a gentleman's private estate in fact, instead of what they should have guarded – his frontiers.' Marsin shared Tallard's frustration, writing on 8 August, 'Love for his country has induced him to take this course, though he has done his country no good thereby.' In response to these remonstrances, the Elector agreed to bring forth four battalions and four squadrons into the field as soon as possible, and to release further battalions from garrison duty once the Allies had evacuated Bavaria.



Just as Tallard and the Elector were combining their forces, Eugene arrived on the plain of Höchstädt. At this juncture the two Allied armies were too far apart to provide mutual assistance, and as such each was in danger of being overwhelmed had a united Franco-Bavarian army rapidly moved against either of them in turn. To facilitate the junction of their forces on either side of the Danube and guard against the enterprises of their opponents, Marlborough and Baden broke up from Friedberg and encamped on the Paar near Schrobenhausen on 6 August. Here, Eugene arrived in person at Marlborough's quarters, and on the 7th they were joined by Baden to discuss strategy. The three commanders agreed to proceed with Baden's earlier plan of taking Ingolstadt: Baden would direct the siege while Marlborough and Eugene would command the field army and supply the covering force. Ingolstadt would provide the Allies with another crossing on the Danube; once taken they could next move against Ulm, a fortress without which the French would find it difficult to subsist for the remainder of the campaign or reinforce and supply themselves for the next. Depriving the French of Ulm, reasoned Marlborough, might even precipitate a general action, something which he and his men desired.



On the 8th Marlborough moved forward to Sandizell. The following day the bulk of Baden's 15,000 troops (24 battalions and 31 squadrons, most of whom were camped along the Neuberg road) marched off to Ingolstadt. Eugene returned to his camp at Höchstädt while Marlborough took his army to Echsheim, five miles closer to Donauwörth. However, it was not long before both men received news that the Franco-Bavarian army was marching towards the Danube, looking to cross the river at Lauingen. This manoeuvre would not only imperil Eugene's small force, it would also threaten Allied communications with Nördlingen. Yet despite these dangers Marlborough and Eugene agreed that Baden should continue with the siege of Ingolstadt, thereby disregarding their own numerical superiority. Marlborough needed to move quickly lest he be forced to abandon Donauwörth and perhaps even to retreat out of Bavaria, and there was not enough time to recall Baden before seeking a general battle.

Marlborough had been forced into a defensive move. He now had two immediate objectives: safeguard Baden's position before Ingolstadt; and support Eugene isolated on the north bank of the Danube. At midnight on 9 August, Marlborough detached the Duke of Württemberg at the head of 27 squadrons with orders to cross the river on newly erected pontoon bridges at Marxhiem and join Eugene's cavalry. Charles Churchill shortly followed with 20 battalions, accompanied by the artillery and baggage. Even now the situation was unclear, and Marlborough could not move his whole army without knowing for certain that the French had committed themselves to crossing the Danube. These doubts were allayed when at Rain Marlborough received an urgent dispatch from Eugene reporting that he was falling back from Höchstädt towards Donauwörth:


 * 'Sir: The enemy have marched. It is almost certain that the whole army is crossing the Danube at Lauingen [10 August] … The plain of Dillingen is crowded with troops. I have held on all day here [his camp at Munster]; but with eighteen battalions I dare not risk staying the night. I quit however with much regret, [the position] being good and if he [the enemy] takes it, it will cost us much to get it back … I am therefore marching the infantry and part of the cavalry this night to a camp I have marked out before Donauwörth. I shall stay here as long as I can with the cavalry which arrived today from Your Excellency's camp and my own dragoons … Everything, milord, consists in speed and that you put yourself forthwith in movement to join me tomorrow, without which I fear it will be too late.'

While Eugene withdrew eastwards along the course of the Danube, the Duke moved towards Donauwörth, crossing the Lech at Rain with the main body. During the latter part of 11 August the link-up with Eugene at Münster on the river Kessel was complete.

Battle looms
In the mean time Tallard, the Elector, and Marsin – finding the fortifications at their old camp at Launingen-Dillingen levelled – marched forward to Höchstädt; on 12 August they moved into their new position on the open ground in front of the town. It never occurred to Tallard that he would be attacked: he believed he had outmanoeuvred his opponents who, in order to make best their strategic disadvantage, would soon abandon the conquered territory; Marlborough would move to secure his Franconian supply bases while Eugene would cover the Danube route into the Habsburg territories. Consequently the French and Bavarians expected to do no more the following day than to press the allied rearguard. However, the two Allied generals needed an early, decisive engagement: should they fail, there would be little chance of maintaining their army in Germany, and they would be compelled to abandon Leopold I to his fate. Instead of retreating, therefore, the Allies pitched their tents. A French reconnaissance under the Marquis de Silly went forward with a detachment of cavalry to the Reichenbach beyond Schwenningen. These were eventually driven off by Allied troops who had deployed to cover the pioneers of the advancing army, labouring to bridge the numerous streams in the area and improve the passage leading westwards to Höchstädt. Marlborough quickly moved forward Rowe's brigade, the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards, and Wilkes' Hessian brigade to secure the narrow strip of land between the Danube and the wooded Fuchsberg hill at the Schwenningen defile.

During this day (12 August) Marlborough and Eugene carried out their own reconnaissance of the French position from the church spire at Tapfheim, as well as from the Hühnersberg hill near Wolperstetten. From their vantage points they saw the wide, flat, floodplain stretching nearly 4 mi between the undulating pine-covered hills to the north and the river Danube to the south. To the front of the Franco-Bavarian position ran the Nebel stream flowing into the Danube, the ground either side of which was boggy: guns would need bridges to cross, but infantry and cavalry could pass the stream on improvised crossings. The French right rested on the village of Blindheim (what the English would later call Blenheim) comprising of about 300 houses clustered around a church and stone-walled graveyard. A small stream, the Maulweyer, rose amongst the surrounding cornfields and flowed through the village and into the Danube. Between Blindheim and the next village of Oberglauheim 2 mi to the north, the fields had been cut to stubble and were now ideal to deploy troops. About 1.5 mi farther on stood the larger village of Lutzingen, close to the wooded foothills that formed a barrier to the deployment of the Allied right flank. The surrounding terrain of ditches, thickets and brambles was potentially difficult ground for the attackers. On the Allied side of the Nebel stood Unterglauheim and Weilheim Farm, as well as several smaller hamlets which were set on fire by the French picquets before the battle began.

Some Allied officers who were acquainted with the superior numbers of the enemy and their strong defensive position, ventured to remonstrate with Marlborough about the hazards of attacking. Moreover, if the Allies were defeated the ground was unfavourable for an army in retreat: the right flank was blocked by the wooded hills, while the left flank of the army would be forced into the bottleneck of the narrow defile between the hills and the village of Schwenningen from where they had just passed. But the Duke was resolute: 'I know the danger, yet a battle is absolutely necessary, and I rely on the bravery and discipline of the troops, which will make amends for our disadvantages.' Marlborough and Eugene decided to risk everything, and agreed to attack on the following day. At 02:00 on 13 August, 40 Allied squadrons were sent forward to screen the advance of the main army following an hour behind in eight columns. At about 06:00 they reached Schwenningen, two miles (3 km) from Blindheim. The English and German troops who had held the advanced positions through the night joined the march, making a ninth column on the left of the army under the command of Lieutenant-General John Cutts.

Opposing armies
The Allied army numbered about 52,000 men (66 battalions, 178 squadrons) and 66 guns. Marlborough's wing comprised 48 battalions (14 English, 14 Dutch, 7 Hessian, and 13 of Hanover, Lunenburg, Zell, and Swiss), and 86 squadrons (14 English, 22 Danes, 18 Dutch, 7 Hessian, and 25 of Lunenburg, Hanover and Zell). Eugene on the right wing comprised 11 Prussian and 7 Danish battalions, and 74 squadrons of Imperial cavalry. Note: Marlborough initially had 113 squadrons and Eugene 47, totalling 160. However, Marlborough transferred 27 Imperial squadrons to Eugene before the battle, and it is probable that Eugene reformed these into smaller squadrons of similar size to those in the rest of his army. This would account for Eugene reporting his cavalry comprised 92 squadrons, a figure which was also the French estimation.

The Franco-Bavarian army numbered about 56,000 men (78 battalions, 143 squadrons) and 90 guns. These figures underestimate the French inferiority in cavalry. Due to disease amongst Tallard's horse, 12 squadrons of dragoons in his army fought on foot, thereby giving a more accurate number of 131 squadrons available; moreover, Marlborough's Imperial squadrons were stronger than their French counterparts. In infantry the Franco-Bavarian's were superior, totalling 82 battalions (including the 12 dismounted dragoon squadrons) against the Allies 66 battalions. This gave Tallard, the Elector, and Marsin approximately 4,000 more troops in total, but the country on which the action was ultimately fought was ideal for cavalry, and for that the Allies had the advantage.

Deployment
The Franco-Bavarian belief that they would not be attacked that morning was reinforced by intelligence gathered from prisoners taken by de Silly's reconnaissance the previous day. At around 07:00 Tallard wrote a report to this effect to Louis XIV. 'This morning before daybreak the enemy beat the général at 2 o'clock and at three the assemblée. They are now drawn up at the head of their camp, and it looks as if they will march this day. Rumour in the countryside expects them at Nördlingen.' Yet hardly had he sent the messenger when the Allied army began to appear opposite his camp as if to attack. 'I could see the enemy advancing ever closer in nine great columns', wrote Mérode-Westerloo, ' ... filling the whole plain from the Danube to the woods on the horizon.' There was no time to retire. Signal guns were fired to bring in the foraging parties and picquets as the French and Bavarian troops drew into battle-order to face the oncoming threat.



On their far left, in Lutzingen, Count Maffei positioned five Bavarian battalions with a great battery of 16 guns at the village's edge, where they enjoyed an excellent field of fire across the cornfields and the Nebel. In the woods to the left of the village 11 French battalions under the Marquis de Rozel moved into place. Between Lutzingen and Oberglauheim the Elector placed 27 squadrons of cavalry (Count d'Arco's 14 Bavarian squadrons and Count Wolframsdorf's 13 squadrons in support nearby). To their right stood Marsin's 40 French squadrons and 12 battalions. In and about the village of Oberglauheim stood 14 battalions commanded by the Marquis de Blainville, including the Irish Brigade. Six batteries were ranged alongside the village to cover Unterglauheim and Weilheim Farm. On the right of these French and Bavarian positions, between Oberglauheim and Blindheim, Tallard deployed 64 French and Walloon squadrons (including 16 drawn from Marsin) supported by nine French battalions standing near the Höchstädt road. In Blindheim and its immediate vicinity stood 16 battalions under the Marquis de Clérambault; behind the village stood a further 11 battalions in reserve. These were supported by the Count of Hautefeuille's 12 squadrons of dismounted dragoons holding the gap between Blindheim and the Danube.



Between 08:00 and 08:30 the French guns opened fire. In response, Marlborough ordered Colonel Holcroft Blood, who had just arrived with his own artillery, to position his batteries in advantageous positions, particularly on the high ground below Unterglauheim. As soon they were in position they returned fire, each battery receiving from the Duke his own personal attention. The guns were heard by Baden in his camp before Ingolstadt, 'The Prince and the Duke are engaged today to the westward', he wrote to the Emperor. 'Heaven bless them.' About an hour later the three Franco-Bavarian commanders met in Blindheim to finalise their plans. It was settled that the Elector and Marsin would hold the front from the hills to Oberglauheim on the left flank, while Tallard would defend the flat and open plain that sloped gently down to the banks of the Nebel between Oberglauheim and Blinheim on the right. The Elector and the two French Marshals were, however, divided as to how to utilise the Nebel. Tallard's tactic was to lure a considerable part of the enemy across before unleashing his cavalry upon them; if judged correctly, the more of the enemy that crossed the fewer would escape. While the Allies were struggling in the marshes, troops from Blindheim and Oberglauheim would sally out upon their flanks, and Tallard would have achieved a clear-cut victory.

Like the French, the Allies would fight the battle as two separate armies fighting side by side, with their deployment largely dictated by the nature of the ground. Marlborough on the left would command 36,000 troops and attack Tallard's force of 33,000 men. On Marlborough's left Cutts would lead 20 battalions and 14 squadrons of dragoons against Blindheim; while on his right the Duke's brother, Charles Churchill, commanded 72 squadrons and 28 battalions. Eugene on the Allied right, commanding some 16,000 men, would attack the Elector and Marsin's combined forces of about 23,000 troops. The Prince posted 18 battalions opposite Lutzingen, and his 92 squadrons on their left. Eugene had little hope of achieving a decisive breakthrough due to his inferiority in infantry; likewise Marlborough could not expect to carry the two heavily defended villages to his front. However, the Duke would enjoy a superiority in cavalry in the centre, which, by making it the crucial sector, would deliver the decisive victory he required.

Eugene was expected to be in position by about 11:00, but it was a long march to his post, and due to the difficult terrain and enemy fire, progress was slow. Cutts' column had already deployed by the river against Blindheim. At 10:00 they had driven enemy pickets out of two watermills on the Nebel, and for the next three hours they endured severe artillery fire from a battery posted near the village. The rest of Marlborough's wing, waiting in their ranks on the forward slope, were also forced to bear the cannonade from the French artillery. In the mean time engineers repaired a stone bridge across the Nebel, and constructed five additional bridges or causeways across the marsh, one above Unterglauheim, and four between that village and the mills. For their part, by about 11:00, Tallard, the Elector, and Marsin had recovered their poise and were ready to fight. Marlborough's chaplain, Dr Hare, said afterwards, 'Almost all the generals were against my Lord's attacking the enemy, they thought it so difficult', and Earl Orkney, who fought at Blenheim that day, wrote, '… had I been asked to give my opinion, I had been against it, considering the ground where they had been camped and the strength of the army. But his grace knew the necessity there was of a battle.' At last, sometime between 12:00 and 12:30, Marlborough's anxiety was finally allayed when a message arrived from Eugene that his cavalry and infantry were nearly in place. At 13:00, Cutts was ordered to attack Blindheim while Eugene was requested to assault Lutzingen on the Allied right flank.

Blindheim (Blenheim)


Cutts ordered Brigadier-General Archibald Rowe's brigade to attack. The British infantry rose from the edge of the Nebel, and silently marched towards Blindheim. As the range closed to within 30 yd, the French fired a deadly volley, taking down many in the leading ranks. Small parties penetrated the defences, but repeated French volleys forced the British back towards the Nebel to recover their order. General Rowe fell mortally wounded in this first attack, and two of his staff officers were killed trying to carry him away. John Ferguson's brigade, led by 1st English Foot Guards, had supported Rowe's left, and moved in perfect order towards the barricades between the village and the river, defended by Hautefeuille's dragoons. But these too recoiled from the deadly fire, and like Rowe's men were forced back. As the attack faltered three squadrons of elite Gens d'Armes (part of the Maison du Roi), led by the veteran Swiss officer, Lieutenant-General von Zurlauben, fell upon the exposed flank of the right-hand British battalion, Rowe's own regiment. The troops tried, but failed, to form square, and instead broke apart, losing their colours in the process. However, Wilkes’ Hessian brigade, lying nearby in the marshy grass at the water's edge, moved forward to steady the British regiment and repulsed the Gens d'Armes with disciplined fire. The Gens d'Armes themselves now fell into disarray and lost the colour they had captured.



Lieutenant-General Henry Lumley ordered five English squadrons under Colonel Francis Palmes to advance across the Nebel to cover Cutts' right flank. 'All of which had no sooner drawn up than eight of the enemy's squadrons moved down upon them,' recorded Dr. Hare, 'and ours advanced to meet them. Those of the enemy gave their fire at a little distance, but the English squadrons charged up to them sword in hand, and broke and put them to flight.'SOURCE Completely routed, the Gens d'Armes were pushed back in terrible confusion well beyond the Maulweyer stream that flows through Blindheim. Palmes attempted to follow up his success, but he was himself repulsed in some confusion by other French cavalry, and musketry fire from the edge of the village. Captain Parker considered the defeat of the Gens d'Armes had a serious effect on Tallard's morale: 'Tallard seeing his five [eight] squadrons so shamefully beaten by three [plus the two squadrons thrown out on either flank], was confounded to that degree, that he did not recover himself the whole day, for after that, all his orders were given in hurry and confusion'.SOURCE. Tallard himself agreed, for after the battle he ascribed his defeat firstly 'because the Gendarmerie failed to overwhelm the five English squadrons.'

Cutts gathered his troops into line, and the British and Hessians prepared to launch another attack. The French fire was unfaltering and the casualties severe, and again the Allies were repulsed; but Clérambault was by now making a fateful mistake. Without consulting Tallard he began to draw into the village his reserve battalions, thereby upsetting the balance of the French position and nullifying their numerical superiority in infantry. Thus by 14:00 there were 27 battalions and 12 squadrons of dismounted dragoons crammed into Blindheim and its vicinity. Mérode-Westerloo, who was stationed with his cavalry to the left-rear of the village, later wrote, ' … a mere ten battalions would have been capable of defending the place in far better fashion – and all the remainder of this veritable army could have been far more usefully employed elsewhere. The men were so crowded in upon one another that they couldn't even fire – let alone receive or carry out any orders.' The fighting around Blindheim now became a matter of containment, and no more than about 5,000 Allied troops were able to pen in twice the number of French infantry and dragoons. Elements from Cutts' column could now be transferred from the front of the village to join the main attack in the left-centre.

Centre and Oberglauheim
While Cutts' was attacking Blindheim Marlborough was preparing to cross the Nebel. His centre, under Charles Churchill, comprised 28 battalions of Dutch, German, and British infantry arranged in two lines, 17 battalions to the front and 11 to the rear. Sandwiched between the infantry were two lines of cavalry under the Prince of Hesse-Kassel, each line comprising 36 squadrons. The first line of foot was to pass the stream first and march as far to the other side as could be conveniently done. The infantry would then form and cover the passage of the horse, leaving gaps in the line large enough for the cavalry to pass through and take their position in front.



Marlborough ordered the formation forward, and the first line of infantry drew up across the Nebel undisturbed, shortly followed by the first line of cavalry. The Allies had expected a determined effort from the French to disrupt their crossing. Tallard's cavalry was visible at the top of the higher ground, but Sergeant Millner remembered the Allies' astonishment when the French cavalry failed to cut them down as they formed on the far side of the Nebel: 'The enemy gave us all the time we wanted for that purpose … insomuch that even our second line of horse had time to form themselves'. Only belatedly did Tallard order his cavalry to charge the Allied foothold on his side of the rivulet. The full force of the attack, whose momentum was enhanced by the slope of the hill, fell on the first line of Allied cavalry. Lumley's sector on Churchill's left was particularly hard hit, and faltered under the combined effort of French horse, and artillery and infantry fire from Blindheim. But the French squadrons were unable to follow up their initial success. Only part of Tallard's horse committed themselves to what was to be a general cavalry attack, and lacking in numbers their charges became uncoordinated and recoiled from the fire-power of the Allied infantry support. Tallard later confessed that 'misfortunes … came upon us because we did not drive back the enemy in our first charges.'



Meanwhile, Württemberg's Danish cavalry on Churchill's right had made slow work of crossing the Nebel near Oberglauheim. Harassed by Marsin's infantry near the village, the Danes were driven back across the stream. Count Horn's Dutch infantry managed to push the French back from the water's edge, but it was evident that before Marlborough could launch his main effort against Tallard, Oberglauheim would have to be secured. Horn directed the Prince of Holstein-Beck to attack the village with ten Dutch battalions taken from Churchill's main body. In response, the Marquis de Blainville, who commanded in Oberglauheim, drew out into the open nine of his own battalions, with the Irish Brigade in the van, to meet this attack. French cavalry from Marsin's army supported Blainville's infantry, threatening the exposed right flank of the oncoming Dutch. Holstein-Beck requested assistance from Major-General Count Hendrick Fugger's Imperial cuirassiers in Eugene's wing, but he declined to move without explicit permission from Eugene himself. This decision ensured the defeat of the Dutch. The regiments of Benhiem and Goor were thrown back across the Nebel in confusion, and Holstein-Beck was himself wounded and taken prisoner.

The battle was now in the balance. If Holstein-Beck's column were destroyed, the Allied army would be split in two: Eugene's wing would be isolated from Marlborough's, passing the initiative to the Franco-Bavarian forces now engaged across the whole plain. 'I saw one critical moment when the battle was won', Tallard later wrote. When Marlborough saw Holstein-Beck's shattered column falling back he personally organised the combined effort to counter the French advance. Hulsen's Hanoverian brigade were ordered to support the Dutch infantry. A Dutch cavalry brigade under Averock was also called forward, but they too came under pressure from Marsin's more numerous squadrons. Marlborough now requested Eugene to release Fugger and his Imperial cuirassier brigade standing near Weilheim Farm to help repel the French cavalry thrust. Despite his own desperate struggle (his second attack on Lutzingen was on the point of collapse), the Austrian commander at once complied, demonstrating the high degree of confidence and mutual co-operation between the two generals. The French were forced to change front to meet this new threat. Fugger's cuirassiers charged and, striking at a favourable angle, threw back Marsin's squadrons in disorder. With support from Colonel Blood's batteries, the Hessian, Hanoverian and Dutch infantry – who had by now regrouped under the command Count Berensdorf – succeeded in pushing the French and Irish back into Oberglauheim so that they could not again threaten Churchill's flank as he moved against Tallard. The fighting around the village was prolonged and costly, and losses on both sides were severe. The French commander, Blainville, numbered amongst the fatalities.

Lutzingen
Meanwhile, on the Allied right wing, Eugene's Prussian and Danish infantry were desperately fighting the numerically superior forces of the Elector and Marsin. At about 13:00 Leopold I, Prince of Anhalt-Dessau, (the 'Old Dessauer' of Frederick the Great's wars), had led forward four brigades of infantry against Lutzingen. The village had been well fortified by the Bavarians that morning, and the great battery positioned on its edge enjoyed a good field of fire across the open ground stretching to the hamlet of Schwennenbach. As soon as the Prussians and Danes reached the far bank of the Nebel they were struck by heavy volleys from Maffei's infantry, and salvoes from the Bavarian guns. Despite heavy casualties the Prussians stormed the great battery, while the Danes, under Count Scholten, attempted to drive the French infantry out of the copses beyond the village.

With the infantry heavily engaged, Eugene's first line of cavalry under the Imperial General of Horse, Prince Maximilian of Hanover, picked its way across the Nebel. As soon as they reached dry ground Marsin sent forward his first line of French and Bavarian cavalry. Against this attack Maximilian's horse proved successful, but when Marsin attacked with his second line, the Imperial horse were thrown back across the Nebel in confusion. The exhausted French were unable to follow up their advantage, and the two cavalry forces tried to regroup and reorder their ranks. However, without cavalry support, and threatened with envelopment, the Prussian and Danish infantry were in turn driven back across the Nebel. Struggling over the boggy ground and under withering fire, panic gripped some of Eugene's troops as they crossed the stream. Ten infantry colours were lost to the Bavarians, and hundreds of prisoners taken; it was only through the leadership of Eugene and Anhalt-Dessau that the Imperial infantry were prevented from abandoning the field.

At around 16:00, after rallying his troops near Schwennenbach – well beyond their starting point – Eugene prepared to launch a second attack, led by the second-line squadrons under Eberhard Ludwig, the Duke of Württemberg-Teck. Once more they enjoyed initial success, but caught in the cross-fire of Lutzingen and Oberglauheim they were again thrown back in disarray. The French and Bavarians were almost as disordered as their opponents, and they too were in need of inspiration from their commander, the Elector, who was seen inspiring his men with fresh courage. The Prussian and Danish infantry attacked a second time into Lutzingen and the wood beyond. They was now supported by 14 guns, but again the foot could not sustain the advance without proper cavalry support, and once more they fell back across the Nebel and to where they had begun their attack.

Breakthrough


By 16:00, with the French besieged in Blindheim and Oberglauheim, and Eugene pressing hard against the French and Bavarians around Lutzingen, the Allied centre of 81 squadrons (nine squadrons had been transferred from Cutts' column), supported by two lines of infantry was firmly planted beyond the Nebel facing the 64 squadrons of French and Walloon cavalry and, because of Clerambault's misjudgement in Blindheim, just nine battalions of raw recruits. There was now a lull in the battle: Marlborough wanted to concert the attack upon the whole front, and Eugene, after his second repulse, needed time to reorganize.

At around 17:00 battle was renewed at all points. Thanks to their infantry the Allied horse were still in reasonably good order; this compared favourably to the French and Walloon cavalry on the Höchstädt plain who were by now tired and weary from their earlier, fruitless exertions. The French cavalry exerted themselves once more against the Allied horse – Lumley's English and Scots on the Allied left, and Lieutenant-General Hompesch's Dutch and German squadrons on the right – and managed to push the first line back to their infantry support. 'All our brigades', wrote a French officer at Tallard's side, 'charged briskly and made all the squadrons they attacked give way; but these squadrons being sustained by several lines of horse and foot, our men were forced to shrink back and throw themselves on our second line, which, being at some distance, gave the enemy time to gain ground, which they maintained, by their numbers and their slow and close march.' The repulse of Tallard's cavalry left his foot exposed to Allied attack. The nine French battalions fought with desperate valour, trying to form square; but it was futile, and they were eventually overwhelmed by platoon fire and close-range artillery. Mérode-Westerloo later wrote that they, 'died to a man where they stood, stationed right out in the open plain – supported by nobody.'

Originally, Tallard had envisaged troops from Blindheim marching out to attack the flank of the advancing enemy. But his plan failed to materialize. Although Mérode-Westerloo attempted to extricate some French infantry crowded in Blindheim, Clérambault ordered the troops back into the village. On the French left Marsin refused Tallard's entreaties for assistance, feeling himself unable to send reinforcements in the face of Eugene's determined attacks. Tallard was therefore left to face the decisive encounter of the battle alone. By about 17:30 Marlborough had re-formed both lines of cavalry. Judging that the French were now faltering, the Duke launched his squadrons at full trot and, driving through the centre, they finally put Tallard's tired horse to flight. 'The French fire was quite extinguished', wrote Captain Parker, 'and they made not the least resistance, but gave way and broke at once. Our squadrons broke through the very centre of them, which put them to an entire rout'.



Tallard's cavalry fled the field in two streams: one towards Hochstadt and a smaller force towards Sonderheim. The pursuit was hard, and some 30 French squadrons were driven down into the Danube where many were drowned trying to cross its fast flowing waters. The Marquis de Gruignan attempted a counter-attack with remnants of the Gens d'Armes, but he was easily repulsed by the jubilant Allies. After a final rally behind his camp's tents, shouting entreaties to stand and fight, Tallard was caught up in the rout and pushed towards Sonderheim. Surrounded by a squadron of Hessians from Bothmar's dragoons, Tallard surrendered to Lieutenant-Colonel de Boinenburg, Hesse-Kassel's aide-de-camp, and was sent under escort to Marlborough. With courtesy the Duke offered his carriage to the French commander who was escorted away to begin his captivity.

Victory was assured but as yet incomplete as the battle for the villages on the flanks was still raging. By now Eugene had became exasperated with the performance of his Imperial cavalry whose third attack against Lutzingen on the Allied right had failed. Declaring his disgust, Eugene went into the attack with the Prussian and Danish infantry alongside Anhalt-Dassau to see if they could provide victory where his horse could not. This time the Prussians were able to storm and hold the great Bavarian battery, while in the wood beyond the village Scholten's Danes defeated the French infantry in a desperate hand-to-hand bayonet struggle. When they saw that Tallard's centre had broken, the Elector and Marsin decided the battle was lost and, like the remnants of Tallard's army, departed the battlefield, albeit in better order than Tallard's men. 'They instantly, and with great dexterity and expedition,' recorded Captain Parker, 'formed their troops into three columns, and marched off with the greatest despatch and order imaginable'. Marsin and the Elector had failed to overwhelm their opponent’s smaller force but Eugene, leading from the front, had stemmed his earlier reverses and kept his army together until final victory.

By 19:00 the whole of Marsin's army was making for the gap above Morselingen. Marlborough ordered Hompesch and his Dutch and German squadrons to cut off the Franco-Bavarian retreat, but the attempt failed owing to the exhaustion of the cavalry and the growing confusion in the field. The Allied commanders failed to coordinate their pursuit, and in the fading light of the smoke-filled arena, Hompesch's squadrons mistook Eugene's cavalry for Marsin's rearguard. At the same time Eugene believed Hompesch's squadrons to be Franco-Bavarian, and he faltered in his pursuit. By the time the Allied commanders realised their mistake it was too late, and Marsin and the Elector had slipped away without suffering the fate of Tallard's army.

Fall of Blindheim
Following the destruction of Tallard's cavalry, fears remained over the large numbers of French infantry in Blindheim. 'The enemy also made several attempts to come out upon us:' Wrote Captain Parker, 'but … before they could form in to any order for attacking us, we mowed them down with our platoons in such numbers, that they were always obliged to retire with great loss.' However, the Allies had themselves made little headway in their attacks against a determined defence, and the French infantry fought tenaciously to hold on to their position. Yet their commander was nowhere to be found. Clérambault's insistence on confining his huge force in the village was to seal his fate that day. Realising his tactical mistake had contributed to Tallard's defeat in the centre, Clérambault had deserted Blindheim and the 27 battalions and 12 squadrons defending the village, and reportedly drowned in the Danube while attempting to make his escape. More charitable accounts have it that he rode to the Danube to examine its banks when a cannon-ball startled his horse and he was thrown in. Saint-Simon has his own version: 'He had attempted to swim his horse over the river, accompanied by a mounted groom, and supposedly with the intention of afterwards becoming a hermit.'



Marlborough detached Churchill, and with him two Lieutenant-Generals, Orkney and Ingoldsby, to assist Cutts' attack on Blindheim where, by now, many of the cottages were on fire. 'Many on both sides were burnt to death.' Wrote Private John Deane. 'Great and grevious were the cryes of the maimed, and those suffering in the flames.' By about 18:00 Blindheim was surrounded. With the light fading Cutts, Orkney and Ingoldsby led another concerted attack from three sides, and pushed back the defenders from their barricades and towards the centre of the village. But the French were not ready to capitulate, and at every spot the Allies met fierce resistance. The high stone wall of the churchyard had been transformed into a formidable bastion, and the attackers were once again forced to retire in face of the withering musketry. Hearing the din of battle Tallard sent a message to Marlborough, now in the saddle near Morselingen, offering to order the garrison to withdraw from the field. Marlborough had nothing to gain from permitting the escape of the hard-pressed garrison, and Tallard received a terse reply from the Duke, 'Inform Monsieur Tallard that in the position in which he is now, he has no command.' Nevertheless, as dusk came the Allied commander was anxious for a quick conclusion. Having been thrown back several times Orkney now tried a different tactic, '… it came into my head to beat parley', he later wrote. The Marquis de Denonville, who was cut off in his own part of the village, agreed to a temporary cease-fire where his regiment stood to allow the wounded to be dragged from the burning cottages. Taking advantage of the pause in the fighting Orkney persuaded the Marquis de Blanzac, who had taken charge in Clérambault's absence, of the futility of continuing the struggle. For the most part this was a bluff. The Allies were fully extended in a thin encirclement: if Blanzac realised the true situation he might opt to fight on with the thousands of troops still at his command, to form square and break out. Reluctantly, however, after a council of war with his generals, the French commander agreed to surrender, and at about 21:00 the last of his regiments laid down their arms.

At some stage after his defeat of Tallard Marlborough, while conducting the pursuit of the fleeing enemy, paused to write his famous note on the back of an old tavern bill to his wife, Sarah:


 * I have no time to say more but to beg you will give my duty to the Queen, and let her know her army has had a glorious victory. M. Tallard and two other generals are in my coach and I am following the rest. The bearer [of the message], Colonel Parke, will give her an account of what has passed. I shall doe it in a day or two by another more at large.

Aftermath
The Franco-Bavarian army lost over 34,000 killed, wounded and missing, including some 14,000 taken prisoner. Moreover, the myth of French invincibility had been destroyed and Louis XIV's hopes of an early and victorious peace had been wrenched from his grasp. 'We were not accustomed to defeat', wrote Saint-Simon. 'You may readily imagine the dismay in France, where every noble family, not to mention the rest, had some member dead, wounded, or missing'. Such was the severity of the defeat that for the first time one of Louis XIV's armies had lost the ability to fight. The remnants streamed back to Ulm, before heading for the Rhine. Villeroi advanced towards Villingen to aid the retreat, but the French lost another 7,000 men along the way through desertion. For their part the Allies lost some 14,000 killed and wounded. However, the fruits of victory were considerable, and the Elector of Bavaria's gamble to side with Louis XIV against Emperor Leopold I had not paid off. Despite being offered the chance to return to the Imperial fold and remain as ruler of Bavaria (under strict terms of an alliance with the Austrian Habsburgs), the Elector left his country and family in order to continue the fight against the Allies from the Spanish Netherlands where he still held the post of governor-general. By the Treaty of Ilbersheim, signed 7 November 1704, Bavaria was placed under Imperial military rule (although the Elector's Polish consort retained titular sovereignty), allowing the Habsburgs to utilise its resources for the rest of the war.

The 1704 campaign lasted considerably longer than usual as the Allies sought to wring out maximum advantage from their victory. Their objective was to gain favourable positions on the Upper Rhine and on the Moselle from which they could launch major assaults in next years' campaigning season. This required the capture of the major fortress of Landau which guarded the Rhine, and the towns of Trier and Trarbach on the Moselle itself. Marlborough took Trier on 26 October and Landau, after a resolute defence, finally fell on 23 November to Baden and Eugene. With the fall of Trarbach on 20 December, the campaign season for 1704 came to an end.

When Joseph I succeeded Leopold I as Holy Roman Emperor in May 1705 he pursued his father's anti-Bourbon policy with great enthusiasm. But the victory at Blenhiem had stemmed the Franco-Bavarian advance against the Habsburg territories, and he began to reassess his priorities. Although the Emperor recognised the importance to the German princes of regaining some of their lost territories in Alsace and Lorraine - and thereby strengthening the Empire's western frontier - he could not place their interests above Habsburg dynastic objectives in other theatres. Replacing Spanish with Austrian rule in Italy – and thereby securing the Monarchy's south-west flank – became Joseph I's priority, for which he committed not only his own resources, but also those of the Empire (in occupied Bavaria heavy taxation and forced recruitment even led to a brief peasant revolt).

Analysis and legacy


Marlborough and Eugene, working indivisibly together, had saved Vienna and the Habsburg Empire from invasion and defeat. The victory did not bring about the end of the War of the Spanish Succession which would last for another ten years; but the battle had altered the course of the war and preserved the Grand Alliance. Marlborough achieved complete strategic success by transferring Allied military predominance in the Low Countries where it was ineffective, to southern Germany and the Danube where it proved to be decisive. The march is often regarded a masterpiece of military organisation and, in historian John Lynn's words, 'provides one of the greatest examples of marching and fighting before Napoleon'. The strategic move compelled Louis XIV to send reinforcements to Bavaria, thereby putting the two French armies in great peril as Tallard and Marsin had to fight with no great advantage and far from their own bases. Their logistical weakness placed them in a strategically vulnerable situation, and it was extremely difficult to send supplies through the Black Forest in substantial quantities – any defeat would likely turn into catastrophe. The only rationale for the set of decisions, writes historian, J. R. Jones, can be found in the contempt Louis XIV had for his opponents and a belief that they were not astute enough to take advantage of their favourable situation. The French king was certain of his military superiority, and defeat does not seem to have entered his calculations.

In his post-combat reports to Chamillart, written while he was a prisoner of war, Tallard ascribes several reasons for his defeat and the shortcomings of the campaign. Poor logistics hampered their ability to manoeuvre, just as Marlborough had suspected they would, and poor intelligence had kept the French generals ignorant of their enemy's true strength and whereabouts. Moreover, desertion was rife, especially amongst foreign units, and an equine disease had swept through his cavalry, with some units down to half their operational strength. There was also a problem of command. Tallard's opprobrium was directed at the Elector of Bavaria when he wrote, 'The diversity of advice … shows us clearly that it is a fine lesson that we should only have one man commanding an army.' Baron de Montigny Langnat, wounded at the battle, was convinced where the blame lay: 'It is certain that the gendarmerie and the cavalry of M. Tallard are the cause of the loss of this great battle; as well as the fact that we had too many battalion on our right [in Blindheim], and those in the centre missed them.' Mérode-Westerloo summarised his own case against the Franco-Bavarian army: 'The French lost this battle for a wide variety of reasons. For one thing they had too good an opinion of their own ability and were excessively scornful of their adversaries. Another point was that their faulty field dispositions were badly made, and in addition there was rampant indiscipline and inexperience displayed by Marshal Tallard's army. It took all these faults to lose so celebrated a battle.'



For Marlborough, the gamble of marching his army into the heart of Germany had paid off. Holland's Pensionary, Heinsius, felt vindicated for his support and confidence in the Allied commander; the criticised bloody action at the Schellenberg was soon forgotten, and European leaders from Hanover and Prussia expressed their gratitude for Marlborough's and Eugene's victory. Queen Anne was also grateful to the Duke who returned to England on 14 December 1704 (O.S) to the acclamation of the country. Anne granted him the Park of Woodstock, some 15,000 acres, and promised a sum of £240,000 to build a suitable house as a gift from the crown in recognition of his victory. In contrast, hard-pressed Leopold I paid just 6,000 gulden to the city of Vienna for Eugene to be exempt from billeting impositions in his Palace in the Himmelpfortgasse. For the three Franco-Bavarian commanders the war offered little chance of redemption. After his defeat at Blenheim Tallard was taken to England and imprisoned in Newdigate House, Nottingham, until his release in 1711. When he returned to Versailles he was warmly welcomed, though he would never command again. Marsin would die of his wounds sustained fighting Eugene at the Battle of Turin in 1706, the same year that the Elector of Bavaria would again be heavily defeated by Marlborough at the Battle of Ramillies. However, by the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the Elector was restored to all his lands, including Mindleheim, the tiny principality the Emperor had awarded Marlborough during his march to the Danube in June 1704.

Cultural references

 * Joseph Addison's poem The Campaign
 * Robert Southey's anti-war poem After Blenheim

Primary

 * Lediard, Thomas. The Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, Vol. 1. London, 1705
 * Mérode-Westerloo, Jean Philippe Eugène, comte de. Mémoires. 2 Volumes (pub. 1840). Extract in David Chandler's Blenheim Preparation: The English Army on the March to the Danube: 273–85
 * Parker, Robert. Memoirs of the most remarkable military transactions from 1683–1718. Dublin. Pub. 1746
 * Saint-Simon, Louis de Rouvroy, duc de. Memoirs: 1691–1709, Vol 1. Prion Books Ltd, 1999. ISBN 1853753521

Secondary

 * Barnett, Correlli. Marlborough. Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1999. ISBN 184022200X
 * Burton, Ivor F. The Captain-General: The Career of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, from 1702 to 1711. Constable & Co Ltd., 1968. ISBN 0094561001
 * Chandler, David G. Blenheim Preparation: The English Army on the March to the Danube. The History Press Ltd., 2004. ISBN 1873376952

——— Marlborough as Military Commander. Spellmount Ltd, 2003. ISBN 186227195X ——— The Habsburg Monarchy: 1618–1815. Cambridge University Press, 1994. ISBN 0521389003 ——— Louis XIV. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1968. ISBN 0575000880
 * Churchill, Winston. Marlborough: His Life and Times, Book. 1, Vol. 2. University of Chicago Press, 2002 [1933–38]. ISBN 0226106330
 * Coxe, William. Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Vol. 2. London, 1820
 * Falkner, James. Blenheim 1704: Marlborough's Greatest Victory. Pen & Sword Books Ltd., 2004. ISBN 184415050X
 * Henderson, Nicholas. Prince Eugen of Savoy. Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1966. ISBN 1842125974
 * Holmes, Richard. Marlborough: England's Fragile Genius. HarperCollins, 2008. ISBN 9780007225712
 * Ingrao, Charles. In Quest and Crisis: Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy. Purdue University Press, 1979. ISBN 0911198539
 * Jones, J. R. Marlborough. Cambridge University Press, 1993. ISBN 0521375932
 * Lynn, John A. The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714. Longman, 1999. ISBN 0582056292
 * McKay, Derek. Prince Eugene of Savoy. Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1977. ISBN 0500870071
 * Ostwald, Jamel. The 'Decisive' Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare. The Journal of Military History 62 (July 2000): 649–78
 * Spencer, Charles. Blenheim: Battle for Europe. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004. ISBN 0297846094
 * Spielman, John. Leopold I of Austria. Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1977. ISBN 0500870055
 * Trevelyan, G. M. England under Queen Anne. 3 volumes. London, 1930–34
 * Tincey, John. Blenheim 1704: The Duke of Marlborough's Masterpiece. Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2004. ISBN 1841767719
 * Veenendaal, A. J (ed. Bromley, J. S). The New Cambridge Modern History VI: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688–1725. Cambridge University Press, 1971. ISBN 0521075246
 * Wolf, John B. The Emergence of the Great Powers: 1685–1715. Harper & Row, 1962. ISBN 0061397509