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1st Guards Cavalry Corps
The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps was one of the most instrumental and most decorated cavalry units of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War. It was transformed from the 2nd Cavalry Corps named after the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR on November 26, 1941. Through the whole war the Corp never suffered a significant defeat, was never destroyed or rebuild. It also holds the record for the longest raid of 6 months through the war.

Body composition
(As of May 1, 1945)

1st Guards Cavalry Division;

2nd Guards Cavalry Division;

7th Guards Cavalry Division

61st Tank Zhytomyr Regiment (from September 26, 1943)

230th Tank Regiment (from October 8, 1943, to December 30, 1943)

58th Tank Regiment (from May 22, 1944)

87th Tank Zhytomyr Regiment (from September 29, 1943)

1244th Self-propelled artillery Peremyshlsky Order of Alexander Nevsky Regiment (from March 1944 to May 1945)

1461th Self-propelled artillery Zhytomyr (October 1943 - January 1944)

143rd Guards Fighter Anti-Tank Artillery Zhytomyr

1st Separate Guards Fighter Anti-Tank Division

49th Separate Guards Mortar Division

1st Guards mortar Zhytomyr Regiment of Rocket Artillery

319th anti-aircraft artillery

1st Separate Guards Anti-aircraft Battery

Additional Units
1st Separate Guard Communication Division (until May 1, 1942 - 10th Separate Communication Division)

187th Separate motor battalion

349th Field auto repair base

256th Laundry squad

27th Field automobile bakery

561st Military postal station

436th Fighter Aviation Regiment

I-16 Aircraft 28th Mixed Aviation Division

Battle way
As part of the troops of the South, South-West, West, again South-West, Voronezh, and 1st Ukrainian fronts. The corps took part in defensive battles in the territory of Moldova, in Sumy, Belgorod forces. In the Battle of Moscow, repelling the advance of German troops from the Zhizdra region and Kashira, later taking part in the famous 6-month raid and the Battles of Rzhev. Liberated Ukraine, as well as the Lviv-Sandomierz, Carpathian-Duklinsk, Sandomierz-Silesian, Lower Silesian, Berlin, and Prague offensive operations.

Commanders
Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant General Pavel Belov (November 26, 1941 - June 28, 1942)

Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant General Viktor Kirillovich Baranov (June 29, 1942 - May 11, 1945)

Divisional Awards
Order of the Red Banner Order of the Red Banner - for exemplary performance of combat missions of the command at the front of the struggle against the German invaders and at the same time shown valor and courage.

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 13, 1943.

The honorary name "Zhytomyr" - to commemorate the victory and the difference in the battles for the liberation of Zhytomyr. Order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of November 13, 1943.

The Red Banner of the Mongolian People's Republic (December 18, 1942)

Battle of Moscow
The 2nd Cavalry Corps during the Battle of Moscow was renamed 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, which served until the end of the war. It was an elite Soviet unit that was never destroyed like many other Soviet units, it was often used in the most difficult situations on the front as was the case in late November 1941. Pavel Belov was given the task of being the central focus of the counterattack against Guderian's forces in the southern part of Moscow. His flanks were covered by the 10th Soviet Army and the 322nd Division on the east while the 50th Soviet Army held Tula on the west.

Battle of Kashira
By order of the NCO No. 342 of November 26, 1941, the 2nd Cavalry Corps (Soviet Union) named after The Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR was transformed into the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. The 5th Cavalry Division was transformed into the 1st Guards Cavalry Division and the 9th Cavalry Division into the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division. On November 25, 2nd Cavalry Corp was ordered to advance to Zaraysk and Ryazan. Their task was to cover this direction from the rapidly advancing parts of the Guderian Panzer group. The cavalry corps commander Pavel Belov was informed of the decision that was given out of the Military Council of the Front, which imposed on him personal responsibility for Kashira.

After concentrating by the morning of November 27, 2nd Guards Cavalry Division together with 112th rifle Division and 9th Tank brigade from the Kashira region (from the front of Ivankovo, Sorokino, Redkino, Klishino) launched at 9 o’clock an attack from the north on the opposing group of enemy troops, having on the flanks a tank division and brigade. As a result of the fighting, the Germans were defeated, forcing a significant part of the force to switch to defense, and then to retreat south. The success of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division from November 27, caused the Germans to transfer 29th Motorized Division to the line of Pryakhino, Tunezh to ensure the right flank and rear. As the Soviet cavalry advanced, while heavy tanks lagged behind due to the lack of strong bridges in the Zaraysk area. The 112 Tank Division fought with tanks and motorized infantry of the enemy in the Ivankovo region.

On November 28, corps formations occupied the following position: 112th in the Ivankovo region covered the road to Serpukhov; the 1st Guards Cavalry Division captured the villages on Friday of Dudilovo; the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division was positioned in the Kokino area. By 5 o’clock the tank group reached the line of Dyakovo and Purlovo. On the approaches to Kashira, the Soviets had to face up to one motorized infantry battalion with 20–25 tanks. Performing the tasks, the corps regrouped on the night of November 28 to continue the offensive from 19:15. During November 28, corps formations occupied the following position: 112th in the Ivankovo region covered the road to Serpukhov; 1 Guards Cavalry Division captured the villages of Friday and Dudilovo; 2 Guards Cavalry Division was in the Kokino area. By 5 o’clock the tank group reached the line of Dyakovo and Purlovo. Caught in a semi-circle, the Germans on November 28 stubbornly defended themselves in the Starodub, Pyatnitsa, Rudnevo areas with forces to an infantry regiment with 60 tanks, some of which were buried in the ground. Enemy aircraft assaults also disrupted communications among the units on November 28. In addition, the enemy stubbornly tried to counterattack the 136th regiment and 2 Guards Cavalry Division towards Kokino by force of two companies of infantry with a small number of tanks.

Between November 29 to December 3, the cavalry corps with reinforcements developed the offensive, and already on November 29, the enemy was slowly retreating south, putting up stubborn resistance. The pursuit of the enemy continued on November 30 and the following days, with stubborn resistance from the Germans, who on December 1 counterattacked from the Konchinka region (mainly with tanks) on the 1 Guards Cavalry Division. Stopping this counterattack, the division entrenched itself at the line of Uvarovka, Rusalkino, defending Kashira with one regiment. 2 Guards Cavalry Division, destroyed about a company that same day, then took possession of Orekhovka, Pavlovo-Vorontsov, Kozlovka and interacting with 9th Tank brigade attacked Mordves, taking possession of Marygin. In connection with the enemy’s breakthrough in the Rudnevo area (18–20 km north-east of Tula), the 112th Tank Regiment and 35th Tank Regiment units (whose main forces were on December 2 at the Borisovo, Pavlovskoye, Odintsovo line) were tasked to advance in the direction of Rudnevo to destroy the enemy that had broken through. 173 Rifle Division, 1 Guards Cavalry Division, and 9 Tank Regiment with 127 Tank Regiment continued to pursue during December 2, with 173rd advancing in the direction of Gritchino, 1 Guards Cavalry Division took control of Konchinka, 9th with 127 Tank Regiment fought for Pryakhino, having the main forces at the line of Dyakonovo and Barsuki.

The 2nd Guards Cavalry Division, was located at the turn of Selink, Kozlovka, and at that time served as a reserve of the corps. On December 3, 173 Division, having captured Zarazy, Khrenovo, Zhilevo, continued to attack the Gritchino. At the same time, the 1st Guards Cavalry Division by 18 o’clock captured Martemyanovo, Lashino. The 2nd Guards Cavalry Division with two regiments together with the 9th tank regiment attacked Mikhailovka. The enemy, continuing to retreat, however on December 3 at 13 o'clock the Germans tried to strike at the left flank of the corps and the nearest rear 9th Tank regiment with motorized infantry of 50 vehicles and 2 tanks. To eliminate this breakthrough, a tank battalion was advanced from the Dyakonovo region to Marygino; in addition, to cover the left flank of the corps in the Marygino, Dyakonovo and Kozlovka districts, 2 Guards Cavalry Division was concentrated.

On December 2, the enemy went on the offensive to the southeast from Tula and went to the line of Sevryukovo, Revyakino (15 km north of Tula), and Torkhovo. As a result of the fighting unfolding here, the Germans were unable to close the Tula encirclement ring in the Kostrovo region (on the Tula-Serpukhov highway). With strikes to the south, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corp defeated and forced to withdraw a significant part of the Germans' mechanized forces most rapidly moving towards Moscow from the south. During the liquidation of the enemy forces that had erupted in the Rudnevo area, the 1st Guards cavalry Corp, with their tank units, were directly involved in the liquidation of the enemy at the most tense moment for the defense of Tula, this helped the 50 Army defend Tula and the counter-attack.

Battle of Stalinagorsk
Following the victory at Kashira, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corp was given a new assignment to capture the important town of Stalinogorsk. The Germans were heavily dug in the cities two parts of Stalinagorsk I and II, this task was designed to help the 10th Army with its breakthrough to the west. 2 Guards Cavalry Division with 9th brigade left in the area of Medvedovka, with the task of attacking Stalinogorsk-2. In the first half of December 10, the 2nd Guards Division attacked Stalinogorsk. The main forces of the corps, meanwhile, reached the line of Pozhilki, Mikhailovka, Urusovo. The battle for Stalinogorsk II lasted 2 days. The commander of the 2nd Guard Division left two regiments to strike from the front, and the other two threw bypassing Stalingogorsk-2 from the west. One cavalry regiment and the 9th brigade had to go through the ice, and several tanks and a battery of guards mortars sank. As a result of encompassing actions, on the night of December 11th, the 2nd Guards cavalry Division took possession of Stalinogorsk II, throwing forward in the morning the regiment to Stalinogorsk-1 which was taken the same day.

After occupying Stalinogorsk, the corps turned in the south-west direction. The enemy, trying to prevent the pursue, blew up a dam on the Shat River in the Verkh. Petrovo area of Stalinogorsk-1. However, attempts to stop the progress were unsuccessful. Bypassing individual parts of the enemy, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps confidently moved forward. The resistance of the Germans on the Shat River was broken. On December 13, the corps advanced to the line of 8-10 km approximately. Advanced units of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division fought the battle on the outskirts of the station Uzlovaya. In January 1942, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps left under Vyazma in a deep raid on the rear of the Nazis, and only in June 1942, the exhausted but combat-ready corps left the encirclement in the Kirov region.

Counterattack and the Raid
The design of the command assumed the encirclement of the forces of the 4th and 9th armies of the Center group in the area of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge with a joint strike from the two fronts. First the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps of the Kalinin Front attacked from the north-west, followed by the 2nd Cavalry Corps (in the future, the 1st Guards Corps) and the 33rd Army of the Western Front entered the breakthrough from the southeast direction.

The directive of the command of the Western Front of January 2, 1942, stated: "A very favorable situation was created for the encirclement of the 4th and 9th armies of the enemy, and the main role should be played by the Belov strike group, quickly interacting through the headquarters of the front with our Rzhev group."

Belov’s corps did not enter the breakthrough in its entirety. Two rifle divisions remained behind the Warsaw highway, all tanks, almost all artillery, and rear services. The corps, therefore, consisted of the 1st and 2nd Guards Cavalry Divisions, along with 41, 57, and 75th Cavalry Divisions, as well as several ski battalions. The three-light raid cavalry divisions formed by the abbreviated states of 1941 were much weaker than the guard divisions in the later years. At the time the 41st numbered 1291 people, 57th 1706 people, and the 75th 2760 people. According to various sources, ski battalions had from 800 to 2 thousand people. Thus, the corps totaled about 19,000 people.

Unfortunately, the forces of Army Group Center in the area of the ledge were greatly underestimated. The fascists recovered from the consequences of the battle for Moscow and managed to create a solid defense, especially in settlements with deeply entrenched fortifications and solid communications. Breakthroughs that included strike groups were closed by the enemy as the Corps entered the raid. The shock groups were in an extremely difficult situation. Lack of supply and replenishment, lack of heavy weapons, low mobility of rifle divisions, harsh climatic conditions all this made the task almost impossible.

The situation was aggravated by the lack of a unified command of the operation between the STAVKA and the Generals on the ground. It should be noted that the Northern group was completely blocked and ceased to play any serious role by the end of February. Ultimately it will face the same tragic fate with the 33rd Army. Of all the connections involved in the operation, only the Pavel Belov Corps was able to avoid defeat, while inflicting the maximum possible damage to the enemy.

The fighting began on January 14 on the line Lobkovo by the station Zhelanye. At this time, the 33rd Army still stood near Vereya and fought stubborn battles for the strongly fortified city. On the approaches to Vyazma, the advanced parts of the corps came out on February 4. This day, perhaps, the only joint attack on Vyazma by the forces of the corps and the infantry regiments of the 33rd army was carried out. The attack was repelled. Subsequently, the attacks of the group were disparate. We can assume that after February 4, General Belov realized that he could not take Vyazma, and in order to survive, it was urgent to change the plan of the operation. But the command of the Western Front in the person of G.K. Zhukov was adamant. Vyazma should be taken "at all costs." On February 6, Belov's forces repeated their attack on the city. They broke into a stronghold of the village of Zubovo. As the Soviets cleared the village the Germans began to gain a foothold, pulling up new forces. But from the side of Vyazma, a counterattack followed immediately. The Germans processed the defense of cavalrymen from heavy guns and went on the offensive. The blow fell primarily on the 75th Cavalry Division, the division did not flinch. But it soon became clear that her resilience only led to trouble as the division became surrounded. Belov ordered a thorough reconnaissance after the enemy’s forces and firing points were determined. The cavalrymen launched an attack from both sides and broke through the ring thus reaching the location of the main forces. As a result of these battles, the corps was driven back from the city by 15 kilometers suffering significant losses, most importantly, the initiative was lost. By this point, the corps was 120 kilometers away from its rear and bases. In addition, he was forced to keep the 41st Cavalry Division in the rear to cover the flanks. Belov in his book “Moscow Behind Us” later wrote: “The approaches to Vyazma from all sides are occupied by the enemy in a radius of 10 to 20 kilometers, and the railway and the Vyazma-Smolensk highway are occupied by the enemy throughout and persistently defend. Vyazma was not taken by the corps because it was too much for it, the railway was not captured by the corps, although it crossed paths because the enemy was superior in technology and strength. The corps in cash is able to raid, but is not able to hold captured settlements.”

After the corps rolled away from Vyazma, Belov decides to proceed with semi-partisan actions. The most important task was the keep supplies for combat units and the treatment of the wounded. It was necessary to prepare the area, space for a new deployment of the corps. This area became a partisan region from Germination to Dorogobuzh. This was the only area under Soviet control in occupied territory. In the dense forests around Dorogobuzh at that time, several large partisan detachments were operating, and an underground was formed in the city. By decisive maneuver, Belov’s cavalry together with the partisans cleared the area of the enemy. Vyazemsky local historians have collected a wealth of material about the actions in their areas of cavalry general Belov.

The corps received replenishment while being constantly surrounded and attacked, more than 11 thousand people joined its regiments and squadrons. A significant amount of weapons and ammunition remained in the surrounding forests after the Red Army retreated in the fall of 1941. So, the residents of the Brazhinsky Village Council gathered 200 rifles in the surrounding forests, 2 light machine guns, 2558 grenades, 1240 fuses for them about a million rounds, 20 thousand mines for mortars, 1486 shells of various calibers. Residents of the Safonovsky district 800 rifles, 63 heavy machine guns, 87 light machine guns, 27 anti-tank rifles, 33 guns, 78 mortars, 1602 mines, 8046 shells. Residents of the Dorogobuzh district collected and handed over to the corps 64 heavy machine guns, 232 light machine guns, 23 guns, 5249 rifles, 2074 grenades, 50 mortars. Repair and mechanical workshops were established in the Vskhodsky and Dorogobuzh districts. Damaged equipment and small arms were repaired here. In the workshops, a long-range gun was brought into combat conditions. By order of General Belov, it was installed near the village of Grishin and from time to time fired at the Vyazma railway station. These shellings annoyed the Germans so much that the Germans began to regularly raid any suspicious objects. The gun was never found. In addition, two batteries of 152-mm howitzers for a long time, until the middle of the summer of 1942, fired at German positions south of the Sprouts.

But to the north of Vyazma, in the Vadin partisan region, where the 11th Cavalry Corps and the 39th Army of the Kalinin front were operating, the Germans achieved great success. For the operation "Zeydlitz" to surround and eliminate the group, the enemy used 4 infantry divisions, 2 tank battalions, and the SS cavalry brigade, this was followed by two weeks of hard battles. The 39th Army and part of the 11th Cavalry Corps were destroyed when leaving the encirclement. Belov tried to break through to the encircled, to join the units of the 11th Cavalry Corps of the Kalinin Front. However, this did not turn successful due to limited supplies and faulty communications. As a result of the battles in the direction to the north Belov's 41st Cavalry Brigade and the units of the 8th Airborne Brigade that acted together with it were surrounded. Only on February 27th, they managed to break through to their own with great losses. When on the other wing were surrounded by units of the 329th Infantry Division of the 33rd Army and 250th regiment of paratroopers, Belov comes to their aid, breaks through the ring, and takes the surrounded troops to the location. From that time on, paratroopers and regiment of the 329th rifle division operated in the corps. These units were with him and left the encirclement in the summer of 1942 on Kirov. According to the recollections of P.A. Belov, about 400 soldiers and commanders joined his corps from the defeated 329th Rifle Division. By May 1942 the territory of the guerrilla region, where the cavalry corps operated, covered a fairly vast area from the Ugra station in the east to the Solovyovaya crossing in the west and from Dorogobuzh in the north to Yelnia in the south. The corps at that time numbered up to 20 thousand people of those about 15 thousand fought in partisan detachments and brigades. At the end of May, the Germans, having accumulated strength, decided to destroy the cavalry corps with local partisans. It was impossible to tolerate them in the rear of the Army Group "Center" for the Germans. This culminated in Operation "Hannover" during which armies of the 4th field army had to finish the 1st Guards cavalry corps and partisans of Dorogobuzh region.

If the life of political workers who voluntarily surrendered to the German army was already guaranteed, one can imagine how annoying General Belov and his horsemen were to the group of armies "Center" by the very fact of their standing in the forests in the rear of a large group concentrated near Sukhinichi and Mosalsk. Franz Halder (Chief of General Staff of the Ground Forces 1939-1942) says the following in his diary about the planned operation:

On May 24, 1942, Galder makes the following entry: "The offensive of the Army Group "Center" against the Russian cavalry corps of General Belov led to good results (even without aircraft and tanks, which, because of bad weather, probably could not be used at all). The enemy is persistently defending itself. The activity of his artillery has increased."

May 25, 1942: "In the strip of the Army Group "Center" due to bad weather and transportation difficulties, the operations against the partisans south of Vyazma produced only minor results".

May 26, 1942: "In the strip of Army Group "Center" the offensive against the Belov's troops develops very slowly due to weather conditions. The enemy is pulling forces from Dorogobuzh here".

And finally, on May 27, 1942: "The opposition to the troops of Belov brings success. Here the enemy ... is divided into small groups, which partly provide persistent resistance".

June 9, 1942: "In the center of Belov's troops broke through to the south".

June 10, 1942: "The broken through troops of Belov are pursued".

June 11, 1942: "Liquidation of the enemy remnants in the rear of the 4th Army is successful. Unfortunately, the main forces of Belov's cavalry corps and the 4th Airborne Brigade are going south".

June 16, 1942: "At the front of the Army Group "Center" the troops of Russian general Belov again broke through to Kirov. It does not do us any honor!"

June 17, 1942: "The cavalry corps of General Belov now operates west of Kirov. Anyway, he distracted himself in general 7 German divisions".

Reflecting on the fate of the fallen and survived Soviet soldiers who fell into the hell of the Rzhev Meatgrinder Rzhevsko-Vyazemskaya operation, one involuntarily comes to the conclusion about the influence of the personality in the history of the general. Having almost the same conditions and operational situation, only Belov, of all the generals who were surrounded, found the strength and courage to act independently and decisively. With fire, maneuver, and skillful use of the terrain, the horsemen imposed their battle conditions on the enemy. Instead of breaking through the back or trying to hold the supply corridor, instead of bleeding the hull in unsuccessful attacks on Vyazma, Belov goes further and further to the south-west. He beats the Nazis in brave raids and raids, frees up the vast region, and eventually, having pulled back seven German divisions, which is yet to be repeated by any general.

Battle of Rhzev and liberation of Europe
After the end of the winter campaign and the withdrawal of 1 Guards Cavalry Corp. from the encirclement on June 28, Major-General Belov was appointed commander of 61 Army. The cavalry corps was headed by Major-General Baranov V.K. The corps was enlarged and was located behind the right flank of 16th Army in the nearest rear between the rivers Gizdra and Vytebet Yuz Kozelska. By the beginning of August 1942 more and more clearly began to show signs of approaching enemy offensive. By August 9, the concentration of motorized units in the nearest enemy rear also began to testify to a possible near offensive of the Germans. The 1 Guards Cavalry Corp. was preparing for counterattacks.

On the morning of August 11, after a strong training and the strike of a large number of aircraft the enemy went on the offensive. By the evening of August 11, the defense of 322nd Rifle Division in the region of Khatkovo on the river Reset and 346rd Rife division in the region of Kireevskoe was broken. The enemy with units of (17th 19th and 52nd) were advancing from Khatkovo area. 7th Guards Cavalry Division a day before the German offensive, by order of 16 Army Commander Lieutenant General Baghramyan I.H. was withdrawn from its prepared defensive line and sent to Sukhinich direction. 1 Guards Cavalry Division, which was to replace its place was to take up the defensive line. It was supposed to counterstrike the 7th Guards Cavalry Division and 2 Guards Cavalry Division with the support of 6 Guards Cavalry division and restore the defense with the 322nd division. "Passing the evening of August 11, our units managed to squeeze out the enemy and partially restore their position on the Reset. However to the south motorized units of the enemy broke through to Slobodka. 2 Guards cavalry division occupied the defense in the area of Nikitka, trying to prevent the enemy to break through to the north of Slobodka. The whole day on August 12, 2 Guards Cavalry Division repulsed the enemy attacks, knocking down to 15 tanks. However, 7 Guards Cavalry Division for the day lost up to 80% of its staff, was surrounded and forced to break through the forests.

1 Guards Cavalry Division tried to restrain the second enemy strike group. The enemy units that came to the river Vytetya forced it in the west direction, seeking to join with the strike group. On the morning of August 12 the 1st Guards Cavalry Division, the division was to pass the counteroffensive on the enemy's bridgehead in the area of Rechitsa, Debri. However, in the morning the advancing cavalry regiments were heavily bombarded by the enemy, losing almost all air defense. This was followed by an attack by German tanks. As a result of heavy combat, the division was able to repel several attacks, but due to losses, the further successful defense was in question. Especially large losses were incurred by 3 and 5 Guards Cavalry Division who lost up to 500 people, the 2 Guards Cavalry division lost up to 300 people on August 12... On the whole, the 1 Guards Cavalry Corp actions were successful despite the heavy losses. The Corps, which was the only 16 Army reserve at the time of the breakthrough of our troops' defense, was able to deter the enemy offensive within two days and provided an opportunity to tighten the mobile reserves for the 10th Tank Corp. and 3rd Tank Corp. along with other units.

On August 13, 10 Tank Corp units came to the attack together with the cavalrymen in Old Town. 1 Guards Cavalry Division under the blows of the enemy went along the river Vytebet to Ozhigovo. 2nd and 7th Guards Cavalry Divisions with the remains of 322 Cavalry Division fought in the forest area south of the river Zhizdra. On August 13, the enemy finally closed the encirclement ring around the units defending in the outcrop of the front at the junction of the 16th and 61 Armies and went on the offensive in the north direction. Cavalrymen together with the 10 Tank Corp defend counterattacks and held back the enemy's onslaught against the Gisdr river. On August 13-14, 1 Guards Cavalry Division conducted heavy fighting in the area of Perestyazh and along the river, Vytebet retreated to the north. The losses of the division were more than 1000 people during these days. The departure of the division opened the 10 Tank regiment flank in the area of Belyi Verkh, as a result of which tankers were also forced to move back to Kolosovo. By the morning of August 16, the 5 Guards Rifle Corp, under Korotkov had occupied the defense along the northern bank of Zhizdra. Under the leadership of the commander Belov, he united a group of divisions of the corps, 10 Tank Regiment, 6 Guards regiment (6 KV, 2 MK-2, 16 MK3, 20 T-60), which was to defend the Kolosovo area. 2nd and 7th Guards Cavalry Divisions went behind the Zhizdra River in the region of Gretnya, where the enemy left by lunch on August 15. However, heavily forested terrain and heavy rains turned the forest areas into rivers of mud prevented not only the cavalry's retreat for Zhizdra, but also the enemy to develop its success. By morning, the Soviet forces had taken up defense along the sowing bank of Zhizdra. The enemy had not made any attempts to force it on that day. On August 16 the enemy managed to conquer Kolosovo, but the Germans couldn't move further north to Dretovo and to cross Zhizdra as the 10 Tank Regiment and 1 Guards Cavalry Corp stood in its way.

On August 17th the German troops managed to force Gzdra on the 1 Guards Cavalry Divisions east section and advance through the Forest to Alyoszynka. But some units have already approached here and further advance of German units to the north was stopped. Until August 20, the units continued to hold their positions. Losses of three divisions of the Corps for defensive battles amounted to 70% of the personnel of divisions, 1000 horses. 135 machine guns, 7 PTO guns, 90 mortars, 156 guns. The losses of only 1 Guards Cavalry Division were 2400 killed and wounded. The resistance of the 1 Guards Cavalry Corp units, and the Reeves put forward towards the advancing enemy gave time for the deployment of 3 Tank Army units. By August 21, the 3 Tank Army was completed and ready to attack the right flank of the enemy group. On the left flank was to strike a group of 1 Guards Cavalry Corp and 5 Guards Rifle Corp. Additionally the 1st Guards Cavalry Division was defending in the Dretovo area until August 21.

From the morning of August 22nd, the units of the right-wing of the corps 7 and 2 Guards Cavalry division went on the offensive, forcing Gisdra southern Gretna. However, the forest area was already heavily fortified by the enemy. Heavy forest terrain made it difficult to maneuver artillery and reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire. All attacks during August 22-25 by the Soviets were unsuccessful. The 2 and 7 Guards Cavalry Divisions themselves by the time of the transition to the offensive had a combat force of no more than 100 - 150 men per division. 322 units together with the 7th Guards Cavalry Division were able to master a small bridgehead on Gizdra East of Chernyshino. Finally, the 1 Guards Cavalry Corp, which was part of General Trubnikov's group with 10 tank Corp and additional units were moving from Dretovo in the course of 25-26 August to captured Kolosovo and advanced to the White Kamen. Further attacks until September 5 were worth up to 870 losses in the division of which 241 were killed. Total losses from August 12 to September 8 in 1 Guards Cavalry Divisions were 1259 killed and 1846 wounded. The losses of the Corps during the operation amounted to 10457 killed and wounded, 2915 horses, 41 guns, 119 mortars. On September 9, the corps was taken to the 16 Army reserve in the area of south-sukhinichi. On September 28th, it was transferred to the Western Reserve. In early October, the first marching squadrons arrived as a replenishment. The period of rest and combat training of the division continued until January 29, 1943, when the transfer of the corps to be part of the Kharkiv offensive operation.

The Corps continued its success all the way until the Elbe meetings with the Americans following the Battle of Berlin. The Commander of the 2nd guards cavalry division took part in the 1945 Vicory parade representing the Soviet cavalry contributions.

In May 1946, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and its members were disbanded

Photos
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/64/RIAN_archive_2548_A_liberated_town.jpg

Literature
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The combat structure of the Soviet Army. Part V. Ministry of Defense of the USSR. Historical and Archival Division of the General Staff - M: Military Publishing House, 1990

Anokhin V. A., Bykov M. Yu. All Stalin's fighter aviation regiments. The first complete encyclopedia. - Popular science. - M .: Yauza-press, 2014 .-- S. 138. - 944 p. - 1,500 copies - ISBN 978-5-9955-0707-9.