User:RekonDog/Sandbox/Amphibious Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance (from Middle French reconoissance, from Old French reconoistre, meaning -to recognize ) is a term denoting reconnoitering; to make a preliminary examination visually or survey, as of the territory and resources of a country, or by act of obtaining information by exploration conducted to determine a foe's intentions by collecting and gathering information about an enemy's composition (position, strength and movement of enemy forces) and capabilities along with pertinent environmental conditions, by direct observation, usually by scouts or military intelligence soldiers especially trained in critical surveillance.

The acronym forms of Australian, Canadian and British form is recce and the United States usage form is recon. The associated, linguistic forms are the verb reconnoitre in British spelling, and reconnoiter in American spelling; informally, recce and recon are used as a verb.

Reconnaissance is part of combat intelligence, and contributes to, and is managed by, the government-level intelligence cycle management. Compare to counterintelligence and surveillance, which are the passive gathering of data and information. Special reconnaissance is the reconnaissance sub-activity of clandestinely collecting data and information by people and with technology behind enemy lines.



Civil Engineering of the term reconnaissance occur in geology, the "examination or survey of the general geological characteristics of a region", and in computer networking and security it is an "exploration or enumeration of network infrastructure including network addresses, available communication ports, and available services."

History
History abounds with examples of successful military surprises; examples of effective warning are difficult to find. Military training emphasized the value of surprise, stratagem, and deception, but the value of warning was long neglected. Flank and rear guards, to protect marching columns, patrols and scouts to locate the enemy, and sentries to guard camps, were of course used in war from earliest times. Animals were sometimes employed to detect the approach of an enemy; dogs and horses were especially favoured, though, according to the ancient historian Livy, the Romans used geese to detect the night attack of the Gauls on Rome in the 4th century bc. High ground, favourable for observation, was often supplemented by watchtowers, such as those placed along the Great Wall of China and on Hadrian’s Wall in Britain.

The observation balloon was an important technological advance. First used in warfare by the French in the late 18th century, primarily for offensive reconnaissance on the battlefield, its defensive possibilities were demonstrated in the American Civil War; in May 1863 a balloon of the army of the Potomac detected Lee’s army moving from its camp across the Rappahannock to commence the Gettysburg campaign. Aerial photography had already been pioneered by the French and used in the War of Italian Independence (1859).

A balloon observer in the Spanish-American War of 1898 is credited with discovering an alternate route up San Juan Hill during the battle there. A few other successes are ascribed to such observation before the balloon was supplemented by the far more valuable airplane in World War I. Nevertheless, the balloon never fulfilled its potential as a warning device.

In sea warfare, warning and detection were equally neglected. As far back as the Minoan civilization of Crete, patrol ships were used, but mainly for offensive purposes. In later centuries, raised quarterdecks and lookout posts atop sailing masts were provided, but the beginnings of serious maritime detection technology did not come until the advent of the submarine.

Binoculars, telescopes, the telegraph, and telephone were well established military equipment by 1914; the airplane, first used by the Italians in the Italo-Turkish War of 1911, showed its potential as an observation device at the Battle of the Marne. Radio communications provided the means to make air observations immediately available. Aerial combat became inevitable as each side tried to deny the other its aerial reconnaissance.

Searchlights, first used in the Russo-Japanese War (1904), saw large-scale use in World War I to detect dirigibles and aircraft on night bombardment missions. Flares were used to illuminate the battlefield between trenches to detect raiding parties. Listening devices, using directional horns to detect and locate enemy aircraft, were also used with limited success.

Despite the novelties of World War I, World War II produced far more technological innovation. Radar made obsolete the slow and inaccurate older listening devices. Radio communications made great strides, particularly in the very high frequency range. The combination of radar and interference-free very high frequency communications was pivotal in permitting the RAF to resist Hitler’s aerial attack and win the Battle of Britain.

Notwithstanding radar sophistication, ground spotters played an important role in filling the gaps between radar coverage. Their messages, forwarded to a plotting centre, were assembled to trace the progress of intruders (tracking).

The advent of nuclear weapons (1945), especially when coupled later with the speed and range of intercontinental missiles, gave new dimensions to the value of surprise for the attacker. Long-term warning was suddenly of paramount importance. Not only did all forms of unequivocal warning become indispensable but the warning had to be made credible to an aggressor; that is, an assurance had to be given that the retaliatory weapons would not all be destroyed by a first strike. Bomber aircraft were kept in the air to avoid destruction on the ground and attempts were made to provide a degree of protection for the civilian population through shelters.

Practically all aspects of science and technology have been introduced into today’s warfare and warning systems: airplanes, helicopters, submarines, earth satellites, television, lasers, and magnetic, acoustic, seismic, infrared, nuclear, and chemical detectors.

Electromagnetic sensors » Modern detector technology » The visible region Binoculars and telescopes have changed very little. Where vibration and motion create interference, gyroscopically stabilized optics are used in surface vehicles, ships, and aircraft.

Newer in character are the image intensifiers used for nighttime detection. These devices receive the moonlight or starlight reflected from targets on a sensitive screen, amplify the image electronically, and present it at much higher light level on a small cathode-ray tube similar to that used in a television receiver. Typical of these devices is the starlight scope, resembling an oversized telescopic sight, with which riflemen can aim at night at 1,000–1,300 feet range. Artillery, tanks, helicopters, and aircraft use similar, larger devices having longer range. In aircraft the direct-viewing device is replaced by a cathode-ray tube in the instrument panel; this version is called low-light-level television.

Ordinary searchlights can often be used at night even in combat situations; but, to avoid drawing fire, invisible light, in the ultraviolet or near infrared range, can be used with appropriate viewing devices. Conventional photography, used in aerial reconnaissance and essential to long-term warning, must have high resolution despite temperature and vibration interference. To cover wide areas, panoramic cameras, scanning from side to side, record high-quality images. Frame cameras are also used, especially for mapping. At night, flares or flashing lights on aircraft are used.

Infrared sensors on the ground, or in aircraft or spacecraft, can detect such hot spots as motor-vehicle engines, hot jet engines, missile exhausts, even campfires. They have good location accuracy and high sensitivity to signals, without registering such false targets as sun reflections.

In the very near infrared region, infrared imaging detectors use specially sensitized photographic film to reveal forms hidden by camouflage. More important are the detectors used in the far infrared region; objects at room temperature radiate sufficient energy for detection at ranges of several miles. Infrared imagery can have longer range than image intensifiers and can operate without starlight. When the humidity is high, the effective range is reduced.

The sniperscope, an early device that used infrared illumination and an infrared viewer, has been largely replaced by the image intensifier and by laser illuminators.

Electromagnetic sensors » Modern detector technology » Radar Radar is used by ground forces for many purposes: in portable sizes, for infiltration detection; in intermediate sizes, for mortar and artillery shell tracking; and in large sizes, for early warning, search, and control of air-defense weapons (interceptors and surface-to-air missiles).

Air Reconnaissance


Airborne reconnaissance goes back to the early era of ballooning, and forward to the latest reconnaissance satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles(UAV). After the French Revolution, the new rulers became interested in using the balloon to observe enemy manoeuvres and appointed scientist Charles Coutelle to conduct studies using L'Entreprenant, the first reconnaissance airplane. The balloon found its first use in the 1794 conflict with Austria, where in the Battle of Fleurus the gathered information and the demoralizing effect on the Austrian troops ensured victory for the French troops.

The first use of airplanes in combat missions was by the Italian Air Force during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912. On 23 October 1911, an Italian pilot flew over the Turkish lines in Libya to conduct history's first aerial reconnaissance mission, and on 1 November 1911, the first ever aerial bomb was dropped on the Turkish troops in Libya.

On 16 October 1912 a Bulgarian Albatros aircraft was used to perform Europe's first reconnaissance flight in combat conditions, against the Turkish lines on the Balkan peninsula, during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.

During the First World War, photo reconnaissance, now called IMINT, was one of the early uses of the aeroplane. Aviators such as Fred Zinn evolved an entire range of new flying and photography techniques to use the new technology in the equally new environment of trench warfare.

Before the Second World War the conventional wisdom was to use converted bomber types for airborne photo reconnaissance. These bombers retained their defensive armament, which was vital since they were unable to avoid interception. Later it was found that day bombers required a fighter escort.

In 1939 Sidney Cotton and Flying Officer Maurice Longbottom of the RAF were among the first to suggest that airborne reconnaissance may be a task better suited to fast, small aircraft which would use their speed and high service ceiling to avoid detection and interception. Although this seems obvious now, with modern reconnaissance tasks performed by fast, high flying aircraft, at the time it was radical thinking. They proposed the use of Spitfires with their armament and radios removed and replaced with extra fuel and cameras. This led to the development of the Spitfire PR variants. Spitfires proved to be extremely successful in their reconnaissance role and there were many variants built specifically for that purpose. Later De Havilland Mosquitos were also used.

The reconnaissance plane that had the earliest and greatest influence for the Americans in WWII was the F-4, a factory modification of the P-38E which replaced the four guns and cannon with four high-quality K-17 cameras. Some 120 F-4 and F-4As were hurriedly made available by March 1942, reaching the 8th Photographic Squadron in Australia by April (the first P-38s to see action.) The F-4 had an early advantage of long range and high speed combined with the ability to fly at high altitude; a potent combination for reconnaissance. In the last half of 1942, Lockheed would produce 96 F-5As, based on the P-38G. The Lightning in its reconnaissance role was so well-liked by military strategists that hundreds of gun-equipped P-38s were field modified into camera-toting F-5 variants. Later in the war, the Mustang F-6 arrived, eventually becoming the dominant reconnaissance model flown by the US in the ETO.

Immediately after World War II, long range aerial reconnaissance was taken up by adapted jet bombers – such as the English Electric Canberra, and its American development, the Martin B-57 – capable of flying higher or faster than the enemy. After the Korean War, RB-47 aircraft were used. These were at first converted B-47 jet bombers, but later these were purposely built RB-47 reconnaissance planes. They did not carry any bombs. They had large cameras mounted in the belly of the plane, and with a truncated bomb bay used for carrying flash bombs.

The onset of the Cold War led the development of highly specialized and secretive strategic reconnaissance aircraft, or spy planes, such as the Lockheed U-2 and its successor, the SR-71 Blackbird (both from the United States). Flying these aircraft became an exceptionally demanding task, as much because of the aircraft's extreme speed and altitude as it was because of the risk of being captured as spies. As a result, the crews of these aircraft were invariably specially selected and trained.

Although much of this type of intelligence can now be gathered by satellite photography and unmanned aerial vehicles, manned reconnaissance aircraft still play a vital role on the modern battlefield. All three -- satellites, UAVs, and manned aircraft -- collect IMINT,SIGINT, and MASINT.



Ground Reconnaissance
Carried out by a variety of troops from different Arms and Services for different purpose. This type of reconnaissance is related to the need for knowledge of the enemy by different echelons of command. The rank superiority in the military hierarchy is related to the distance from the FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area) that the information about the enemy usually needs to come from as the officer seeks to find and understand the decisions and actions of their opposites.

Special Reconnaissance
(SR) is defined, by the US, to be conducted by special operations troops, most commonly United States Army Special Forces, United States Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance and Navy Seals, who operate deep behind enemy lines, usually but not always in uniform. The British equivalents, including the Special Air Service, Special Boat Service, and Special Reconnaissance Regiment. Soviet and Russian equivalents include Spetsnaz. Israeli "reconnaissance units" such as Sayeret Matkal are often more associated with direct action than reconnaissance, but they obviously have that capability. SR units can reach the area of operations by numerous means, including parachuting (often using HALO and HAHO methods), infiltration by foot or tactical vehicles, helicopters, and surface and subsurface access from water.

SR is a strategic mission, responsible to regional or national commands. In both cases, the reconnaissance asset, to the maximum extent possible, remains clandestine, in enemy territory, or, when long-range sensors can be used, outside it. SR does have a Direct Action capability if required. It is not unusual for their troops to operate 250km forward of FEBA.

Long-Range Reconnaissance
Also called Long Range Surveillance (LRS), is defined as in small groups, in uniform, moderately far behind the enemy lines. While LRS units may direct air or artillery strikes against enemy positions, they strive to be unobserved, and have only self-defense, not DA, capability. They may use unorthodox means of entry, such as swimming in from a submarine or specialized parachuting techniques (e.g., high-altitude high-opening (HAHO) or high-altitude low-opening (HALO)). These troops may operate 100km forward of FEBA. Units designated to carry out this role include: LRSU (US Army); 4/73 Sphinx Special Observation Battery and the Honourable Artillery Company (UK Army); and Fernspähkompanie German Army.

Dedicated ground reconnaissance units (known in the US Army as Cavalry) provide both an information gathering and a screening force service to the other Arms and Services engaged in combat. Specialist scout units may operate as far as 25-50km forward of the FEBA.

While almost every frontline military unit is sometimes assigned to do limited patrolling or surveillance of one kind or another, this kind of stealthy scouting far from friendly bases is a particularly dangerous mission. Light cavalry often served this purpose in the past, and modern militaries make this a special forces mission. When the recon team is unfamiliar with the terrain, recruitment of local guides can be very desirable for these kind of missions.

In US practice, combat battalions have reconnaissance or scouting platoons, forces typically of 20-40 men, but sometimes twice that size, that can probe beyond the main line of the unit . Brigades and divisions have separate Long Range Surveillance units , which can go deeper beyond the front line; the structure of such units is changing as the US Army reorganizes into a Brigade combat team model with enhanced reconnaissance. As of 2007 though the Scout specialists were being removed from some US brigades such as the Stryker Brigade Team.

Dedicated scouts serving with infantry, tank, artillery, engineer, or logistics units will generally position themselves about 5km in advance of the forward units where possible. Different Arms and Service scouts have different tasks to perform for their higher echelons of command. For example the engineer reconnaissance detachments will try to identify difficult terrain in the path of their formation, and attempt to reduce the time it takes to transit the terrain using specialist engineering equipment such as a pontoon bridge for crossing water obstacles.

Amphibious Reconnaissance
Patrols are landed on hostile shores in order to secure information of the enemy, of the terrain and hydrography, and for the purpose of effecting a deception."''

Specific missions for amphibious reconnaissance patrols included:


 * 1) To determine characteristics of beaches available for landing, and report same to commander at sea.
 * 2) By hydrographic reconnaissance of water near the shore line.
 * 3) By examining terrain in inmiediate vicinity of beach.
 * 4) By noting beach defenses--wire, mines, and other obstacles; troops in immediate vicinity; other defenses.
 * 5) To report landmarks for assit;ting in locating landing beaches.
 * 6) To mark beaches and landing points during landing.
 * 7) To determine location, strength, and composition of troops in landing area.
 * 8) To take and hold in concealment a prisoner or prisoners and be prepared to turn them over to Headquarters Landing Force.
 * 9) To spot observers to report enemy activity by radio or by panel.
 * 10) To determine road net and be prepared to meet and guide elements of landing force.
 * 11) To determine practicability of terrain for air landings.
 * 12) After the beachhead has been established, to contour the sea floor beginning at the ten foot line and using a two foot contour interval in order to expedite the unloading of supplies by locating most advantageous channels and beaches.

Also assigned were the following non—intelligence missions:


 * 1) To create a diversion from proposed landing point.
 * 2) Minor night attacks.
 * 3) To assist a landing by executing light demolitions.
 * 4) To disrupt enemy communications by wire cutting and jamming radios.
 * 5) To set flares for naval gunfire at night, or to smoke a beach in order to screen a landing wave, or to othenzise mislead the enemy.

History of Amphibious Reconnaissance
At the turn of the 20th Century a U.S. Marine by the name of BGen. Dion Williams referenced the purpose of amphibious reconnaissance by standardizing the 'official' naval doctrine of amphibious reconnaissance  of amphibious warfare in 1906. The scope of the doctrine outlined every aspect that involved recognition of intelligence gathering and planning, the cornerstone of America's present-day methods in amphibious reconnaissance. The earliest activities in amphibious reconnaissance was largely limited in surveying of ports, uncharted islands and adjacent beaches or coastlines. Most of these duties were billeted by senior Naval Intelligence Officers that were prerequisited in topography, hydrography, impermanent construction of fortification with the means of rapid encampment and mobilization of troops to operate in their area.

It took an Intelligence Officer in the Marine Corps, Earl H. Ellis, to put these methods to effect. After fighting in the trenches in WWI, Ellis submitted a request to Headquarters Marine Corps for special intelligence duty in South America and the Pacific; the Director of Naval Intelligence diligently accepted. It was during his special duty that introduced the most profounded accounts of Ellis's intelligence reports. He submitted a 30,000 page Top Secret document concerning his detail discussion of local sea, air and the climate, various land terrain types, the native populaton and economic conditions. He discussed his reports on strategically seizing key inslands as forward-operating bases for project naval forces effectively into the area. His time-tables, mobilization projections, and predictions of manpower necessary to seize certain targets.

Although very little effect of creating a formidable unit capable in utilizing amphibious reconnaissance tactics because the outset of World War I and the Gallipoli Operations due to the lack of Marine Corps personnel by the Isolationism of 1920-30s. Also drawbacks concurred while most of the Marine forces were engaged in conflicts of China and Nicaragua. By 1933, December 7, when the Fleet Marine Force was formed at HQMC in Quantico, VA combining the roles of the Navy and Marine Corps into an integrated naval assault force. Shortly after, a new naval doctrine, the Fleet Training Publication 167 was created to ensure long-term purposes. With this new amphibious reconnaissance doctrine, the Navy and Marine Corps began to consider establishing highly anticipated reconnaissance units.

Route
Specific routes and terrain that the enemy could use for movement and communications, to include roads, railways and waterways. Route Reconnaissance is also employed for friendly forces.

Area
Terrain or enemy activity with a prescribed, specific area (towns, ridges, forest, and structures).

Zone
Total breadth area of a battlefield depending on the adversaries' force, terrain and weather pertaining to the zone. Such parameters are established by determining the intelligence value available.

Force-Oriented
Or also known as Reconnaissance-In-Force, are tasked in focusing on a specific enemy organization or target; its locations and possible movement, shadowing the enemy, moving and stopping when the enemy does, observing and reporting all information that deems pertinent to the MEF Commander. Some military elements tasked with reconnaissance are armed only for self-defence, and rely on stealth to gather information. Others are well-enough armed to also deny information to the enemy by destroying their reconnaissance elements.

Reconnaissance in force (RIF) is a type of military operation used specifically to probe an enemy's disposition. By mounting an offensive with considerable (but not decisive) force, the commander hopes to elicit a strong reaction by the enemy that reveals its own strength, deployment, and other tactical data. In modern warfare, key weapon systems such as surface-to-air missile batteries, radar sites, artillery, and so forth can give their location away to everyone for miles around when actively fighting. The RIF commander retains the option to fall back with the data or expand the conflict into a full engagement.

Reconnaissance by fire (or speculative fire, 'spec fire') is a tactic which applies a similar principle. When not trying to be stealthy, reconnaissance units may fire on likely enemy positions to provoke a reaction. In the Iraq war, the irregular forces use a similar tactic, in which they brandish weapons or purposely draw suspicion, in order to learn about the rules of engagement of opposing forces.

Characteristics of Reconnaissance


Reconnaissance mission are characterized by accordance to the depth of penetration they are required in having an impact, in terms of time, risk coordination, and its support requirements.


 * Close - conducted in the area extending forward of the 'forward edge of the battle area' or FEBA) to the 'Fire Support Coordination Line' (or FSCL ).


 * Distant - concerned in location, disposition, composition and movement of enemy forces, battle space beyond limits of the fire support coordination line (FSCL). Both the FEBA and FSCL are in the Area of Influence, within the range of friendly artillery.


 * Deep - conducted beyond the commander's Area of Influence to the limits of the commander's Area of Interest. Usually directed toward in ascertaining the disposition of enemy reinforcements.

Battlefield Control Measures
Ground forces use a variety of control measures, most of limited interest to the tactical aircrew involved in air-to-ground operations. For our purposes, only the FLOT, FEBA, and FSCL need elaboration.

The FLOT and FEBA are battlefield-planning lines that describe the present position of friendly forces. The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS Pub. 1) definitions are:

forward line of own troops (FLOT)––A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time.

forward edge of the battle area (FEBA)––The foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground combats units are deployed, excluding the areas in which the covering or screening forces are operating, designated to coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units.

Each ground maneuver unit establishes FLOT and FEBA lines to determine unit deployment. The FLOT encompasses all of the unit's people. Accordingly, the FLOT is likely to extend well beyond the location of the main body of friendly troops to incorporate screening or covering forces. On the other hand, the FEBA depicts the forward limits of the main battle area and specifically excludes the screening or covering force.

In today's doctrinal dialogue, one does not hear much discussion of the FEBA. Interest has shifted to the FLOT. In a 10 August 1981 memorandum to his commanding general, then Brigadier General McDonald Morelli of TRADOC described the Army's rationale for emphasizing the FLOT:

The primary reason the US adopted FLO AirLand Battle operational concepts stemmed from the change in the operational concept and mission of the Corps Covering Force, approved by General Starry several years ago.Essentially, when General Starry decided that the Covering Force would be the first echelon of defense and fight a major battle to force the enemy to deploy his main body, there was no way to depict a FEBA for this "battle area" and remain in consonance with approved NATO terms (NATO definition of FEBA excludes the covering force operations). General Starry decided to use FLOT since the Covering Force Battle was to be the baseline where he wanted the time lines established and the AirLand Battle to begin.4

In brief, today's baseline battlefield control measure is the FLOT.

According to JCS Pub. 1, the planning line most often linked with tactical air operations is the FSCL, defined as:

fire support coordination line (FSCL)
A line established by the appropriate ground commander to insure coordination of fire that is not under his control but may affect current tactical operations. The fire support coordination line is used to coordinate fires of air, ground or sea weapon systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. The fire support coordination line should follow well-defined terrain features. The establishment of the fire support coordination line must be coordinated with the appropriate tactical air commander and other supporting elements. Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the fire support coordination line without prior coordination with the ground force commander, provided the attack will not produce adverse surface effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Attacks against surface targets behind this line must be coordinated with the appropriate ground force commander.5

The FSCL is based on and measured from the FLOT. Ideally, the FSCL should be placed as close to the FLOT as operational and safety considerations permit––say, about ten to fifteen kilometers. For reasons that we shall elaborate later, the FSCL is nearly always found at least twenty-five kilometers from the FLOT when operating with U.S. ground forces.

Historically, the FSCL is the lineal descendant––no pun intended––of the "no bomb line." Before the advent of accurate navigation aids and the current air-ground operations system, easily recognizable terrain features were used to separate the Army and Air Force portions of the battlefield. As one young Army author noted: "Given the problems of communications, coordination, and response time, rigid separation of Army and Air Force fires was the only way to attack targets while protecting our own troops."6 We should not minimize these difficulties even today, but our focus now is on how to attack the target set jointly, rather than on a battlefield that is hived off into exclusive domains.

While the requirement to coordinate attacks inside the FSCL is clear, there is no JCS Pub. 1 definition of "coordinate." By way of general guidance, JCS Pub. 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, describes the coordination process:

The commander of the supported force [will] indicate in detail to the supporting commander the support missions he wishes to have fulfilled and provide such information as is necessary for complete coordination of the supporting action with the action of his own force.

In other words, coordination during attack planning seems not to require active involvement of the supporting force when that force is responding to the request of a supported force. Whatever "coordination" is, responsibility for doing it rests mainly with the commander seeking the action. In the case of fire support, the request specifies desired target and time over target. As a consequence, one could argue that the request itself embodies the requesting commander's coordination.7

To summarize, we are required to "coordinate" attacks inside the FSCL. The particulars of coordination are not well defined. And in the case of attacks requested by the ground commander, the request itself may be viewed as incorporating the required coordination.

Acronyms
FLOT


 * Forward Line of Own Trooops

FEBA


 * Forward Edge Battle Area

FSCL


 * Fire Support Coordination Line

SALT


 * size, activity, location, and time

SALUTE


 * size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment

SAM-DOC


 * strength, armament, movement, deployment, organization, communications

METT-T


 * mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time available