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= Peer Pressure Work =

The Holocaust
It is clear that some Germans are culpable for the Holocaust; when looking at the general population, a broader statement is harder to make. When bringing the concept of peer pressure into the Holocaust, German culpability is even harder to decide.

The primary issue revolves around collective responsibility and beliefs. As such, there are two positions, most notably held by Christopher Browning and David Goldhagen.

Browning's 1992 book Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101
Christopher Browning, most known for his book Ordinary Men, relies on an analysis of the men in Reserve Police Battalion 101. The men of 101 were not ardent Nazis but ordinary middle-aged men of background from Hamburg. They were drafted but found ineligible for regular military duty. Their test as an Order Police battalion first came in the form of Jozefow, a Jewish ghetto in Poland. The Battalion was ordered to round up the men in the ghetto and kill all women, children, and elderly on sight. During the executions, a few dozen men were granted release of their execution tasks and were reassigned to guard or truck duty. Others tried to stall as long as possible as not to be assigned to a firing squad. After the executions were completed, the men drank heavily, shaken by their ordeal.

At the end of his book, Browning supplies his theory on 101's actions: it is true that inescapable orders is no defense for the actions, and putative duress does not hold in this case either; instead a combination of authoritative and peer pressure was a powerful coercive tool. First, the Nazi leadership wanted to keep the country's soldiers psychologically healthy, so soldiers were not forced to commit these murders. Throughout the German ranks, nothing negative happened to the soldiers and policemen who refused to join in on a firing squad or Jewish search party. They would simply be assigned other or additional duties, and perhaps to be subjugated to a little verbal abuse (but nothing of substance.) For the officers, no official sanction was given, but it was well-known that being unable to carry out executions was the sign of a "weak" leader, and the officer would be passed for promotions. Second, Major Trapp, the head of Battalion 101, consistently offered protection from committing these actions, even so far as supporting one man who was blatantly and vocally against all practices. He established "ground" rules in which only volunteers were taking on 'Jewish Hunts" and raids.

Browning relies on Milgram's experiments on authority to expand his point. Admitting that Trapp was not a particularly strong authority figure, Browning instead points to the Nazi leadership and the orders of the "highest order" that were handed down. Furthermore, one reason so few men separated themselves from their task was peer pressure--individual policemen did not want to "lose face" in front of their comrades; some argued that it was better to shoot one and quit than to be a coward immediately. Some superior officers treated those who did not want to execute Jews with disdain; on the other hand, those selected for the executions or Jewish hunts were regarded as real "men" and were verbally praised accordingly. For some, refusing their tasks meant that their compatriots would need to carry the burden and the guilt of abandoning their comrades (as well as fear of ostracization) compelled them to kill.

David Goldhagen's book Hitler's Willing Executioners
Goldhagen, disagreeing with Browning's conclusion, decided to write his own book; its release was highly controversial. He argues that the Germans were always anti-Semitic, engaging in a form of "eliminationism". Taking photos of the deceased, going on "Jew-Hunts", death marches near the end of the war, and a general focus on hate (rather than ignorance) are points Goldhagen utilizes in his book.

He does not believe that peer pressure or authoritative pressure are relevant towards the Germans at all. He believes that in order for the policemen in Battalion 101 (and those in similar situations) to kill, they must all be fully committed--no half-heartedness. As he notes,"For that matter, for someone to be pressured into doing something, by peer pressure, everyone else has to want to do it. Peer pressure can, of course, operate on isolated individuals, or small groups, but it depends upon the majority wanting to do it. So the peer pressure argument contradicts itself. If the majority of the people hadn't wanted to kill Jews, then there would have been peer pressure not to do it."Instead, he places a significant emphasis on the German people's anti-Semitism, to the extent of drawing ire from other historians. Browning notes Goldhagen's "uniform portrayal" of Germans, dehumanizing all of the perpetrators without looking at the whole picture. For example, in the town of Niezdow, the Police Battalion executed over a dozen elderly Poles in retailation for the murder of a German policeman. It is less clear, then, if the Germans in the Police Battalion are antagonistic only towards Jews. The German-Canadian historian Ruth Bettina Birn has—in collaboration with Volker Rieß— checked Goldhagen's archival sources from Ludwigsburg. Their findings confirm the arbitrary nature of his selection and evaluation of existing records as opposed to a more holistic combination of primary sources. Furthermore, Konrad Kwiet, a Holocaust historian, argues that Goldhagen's narrow focus on German anti-Semitism has blinded him to other considerations. He points to the massacres of non-Jews as an example: "No light is shed on the motives of “Hitler’s willing executioners” in murdering handicapped people within the so-called “Euthanasia Program”, in liquidating 2.7 million Soviet prisoners of war, in exterminating Romas or in killing hundreds of thousands of other people classified as enemies of the “German People and Nation”. The emphasis on German responsibility allows Goldhagen to push aside the willingness of genocidal killers of other nationalities [such as Latvians] who, recruited from the vast army of indigenous collaborators, were often commissioned with the task of carrying out the ‘dirty work’, such as the murder of women and children, and who, in many cases, surpassed their German masters in their cruelty and spontaneous brutality."

Rwandan Genocide
The Rwandan genocide occurred in 1994, with ethnic violence between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities. The primary belligerents were the Hutu; however, as with most ethnic conflict conflicts, not all Hutu wanted to kill Tutsi. A respondent named Mectilde described the Hutu breakdown as follows: 10% helped, 30% forced, 20% reluctant, and 40% willing. For the willing, a rewards structure was put in place. For the unwilling, a punishment system was in effect. The combination, Professor Bhavnani argues, is a behavioral norm enforced by in-group policing. Instead of the typical peer pressure associated with western high school students, the peer pressure within the Rwandan genocide, where Tutsi and Hutu have inter-married, worked under coercion. Property destruction, rape, incarceration, and death faced the Hutu who were unwillingly to commit to the genocide or protected the Tutsi from violence.

When looking at a sample community of 3426 in the village of Tare during the genocide, McDoom found that neighborhoods and familial structures as important micro-spaces that helped determine if an individual would participate in violence. Proximity increases the likelihood of social interaction and influence. Starting at a set point (such as the home of a "mobilizing" agent for the Hutu), the proportion of convicts living in a 100m radius of a resident is almost twice as many for convicts as for non-convicts. As the radius increases, so does the proportion decrease. This data hints "social influence" at play. Looking at neighborhoods, an individual is 4% more likely to join the genocide for every single percentage point increase in the proportion of convicted perpetrators living within a 100m radius. Looking at familial structures, for any individual, each percentage point increase in the proportion of genocide participants in the individual's household increases his chances of joining the violence by 21 to 25%.

Of course, the complete situation is a little more nuanced. The extreme control of citizens' daily lives by the government in social affairs facilitated the rapidity of the genocide's spread and broke down the resolve of some who initially wanted no part. First, prior to the genocide, Rwandans' sense of discipline was introduced and reinforced through weekly umuganda (collective work) sessions, involving praise for the regime and its leaders and a host of collective activities for the community. Respect for authority and the fear of stepping out of line were strong cultural values of pre-genocide Rwanda and so were included in these activities. Second, their value of social conformity only increased in the decades leading up to the genocide in both social and political manners. Peasants were told exactly when and what to farm and could be fined given any lack of compliance. These factors helped to drive the killing's fast pace.

Most importantly, there were already ethnic tensions among the groups for a variety of reasons: conflicts over land allocation (farming versus pasture) and declining prices of Rwanda's main export: coffee. These problems combined with a history of previously existing conflict. With the introduction of the Second Republic under Habyarimana, former Tutsis in power were immediately purged, and racism served as an explanation as keeping the majority Hutu in legitimate government power. As a result, when the war came, the Hutu were already introduced to the the concept of racism against their very own peers.

The division in Rwanda was reinforced for hundreds of years. King Kigeli IV, a Tutsi, centralized Rwandan power in the 1800s, just in time for German colonization. The Germans furthered the message of distinct races, allowing Tutsi men to remain the leaders in the society. A combination of centuries-long animosity and deteriorating economic and social situations within the country simply brought the violence to the forefront. Peer pressure was a strong tool in facilitating the killings, especially given the strong culture of obeying authority within society.

In Software Development
Agile software development is a relatively new software development methodology involving a focus on people rather than processes, features rather than tasks, continuous rather than formal communication, and continuous rather than one-time customer involvement. In agile development, one important characteristic is the focus on peer development. Used correctly by management, this focus on teamwork can reinforce correct work through positive and negative mechanisms (rewards vs. sanctions.)

Code reviews, where one developer invites one or more of her peers to review the written code before it is put into production, can make sure that developers are not producing incorrect and sloppy code. Automated testing and continuous integration with the project can highlight deficiencies and provoke an increase in work quality. However, this form of peer pressure should be balanced accordingly. Developers who have low esteem but are performing well can feel inadequate in a transparent environment, while other developers can form large egos.

Scrum meetings are a good example of the positive results of successful agile management. These meetings include all developers and the project manager. During these scrum meetings, developers can talk about what they accomplished the previous day. Group recognition (informal awards,) the positive side of peer pressure, can manifest as a result when a developer fixed a critical bug or released an important feature. On the other hand, for the individuals who did not work hard, their statements during scrum will likely be short; peer pressure (group judgment) forces these employees to work harder and ask for help if necessary.

Agile teams are much like a self-managing team, where internal forces and peer pressure within the team direct the day-to-day activities. In the case of agile, there is a still a formal manager, but he might play a less vocal role in decisions. Agile teams are structured so that the project manager does less work managing (since there is already peer pressure as a control system in place) and more time with the business clients.

In Education
In schools, peer pressure is a manifestation of informal accountability pressure. Principals who had a strong rapport with their teachers and engaged in mutually respectful conversations were able to leverage their relationships with teachers through peer pressure--the teacher does not want to disappoint the principal and let her down. Similarly, principals who served as strong "instructional" leaders and introduced new curricula and academic programs were able to create a system of peer pressure at the teaching level, where the teachers placed accountability pressure on themselves.

Regarding Voting
Peer pressure can be especially effective (more so than door-to-door visits and telephone calls) in getting people to vote. Gerber, Green, and Larimer conducted a large-scale field experiment involving over 180,000 Michigan households in 2006 and four treatments: one was a reminder to vote, one was a reminder to vote and a note informing them that they were being studied, one that listed the voting records for all potential household individuals, and finally one that listed the voting records for the household individuals and their neighbors. The final treatment emphasized peer pressure within a neighborhood; neighbors could view each other's voting habits with the lists, and so the social norm of "voting is best for the community" is combined with the fear that individuals' peers would judge their lack of voting. Compared to a baseline rate of 29.7% (only the voting reminder), the treatment that utilized peer pressure increased the percentage of household voters by 8.1% (to 37.8%), which exceeds the value of in-person canvassing and personalized phone calls.

For Charitable Donations
A study completed by Jonathan Meer of Texas A&M University found that social ties and race play a significant role in both the existence of a donation and its size. June was the month where most personal donations to an unnamed university were made. For this month, Meer found that if a solicitor was a freshman roommate of a potential donor, the latter was 2.2% more likely to donate to the school; off of a baseline donation rate of 26%, this is not insignificant. Furthermore, if the solicitor and a random potential donor had very similar experiences in school, the donation is much more likely. On the other hand, mix-matches in race, social clubs, and academic standing reduced the chance of donation. This provides a nuanced approach to peer pressure and school charity: the effect of peer pressure is very strong when the solicitor and the donor share similar college circumstances and is rather low when there are situational mismatches.

Regarding Neural Mechanisms
From a purely neurological perspective, the medial pre-frontal cortex (mPFC) and the striatum play an important role in figuring out the value of specific actions. The mPFC is active when determining "socially tagged" objects, which are objects that peers have expressed an opinion about; the striatum is significant for determining the value of these "socially tagged" objects and rewards in general. An experiment performed by Mason et. al utilizing fMRI scans analyzed individuals who were assigned to indicate if a chosen symbol appeared consecutively. The researchers did not tell the subjects the real purpose of the experiment, which was to collect data regarding mPFC and striatum stimulation. Before the actual experiment began, the subjects were subject to a phase of "social" influence, where they learned which symbols were preferred by other subjects of completed the experiment (while in actuality these other subjects did not exist.) Mason et. al found that determining an object's social value/significance is dependent on combined information from the mPFC and the striatum [along the lines denoted in the beginning of the paragraph.] Without both present and functional, it would be difficult to determine the value of action based upon social circumstances..

A similar experiment was conducted by Stallen, Smidts, and Sanfrey. Twenty-four subjects were manipulated using a minimal group paradigm approach. Unbeknownst to them, they were all selected as part of the "in-group", although there was an established "out-group". Following this socialization, the subjects estimated the number of dots seen on the screen while given information about what an in-group or out-group member chose. Participants were more likely to conform to in-group decisions as compared to out-group ones. The experiment confirmed the importance of the striatum in social influence, suggesting that conformity with the in-group is mediated with a fundamental value signal--rewards. In other wards, the brain associates social inclusion with positive reward. The posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), which is associated with perspective taking, appeared to be active as well, which correlated with patients' self-reports of in-group trustworthiness.

In adolescence, risk-taking appears to increase dramatically. Researchers conducted an experiment with adolescent males who were of driving age and measured their risk-taking depending on whether a passenger (a peer of the same age) was in the car. A driving simulation was created, and certain risky scenarios, such as a decaying yellow light as the car was approaching, were modeled and presented to the subjects. Those who were most likely to take risks in the presence of peers (but took fewer risks when there were no passengers) had greater brain activity in the social-cognitive and social-affective brain systems during solo activity (no passengers.) The social-cognitive aspect refers to the ability to gauge what others are thinking and is primarily controlled by the mPFC, right temporal parietal junction, and the posterior cingulate cortex. The social-affective aspect relates to the reward system for committing actions that are accepted or rejected by other people. One side of the reward system is "social pain", which refers to the emotional pain felt by individual due to group repudiation and is associated with heightened activity in the anterior insula and the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex.