User:Rinye/sandbox

=Blair Doctrine= The Blair Doctrine refers to the statement which was spoken before the Chicago Economic Club on April 22, 1999, by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

At the height of the crisis in Kosovo, then British Prime Minister Tony Blair addressed the Chicago Economic Club, giving what became the famous "Doctrine of International Community" speech. He laid out six principles for a doctrine of international community and its institutions: reform of the system of international financial regulation; a new push on free trade in the WTO; a reconsideration of the workings of the UN; a critical examination of NATO; greater cooperation on meeting the targets of Kyoto; and scrutiny into the issue of third world debt. Speaking on globalization, economics, politics, and security, and giving particular attention to the criteria for when to undertake military intervention, he declared: "We are all internationalist now, whether we like it or not."

The speech was divided into five parts. The opening part was on 'the unspeakable things' then happening in Kosovo. In the second part, Blair explored the concept of globalization and used it to frame his opinion that interdependence was a fact of the modern world and that coping with its forces and effects was the major challenge now facing states. 'We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not, he claimed. The third part concentrated on the economic aspects of globalization and -perceptively given the current economic downturn- set out the case for major global reforms via more transparency, regulation, and supervision. In the fourth, best-remembered and most heavily briefed part, Blair applied these principles of international community to international security. He reiterated the threats both Saddam Hussein and Milosevic posed to international order and called for NATO to maintain its credibility by standing firm over Kosovo, which would 'ensure that others do not make the same mistake in the future'. Blair did not write his principles of military intervention in stone but put them out there as  'the kind of issues we need to think about in deciding in the future when and whether we will intervene' .

Blair went on to list five major considerations which might help in decisions on 'when and whether to intervene':

'' 'First, are we sure of our case? War is an imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress, but armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing with dictators. Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? We should always give peace every chance, as we have in the case of Kosovo. Third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term? In past we talked too much of exit strategies. But having made a commitment we cannot simply walk away once the fight is over; better to stay with moderate numbers of troops than return for repeat performances with large numbers. And finally, do we have national interests involved? The mass expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo demanded the notice of the rest of the world. But it does make a difference that this is taking place in such a combustible part of Europe. I am not suggesting that these are absolute tests. But they are the kind of issues we need to think about in deciding in the future when and whether we will intervene.' ''

The phrase Blair Doctrine has been used by the media to signify the belief that force can be harnessed for good ends: in other words, to enhance security and build democracy.

Blair responded to the events by further elaborating his doctrine of international community, defending a progressive view of the world starting from the reality of interdependence in the age of globalization, and acting according to certain values, equal to strategic interests.

=Criticism= This Blair Doctrine, however, relies excessively on consequentialist reasoning and, as a result, collapses into realism. It thus provides a timely reminder of the important role of deontological and virtue theoretical considerations in constraining consequentialist thinking in the moral assessment of the war.

In 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) took serious issue with Blairite language about the 'right to intervene on humanitarian grounds' by arguing, first, that it privileges the actions and needs of those doing the intervening as opposed to those affected by those actions; second, that it foregrounds the act of intervention as opposed to the preventive  and post-intervention efforts that make for a successful intervention; and third,  that sovereignty is trumped by intervention in discursive terms at the outset, so that any opposition to the proposed intervention can be delegitimized as 'anti-humanitarian'.

=Further Reading= • Tony, Blair. "Doctrine of the international community: Ten years later." Yale J. Int'l Aff. 4 (2009): 5.

=References=