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Diplomatic history of World War I
old version title was Diplomatic history of the First World War

Draft outline

Goals
USED In 1914 both sides expected quick victory and had not formulated long-term goals. The stalemate by the end of 1914 forced serious consideration of long-term goals. Issues such as slices of territory or overseas colonies or reparations mattered little. Britain, France, Russia and Germany all separately concluded this was not a traditional war with limited goals. Britain, France and Russia became committed to the destruction of German military power, and Germany to the dominance of German military power. One month into the war, Britain, France and Russia agreed not to make a separate peace with Germany, But Russia did not fully trust its allies, nor vice versa. There was no serious three-way coordination of strategy, nor A clear-cut two-way understanding between Britain and France.

Petrie
[text ok] in Questia: Petrie, Charles. Diplomatic History, 1713-1933 (1946) online; detailed summary
 * The Four Years’ War, 1914-1918 .... 312
 * Diplomacy and War.
 * The Two Camps.
 * Turkey Joins the Central Powers.
 * Russia promised Constantinople.
 * Italy and the Allies. The Treaty of London.
 * Bulgaria joins the Central Powers.
 * The Problems of the Near East.
 * Peace Proposals and Suggestions.
 * The Mission of Sixte of Bourbon-Parma.
 * Anglo-French offer to Austria-Hungary.
 * Allied Opinion Hardens.
 * Lloyd George’s Speech.
 * Wilson’s Fourteen Points.
 * Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest.
 * Collapse of the Central Powers.
 * The Armistice.

Great Britain
ADDED British diplomacy during the war focused on new initiatives in cooperation with the leading allies, promote propaganda efforts with neutrals, and initiatives to undermine the German economy, especially through a naval blockade. In 1915, an Allied conference began operations in Paris to coordinate financial support for allies, munitions productions, and rationing of raw materials to neutrals who might otherwise reship them to Germany. A blacklist was established in December, followed in Early 1916 by an Allied Shipping Control Commission, and a [[ministry of blockade[[ in Britain.

Arabs & Jews

 * Balfour Declaration

Blockade of Germany
The Blockade of Germany By the Royal Navy was a highly effective technique to prevent Germans from importing food, raw materials, and other supplies. It repeatedly violated neutral rights, and the United States repeatedly objected. British diplomacy had to deal with that crisis.

British cites

 * Cassar, George H. Lloyd George at War, 1916-1918 (2009) full text online at JSTOR; |lang_fr&id=W5F4I6gG94YC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=+Cassar,+George+H.++%27&ots=wTGhUljfdA&sig=fAmoM0NIlMKovjm9obE31aRDo2g#v=onepage&q=Cassar%2C%20George%20H.%20%20'&f=false excerpts
 * Egerton, George W. Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 1914-1919 (1978) online
 * French, David. British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986)
 * French, David. The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918 (1995) online
 * Grigg, John. Lloyd George: War leader, 1916–1918 (2002),
 * Hayes, Paul. Modern British foreign policy: The 20th century 1880 – 1939 (1978), pp, 177-222
 * Hinsley, Francis H, ed. British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey (1977)
 * Johnson, Gaynor. Lord Robert Cecil: politician and internationalist (Routledge, 2016).
 * Lowe, C.J. and M.L. Dockrill. The Mirage of Power: British Foreign Policy 1914-22 (vol 2 1972) pp 169-423
 * Lowe, C.J. and M.L. Dockrill, eds. The Mirage of Power: The Documents of British Foreign Policy 1914-22 (vol 3, 1972), pp 423-759
 * Rothwell, Victor. British war aims and peace diplomacy, 1914-1918. (Oxford UP, 1971). https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000401825
 * Taylor, A. J. P. English History, 1914–1945 (1965) pp 1-125
 * Weigall, David. Britain and the World: 1815-1986: A dictionary of international relations (1986)

Economics

 * Adams, R. J. Q. "Delivering the Goods: Reappaising the Ministry of Munitions: 1915–1916." Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies (1975) 7#3 pp: 232–244  in JSTOR
 * Adams, R. J. Q. Arms and the Wizard: Lloyd George and the Ministry of Munitions. (1978)
 * Ashworth, William. An Economic History of England, 1870–1939 (1960)
 * As available from Archive.org.
 * Barnett, Margaret. British food policy during the First World War (Routledge, 2014)
 * Hancock, W.K. and M. M. Gowing. British War Economy (1949) pp 3–40 covers WWI
 * Whetham, Edith H. The Agrarian History of England and Wales: Volume VIII: 1914–39 (Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp 70–123
 * Whetham, Edith H. The Agrarian History of England and Wales: Volume VIII: 1914–39 (Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp 70–123

France
copy 3-23-17 FROM History of French foreign relations

First World War
After Socialist leader Jean Jaurès. a pacifist, was assassinated at the start of the war, the French socialist movement abandoned its antimilitarist positions and joined the national war effort. The labor unions supported the war. Prime Minister Rene Viviani called for unity—for a "Union sacrée" ("Sacred Union")--Which was a wartime truce between the right and left factions that had been fighting bitterly. France had few dissenters. However, war-weariness was a major factor by 1917, even reaching the army.

The French Right supported the war, emphasizing the deep spiritual value of "the Union Sacrée." The middle-of-the-road Radicals split--one wing wanted a compromise peace. By winter 1916-17 strong annexationist demands emerged on the right, calling for annexation of Germany's Saar basin to France and the creation of independent German states on the left bank of the Rhine.

In 1914 London and Paris agreed that financially Britain would support the weaker Allies and that France would take care of itself. there was no common financial policy. French credit collapsed in 1916 and Britain took full control of the failing Allied finances and began loaning large sums to Paris. The J. P. Morgan bank in New York assumed control of French loans in the fall of 1916 and relinquished it to the US government when the U,S, entered the war in 1917.

In 1917 the Russian Revolution ended the Franco-Russian alliance, and French policy changed. It joined Britain sending forces against the Bolsheviks and in support of the "white" counter-revolutionaries. Paris gave active support to the Southern Slav unionist movement and to the Czech and Polish claims for independence. Serbia, was a loyal ally of France throughout World War I. Serbia was highly appreciative of French financial and material aid before its collapse in 1915 as well as funding the Serbian government in exile. There was popular support in France for Serbia as seen in taking in refugees and educating students. France took part in the armed liberation of Serbia, Montenegro, and Vojvodina in 1918. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 France strongly, strongly supported the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It became and in the 1920s and 1930s Yugoslavia helped France by opposing German ambitions in the Balkans.

rj drafts
copy 3-23-17 to History of French foreign relations Factions = The Right supported the war, the Union Sacrée and aimed at victory. The extreme Right = militantly annexationist and ok's government coalition. The Left had some pacifism. Radicals split--one wing wanted a compromise peace. Socialists had much pacifism & opposition to the government. The labor unions generally moderate. (AN: 46452635)\ Finance In 1914 London & Paris agreed that Britain would support the weaker Allies and that France would take care of itself. there was no common financial policy. French credit collapsed in 1916 & Britain took full control of the failing Allied finances. J. P. Morgan assumed control in the fall of 1916 and relinquished it to the US government when America entered the war in 1917. ?? re Britain subsidized the Allies. Horn points to French finance minister Alexandre Ribot who wanted closer money ties with Britain but the differences in monetary methods & British Treasury's unwillingness to share authority, and Ribot's own inability to develop a useful plan of cooperation led to his failure. * Horn, Martin. "External Finance in Anglo-French Relations in the First World War, 1914–1917." The International History Review 17.1 (1995): 51-77.

war aimsPierre Renouvin, Pierre. three stages of policy development: 1) 1914- July 1916, = no official policy; 2) July 1916-March 1917, planning results the extensive program of January 1917 but it was soon upset by events; and 3) March 1917-November 1918, a new limited program. 1-2-3 all demanded Alsace-Lorraine without plebiscite. In winter 1916-17 some strong annexationist demands, for the Saar basin to France and the creation of independent German states on the left bank of the Rhine. (AN: 46630399) On 18 July 1916 the French Government signed a contract with the American Foreign Securities Company for the flotation of a loan of 100 million dollars to run from 1 August 1916 to 31 July 1919 at seven and one-fourth percent interest due the first day of February and August. This contract represented the culmination of six months of arduous negotiations conducted for France by Octave Hornberg, director of the French financial mission in the United States since its creation in October 1915, and his American opposite Arthur M. Anderson, vice president of the American Foreign Securities Company. Already the Anglo-French loan of 500 million dollars of October 1915 had met with difficulties in the United States. In 1916 American hesitations had been manifold: American bankers were dubious about the future financial strength of the French State and were apprehensive about the possibility of a Mexican-American war; and the Morgan bank insisted on its position as sole agent between American investors and the French Government.Also the U. S. Government became increasingly concerned over too close financial ties between American investors and the French Government. In the United States the loan had only "mediocre success," thus showing that American financial circles did not share the Francophilia of American public opinion. (AN: 45872845)
 * Russia in 1917 Russian Revolution ended the Franco-Russian alliance, French policy changed. It intervened against the Bolsheviks, and gave active support to the Southern Slav unionist movement and to the Czech and Polish claims for independence. (AN: 46506528)
 * Serbia was highly appreciative of French financial and material aid before the collapse in 1915 as well as funding the Serbian government in exile. Those popular support in France for Serbia as seen in taking in refugees and educating students. France took part in the armed liberation of Serbia, Montenegro, and Vojvodina in 1918. At paris 1919 it strongly, strongly supported the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Serbia, was a loyal ally of France throughout World War I. After the war Yugoslavis helped France by opposing German ambitions in the Balkans. (AN: 46206055); France was highly annoyed at Italy's treatment of Serbia, esp re the evacuation of Serb soldiers from Albania. AN: 46296540)

France: Cites

 * Bernard, Philippe, and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, 1914–1938 (1988) pp 3-82.
 * Brecher, F.W. "French policy toward the Levant 1914-18." Middle Eastern Studies (1993) 29#4 French and British discussions on setting spheres of influence in the region began in 1915 and led to the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
 * Greenhalgh, Elizabeth. Victory through Coalition: Britain & France during the First World War. 2006, 304p
 * Hanks, Robert K. "‘Generalissimo’ or ‘Skunk’? The Impact of Georges Clemenceau's Leadership on the Western Alliance in 1918." French History (2010) 24#2 pp 197-217. The winter of 1917-18 marked a nadir in Allied morale. To address this problem, Lloyd George issued a liberal war aims speech on 5 January 1918. Three days later Wilson set forth his Fourteen Points. Despite his historical image as a French nationalist, his personal knowledge of the Anglo-American world and strong leadership played a key role in bolstering the alliance during the nadir. His methods exacerbated inter-Allied controversies over strategy and war aims.


 * Schuman, Frederick. War And Diplomacy In The French Republic (1931) online
 * Stevenson, David. French War Aims Against Germany, 1914–1919 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). The best and most detailed book on French war aims
 * Stevenson, David. "French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918" Historical Journal 22#4 (1979) pp. 877-894 in JSTOR
 * Stevenson, David. "French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918" Historical Journal 22#4 (1979) pp. 877-894 in JSTOR

Russia
Fry, Michael G. "Britain, the Allies and the Problem of Russia 1918-1919." Canadian Journal of History 2.2 (1967): 62-84. Allies deeply divided re Russia --> no agreed policy. Lloyd George took conciliatory approach, and his Cabinet agreed to bring all the Russian factions invited to the peace conference. Clemenceau said no Bolsheviks could come to Paris. American Robert Lansing wanted to destroy them. on three occasions in 1919 Churchill resurrected the idea of armed intervention, against the will of the Cabinet majority.
 * Sergei Sazonov, Foreign Minister
 * Jelavich, Barbara. St. Petersburg and Moscow: tsarist and Soviet foreign policy, 1814-1974 (1974).
 * Phillips, Steve. Lenin and the Russian Revolution (2000) 177pp; Short textbook
 * L. C. F. Turner, "The Russian Mobilization in 1914" Journal of Contemporary History (1968) 3#1 65-88 in JSTOR.

Serbia

 * Fryer, Charles. The destruction of Serbia in 1915. No. 488. Columbia University Press, 1997.
 * Strachan, Hew. The First World War: Volume I: To Arms. (2003)
 * DiNardo, Richard L. "he Limits of Technology: he Invasion of Serbia, 1915." Journal of Military History 79.4 (2015). The invasion of Serbia in October 1915 saw the Serbian army, which had fought off three separate invasions by Austria-Hungary the year before, driven out of Serbia within six weeks. A critical land route to Turkey and Bulgaria was opened, and Austria-Hungary...
 * Andrej Mitrovic (Serbia's Great War 1914-1918 (2007)

by Andrej Mitrovic (Author)
 * Jowett, Philip S., and Balkan Wars. "Serbia in World War I." War in the Balkans: 277. ??

ADDED Romania
ex "Romania during World War I" Romania entered the war in an attempt to seize Transylvania, a region with majority Romanian population, from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Despite initial successes, the Romanian forces (aided by Russia) suffered several setbacks, and by the end of 1916 only Moldavia remained under Allied control. After several defensive victories in 1917, with Russia's withdrawal from the war following the October Revolution, Romania, almost completely surrounded by the Central Powers, was also forced to drop out of the war; it signed the Treaty of Bucharest with the Central Powers in May 1918. On 10 November 1918, just one day before the German armistice and after all the other Central Powers had already capitulated, Romania re-entered the war. By then, about 220,000 Romanian soldiers had been killed, about 6% of total Entente military deaths.
 * Torrey, Glenn E. "Romania in the First World War: The Years of Engagement, 1916-1918", The International History Review 14, 3 (1992): 462–79.

Poland
Mankoff, Jeffrey. "The future of Poland, 1914–1917: France and Great Britain in the Triple Entente." International History Review 30.4 (2008): 741-767. France especially and also Britain saw Poland in sympathetic terms. Much more important was the need to mollify Russia which controlled half of Poland And wanted the rest. By late 1916 France was ready to support Russian annexation of Austrian- and German- Poland. in exchange for Russian support of France taking the Rhineland. Britain Agreed with France. The February Revolution in 1917 changed everything, putting the focus on Polish independence.

The declaration of Grand Duke Nicholas on 14 August 1914, promising Poland peace, a renewal of freedom of religion and language, and self-government, ambiguous as it was, satisfied the French government. French policy, guided by the prudent Ambassador Paléologue did not favor independence, seeking rather the military support of Russia& support for Alsace-Lorraine. Briand yielded to Russian requests of March 1917. However t& GB freedom to support Poland (AN: 46083582)

Japan added to Wiki 4-4-17
copy ex "Taishō period " on 3-16-17

Japan joined the Allies, seized German holdings, cut deals with Russia and put heavy pressure China in order to expand.

The Twenty-One Demands} on the new and fragile Republic of China included control over former German holdings, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, as well as joint ownership of a major mining and metallurgical complex in central China, prohibitions on China's ceding or leasing any coastal areas to a third power, and other political, economic and military controls. The result was intended to reduce China to a Japanese protectorate. In the face of slow negotiations with the Chinese government, widespread anti-Japanese sentiment in China and international condemnation forced Japan to withdraw the final group of demands and treaties were signed in May 1915.

Japan's hegemony in northern China and other parts of Asia was facilitated through other international agreements. One with Russia in 1916 helped further secure Japan's influence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and agreements with France, Britain, and the United States in 1917 recognized Japan's territorial gains in China and the Pacific. The Nishihara Loans (named after Nishihara Kamezo, Tokyo's representative in Beijing) of 1917 and 1918, while aiding the Chinese government, put China still deeper into Japan's debt. Toward the end of the war, Japan increasingly filled orders for its European allies' needed war material, thus helping to diversify the country's industry, increase its exports, and transform Japan from a debtor to a creditor nation for the first time.

After Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in late 1917 the Japanese army planned to occupy Siberia as far west as Lake Baikal. After getting China to allow transit right more than 70,000 Japanese troops joined the much smaller units of the Allied expeditionary force sent to Siberia in July 1918 as part of the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War. On November 2, 1917, the Lansing–Ishii Agreement noted American recognition of Japan's interests in China and pledges of keeping an "Open Door Policy".

Cites

 * Akagi, Roy Hidemichi. Japan's Foreign Relations 1542-1936: A Short History (1979) online pp 306-350
 * Dickinson, Frederick R. War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919 (Harvard Univ Asia Center, 1999).
 * Duus, Peter, ed. The Cambridge history of Japan: The twentieth century (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
 * p 280 states Allies wanted troops in Europe. Instead Tokyo sent convoy-escort destroyers to the Mediterranean and hunted German raiders in the Pacific and Indian oceans. Its concentrated on expanding its sphere of influence in the Pacific.
 * Kawamura Noriko. Turbulence in the Pacific: Japanese-U.S. Relations During World War I  (2000) excerpt; online at Questia
 * Saxon, Timothy D. "Anglo-Japanese Naval Cooperation, 1914–1918." Naval War College Review, 53, 1 (2000): 62–92.
 * Sōchi, Naraoka. "Japan’s First World War-Era Diplomacy, 1914–15." in Best, Antony, and Oliviero Frattolillo, eds. Japan and the Great War (Springer, 2015). 35+ copy
 * Strachan, Hew. The First World War: Volume I: To Arms (Oxford University Press, 2003) 455-94.

China
Japanese and British military forces in 1914 liquidated Germany's holdings in China. Japan occupied the German military colony in Qingdao, and occupied portions of Shandong Province. China was financially chaotic, highly unstable politically, and militarily very weak. Its best hope was to attend the postwar peace conference, and hope to find friends would help block the threats of Japanese expansion. China declared war on Germany in August 1917 as a technicality to make it eligible to attend the postwar peace conference. They planned to send a combat unit to the Western Front, but never did so. British diplomats were afraid that the U.S. and Japan would displace Britain's leadership role in the Chinese economy. They sought to play Japan and the United States against each other, while at the same time maintaining cooperation among all three nations against Germany.

In January 1915, Japan secretly issued an ultimatum of Twenty-One Demands to the Chinese government. They included Japanese control of former German rights, 99 year leases in southern Manchuria, an interest in steel mills, and concessions regarding railways. China did have a seat at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. However it was denied a  return of the former German concessions and China had to accept the Twenty-One demands. A major reaction to this humiliation was a surge in Chinese nationalism expressed in the May Fourth Movement.


 * Schmidt, Hans. "Democracy for China: American propaganda and the May Fourth movement." Diplomatic History 22.1 (1998): 1-28. Nationalism had become prevalent among activists across Chine but after 4 May it was marked by anti-Western feeling. US commitment to self-determination was fleeting, while in China the notion had a more lasting impact.
 * Xu, Guoqi. "The Great War and China's military expedition plan." The Journal of Military History 72.1 (2008): 105-140.

Central powers
{{further|History of Germany during World War I

Germany

 * Brandenburg, Erich. From Bismarck to the World War: A History of German Foreign Policy 1870-1914 (1927) online free; revisionist on causes
 * Herwig, Holger H. The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (1997) ch 4-6
 * Jarausch, Konrad H. The enigmatic chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the hubris of imperial Germany. Yale University Press, 1972.
 * Jarausch, Konrad H. "Revising German History: Bethmann Hollweg Revisited." Central European History 21.03 (1988): 224-243.
 * Kaiser, David E. "Germany and the origins of the First World War." The Journal of Modern History 55.3 (1983): 442-474.
 * Silberstein, Gerald E. Tthe troubled alliance: German-Austrian relations 1914-1917 1970
 * Trumpener ''Germany, and the Ottoman Empire
 * Watson, Alexander. Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I (2014).

Strachan argues that the decision to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 actually save the allies, for brought the United States into the war. The German high command was making all of the decisions, and ignored economic and financial factors. Victory met conquest by land and sea and straightforward military fashion. They did not realize that Britain was bankrupt and the ally economic system was on the verge of collapse. Strachan p 975

Austria
Weber, Frank G. Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the diplomacy of the Turkish alliance, 1914-1918. Cornell University Press, 1970.
 * Bridge, F.R. From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary 1866–1914 (1972) review
 * Deak, John. "The Great War and the Forgotten Realm: The Habsburg Monarchy and the First World War" Journal of Modern History (2014) 86#2 pp: 336–380.
 * Herwig, Holger H. The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (1997) ch 4-6
 * King, L. "The Passing Of The Hapsburg Empire." Contemporary Review. 1968, Vol. 213 Issue 1229, p320-325. New Emperor [[Charles I of Austria] opened secret negotiations with Britain and France in 1916, but Allied insistance on Austrian recognition of Italian claims rendered these discussions nugatory. Allied attitude to Austria hardened after Brest-Litovsk, and ethnics took advantage of Wilson's Fourteen Points and Imperial weakness.


 * Watson, Alexander. Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I (2014).


 * Wargelin, Clifford F. "The Austro-Polish Solution: Diplomacy, Politics, and State Building in Wartime Austria-Hungary 1914-1918" East European Quarterly,'' Vol. 42, No. 3, Fall 2008

HORČIČKA, Václav. Austria-Hungary, Unrestricted Submarine Warfare, and the United States' Entrance into the First World War. International History Review .. Jun2012, Vol. 24 Issue 2, p245-269. 25p. Historical Period: 1914 to 1918. Abstract: This study shows that Austro-Hungarian policy toward the United States of America was in winter 1917 not primarily dictated by its German ally but by the sober evaluation of its own interests. The separate peace, which was offered by the Wilson administration, was not a realistic foreign-policy option for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Therefore, this article shows why Austria-Hungary did not accept US peace feelers. On the other hand, it also demonstrates that in the winter of 1917 Washington did not treat Germany and Austria-Hungary as equals, with the latter being in a better position. But the monarchy's acceptance of the German course in the submarine war strengthened the perception of the monarchy as an appendage of the stronger Germany in the United States, and finally caused great damage to its reputation across the Atlantic.

Ottoman Empire
The Ottoman Empire (Turkey) had never joined one of the two alliances, but it decided in July 1914 to join Germany, and signed a treaty on August 2. Been able to German heavy cruisers to use Constantinople as a base. In October, they attacked Russian fortifications on the Black Sea. The Allies declared war. Much of the diplomacy of the war among the Allies Involve plans to divide up The Empire after victory was achieved. A series of secret agreements split up the prize 11 ways, with shares to Russia, Britain, France, Italy, international control, and promises for an Arab state, and a Jewish homeland. In 1916 France and Britain used the Sykes-Picot agreement to assigned zones of control;that agreement is often cited but never actually took effect. . The confusion over boundaries and religious minorities has had explosive repercussions for over a century.

cites

 * Hurwitz, J.C. ed. Diplomacy In The Near And Middle East, V2: A Documentary Record, 1914-1956 (2011)
 * Johnson, Rob. The Great War and the Middle East (Oxford UP, 2016).
 * Kent, Marian, ed. The Great Powers and the end of the Ottoman Empire (Routledge, 2005).
 * Miller, Geoffrey. "Turkey Enters the War and British Actions". December 1999.
 * Silberstein, Gerard E. "The Central Powers and the Second Turkish Alliance, 1915." Slavic Review 24.1 (1965): 77-89. in JSTOR
 * Strachan, Hew. The First World War: Volume I: To Arms (Oxford UP, 2003) pp 644-93.
 * Trumpener. Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918 (1968) enter*Frank G Weber, eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the diplomacy of the Turkish alliance, 1914-1918 (1970)

United States
Historians are of two minds on the matter – one school led by Arthur Link emphasizes the dominant role of Woodrow Wilson, arguing that he was able to transcend public opinion & interest group pressures. The second approach common in recent diplomatic history, emphasizes foreign policy as largely a product of a calculus of internal forces, including ethnic groups, in the economic groups, ideological groups such as pacifists and socialists. Wilson denounced militarism and promoted democracy;

Neutrality policy
Wilson distrusted professional diplomats; Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan appointed deserving Democrats on a partisan basis, despite their lack of diplomatic experience and lack of family resources to deal with the upper class diplomats in foreign capitals. Dealing with Asian Wilson rejected the dollar diplomacy of president Taft, that emphasized private investment in China and Asia generally. Wilson withdrew from an international Chinese consortium, and helped China modify Japan's 21 demands of 1915. Wilson's first term concentrated his focus on to crises, the Civil War in Mexico, and the first world war. He sent American troops to chase down Poncho villa – they failed to find him – and he sent the Navy to invade Veracruz, Mexico. After Mexico rejected the Zimmerman note in early 1917, relations with Mexico and the United States dramatically improved, and Wilson recalled Persian Pershing's invasion force. The net result was a high degree of anti-Americanism for decades in Mexico. Wilson declared neutrality as soon as the war broke out in Europe, and the State Department concentrated on bringing home over hundred thousand American tourists and businessmen. The heavy flow of immigration to the United States practically stopped. The neutrality policy had several dimensions. On the one hand United States insisted on its right to trade with the belligerents. Britain’s Royal Navy control the seas, and blockaded Germany. There was virtually no trade with Germany, but a rapidly increasing trade with Britain in terms of food, raw materials, chemicals, and steel. The United States manufactured human missions and they were not at issue. In a broad sense, American policy since the American Revolution had emphasized that free trade promotes peaceful relationships, and it was repeatedly annoyed by British efforts to examine American shipping a block potential exports to Germany. The dominant American Outlook assumed human reasonableness, and assumed that all disputes could be settled without warfare. The most prominent exponent of this position was industrialist Henry Ford. The British restrictions included the declaration that nearly all commodities were illegal contraband, they tightly controlled American exports to neutral countries such as the Netherlands to prevent re-exports; they search. Neutral merchant ships; they blacklisted American firms trading with Germany. Wilson ministration repeatedly protested, the Britain said it was a battle for survival. The British never sank American ships are killed American passengers. Britain made extensive propaganda efforts of the United States. The British emphasized German militarism and atrocities, especially in Belgium in 1914, and its violation of international law by sinking the British liner the Lusitania in 1915, killing 1200 passengers, including hundred and 28 Americans. International law required submarines to allow the passengers to board lifeboats before firing torpedoes. The German U-boat fired without warning, the Lusitania sank in 20 minutes. American public opinion was outraged, giving strong momentum to the British propaganda effort and undercutting the feeble explanations the Germans were making. Wilson protested the sinking of passenger ships vehemently, and forced Germany to agree not to target them. When Germany broke that agreement in early 1917, war became inevitable.

German propaganda efforts were poorly done, and ineffective in shaping American opinion. Berlin sent desperate notch agents who tried to sabotage American shipping, with scant results. The top German espionage agent in the United States stuffed his briefcase with secret documents, then accidentally left it on the New York subway. Very few Americans spoke out on behalf of Germany. The German-American community gave Berlin very little support, and strongly counseled neutrality. The German Americans comprised of very large element in every major city, and across the rural Midwest, but was poorly organized, had few major politicians in office, and this message seldom reach the broader American public. The Irish Catholic community, on the other hand, was very well organized and articulate and a major power inside the Democratic Party in most large cities. The Irish did not favor Germany, but they strongly opposed Britain, and lobbied intensively to keep the United States neutral. Most Protestant churches and women's organizations have significant pacifist element, and demanded American neutrality. Wilson generally ignored these pressures, and in 1917, told the pacifist that if they really wanted permanent peace, they had to support this “war to end all wars.”

The British appeal resonated broadly among more cosmopolitan Americans, and the business class. The leading New York bank J.P. Morgan was also a leading London bank, and is organized and facilitated large-scale loans so that Britain could buy supplies in the United States. That was legal, but by 1916 the Federal Reserve was imposing restrictions on the bankers, and the allies were fast running out of money or credit.

Wilson
Link: [Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace pp 22-23] "Yet it would be a serious error to conclude from the foregoing that Wilson was a prisoner of public opinion, and that his will to adopt stern measures was paralyzed by the counterforce of neutralism. The evidence points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that Wilson himself was substantially neutral in attitude. While recognizing the constraints that public opinion put upon him, he acted during all periods of crisis from his “lonely eminence of power” on a basis of what he thought was right. Above all, he believed that the United States could best serve mankind by doing everything possible to bring the war to a speedy end. As he wrote to a friend during the submarine crisis of 1915, it would be the greatest calamity possible if the United States become involved in the war, because belligerency would end all chances for American mediation. His one great objective from 1914 to 1917 was peace; every policy that he executed during this period has to be understood within the framework of this overriding goal."

Cites

 * Calhoun, Frederick S. ''Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy. Kent State University Press, 1986.
 * Calhoun, Frederick S. Uses of Force and Wilsonian Foreign Policy. Kent State University Press, 1993.
 * Esposito David M ''The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I 1996 Questia
 * Knock, Thomas J. ''To end all wars: Woodrow Wilson and the quest for a new world order. 1992.
 * Levin, Norman Gordon. Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution 1968.
 * Link, Arthur Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (1979) Questia https://www.questia.com/read/117332106/woodrow-wilson-revolution-war-and-peace
 * Wilson, Volume V: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917. date?
 * Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 1913-1921'' University of North Carolina Press, 1982 Questia
 * Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major Foreign Policies 1957 Questia
 * Martin, Laurence W. Peace Without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the British Liberals (Yale University Press, 1958.
 * Schwabe, Klaus, ed. Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919: Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power UNC, 1985 Questia
 * Smith, Daniel Malloy. Aftermath of war: Bainbridge Colby and Wilsonian diplomacy, 1920-1921. Vol. 80. American Philosophical Society, 1970.
 * Walworth, Arthur.  Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (19860 online

Colonel House

 * Williams, Joyce G. Colonel House and Sir Edward Grey: A Study in Anglo-American Diplomacy. Univ Pr of Amer, 1985.

postwar planning

 * Gelfand, Lawrence Emerson. The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919 (1963).
 * Raffo, Peter. "The Anglo-American Preliminary Negotiations For A League Of Nations." Journal of Contemporary History. Oct1974, Vol. 9 Issue 4, p153-176. 24p. Wilson and Lord Robert Cecil dominated the League of Nations Commission at the Peace Conference of 1919. In September 1916 Cecil drew up the 'Memorandum' of first principles to govern postwar peacekeeping machinery. Included was a Conference of Powers. The idea was announced in Lloyd George's declaration of 5 January 1918 and Wilson's Fourteen Points of 8 January 1918. But during most of 1918 there was little Anglo-American cooperation on the drafting of a practical proposal for a League of Nations. Each side worked on its own. The evidence points to the fact that Wilson was more interested in the shape of the Covenant than its actual provisions, which was largely the British idea. Wilson's role in the final Covenant of the League was less than has been usually assumed.

14 Points

 * Hoover, A. J. "Waiting For Woodrow Wilson: Internationalism And The British Clergy'S Attitude In World War I." Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism. 1993, Vol. 20 Issue 1/2, p87-95. British clergy throughout the war had preached internationalism. They held that Germany's amoral realpolitik ideology and actions contradicted Christian teachings. The bankruptcy of nationalism and excesses of militarism called for an international solution of the kind that appeared in Wilson's Fourteen Points. they strongly endorsed the League of Nationa
 * AJP Taylor English History 118

Italy
copied to History of Italy 3-16-17. Italy took the initiative in entering the war in spring 1915, despite strong popular and elite sentiment in favor of neutrality. Italy was a large, poor country whose political system was chaotic, its finances were heavily strained, and its army was very poorly prepared. The Triple Alliance meant little either to Italians or Austrians – Vienna had declared war on Serbia without consulting him. Two men, Prime Minister Antonio Salandra and Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino made all the decisions, as was typical in Italian foreign policy. They operated in secret, enlisting the king later on, but keeping military and political leaders entirely in the dark. They negotiated with both sides for the best deal, and got one from the Entente, which was quite willing to promise large slices of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, including the Tyrol and Trieste. Russia vetoed giving Italy Dalmatia and Albania. Britain was willing to pay to get 36 million Italians as allies who threatened the southern flank of Austria. When the Treaty of London was announced in May 1915, there was an uproar from antiwar elements. Salandra resigned but no one could form a majority against him, and he returned to office. Most politicians, and indeed most Italians opposed the war, including most Catholics. Reports from around Italy showed the people feared war, and cared little about territorial gains. Rural folk saw war is a disaster, like drought, famine or plague. Businessmen were generally opposed, fearing heavy-handed government controls and taxes. Reversing the decision seemed impossible, for the Triple Alliance did not want Italy back, and the king's throne was at risk. Pro-war supporters mobbed the streets with tens of thousands of shouting by nationalists, Futurists, anti-clericals, and angry young men. Benito Mussolini, an important Socialist Party editor took a leadership role, but he was expelled from the Party and only a minority followed him. Apart from Russia this was the only far left party in Europe that opposed the war. The fervor for war represented a bitterly hostile reaction against politics as usual, and the failures, frustrations, and stupidities of the ruling class.

Balkans, Greece
The Greek government was neutral, but in 1915 it negotiated with the allies, offering soldiers and esopecially a geographical launching point for attacks on the Strait. Greece itself wanted control of Constantinople. Russia vetoed the Greek proposal, because its main war goal was to control the Straits, and take control of Constantinople. In 1915, the British and French agreed to the Russian demands.

Latin America
Desperate for gold, the British and Germans sold most of their holdings in Latin America. The main customer was American business, which tripled its holdings in Central America, and multiplied them by a factor of eight in South America. Oil was the favorite target, especially in Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. In Cuba, the target was sugar; in Chile, copper and nitrates; in Argentina, cattle ranches.

Mexico
Germany, having decided on unrestricted submarine warfare, expected war with the U.S. in 1917. It tried to divert American attention away from from Europe by sparking a war by Mexico. It sent Mexico the Zimmermann Telegram in January 1917, offering a military alliance to fight the U.S. The British intercepted the message and Wilson released it to the press, escalating demands for American entry into the European War. The Mexican government rejected the proposal, in no small part due to a contract to provide the Royal Navy with oil.

Czechoslovakia
B] An Incident at Chelyabinsk: The Mutinous Army that Threatened a Revolution, Destroyed an Empire, Founded a Nation, and Made the Map of Europe K McNamara - 2016 - books.google.com " In this strange way," observed historian AJP Taylor," the deathblow to an empire centuries old was struck far away on the railway platform at Chelyabinsk." On May 23, 1918, the Czecho Slovak Legion was waiting to board a train in Chelyabinsk, then the Western-most Related articles More

Economics: cost of the war
The four year war was expensive. Britain spent 37% of its national income on the war; Germany spent 32%. Other spent less.

The total cost of War as a % of national income: ALLIES Britain, 37%; France, 26%; Italy,	19%; Russia, 24%; United States,	16%. CENTRAL POWERS Australia Hungary, 24%; Germany, 32%.

The total direct cost of war, for all participants including those not shown here, was about $80 billion (in 1913 US dollars) Since  $1 billion in $1913 = about $25 billion in 2017 US dollars the total cost comes to about $2 trillion in 2017 dollars.

Britain had a direct war cost about $21.2 billion; it made loans to Allies and Dominions of $4.886 and received loans from Allies (United States) of $2.909

France had a direct war cost about $10.1 billion; it made loans to Allies of $1.104 and received loans from Allies (United States and Britain) of $2.909 1.926

Italy had a direct war cost about $4.5 billion; it received loans from Allies (United States and Britain) of  $1.278.

Russia had a direct war cost about $7.7 billion; it received loans from Allies (United States and Britain) of $2.289.

The United States had a direct war cost about $12.3 billion; it made loans ti from Allies of $5.041.

Germany had a direct war cost about $18.5 billion; it made loans to its allies of  $1.290

All money totals are in billion US 1913 dollars (equal to about $25 billion 2017 dollars). Direct cost includes: actual expenditures during war minus normal prewar spending. It excludes postwar pensions, interest etc. Loans to/from allies are not included in "direct cost." Repayment of loans is not included here.

Germany

 * Farrar, L. L.  'This Unfathomable Sphinx': German Efforts During 1916 to Conclude a Separate Peace." New Review of East-European History.'' 1975, 15#1 65-90. In 1916. stalemated Germany sought to split the Entente by separate peace agreements with Russia & France. French effort failed with the siege of Verdun and the Battle of the Somme. Russian effort failed because the Germans could not gain support from any of the Russian factions despite promises of access to the Dardanelles or threats of establishing an independent Poland. By December, Germany's machinations had succeeded only in solidifying the Entente and in alienating the Americans.

Britain
By: Canadian Journal of History. Spring1971, Vol. 6 Issue 1, p75-93. A study of Lloyd George's exploration of a negotiated peace with Germany with emphasis on his response to the peace proposal made by Richard von Kühlmann, the German Secretary of State on 18 September 1917. Lloyd George, who was committed to dealing a "knock-out blow" to the Germans and who had replaced Asquith as British Prime Minister on 7 December 1916, had taken a conciliatory position in dealing with the issue of a negotiated peace as set forth in the German peace note of 12 December 1916 and with President Wilson's renewed peace offensive in that same month. On 24 September 1917 the British War Cabinet met to consider the Kühlmann peace feeler of 18 September. The Cabinet suggested that the terms that should be submitted to the Germans must include the following: Cession of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany; restoration of Serbia; territorial concessions to Italy; colonial concessions to Great Britain; and restoration of Belgium. The significant feature of these terms was that neither Russia nor Rumania was referred to. On 9 October the German response was "No, never. We must continue to persevere until the German Empire on the Continent and overseas establishes its position." On 11 October Lloyd George announced that the war would continue until Germany redeemed France's "oppressed children from the degradation of a foreign yoke. (AN: 46152626)
 * Woodward, David R. "David Lloyd George, A Negotiated Peace With Germany, And The Kuhlmann Peace Kite Of September, 1917."

However the Letter led to a series of new departures: Colonel House's visit to the inter Allied Conference in December, the Labour War Aims Memorandum, Lloyd George's Caxton Hall speech, Wilson's Fourteen Points Address, and the beginning of a public parley with the Central Powers in the replies of Georg von Hertling and Ottokar Czernin in January 1918. This went on until the allied demand for a "knockout blow" at Versailles in February 1918, rejecting any negotiations. The Allied Supreme War Council announced that the only immediate task was the prosecution of the military effort, which indicated that the Allies planned a knockout blow and a punitive peace. [see Stevenson With Our Backs to the Wall] Wilson took an ambiguous position in this debate. The "knockout" resolution weakened moderate opinion in Germany.
 * Newton, D. "The Lansdowne 'Peace Letter' of 1917 and the Prospect of Peace by Negotiation with Germany." Australian Journal of Politics & History (2002) 48#1 pp16-39. 24p. In late November 1917, Lord Lansdowne, a top Unionist politician, published a letter in the 'Daily Telegraph.' proposing war aims of the Entente & USA be coordinated and said a moderate revision of war aims might bring a negotiated peace nearer. This position aligned Lansdowne with the British Radicals, who called for a negotiated peace since the autumn of 1916. Lansdowne's letter was strongly denounced by the Northcliffe press, and by many of Lansdowne's Unionist colleagues: it was called a "plea for surrender" and "a national misfortune."

cites
added??
 * Farrar Jr, Lancelot L. Divide and Conquer: German Efforts to Conclude a Separate Peace, 1914–1918 (London: East European Quarterly, 1978). An important monograph on an important subject
 * Jarausch, Konrad H. "Armageddon Revisited: Peace Research Perspectives on World War One." Peace & Change 7.1‐2 (1981): 109-118.
 * Patterson, David S. The Search for Negotiated Peace: Women's Activism and Citizen Diplomacy in World War I (Routledge. 2008).
 * Tylee, Claire M. "“Maleness run riot”—The great war and women's resistance to militarism." Women's Studies International Forum 11#3 (1988). online

Media
The Relation Of Public Opinion And Foreign Affairs Before And During The First World War. By: Schmitt, Bernadotte. Studies in Diplomatic History & Historiography in Honour of GP Gooch. 1962, p322-330. 9p. 1914 to 1918 The influence of public opinion on the conduct of foreign affairs is somewhat mysterious when examined at close range. It is able to call the tune on fundamental issues but is often quite powerless to deflect the government from a determined course. Before the war, the British government seems to have used public opinion as an excuse, while the French were less influenced by it. The German, Austrian, and Russian governments were influenced only by the fear that public opinion might accuse them of insufficiently aggressive policies. During the war public opinion came into its own and proved to be a Frankenstein.

Further reading: diplomacy

 * Albrecht-Carrié René. A diplomatic history of Europe since the Congress of Vienna (1958)
 * Fisk, Harvey. English Public Finance from the Revolution of 1688: With Chapters on the Bank of England (1920) Questia:
 * Fisk, H.E. The Inter-Ally Debts: An Analysis of War and Post-War Public Finance, 1914-1923 (1924) online Questia
 * Fisk, H.E. The Inter-Allied Debts (1924) pp 13 & 325 reprinted in Horst Menderhausen, The Economics of War (1943 edition), appendix table II
 * Gooch, G.P. History of Modern Europe: 1878-1919 (2nd ed. 1946) online
 * Langer, William L. Encyclopedia of world history: ancient, medieval, and modern, chronologically arranged (1968).
 * Martel, Gordon, editor. . A Companion to Europe: 1900-1945 (2011) pp 180-276
 * Matthew Stibbe. "The War from Above: Aims, Strategy, and Diplomacy" in Martel, Gordon, editor. . A Companion to Europe: 1900-1945 (2011)  228-242
 * Petrie, Charles. Diplomatic History, 1713-1933 (1946) online; detailed summary
 * Rich, Norman. ''Great power diplomacy. Since 1914, (2003) pp 1 to 40
 * Seaman, L.C.B. From Vienna to Versailles (1988) short history of European diplomacy 1814-1914'' (1988) 228pp; online
 * Stephenson, David. The First World War and International Politics (1988), thorough scholarly coverage
 * Strachan, Hew. T. The First World War: Volume I: To Arms'' (Oxford UP, 2003), thorough scholarly coverage to 1916
 * Taylor, A.J.P. ''The struggle for mastery in Europe 1848-1918 1954 pp 532-68
 * Tucker, Spencer, editor, the European powers in the first world war: an Encyclopedia 1999
 * Winter, Jay, ed. The Cambridge History of the First World War (2 vol. 2014) v 2 "Diplomats" pp 62-90
 * Zeman. The gentleman negotiators: the diplomatic history of World War I (1971); Also published as A Diplomatic History of the First World War

Historiography

 * Gooch, G.P. ed. Recent revelations of European diplomacy (1st ed 1927; 4th ed 1940) online; summary of primary sources; 1st edition in Questia
 * Higham, Robin and Dennis E. Showalter, eds. Researching World War I: A Handbook (2003) 493 pp online at Questia; scholarly reports covering each major country.
 * Iriye, Akira. "The Historiographic Impact of the Great War," Diplomatic History 38#4 (2014) 751–762 doi=10.1093/dh/dhu035}}
 * Jones, Heather. "As the centenary approaches: the regeneration of First World War historiography." Historical Journal (2013) 56#3 pp: 857–878. doi=10.1017/S0018246X13000216
 * Kramer, Alan. "Recent Historiography of the First World War – Part I", Journal of Modern European History (Feb. 2014) 12#1 pp 5–27; "Recent Historiography of the First World War (Part II)", (May 2014) 12#2 pp 155–174; doi=10.17104/1611-8944_2014_1_5 and doi=10.17104/1611-8944_2014_2_155
 * Mulligan, William. "The Trial Continues: New Directions in the Study of the Origins of the First World War." English Historical Review (2014) 129#538 pp: 639–666.

Propaganda

 * Cornwall, Mark. "News, Rumour and the Control of Information in Austria-Hungary, 1914–1918." History 77#249 (1992): 50-64.
 * Green, Leanne. "Advertising war: Picturing Belgium in First World War publicity." Media, War & Conflict 7.3 (2014): 309-325.
 * Gullace, Nicoletta F. "Allied Propaganda and World War I: Interwar Legacies, Media Studies, and the Politics of War Guilt." History Compass (2011) 9#9 pp: 686-700.
 * Haste, Cate. Keep the home fires burning: Propaganda in the First World War (Lane, Allen, 1977)
 * Johnson, Niel M. George Sylvester Viereck, German-American Propagandist (U of Illinois Press, 1972), in World War I
 * Kennedy, Greg, and Christopher Tuck, eds. British Propaganda and Wars of Empire: Influencing Friend and Foe 1900-2010 (2014) excerpt and text search
 * Lasswell, Harold D.. Propaganda Technique in World War I. (1927)
 * Lutz, Ralph Haswell. "Studies of World War Propaganda, 1914-33." Journal of Modern History (1933) 5#4 pp: 496-516. in JSTOR
 * Marquis, Alice Goldfarb . "Words as Weapons: Propaganda in Britain and Germany during the First World War," Journal of Contemporary History (1978) 13#3 pp. 467–498 in JSTOR
 * Monger, David. Patriotism and Propaganda in First World War Britain: The National War Aims Committee and Civilian Morale (2013) online edition
 * Paddock, Troy. A Call to Arms: Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Newspapers in the Great War (2004)
 * Sanders, Michael, and Philip M. Taylor, eds. British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-1918 (1983)
 * Taylor, Philip M. British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century (Edinburgh UP, 1999)
 * Thompson, J. Lee. Politicians, the Press, & Propaganda: Lord Northcliffe & the Great War, 1914-1919 (Kent State UP, 1999), On Britain
 * Welch, David. Germany, Propaganda and Total War, 1914–1918 (2003)