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In France, the right to proceed with a parliamentary dissolution, which consists of prematurely ending the mandate of a parliamentary chamber, is attributed to the head of state or, more exceptionally, to the government or even to one of the chambers, in different regimes since 1802: First French Empire, Restoration, July Monarchy, Third, Fourth, and Fifth republics.

It was first introduced, in favor of the Conservative Senate, in the Constitution of the Year (1802). However, parliamentary dissolution, in the truly parliamentary sense, was born in France during the Restoration, in the Charter of 1814 (Article 50). The use of dissolution was initially quite consistent with parliamentary theory, before becoming, under Charles, an authoritarian prerogative. Under the July Monarchy, Article 42 of the Charter of 1830 again provides for dissolution, but this time, a true system of ministerial responsibility is established. The two processes balance each other out — motion of no confidence against dissolution, — so that France experiences its first authentic parliamentary regime, where the government truly becomes the point of contact between the two fundamental organs, the monarch and the elected chamber.

Outside of parliamentary tradition, the Second French Empire, an authoritarian regime, recognizes the emperor's right to dissolve the Legislative Corps.

The Constitutional Laws of 1875 take up the Orléanist mechanism of dissolution, adapting it. However, the 16 May 1877 crisis made the process odious to republicans, and dissolution was not used again during the rest of the Third Republic, allowing the instability of the Chamber of Deputies to develop without sanction, leading to ministerial instability worsening from decade to decade.

The constitution-makers in 1946, shaped by recent French history, maintain the right of dissolution, but make it an in the face of chamber instability, rather than a discretionary prerogative of the executive branch. The constitutional practice of the Fourth Republic showed the limits of overly strict regulation of the right of dissolution: while governments fell without respite, only one dissolution took place, in 1955. The Constitution of 1958 therefore put an end to the regulation of dissolution: henceforth, it is a discretionary prerogative of the President of the Republic defined by its Article 12.

However, the stability of parliamentary majorities achieved since the 1962 legislative elections has eliminated the threat of a motion of no confidence against governments. Dissolution, under the Fifth Republic, thus presents a different face from what the theory of the parliamentary regime teaches: it has been used only once to resolve a conflict between the executive branch and the legislative branch (in 1962), while other dissolutions carried out obey different logics.

Birth of the dissolution of an elected chamber in French law: the Consulate
"The Senate, by acts entitled senatus-consults, [...] dissolves the Legislative Corps and the Tribunate;"

- Extract from article 55 of the organic senatus-consult of the Constitution of the 16th Thermidor Year (August 4, 1802).

The "organic senatus-consult of the Year ," which established the Consulate for life, or "life Consulate," is also the first constitutional text to mention the possibility of ending the mandate of one of the legislative chambers.

The procedure adopted is quite exceptional, and it testifies to the fact that Napoleon Bonaparte did not envisage the nascent regime as a parliamentary regime, but rather as an authoritarian regime. Indeed, the dissolution of the Tribunate or the Legislative Corps, two of the chambers of a tricameral parliament, is carried out by an act issued by the Conservative Senate (a "senatus-consult"), but the initiative is reserved for the government, that is, for the first consul (article 56 of the senatus-consult). This is a strange mechanism aimed at ensuring the submission of chambers with already restricted powers, and it is noteworthy in this regard that no deadline was provided for the convening of the renewed chamber.

Under the Restoration


"The King convenes the two Chambers each year; he prorogues them, and may dissolve that of the deputies of the departments; but, in this case, he must convene a new one within three months."

- Article 50 of the constitutional charter of June 4, 1814.

As early as the draft constitution proposed by the Conservative Senate in April, the right for the monarch to dissolve the lower house of parliament appears. The constitutional charter of 1814 confirms this prerogative, widely accepted by constitutional thought of the time,.

Initially, the text's drafters aimed to guarantee the preeminence of the King of France, and to prevent the Chamber of Deputies from encroaching on his prerogatives. However, it quickly became apparent that royal preeminence could only rest on the support of the lower chamber for the government's policies — support made difficult by the lack of political parties, — and thus on a genuinely parliamentary mechanism of parliamentary confidence in the ministry. In these conditions, resorting to dissolution to end a conflict between the executive and legislative powers amounted to making the electorate (restricted due to censitary suffrage) "the ultimate arbiter of institutions" .

Parliamentary use of the right of dissolution until 1830
The three dissolutions (in 1816; 1824; 1827) that took place before the year 1830 are all consistent with the theory of the parliamentary regime.

The first dissolution, on 5, corresponds to a case where the parliamentary majority is in conflict with the government. Indeed, the Chamber of Deputies elected in August 1815, the "Incomparable Chamber", whose majority is ultra-royalist, seeks to dominate the Richelieu ministry. To safeguard his governmental prerogatives against the dominance of the parliamentary majority, Louis, urged by Decazes, Minister of Police, dissolves the lower chamber, asking the electorate to arbitrate the conflict. The elections are indeed a great success for the king and the government.

The other two dissolutions, in 1824 and 1827, correspond to a second scenario, where the king prevents, by dissolution, a possible conflict between the government and the lower chamber. On each occasion, Charles seeks to protect the Villèle ministry, whose majority, which still exists, is weakened due to political circumstances. The 1824 elections support the Villèle government, but those of 1827 bring a moderate majority. The king draws the only logical political conclusion from this, by appointing a moderate to head a new ministry: this is the Martignac ministry.

Authoritarian drift: the last dissolution of 1830
In August, dismissing the moderate Martignac ministry, Charles appoints an ultra-royalist, Jules de Polignac, to head a new government. In order to resolve the conflict between the moderate Chamber of Deputies and the ultra-royalist government, the king appeals to the electorate on 16, in accordance with parliamentary tradition.

Parliamentary logic, however, is undermined when Charles refuses to accept the verdict of the 1830 legislative elections, which favored the moderates. Faced with the "legal country", which does not share his political views, he uses Article 14 of the 1814 Charter as legal basis for a new dissolution on 25, even before the new chamber convenes : one of the four "Ordinances of Saint-Cloud" is precisely the one that dissolves the Chamber of Deputies. This ordered dissolution never took place due to the revolution of the Three Glorious Days.

By rejecting the ballot box verdict in 1830, Charles imposes an authoritarian vision of the system born in 1814, where dissolution loses its parliamentary character, to become nothing more than a tool of domination over the lower chamber. A genuine constitutional deadlock arises here, which will be ultimately resolved by the revolution of the Three Glorious Days.

Under the July Monarchy


"The King convenes the two Chambers each year: he prorogues them and may dissolve that of the Deputies; but, in this case, he must convene a new one within the period of three months."

- Article 42 of the constitutional charter of August 14, 1830.

The Charter of 14 August 1830 is hardly modified in its actual text: the deputies only make changes of medium importance to the text of the 1814 Charter. The main change in the constitution lies in the new conception of the text: whereas Louis had firmly intended to "grant" the 1814 charter, Louis-Philippe Ier makes a "pact" with the nation. While the nature of Louis-Philippe's right to reign remains controversial, between those who consider that he reigns "because Bourbon" — monarchic legitimacy stemming from the right of blood (Guizot), — and those who think that legitimacy comes from the people, Louis-Philippe reigns although Bourbon (Dupin), it remains that both theories agreed to see the new charter as a pact concluded between the country and the king, and no longer as a manifestation of the unilateral will of the monarch.

The general spirit of the institutions is transformed by the circumstances of the conception of the charter: the denial of national sovereignty represented by the 1814 charter is replaced by a regime born of a revolution and an appeal made by the elected chamber to another sovereign. Henceforth, two distinct centers of power emerge: the king and the elected chamber. Since the 1830 charter is hardly more detailed than its predecessor, it has mainly fallen to political practice to implement this compromise, but the essence of the regime is already parliamentary.

A Use in Line with Parliamentary Theory
The institutional practice of the July Monarchy is rich in the use of the right of dissolution: no legislature completed its normal five-year term. Six dissolutions can thus be distinguished, , :
 * May 31, 1831 (1831 elections) ;
 * May 25, 1834 (1834 elections);
 * October 3, 1837 (1837 elections);
 * February 2, 1839 (1839 elections);
 * June 13, 1842 (1842 elections);
 * July 6, 1846 (1846 elections).

These numerous dissolutions never raised protests in the country, despite the intensive use of the procedure, which could have been seen as an abuse. Often, the dissolution was initiated by the government, which could thus choose the most opportune moment to hold new elections, a process perfectly in line with the English parliamentary system.

A Political System Depriving Dissolution of its Effects
However, despite its frequent use, the right of dissolution had little effect, apart from the holding of elections itself. Ministries, which should have benefited from the dissolution with strengthened and sufficient majorities to pursue a policy, emerged from the elections as weakened as they had entered, except for the 1846 election.

The main cause of this lack of effect is the disorganization of political parties: unlike the English model, dominated at the time by the Whigs and the Conservatives, the French regime suffered from the absence of parties that would structure the vote, the composition of the chamber, and define clear political options for the voter.

The result of this disorganization of the vote is the absence of a stable majority until 1840, and the ineffectiveness, in almost all cases, of the elections, which do not produce any clear majority to pursue a defined policy. The only "successful" dissolution, in 1846, which gives the Guizot Ministry a reinforced conservative majority, is a paradoxical failure: due to the censitary nature of the suffrage, the chamber is hardly representative of the country's real political tendencies. It follows that, supported by a firm majority, the conservative and immobile policy regarding electoral law pursued by Guizot eventually becomes unbearable to the "real country", which revolts (1848 revolution).

Under the Second Republic of Bonaparte and then under the Second Empire




Completely absent from the 1848 constitution, the right of dissolution reappears with the new constitution that Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte has drafted, based on the plebiscite that immediately followed the French coup d'état of 2 December 1851. The establishment, at the end of 1852, of the Second Empire does not change the constitutional texts: the text of January 14, 1852, which established the "decennial republic ," remains in force, modified by the senatus-consultum of November 7, 1852.

"The president of the Republic convenes, adjourns, prorogues, and dissolves the Legislative Body. In case of dissolution, the president of the Republic must convene a new one within six months."

- Article 46 of the constitution of January 14, 1852.

"In case of dissolution of the Legislative Body, and until a new convocation, the Senate, on the proposal of the president of the Republic, provides, by emergency measures, for everything necessary for the operation of the government."

- Article 33 of the constitution of January 14, 1852.

Between 1852 and 1870, numerous constitutional modifications were adopted. However, during this period, the only change concerning dissolution was the adoption, by the people, of a new constitution, after the plebiscite of May 8, 1870: the "senatus consultum of 21 May 1870 fixing the Constitution of the Empire". This new text brought only a slight change to the one in force since 1852, by eliminating the possibility, for the Senate, to provide by emergency measures for the necessities related to the functioning of the state, until the convocation of the Legislative Body after its dissolution: the 1870 constitution establishes true equal bicameralism between the two chambers.

"The emperor convenes, adjourns, prorogues, and dissolves the Legislative Body.

In case of dissolution, the emperor must convene a new one within six months.

The emperor declares the adjournment of the sessions of the Legislative Body."

- Article 35 of the senatus consultum of 21 May 1870 fixing the Constitution of the Empire.

Due to the various methods implemented to "neutralize" universal suffrage and make it conform to the political power's wishes (such as "official candidacies"), the Legislative Body was never a dangerous chamber for the government. Only one dissolution took place, in 1857. Napoleon indeed wished to shorten by one year the term of the first Legislative Body, in order to demonstrate to all of Europe that the imperial regime was popular.

Under the Third Republic
The dissolution of the National Assembly is provided for in Article 5 of the constitutional law of February 25, 1875:

"The President of the Republic may, on the joint advice of the Senate, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies before the expiration of its legal term.

In this case, the electoral colleges are convened for new elections within three months."

- Article 5 of the constitutional law of February 25, 1875 relating to the organization of public powers.



The Emergence of Dissolution in a Republican Regime
This is the first time that a republican regime in France provides for a right of dissolution, in favor of an executive authority, against the chamber elected by universal suffrage. This power is a direct "importation" from the Charter of 1830, from which the constitutional laws are inspired. The "three months" period itself replicates a similar provision of Article 42 of the Charter of 1830.

The original point of dissolution under the Third Republic is the very important role of the Senate: it has the power to authorize or not the dissolution. It is thus placed in the position of arbitrator of conflicts between the president and the Chamber of Deputies. The solution may have seemed to temper the excessive power, in the eyes of the republicans, that was given to the president of the Republic — and it is significant that the amendment including this prior authorization came from Henri Wallon, "the father of the Republic", — but it mainly made the hypothesis of dissolution very unlikely if the majorities of both chambers agreed.

The Crisis of May 16, 1877: First and Last Use of Dissolution
This prerogative, fundamental in a parliamentary regime, was only used once under the Third Republic, during the 16 May 1877 crisis, by President Mac Mahon. While the dissolution was in accordance with the letter and the Orléanist spirit of the constitution, it was considered by the republicans as an attempted coup d'état by the monarchists, as it followed the refusal of the chambers to invest governments chosen by the president of the Republic from the monarchist camp.

Thus "burdened with a hypothesis of anti-republicanism ," the already poorly viewed dissolution by the republicans was definitively abandoned by the Third Republic and timidly reintroduced by the Fourth. On February 6, 1879, the new President Jules Grévy, in the message addressed to the chambers to thank them for his election as President of the Republic on January 30 of the same year, said these famous words: "I will never enter into conflict with the national will expressed by its constitutional organs ."

Now, with a Senate mostly republican since 5, and a republican presidency, the right of dissolution falls into oblivion, radically changing the interpretation of the constitution to the point that it was called the "Grévy constitution ." The government, without the protection of dissolution, finds itself constantly challenged by the two chambers of parliament, and the instability of the Third Republic finds its roots there.

French constitutional thought, after 1918, facing the deep crisis experienced by the regime, sometimes proposed reintroducing dissolution into political practice, by freeing it from the joint opinion of the Senate, and in some projects, entrusting it to the Prime Minister: thus the reform project of Gaston Doumergue. The proposed reforms were never adopted.

Dissolution in the April Constitution Project
The first constitutional project drafted by the First Constituent Assembly included two hypotheses of dissolution. Firstly, Article 84 of the project provided for a mechanism substantially equivalent to that of Article 51 of the 1946 constitution, where the occurrence of two crises in the same annual session, under the conditions provided for by the constitution, could have led to the dissolution of the single chamber, if half of the legislature had already elapsed. This dissolution would have been decided in the Council of Ministers, and ordered by decree of the President of the Republic. Moreover, as in the final text, dissolution by the government would have simultaneously caused it to disappear completely, whereas the final constitution only dismisses the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior.

The most original procedure was that provided for in Article 83 of the project:

"The National Assembly has the right to dissolve itself by a resolution adopted by a two-thirds majority of the deputies."

- Article 83 of the draft constitution of 19 April 1946.

This procedure would have amounted, for the Assembly, to wanting to put an end to a large majority to its own divisions.

In both cases, it should be noted that the initiative for dissolution would have rested, directly or indirectly, with the chamber alone: the right to dissolve was absolutely not considered as a means for the government to protect itself from the chamber.

Maintenance of a Binding Procedure in the Final Constitution
The dissolution of the National Assembly alone, not of the Council of the Republic, is provided for by two articles:

"If, during the same period of eighteen months, two ministerial crises occur under the conditions provided for in articles 49 and 50, the dissolution of the National Assembly may be decided by the Council of Ministers, after consulting the President of the Assembly. The dissolution shall be pronounced, in accordance with this decision, by decree of the President of the Republic.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall apply only at the expiration of the first eighteen months of the legislature."

- Article 51 of the 1946 constitution.

"In the event of dissolution, the cabinet, with the exception of the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior, remains in office to handle current affairs.

The President of the Republic appoints the President of the National Assembly as Prime Minister. The latter appoints the new Minister of the Interior in agreement with the Bureau of the National Assembly. He appoints as Ministers of State members of groups not represented in the government.

General elections shall be held at least twenty days and not more than thirty days after the dissolution.

The National Assembly shall meet automatically on the third Thursday following its election."

- Article 52 of the 1946 constitution.

A Highly Complex Procedure


In reaction to the excesses of the Third Republic, which had been partly made possible by the disappearance, in practice, of the right of dissolution after the 16 May 1877 crisis, the drafters of the 1946 constitution, whether in the April draft, rejected by referendum, , or in the one accepted in October, provided for a dissolution.

However, this is not a discretionary power of dissolution by the head of state, as in the French Constitutional Laws of 1875. Dissolution belongs to the Council of Ministers, which exercises it under two conditions: at least two ministerial crises must have occurred under the conditions of articles 49 and 50 of the constitution, during the same period of eighteen months, and we must be beyond the first eighteen months of the legislature. We are faced here with a "technical refinement" of dissolution, but also with a true "mechanism," almost automatic, which has nothing in common with the traditional parliamentary dissolution, which is the counterweight of government responsibility.

It should also be noted that this dissolution is a unique weapon of mutual annihilation: dissolving the National Assembly obliges the Prime Minister to leave office and be replaced by the President of the dissolved Assembly. The drafters feared that the retention of the Prime Minister who dissolved the chamber would influence the upcoming elections. This provision shows that dissolution is not conceived here as a way to end the conflict between the government and the chamber, but as a way to extricate the National Assembly from an intractable situation where no majority emerges.

A Mechanism Incapable of Ending Ministerial Instability
The highly mechanistic nature of dissolution had a major flaw: the government remained effectively defenseless against the whims of the chamber since it could only dissolve if very specific conditions were met. These conditions, in practice, rendered dissolution useless.

The institutional practice inherited from the Third Republic quickly resurfaced: governments lacked the courage to resist the National Assembly, even when constitutional mechanisms of censure were not utilized. The "vote of confidence," for instance, constitutionally framed, was rarely posed by the Prime Minister, who preferred simply to warn that if the Assembly did not vote as requested, he would resign. This "pseudo-vote of confidence " prevents the fall of the government, triggered by the chamber, from being counted in the ministerial crises of Article 51.

The National Assembly employed another method, the "calibrated vote": it ensured that confidence was refused by a majority smaller than that provided for in the constitution, to show the government that it was disavowed, without the resulting fall being counted. In this case, the weight of the Third Republic tradition and the weight of customs are clearly distinguishable.

Thus distorted, the constitution, already poorly equipped for such scenarios, no longer protected the government. Despite record ministerial instability — twenty-four governments in eleven years, with periods of crisis between two governments becoming increasingly longer, up to a month to form a new coalition, — only one dissolution occurred, on 1, when Edgar Faure was Prime Minister.

Summary Table of Dissolutions Before the Fifth Republic
{| class=wikitable align=center style="text-align:center;" ! scope=col rowspan=2 | Date of Dissolution ! scope=col rowspan=2 | Author of Dissolution ! scope=col rowspan=2 | New Elections ! scope=col colspan=2 | Legislature ! scope=col rowspan=2 | Name of Dissolved Chamber ! scope=col rowspan=2 | Reference ! scope=col | Previous (Election Date) ! scope=col | New ! colspan=7 id="restoration" | Bourbon Restoration (1815-1830)
 * + Summary Table of Dissolutions Before 1958
 * headers="restoration" | 13
 * rowspan="3" headers="restoration" | Louis XVIII, King of France
 * headers="restoration" | 14 and 28 August 1815
 * headers="restoration" | Hundred Days Chamber (May 1815)
 * headers="restoration" | "Chambre introuvable" ( legislature)
 * headers="restoration" | Chamber of Representatives
 * headers="restoration" | ,
 * headers="restoration" | 5
 * headers="restoration" | 25 September and 4 October 1816
 * headers="restoration" | "Chambre introuvable" (1815)
 * headers="restoration" | legislature
 * rowspan="5" headers="restoration" | Chamber of Deputies
 * headers="restoration" | ,
 * headers="restoration" | 24
 * headers="restoration" | 25 February and 6 March 1824
 * headers="restoration" | legislature (1820)
 * headers="restoration" | legislature ("Found Chamber")
 * headers="restoration" |
 * headers="restoration" | 5
 * rowspan="3" headers="restoration" | Charles X, King of France
 * headers="restoration" | 17 and 24 November 1827
 * headers="restoration" | legislature (1824)
 * headers="restoration" | legislature
 * headers="restoration" | ,
 * headers="restoration" | 16
 * headers="restoration" | 5, 13, and 19 July 1830
 * headers="restoration" | legislature (1827)
 * headers="restoration" | ( legislature) legislature of the July Monarchy
 * headers="restoration" | Decree of 16 May 1830 by the King dissolving the Chamber of Deputies and convening the electoral colleges, in J. B.
 * headers="restoration" | 16
 * headers="restoration" | 5, 13, and 19 July 1830
 * headers="restoration" | legislature (1827)
 * headers="restoration" | ( legislature) legislature of the July Monarchy
 * headers="restoration" | Decree of 16 May 1830 by the King dissolving the Chamber of Deputies and convening the electoral colleges, in J. B.