User:RoslynSKP/Gaza school of military strategy

The Gaza school of military strategy argued after the Southern Palestine Offensive, which occurred during the Sinai and Palestine Campaign of World War I, that the offensive should have begun with a much stronger attack at Gaza, instead of the two corps' attack at the Battle of Beersheba. This would have required a repeat of the Second Battle of Gaza which had inflicted very heavy losses on the Egyptian Expeditionary Force infantry divisions. They argued that a breakthrough at Gaza could have resulted in a much quicker capture of Jerusalem and the capture of Ottoman armies not accomplished until the Battle of Megiddo in late 1918.

Background


After the first two battles for Gaza, it was obvious that large reinforcements were needed, "to set General Murray's army in motion again." Indeed, Murray made it clear to the War Cabinet and the Imperial General Staff early in May, that he could not invade Palestine without reinforcements. The War Office assured him in the same month, that he should prepare to receive reinforcements, which would bring the EEF up to six infantry and three mounted divisions. However by July, when General Edmund Allenby took command of the EEF, 5,150 infantry and 400 yeomanry reinforcements were still needed after the casualties, suffered during the battles for Gaza.

By the end of the 1917 summer in the northern hemisphere, the political and the strategic interests of the British government and the EEF coincided. This was due in part to the failure on the Western Front of the French Republic's Nivelle offensive and the success of the German submarine campaign against British Empire shipping. The destruction of British shipping caused severe shortages in Britain, and although the United States of America had entered the war, their military support would not be apparent for some time. Britain was about to enter a fourth year of extremely costly war, and their Prime Minister, David Lloyd George appreciated the need to take into account, the "Home Front." He believed a striking military success could bolster the morale of the civil population, and he told Allenby, "he wanted Jerusalem as a Christmas present for the British nation." Lloyd Gorge made clear that this victory was needed in order "to strengthen the staying power and morale of this country." The British War Cabinet needed a successful Palestine offensive, at a time when there was not much good news coming out of the Western Front, and when it was beginning to look like the war could extend into 1919. If they could capture Jerusalem this would put pressure on the Ottoman Empire, which could in turn place a strain on the German alliance, at the same time enhancing Britain's long term aim, of strengthening their influence in the Middle East. By the end of October the EEF, was ready to attack.

The decision to launch a major offensive in Palestine, in the autumn of 1917, was also based on "very sound strategical reasons." The Russian Empire collapsed in the spring, led to the withdrawal of Russia from the war, as a consequence of the Russian Revolution, freeing many Ottoman Empire forces which had been fighting Russian forces on the Eastern Front. These Ottoman units became available to reinforce the Palestine front and were in the process of assembling near Aleppo, along with German soldiers and equipment. They were to launch operations to recapture Baghdad after it was captured by the British in March. The threat to Baghdad, could be more economically opposed by an EEF offensive in southern Palestine. Rather than sending reinforcements to General Frederick S. Maude's Mesopotamian army holding Baghdad, British reinforcements from the Salonika front which the War Office wanted to scale down, would strengthen the EEF.

Allenby's strategical objective was a defeat of the Ottoman army in Southern Palestine, decisive enough to ensure Ottoman reinforcements destined for Baghdad were diverted to Palestine. However by 5 October, General William Robertson, CIGS telegraphed Allenby that the War Cabinet desired him to eliminate the Ottoman Empire out of the war by a "heavy defeat", followed by the occupation of the Jaffa–Jerusalem line. He was to be supplied with "fresh British divisions ... at the rate of one every sixteen days." It was not until after the launching of the offensive that Allenby was told such increases to his force were improbable.



Allenby estimated the Ottoman Army could have 20 divisions, with no more than 12 on the front line. However as these could be replaced by the Ottoman Army, the EEF could not field more than 14 divisions after the doubling of the railway line from Kantara, because of the limitations of the EEF's supply lines. Between April and October 1917 both the EEF and the Ottoman Army laid railways and water pipe lines, and sent troops, guns and huge quantities of ammunition to the front. By mid–October 1917, a staff appreciation from London, acknowledged the strength of the Ottoman defenders in Southern Palestine, and that any attempt to dislodge them from the Gaza to Beersheba line could cost three divisions. "[T]he Turk is a stubborn fighter in trenches and we must expect that in any event he will stand long enough to cause us serious loss ... we must be prepared to supply General Allenby with three more divisions" to relieve weakened divisions.

Introduction


Some senior officers did not agree with Chetwode's conclusion that the failure of the Second Battle of Gaza proved another attack on Gaza was a faulty strategy. These officers, who were identified by the official British historian in 1930 as the "'Gaza School,'" argued after the event that the "tactical dispositions for the attack had been faulty." They thought a much greater attack with another division, than the Third Battle of Gaza, would have broken through. The advantage would have been fresh mounted troops concentrated south west of Gaza, ready to advance along the coast straight on Junction Station, to envelope the retreating Yildirim Army Group. However without the capture of Beersheba, after the capture of Gaza there would have been an uncomfortably narrow corridor for the pursuit, which would be exposed to artillery fire and attack from the "unbroken Ottoman Armies retiring on the high ground to the south east instead of the beaten troops whose threats the British were able virtually to disregard."

It has also been claimed that after "Russia's collapse in 1917" that reinforcements needed in Palestine were sent to the Caucasus, leaving the Ottoman army low in morale, "many had received no mail from home in years. The hapless Turkish recruits awaited the EEF assault in 'fragile tents' with 'nothing to cheer their spirits'." This was because "the condition of the Ottoman railway system was such that the Turks had difficulty maintaining any substantial force in Palestine either for defensive or offensive operations." This is based on a single track for 1,275 miles, and sections of standard and narrow gauge, lead to an assessment of the Ottoman lines of communication as "appalling."

The Ottoman Army in Palestine in 1917 continued to demonstrate most of the characteristics they had during the first two years of war. The army was operationally and tactically aggressive, executing both defensive and offensive operations and training continuously in realistic, up–to–date methods at troop level and in centralised settings. "Divisions were task–organised" for a variety of "specific tactical missions." The commanders were experienced, highly trained and capable leaders who "continued to function well in its third year of a multi–front total war."

However it has also been claimed that the Ottoman front line infantry battalions were "operating at about half strength." The 21st Infantry Regiment on 26 October, in the Turkish General Staff Archives, claimed to be "at half strength in trained men" and reinforcements were failing to keep up with "sick and battle casualties." Their last battle had been a decisive victory seven months ago, in April from behind strong fortifications. Captain Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir, Assistant Chief of Staff, Yildirim Army Group, claimed the 16th Division which had 200 officers, 400 NCOs and 10,900 men in September 1916, had been reduced to only 5,017 officers and men by 15 October 1917. Then the "three infantry battalions in its 78th Infantry Regiment numbered about 400 men each (out of an authorisation of about 750 men per battalion)." He also claimed that every division in the Gaza defences was below strength by 50 per cent, but there is no mention of the establishment of assault battalions. It has also been claimed chronic failures due to casualties and manpower shortages, were "compounded by terrible attrition from disease and desertion." On 3 August 1917 Yildirim Army Group reported "a deficit of some 70,000 soldiers" but that proposed reinforcements would leave them 40,000 short. According to Hussein Husni's Yilderim, "In September 1917 Mustafa Kemal, the commander of the Seventh army in Palestine, reported to Enver Pasha that 50 per cent of the arriving 54th division were either too young or old; [no source] a battalion of one of the best divisions left Istanbul 1,000 strong, only to arrive at Aleppo with 500 men. [note 76 Hussein Husni, Yilderim, Part 1, Chapter 4 (also appendix 16).] "

It has also been claimed that "if the enemy had been well led and properly rationed," the Ottoman 3rd, 7th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 24th, 26th, 27th, 53rd, and 54th Divisions and the 3rd Cavalry Division, should have been able to resist more strongly.

Arguments
The Gaza school argued that an infantry attack supported by artillery would have "punctured" the Ottoman lines allowing cavalry to outflank the defenders. This plan would repeat the Second Battle of Gaza. Such an attack would be easy to supply along the railway from Kantara to Deir el Belah, although there was no water close to Gaza, and navel artillery support could reinforce land based artillery. "The possibility of repeating the essential features of the plan used in the second Battle of Gaza was reviewed and quickly dismissed," because the Gaza defences had proved to be too strong to be won by a frontal attack, even by a larger British infantry force. Another reason for avoiding a second frontal attack on Gaza lay in the difficulty of motivating the soldiers to repeat an attack which had already proved a failure was "too risky" and "would be unwise."

"I [Allenby] think from what I have so far seen, that the Turks expect us to renew our attacks on Gaza. They probably think that we shall cling to the coast line. If we make our attack there, it will probably be costly; and, when we have broken through, we shall not have gained a flank or acquired more freedom for manoeuvre."

- Allenby report to Robertson 11 July 1917 at the end of his first tour of inspection

Hughes claims that "Counterfactual history suggests that an attack at Gaza would have routed the Turks and secured all of Palestine. Garsia [claims] 'had the Cavalry Corps been available on that flank [Gaza], the disaster which ultimately overtook the Turkish army in 1918 might have befallen it twelve months earlier.'" The official British historian of the campaign, claimed in 1930 that the two maneuver warfare offensives of October/November 1917 and September 1918 cannot be compared as it was not possible to pin down the whole Ottoman Gaza to Beersheba front line while they broke through at Gaza, whereas during the Battle of Megiddo the EEF were able to pin down the whole Ottoman front while they broke through on the sea coast.

Erickson suggest this attack may have been successful but at the time EEF intelligence overestimated the strength of the Ottoman Army making it inadvisable. Allenby reported an accurate assessment of the defenders in September eight Ottoman divisions and one–third of a division facing him, with nine and two–thirds in transit with an additional two divisions possibly on their way from Mesopotamia. However, the "depleted state" of these divisions as described by Matthew Hughes in 1999 who states, without taking into account the high number of machine guns, there were less than 3,000 riflemen per division, was unknown to Allenby. In the middle of October, a staff appreciation was received from London noting the "stubborn" fighting qualities of Ottoman soldiers in trench warfare, who could inflict "serious loss" on the EEF. The appreciation also predicted that three more divisions would be needed to "relieve exhausted divisions." This "grudging respect" for the Ottoman Army explains the limited scope of Allenby's plans and operations in October 1917 "and contradicts the viability of Garsia's Gaza school." Falls suggests the military student may, find a problem or war game of great interest in working out an imaginary attack in accordance with the scheme of the "Gaza School."

Conclusions
The plan, based on Philip Chetwode's appreciation, to capture Beersheba and envelop Gaza from the east was focused on the "seizure of geographic objectives rather than the destruction of the enemy's army." These objectives were achievable by the EEF as it was at the end of 1917, while the 'Gaza school' plan would need the strength of the EEF at the end of 1918 with its improved "operational capabilities" to have a chance of success.

It has been suggested that "At the third battle of Gaza the Turks were allowed to retreat in good order. Both XX corps and the DMC were marginalised and the battle hinged on the three infantry divisions at Gaza." That "The Turks' railway system in southern Palestine was also available for [end p. 57] exploitation by a force coming up from Gaza.

However the offensive so far from base depended on efficiently supplying the attacking force, the EEF had severe transport problems. By 9 November most of the infantry divisions were at the end of their lines of communication. The XXI Corps's 54th (East Anglian) Division was forced to remain at Gaza and the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade at Beit Hanun. In the rear, Lieutenant General Philip Chetwode's XX Corps had transferred its transport to XXI Corps. XX Corps's 60th (2/2nd London) Division (Major General John Shea) was stopped at Huj and its 10th (Irish) (Major General John Longley) and 74th (Yeomanry) (Major General Eric Girdwood) Divisions were halted at Karm. Only one infantry division could be supplied and maintained at a distance of 20 – from railhead, with the camels and wheeled transport allotted to the EEF infantry corps. During the attack on Beersheba the transport of the XXI Corps had been assigned to supply the XX Corps, which marched back to near railhead at Karm after the victory. Here minimal transport was needed so the transport was sent back to the XXI Corps.

The 60th (London) Division which could not be supplied north of Huj, remained in that area while the transport of the two infantry corps were being reorganised.