User:Rule (Irene)/sandbox

/Sandbox {{Infobox SCOTUS case
 * Litigants=Goldblatt Et Al v. Town of Hempstead
 * ArgueDate=January 15-16
 * ArgueYear=1962
 * DecideDate=May 14
 * DecideYear=1962
 * FullName=Goldblatt Et Al v. Town of Hempstead
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 * USPage=
 * CitationNew=369 U.S. 590 (1962)
 * Docket=78
 * Prior=
 * Subsequent=
 * Holding=Is a 1958 ordinance regarding dredging in the Town of Hempstead NY unconstitutional?
 * SCOTUS=
 * OralArgument=http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13103509849045168861&q=goldblatt+v.+town+of+hempstead&hl=en&as_sdt=2,22&as_vis=1
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 * Dissent=Justice Clark
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 * LawsApplied=Fourteenth Amendment, Constitution of the United States

Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead - 369 U.S. 590 (1969)

Summary:

In 1962, Herbert W. Goldblatt filed a complaint against the town of Hempstead, NY claiming that a town ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavating on his property prevented him from continuing his business and therefore takes his property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court conceded that the law completely prohibited a prior use by Mr. Goldblatt who had operated a gravel pit for 30 years. But the Court held that depriving the property of its most profitable use does not make the law unconstitutional.

Contents [hide] 1.	Summary 2.	Background 3.	Opinion of the Court 4.	Definitions 5.	Links and References

[edit]Background Herbert Goldblatt owned a 38 acre tract within the town of Hempstead, NY. His business, Builders Sand and Gravel Corporation, had been mining sand and gravel at this sight continuously since 1927. During the first year the excavation depth reached the water table causing the excavated area to fill with water. This process continued from 1927 through 1962 so that the original crater became a 20 acre lake with an average depth of 25 feet. The town of Hempstead grew and expanded around this excavation until within a radius of 3500 feet there were 2200 homes and four public schools. In 1945 the town enacted Ordinance No. 16 in an attempt to regulate mining excavations within its limits. This ordinance provided that such pits must be enclosed by a wire fence and must comply with berm and slope requirements. Goldblatt complied with this ordinance but in 1956 the town sought an injunction against further excavation as being in violation of a zoning ordinance. The town’s zoning case failed because Goldblatt was found to be conducting prior non-conforming use on the premises. In 1958 the town amended Ordinance No.16 to prohibit any excavating below the water table and to require back filling of any excavation below that level. This amendment also made the berm, slope and fence requirements more stringent. In 1959 the Town of Hempstead filed an action to prohibit Goldblatt from further mining on the grounds that he had not complied with amended Ordinance 16. Goldblatt argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was not regulatory of his business but was completely prohibitory and confiscated his property without compensation, that it deprived him of the benefit of the favorable judgment arising from the previous zoning litigation, and that it constituted ex post facto legislation. The trial court decided against Goldblatt and he was enjoined from conducting further excavations on the lot until he had complied with the new provisions of Ordinance 16. Though the ordinance completely prohibits a beneficial use to which the property has previously been used, the question regarding unconstitutionality was resolved by the fact that if the ordinance was considered a valid exercise of the town’s police powers, depriving the property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional. In Mugler v. Kansas, supra. at 668-669, the issue of police powers is addressed: “The present case must be governed by principles that do not involve the power of eminent domain, in the exercise of which property may not be taken for public use without compensation. A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests. . . . The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not—and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be—burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community."

[edit]Opinion of the Court The Supreme Court of the United States rendered its decision on May 14, 1962. Milton I. Newman argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were John J. Bennettand Edward M. Miller. William C. Mattison argued the cause for appellee. With him on the briefs were Richard P. Charles and Mario Matthew Cuomo. John F. Lane and Jerome Powell filed a brief for the National Crushed Stone Association, asamicus curiae, urging reversal. MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. In addressing the question of police power, Justice Clark states: “The question, therefore, narrows to whether the prohibition of further excavation below the water table is a valid exercise of the town's police power. The term "police power" connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private interests. Except for the substitution of the familiar standard of "reasonableness," this Court has generally refrained from announcing any specific criteria. The classic statement of the rule in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 137 (1894), is still valid today: "To justify the State in . . . interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that 595*595 the interests of the public . . . require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals." Even this rule is not applied with strict precision, for this Court has often said that "debatable questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts but for the legislature . . . ." E. g.,Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 388 (1932).”” Regarding the question of whether the ordinance is a reasonable one, Justice Clark writes: “The ordinance in question was passed as a safety measure, and the town is attempting to uphold it on that basis. To evaluate its reasonableness we therefore need to know such things as the nature of the menace against which it will protect, the availability and effectiveness of other less drastic protective steps, and the loss which appellants will suffer from the imposition of the ordinance. A careful examination of the record reveals a dearth of relevant evidence on these points. One fair inference arising from the evidence is that since a few holes had been burrowed under the fence surrounding the lake it might be attractive and dangerous to children. But there was no indication whether the lake as it stood was an actual danger to the public or whether deepening the lake would increase the danger. In terms of dollars or some other objective standard, there was no showing how much, if anything, the imposition of the ordinance would cost the appellants. In short, the evidence produced is clearly indecisive on the reasonableness of prohibiting further excavation below the water table. Although one could imagine that preventing further deepening of a pond already 25 feet deep would have a de minimis effect on public safety, we cannot say that such a conclusion is compelled by facts of which we can take notice. Even if we could draw such a conclusion, 596*596we would be unable to say the ordinance is unreasonable; for all we know, the ordinance may have a de minimis effect on appellants. Our past cases leave no doubt that appellants had the burden on "reasonableness." E. g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U. S. 520, 529 (1959)(exercise of police power is presumed to be constitutionally valid); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545, 553 (1954) (the presumption of reasonableness is with the State); United States v.Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 154 (1938) (exercise of police power will be upheld if any state of facts either known or which could be reasonably assumed affords support for it). This burden not having been met, the prohibition of excavation on the 20-acre-lake tract must stand as a valid police regulation.” On Goldblatt’s claim that he was subjected to ex post facto legislation, Justice Clark responds: “Appellants' other contentions warrant only a passing word. The claim that rights acquired in previous litigation are being undermined is completely unfounded. A successful defense to the imposition of one regulation does not erect a constitutional barrier to all other regulation. The first suit was brought to enforce a zoning ordinance, while the present one is to enforce a safety ordinance. In fact no relevant issues presented here were decided in the first suit.[4] We therefore do not need to consider to what extent such issues would have come under the protective wing of due process.” Justice Clark affirmed the judgment. [edit]Definitions ex post facto: After the fact - retroactively enjoined: To prohibit by a judicial order Fourteenth Amendment: As applies to this case: Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

[edit]Links and References •	http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/369/590/case.html - Justia.com - US Supreme Court Center •	http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13103509849045168861&q=goldblatt+v.+town+of+hempstead&hl=en&as_sdt=2,22&as_vis=1 - Google Scholar •	http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=369&invol=590 - Findlaw •	http://www.communityrights.org/legalresources/otherkeysupremecourtopinions/Goldblatt.asp - CRC - Community Rights Council •	http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19610119_0040620.NY.htm/qx - Find a Case •	http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2516&context=wmlr - William and Mary Law Review •	http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1098&context=lawfaculty - Rutgers Law Review •	http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ex%20post%20facto - Merriam-Webster Dictionary •	http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/fourteenth+amendment - The Free Dictionary