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SPINELLI v. UNITED STATES, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) was an important Supreme Court case that established the Aguilar-Spinelli test for determining the validity of a search warrant based on information provided by a confidential informant or an anonymous tip. This test was later rejected in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, (1983), where the court held that the "two-pronged test" should be abandoned in favor of the traditional, totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.

For about 14 years, however, the Aguilar-Spinelli test became an essential tool for magistrate's in determining probable cause.

Background
William Spinelli was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1952 while traveling from a nearby Illinois suburb to St. Louis, Missouri, with the intention of conducting illicit gambling activities proscribed by Missouri law. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the warrant in the lower courts at every appropriate stage. Supreme Court decided to use this case as a vehicle to clarify the application of the two-prong test it set forth in Aguilar v. Texas. Justice Harlan delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The Warrant
In order to obtain a search warrant in the United States, a law officer must appear before a judge or magistrate and swear or affirm that he has probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. The officer is required to present his evidence to the magistrate and present an affidavit to the magistrate, setting forth his evidence. In Spinelli, the The FBI submitted an affidavit to obtain the warrant which uncovered the necessary evidence for Spinelli's conviction. The affidavit contained the following allegations:

1. The FBI had followed Spinelli's movements on five days during the month of August 1965. On four of these occasions, Spinelli was seen crossing one of two bridges leading from Illinois into St. Louis, Missouri. On four of the five days, Spinelli was also seen parking his car a lot used by residents of an apartment house. On one day, Spinelli was seen entering a particular apartment in the building.

2. An FBI check with the telephone company revealed that this apartment contained two telephones listed under the name Grace P. Hagen.

3. The application stated  that " William Spinelli is known to this affiant and to federal law enforcement agents  and local law enforcement agents as a bookmaker, a gambler, and an associate of gamblers."

4. Finally,  it was stated that the FBI " was informed by confidential reliable informants that William Spinelli  is operating  a handbook accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned..."

Validity of the Warrant
In Spinelli, applying the standard set out in Aguilar v. Texas, the Court determined that the informant's tip, even though it was corroborated to the extent of finding two phones with specified numbers to conduct a gambling business, was insufficient to establish probable cause.

Supreme Court made this finding based on the fact that a magistrate must fairly assess the credibility of the source and weigh the information furnished if the magistrate believes said information to be true. The Government made the argument that probable cause should not be determined by a totality of circumstances based upon a common-sense reading of the entire affidavit. Supreme Court rejected this argument made by the Government and the Court of Appeals (which it later accepts in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, (1983)) because it "paints with too broad a brush" and the necessarily element in finding probable cause must be determined by a more precise analysis, ie the Aguilar-Spinelli test.

Applying the rule to the facts, the Court determined that the affidavit did nothing to further the reliability of the affiant's source. The tip did not contain a "sufficient statement of the underlying circumstances from which the informer concluded that Spinelli was running a bookmarking operation." The only other facts supplied were that Spinelli was using two specified telephones and that these phones were being used in gambling operations. The Court classified the corroborating evidence as a "meager report [that] easily could have been obtained from an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar."

Holding
The informant's tip, an essential part of the affidavit in this case, was not sufficient (even as corroborated by other allegations) to provide the basis for a finding of probable cause that a crime was being committed.

The tip was inadequate under the standards of Aguilar, supra, since it did not set forth any reason to support the conclusion that the informant was "reliable" and did not sufficiently state the underlying circumstances from which the informant had concluded that petitioner was running a bookmaking operation or sufficiently detail his activities to enable the Commissioner to know that he was relying on more than casual rumor or general reputation.

Concurrence
Justice White, who remains a proponent of the Aguilar-Test even when it is ultimately abandoned in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, (1983), agrees with the majority opinion in Spinelli. In his concurring opinion, he states that "the unsupported assertion or belief of the officer does not satisfy the requirement of probable cause."

Dissent
Justice Black, Justice Fortas and Justice Stewart each filed a separate dissent. The most notable of which is Justice Black, who says "the magistrate, I think properly, held the information set forth sufficient facts to show "probable cause" that the defendant was violating the law...A majority of this Court ...substitute[s] their own opinion for that of the local magistrate and the circuit judges, and reject the en banc factual conclusion of the Eighth Circuit and reverse the judgment based upon that factual conclusion. I cannot join in any such disposition of an issue so vital to the administration of justice, and dissent as vigorously as I can." Black further laments that the decision is a departure from early decisions: "If the teachings of the Court's cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants . . . must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. . . Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area." Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-701 (1931). Ultimately, Black's reasoning leads to the ultimate abandoning of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Rvmazzol (talk) 06:23, 6 September 2013 (UTC) References: SPINELLI v. UNITED STATES, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)