User:Ryanjo/sandbox

Cornered in the southwest
The 17 of January of 1935, the news that the troops of Chiang Kai-shek went towards Zunyi forced the Communists to give by concluded the series of meetings and, on the following day,] left the city. Rejected the idea to be united to There am Long, who it found in the province of Hunan, with too many gentlemen of the war and nationalistic military units between averages, Mao it proposed the idea to advance directly towards the north. Zunyi was near the province of Sichuan, in where they could cross a river Yangzi to be united to the Fourth Red Army, the other great division of the communist Armed Forces that, according to the news that had arrived at Zunyi, was in the north of Sichuan. Nevertheless, the zone of Sichuan to the south of the Yangzi was strongly watched over units of the prepared army of the Republic for the fight against the Red Army. The Communists would try to advance towards the north, but they would suffer a military defeat in the battle of Tucheng.

After that misfortune, in a new meeting in the locality of Dahetan, the 7 of February, were decided to cancel the plan of Mao to advance towards in line straight north. The impossibility to undertake the passage towards the north took to the members of the Long March to move in circles during four months, being arrived cross a river Chishui (“red waters”) in four occasions, a series of goings and comings in search of a safe zone, between the provinces of Guizhou, Sichuan and end of Yunnan. During these months a set of meetings which it has been known like “meetings of Zhaxi”, by the name of the zone of Yunnan, border was celebrated with Sichuan, in which they were celebrated. The meeting already mentioned of Dahetan was one of those meetings of Zhaxi, that continued strengthening the new authority of Zhang Wentian and Mao, and in the course from which the decision was taken to try to establish a permanent base in the north of Guizhou, around Zunyi. After crossing the Chishui river for the second time, the 27 of February, the Red Army returned to occupy Zunyi, practically turned a ghost city due to the exodus of the population. The plans to establish a permanent base would be revealed there nonviable after a new military defeat, in the locality of Luban Chang, about 80 km to the west of Zunyi, the 15 of March.

That failure in the attempt of to make sure a safe territory caused a new abandonment of Zunyi towards the north in a movement that would take to the communist troops to cross the channel of the Chishui by third time. After a brief incursion in Sichuan, the expedition would return a to reorient the course towards the south, being crossed the Chishui by fourth and last time. It was during this period when it happened another excellent fact in the biography of Mao Zedong. Its wife There am Zizhen it had begun the Long embarrassed March of five months and would give to light to a girl in the month of February of 1935, after cross a river Chishui for the first time. Before the impossibility to take care of to the girl in a military expedition, this was given to a family farmer. As in the case of the son of Mao Zedong and There am Zizhen that had remained back in Ruijin, would never become that is to say nothing from this 6 girl [].

One of the great difficulties which they faced members of the Long March day after day was the food supplies, as well as the search of routes to continue the trip towards safe zones. In this persistence, the difficulties of communication with the local population was very great since most of the members of the expedition the local dialectos did not speak. In these zones between Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunnan, these difficulties were still greater since the Red Army was in zones populated by ethnic minorities like miao and yi, that spoke languages totally different from the Chinese, and that in addition saw with hostility a foreign army whose ideological fight did not include/understand. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, maximum leader of the KMT and strong man of the nationalistic regime of the Republic of China, moved to the Chinese southwest to direct in person combat operations against the Red Army. Yet, the decision to advance towards the west by these zones inhospitable and populated by minority ethnic groups would be in last instance the salvation of the Red Army and the great success strategist of Mao.

The own Chiang Kai-shek was had displaced to Guiyang, the provincial capital of Guizhou, to direct the combat operations against the Communists. Nationalistic troops comings from other parts of China, together with armies provincial controlled by local leaders they were prepared to face the Communists in case these advanced towards the north, as she were expected. One of tactical decisions of more success of the Red Army were their advance towards Guiyang. Although the Communists did not try to attack the city, the troop movement towards the south woke up the alarm in Chiang Kai-shek, that, before that unexpected displacement of the Red Army, ordered the shipment of troops to defend the provincial capital. The advance towards Guiyang turned out to be a pure one tactical movement of the Red Army, that caused nationalistic concentration of forces around that city, leaving expeditious the way towards the west. Entering itself in the suroccidental province of Yunnan, the Red Army was again forced to advance more and more towards the west, before the impossibility to go to the north by the most direct routes towards the enormous Chinese central province of Sichuan. One of the blows of effect of the Red Army in this phase of the march was the advance towards the provincial capital, Kunming, in a repetition of the similar operation that had made around Guiyang. The nationalistic troops, pawned on preventing the passage of the Communists to the north had settled down in the zone border between Yunnan and Sichuan, leaving unprotected Kunming, the great metropolis of the Chinese southwest. The communist advance towards Kunming caused an exodus of the population and forced one mobilization of the nationalistic troops to try to defend the city. Although an advance party under the command of Lin Biao it would get to watch Kunming the 29 of April of 1935, the Communists did not have intention to take the city and the movement of the nationalistic troops, under the command of the gentleman of the local war Long Yun, would again open a route towards the west, by which the expedition of the Long March would be entered still more in inhospitable territory.

This advance towards the west finally allowed the Red Army cross a river Jinsha (“gold sands”), name that the Yangzi in its initial part receives [7], and to enter Sichuan. The passage of the Jinsha in seven boats doing continuous trips between the two borders took to seven days and seven nights. Finally, the 9 of May, around 30,000 members of the Long March completed the passage of the river, and continued their advance towards the north, in search of the union with the group of Zhang Guotao. This roundup that supposed to avoid the direct passage towards the north made difficult the conditions of the march, by zones inhospitable and populated by nonChinese ethnic minorities with which members of the Long March as soon as they could communicate, but, in last instance, were the key of the final success of the march when avoiding the confrontation with the nationalistic troops. [to publish] Course to the north The trip towards the west had taken to the members of the Long March until zones barely populated and very moved away with the great urban centers controlled by the central Government.

After have cross a river Jinsha, the First Red Army it already caressed the possibility of being united to the Fourth Red Army, the much more numerous group of Zhang Guotao, that was in the north of Sichuan. In order to obtain the union of armies both, Mao Zedong and his men had to again continue the trip towards the north crossing the most western strip of Sichuan, crossing zones populated by ethnic minorities with which communication was difficult. The pass by territory yi raised many doubts to the leaders given to the brutal fame of this town of tradition single-breasted uniform jacket, that never had been subjugated by the Chinese have. Nevertheless, taking advantage of internal rivalries between yi, general Liu Bocheng managed to settle down an alliance with the caudillo yi Xiao Yedan. The “alliance of Yihai”, as knew by the locality in which was reached the agreement, it allowed the Red Army to reach the Dadu river, more to the north, in exchange for helping to the clan yi of kuchi in his local war against the clan of lohung [8].

The plan of Mao consisted of crossing the Dadu river in the locality of Anshunchang. Nevertheless, in this locality there were solely two boats with which cross a river, company that would have taken several weeks. In addition, Anshunchang was enough near the provincial capital Chengdu, from where Chiang Kai-shek could send its troops quickly. Given the danger to try to cross the Dadu in Anshunchang, an advance party of the Red Army was sent to the north, having followed the channel of the river, with the purpose of finding a way towards the bridge of Luding, leaves from the commercial route between Chengdu and the Tibet, that the only possibility offered of cross a river quickly. Once found the way, the Red Army moved until the bridge, where one would get rid of the most well-known battles, and perhaps mitificadas, of the Long March. Bridge of Luding, on the Dadu river, in the province of Sichuan, scene of one of the celebrated episodes more of the Long March. The shortage of direct testimonies on this phase of the Long March has taken to some historians to question veracity of some facts, between which it is indeed the battle of the Luding bridge, one of the most heroic episodes of periplo. The bridge been would have protected by troops nationalists strongly armed and the expedition of the Communist Party would have managed to cross the river thanks to the heroicidad of a reduced group of armed soldiers who crossed the bridge grenades in the middle of the enemy fire. These soldiers they would be able to reach the North border of the river and to clear the way so that their companions could happen through the bridge. The episode has been presented/displayed like a little while nails in course of the Long March and like a heroic act in which the Red Army would have won to troops much more prepared and better equipped in the nationalistic side. The fact that this episode single is known by the very later testimonies of leaders of the Communist Party who participated in the Long March raises, nevertheless, many questions on real circumstances in that the facts happened. Recently, some books have questioned the veracity of the traditional story. Chinese author Sun Shuyun, in her book on the Long March [9], gathers testimonies of villagers nonsurrounded in the political conflict, according to which the presence of nationalistic soldiers defending the bridge would have been minimum. Another recent book, the one of Jung Chang and Jon 10 Halliday [] goes even more far, when denying even that no type of confrontation armed around the river had taken place.

Of a way or another one, the certain thing is that the communist army was able cross a river Dadu, continuing its trip towards the north through the province of Sichuan, advancing by the western part of the province, of tibetana population. After a duro it advances by very steep mountainous zones in which Mao became ill of malaria, the troops arrived at the district of Mougong, at the moment Xiaojin, the 12 of June of 1935. In this place the encounter between main groups took place both of Red army. After a little while of doubt in that the soldiers of each group believed to be in front of nationalistic troops, unfolding of red flags with sickles and hammers untied the joy in both parts. Both groups of the Red Army were as opposed to in front. The longed for meeting of the First Red Army with the Fourth Red Army, commanded by Zhang Guotao, had been obtained.

Zhang Guotao and the Fourth Red Army
The satisfaction due to the union of both armies was seen, nevertheless, dimmed by the personal rivalry between Mao Zedong and Zhang Guotao. Both had already agreed in the University of Beijing [11] and, unlike other younger militants and leaders, they had participated in the original meeting of the Communist Party of China in Shanghai in 1921. After the encounter of both armies, both leaders met in the locality of Lianghekou 26 of June, seeing itself expensive face for the first time from 1923. Although Mao had become the strong man of the party, Zhang had of his side the military superiority. This he had been able to maintain a well equipped strong army and with more than 100,000 men, whereas the First Red Army had been decimated by the hardness of the Long March. Thus, at the moment of the encounter of both armies, Zhang Guotao appeared like El Salvador of the First Army and the leaders of the party. Zhang was in addition member to the Political Bureau of the party, and had its own ambitions of being able, that would hit those of the own Mao.

The meeting of Lianghekou did not give any positive result. Provisionally, both decided to both move the totality of armies until the district of Mao'ergai more to the north, still in the tibetana zone of Sichuan, where a decision would be taken on the advance of the march. Throughout June and July, the meetings followed one another in which the political and military situation was discussed. Although to content to Zhang Guotao the position of political commissioner of the Red Army was granted to him that until then had occupied Zhou Enlai, and the enter the Political Bureau of two of the men of confidence of Zhang, the desire of this replacing to Zhang Wentian as Secretary General of the party were itself frustrated before the refusal of Mao, conscious of the risk for its own position was accepted in case Zhang not purely acceded to a high political position and military man. Next to this rivalry between both leaders by their ambitions of being able, the strategic differences would accentuate the division between both. Whereas Mao wished to continue the trip towards the northeast to settle down a base to the east of the Amarillo River, Zhang preferred the advance towards the west to move away more of the troops nationalists and to approach the Soviet Union. After surpassing a series of mountains in the north of Sichuan, the unified group of both communist armies arrived at Mao'ergai.

There the advance remembered towards the north, but in two divided columns. On the one hand one most of was the First Red Army, with Mao and the leaders coming from Jiangxi, but under the command of Xu Xiangqian, man of confidence of Zhang Guotao. This way, the military command was clearly into the hands of Zhang Guotao, that it as well directed the second column with almost the totality of the Fourth Army plus the added one of two bodies of the First Army. While the group of Zhang Guotao advanced by a route towards the northwest, the one of Mao, ten times more reduced, advanced by one more a route to the east. The division more was motivated by the rejection of both leaders to travel together who by tactical requirements. The two columns maintained contact by telegraph, and discrepancies took to new mix-ups quickly that would be actually division from the Communist Party. Whereas Zhang Guotao considered that the control of the combat operation corresponded to him, Mao used his power in the political apparatus not to accept the orders of Zhang.

The 9 of September of 1935 the rupture took place. Before the dawn, the group of Mao, in that still they were the main leaders of the party, left to Xu Xiangqian and its men. Paying neglectful attention to the orders of this and Zhang Guotao, the group of Mao continued the trip towards the north in solitaire, breaking the cooperation with the Fourth Army. This he would be one of the moments of greater crisis during expedition, that was on the verge of causing a confrontation armed between the two factions of the party. Zhang Guotao felt betrayed, whereas Mao, in the later count of the facts, would accuse on the other hand Zhang to conspire to take control of the power in the party. The division turned the men of Mao, as soon as 8,000, in a species of fugitive group front to the majority group of Zhang Guotao. At this moment, Zhang Guotao seemed to have all the options to lead the Communist Party of China, whereas Mao it took to his men towards an uncertain destiny, crossing the depopulated zone more of all the Long March. This part of the north of Sichuan and the south of Gansu, of bogs and sterile earth, would be one of most difficult of the march. Nevertheless, the group of Zhang Guotao left worse unemployed due to the confrontations armed with the army of Ma Bufang and Ma Buqing, the Muslim gentlemen of the war whom they controlled Qinghai and parts of Gansu and Ningxia like a familiar feudo. Allies with the central Government to defend its interests common, the Ma mounted a ferocious attack against the Legion Western, a group of more than 20,000 men than had itself separated of the Fourth Army of Zhang Guotao to carry out the mission to advance towards the border with the Soviet Union in search of the material aid of the Government of Stalin. The mission was nevertheless a failure, and the confrontation armed between debilitated and famélica Western Legion and the local army of the Ma was settled with the death or captures almost of the totality of the 20,000 men of the Legion, in one of the episodes less known the Long March, and whose causes are still today reason for 12 controversy []. These so severe defeats suffered by the men of Zhang Guotao fragmented and reduced to the Fourth Army, whose survivors, still under the command of the own Zhang, would end up following the way of Mao towards the north, in search of the only safe place that they could find: sóviet of Shaanxi, the communist zone established by Liu Zhidan in the north of China.

Consequences
The Long March in secrecy supposed the most important landmark in the history of the Communist Party of China during its stage, and marked to the definitive ascent the power of Mao Zedong and the defeat of its political rivals. Of between these last ones, Bo Gu, leader of the party when the Long March began, it happened to background after the march, and would die in a flight accident in 1945. Wang Ming, the other leader of the twenty-eight Bolsheviks, he returned to China from the Soviet Union, also happening to background until, years later, he would finish his days exiliado in Moscow, from where he would please write articles in the Soviet communist model and against the ideas of Mao. Otto Braun, the only foreigner in the Red Army, remained in Shaanxi until 1939, when she was expelled from China and she returned to the Soviet Union; many years later he would write ferocious critics to Mao from the German Democratic Republic. As far as Zhang Guotao, the great rival of Mao in the final phase of the Long March, he ended up leaving the Communist Party and going to the KMT; in 1949, before the imminent communist victory in the Civil War, he would flee to Hong Kong, from where one would go away finally to Canada. He never returned to China, dying in the poverty in a residence of old in the city of Toronto in 1979. Only of the previous leaders of the Communist Party that would maintain a position of privilege was Zhou Enlai, that willingly accepted to be exceeded by Mao in the hierarchy of the party and years later, after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, would happen to be one of the more important Chinese leaders. Like Mao and Zhou, practically all the great leaders of the Communist Party in the following decades would be veteran of the Long March, such as Zhu Of, Lin Biao, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi or Deng Xiaoping, among others. Due to the great symbolism of the Long March in the history of the Communist Party of China and, very in special, the ascent of Mao to the power, this historical episode been always has surrounded by a certain controversy with respect to how much there is really and how much of legend in 18 the traditional narration []. Although there are numerous sources that confirm that the main facts happened as they have been described, many events are still open to different interpretations. One of the greater differences between the official version of the party and some critical studies published years in the last it is centered in if the thickness of the losses in the communist rows would be had due to deaths in it fights or, on the contrary, to desertions. A specially representative case of this debate is the one of the battle of the Xiang river, in which the number of members of the Red Army was reduced hardly from about 86,000 to 30.000. According to the version of the Communist Party of China, these losses would be had due to the death of more than 50,000 men in heroic, whereas some recent books like the one of Sun Shuyun [19], critic, and the one of Chang and 20 Halliday [], deeply hostile combat to the figure of Mao and to Chinese Comunism, considers that the number of deaths could not be so high, and that most of those losses they would have had to desertions. In spite of the success of the final regrouping in the north, the Communist Party was in a situation of extreme weakness at the end of the Long March, controlling solely a zone mountainous of little strategic relevance and very moved away of the great cities and Chinese industrial centers. The expression “Long March”, with its connotations of develops, would be coined by Mao in a speech shortly after the arrival to Shaanxi, but the extended perception more at that time saw the crease of the Red Army like a defeat. Nevertheless, the Japanese invasion in 1937 would ruin the plans of Chiang Kai-shek to end to be able bases communist. Before the invasion of an enemy outside, the nationalists of the Kuomintang would be forced to collaborate with the Communist Party in the resistance to invasion. This change in the situation would allow the Communists of Mao to strengthen its control in the northwest and, with the spirit of the Long always present March, to maintain the fight against Japanese army first and, after 1945, again against nationalists until the final victory in 1949 in the Chinese Civil War. The communist victory in the war had like consequence the proclamation of the new Popular Republic, and turned Mao Zedong, the triunfador of the Long March, in the new leader supreme of China