User:S.howse39/Two-level game theory

Two-level game theory is a political model, derived from game theory, that illustrates the domestic-international interactions between states. It was originally introduced in 1988 by Robert D. Putnam, in his publication "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games".

At the fourth G7 summit, at Bonn in 1978, Putnam observed that the attending countries agreed to adopt policies in contrast to what they might have in the absence of their international counterparts. However, the agreement was only viable due to strong domestic influence, in each international government, for implementing the agreement internationally. This resulted in international policy co-ordination as a result of the entanglement of international and domestic agendas.

Putnam's observations of international negotiations at the Bonn summit conference lead to his development of two-level games. It builds on the idea that the unitary-actor assumption is misleading in the context of international negotiations. Instead, suggesting that international negotiations are successful when there is overlap between the national interests of two countries. These interests are negotiated at the international level, but at the same time are influenced by the negotiations occurring between a country's international and domestic parties.